The opinion
J-S25022-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DAVID MICHAEL SHADLE
Appellant No. 1543 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order dated August 15, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Criminal Division at No: CP-65-CR-0001469-2006
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 29, 2015
Appellant David Michael Shadle pro se appeals from the August 15,
2014 order1 of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County (“PCRA
court”), which dismissed as untimely Appellant’s request for collateral relief
under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.
Upon review, we affirm.
A prior panel of this Court summarized the facts and procedural history
of this case as follows.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
We changed the caption to reflect that Appellant appealed the August 15,
2014 order of the PCRA court. Appellant also appealed the August 28, 2014
order of the PCRA court, which denied his pro se request to conduct PCRA
discovery by deposing Dr. Cyril Wecht. Given our conclusion below that the
PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s instant PCRA petition,
we need not address the discovery issue.
J-S25022-15
On March 16, 2007, Appellant was convicted by a jury of
first-degree murder and related charges for the death of his ex-
girlfriend. On June 11, 2007, Appellant was sentenced to life in
prison. Appellant’s judgment of sentence was affirmed by this
Court on October 27, 2008. See Commonwealth v. Shadle,
964 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super. 2008) (unpublished memorandum).
On October 7, 2009, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA
petition. Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was
filed on December 9, 2009, raising two claims: 1) whether trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of
prior bad acts and/or request a limiting instruction; and, 2)
whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court following
the October 27, 2008 memorandum. A hearing on the petition
was held on January 25, 2010. On June 8, 2010, the PCRA court
granted Appellant’s request to file a petition for allowance of
appeal to the Supreme Court nunc pro tunc, but denied
Appellant relief on his other issue. Appellant filed a petition for
allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc to the Supreme Court and a
notice of appeal to this Court from the PCRA order. This Court
quashed the appeal concluding that “[b]ecause the PCRA court
granted Appellant reinstatement of his right to file a petition for
allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc, the court’s consideration of
Appellant’s additional issue did not result in a disposition
Appellant could appeal.” Commonwealth v. Shadle, 1106
WDA 2010, unpublished memorandum, at 3 (Pa. Super. filed
March 8, 2011). Accordingly, this Court directed Appellant to
“raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by filing another
PCRA petition following the disposition of his petition for
allowance of appeal.” Id. Our Supreme Court denied the
petition for allowance of appeal on March 16, 2011.[2]
Commonwealth v. Shadle, 20 A.3d 487 (Pa. 2011).
On April 25, 2011, Appellant filed [another] PCRA petition
alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the introduction of prior bad acts and/or request a limiting
instruction, and also that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise the issue in Appellant’s initial direct appeal. The
PCRA court denied the petition on May 6, 2011[.]
____________________________________________
2
To the extent the PCRA court suggests Appellant’s judgment of sentence
became final on April 16, 2011, thirty days after March 16, 2011, we
disagree. Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on June 16, 2011,
ninety days following our Supreme Court’s denial of his petition and the
time for Appellant to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court had expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.
Sup. Ct. R. 13. Appellant had one year from June 16, 2011 to file his PCRA
petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
-2-
J-S25022-15
Commonwealth v. Shadle, No. 830 WDA 2011, unpublished memorandum
at 1-3 (Pa. Super. filed December 30, 2011). On appeal, the prior panel of
this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition. Id.
at 5. Appellant appealed the panel’s ruling to our Supreme Court, which
denied his petition for allowance of appeal on July 23, 2012.
Commonwealth v. Shadle, 49 A.3d 443 (Pa. 2012).
On September 20, 2012, Appellant pro se filed the instant PCRA
petition, alleging, inter alia, that the mathematical formula used by Dr. Cyril
Wecht conflicted with Newton’s Second Law of Motion. Recognizing that his
PCRA petition was untimely, Appellant raised the newly-discovered evidence
exception to the PCRA time-bar. In support, Appellant argued he did not
discover Dr. Wecht’s use of the incorrect mathematical formula until August
20, 2012, when a “jailhouse lawyer” reviewed the formula in question.
Appellant’s PCRA Petition, 9/24/12, at 4. Alternatively, Appellant also raised
the governmental interference exception, arguing “the Commonwealth
refused [Appellant] Notice of this ‘expert’ testimony (in physics) and left,
unchecked, the fraud, albeit unintentional or otherwise, committed upon the
court, and [Appellant].” Id. at 6. On the same day, the PCRA court
appointed James Robinson, Esquire, to represent Appellant. On January 7,
2014, Attorney Robinson filed a no-merit letter and an attendant motion to
withdraw as PCRA counsel. Following a hearing, the PCRA court granted
Attorney Robinson’s motion to withdraw on May 22, 2014.
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J-S25022-15
On August 15, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA
petition without a hearing, concluding it was facially untimely under the
PCRA and did not meet any timeliness exceptions. The PCRA court found
Appellant filed the PCRA petition on September 20, 2012, even though he
had one year from June 16, 2011 to file the petition. The PCRA court
addressed, inter alia, Appellant’s newly-discovered evidence exception
argument. In so doing, the PCRA court concluded Dr. Wecht’s testimony
was a matter of public record that cannot be said to be “unknown.”3 PCRA
Court Opinion, 8/15/14, at 10 (citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d
1245, 1248-49 (Pa. 2013)). The PCRA court noted:
Dr. Wecht’s testimony occurred in 2007 at the time of trial. The
trial transcript has been available since at least 2008, when his
case was before the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The laws of
physics and motion have been in existence for many, many
years prior to that. The fact that this “issue” was not discovered
and raised by [Appellant] or any of his previous counsel does not
mean that it could not have been discovered or raised. Both
facts are matters of public record and cannot be considered to
have been unknown.
PCRA Court Opinion, 8/15/14, at 10. Accordingly, the PCRA court
determined it lacked jurisdiction over Appellant’s PCRA petition because
Appellant failed to satisfy the newly-discovered evidence requirements of
____________________________________________
3
Testimony offered at a public sentencing hearing was a matter of public
record ascertainable in the exercise of due diligence. See Commonwealth
v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1255 (Pa. 2006).
-4-
J-S25022-15
Section 9545(b)(1)(ii).4 Appellant timely appealed to this Court. Following
Appellant’s filing of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of
on appeal, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on October 14,
2014, incorporating its August 15, 2014 opinion dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition.
On appeal,5 Appellant essentially repeats the same issues. After
careful review of the parties’ briefs, the record on appeal, and the relevant
case law, we conclude that the PCRA court’s August 15, 2014 opinion
authored by the Honorable Rita Donovan Hathaway, thoroughly and
adequately disposes of Appellant’s appeal. See PCRA Court Opinion,
8/15/14, at 8-13. We direct that a copy of the PCRA court’s August 15,
2014 opinion be attached to any future filings in this case.
Order affirmed.
____________________________________________
4
The PCRA court also rejected Appellant’s governmental inference exception
argument, concluding that Appellant “failed to establish how the government
interfered with and impeded his ability to raise the evidence of Dr. Wecht’s
misstatement of Newton’s Second Law of Motion under the PCRA in a timely
fashion.” PCRA Court Opinion, 8/15/14, at 12.
5
“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA
court’s determination ‘is supported by the record and free of legal error.’”
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (Pa. 2007)).
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J-S25022-15
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/29/2015
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WESTMORELAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA - CRIMINAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA )
)
vs. ) No. 1469 C 2006
)
DAVID M. SHADLE, )
Defendant. )
ORDEROF COURT
AND NOW, this~~ of August, 2014, upon consideration of the defendant's pro-
se Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief, after hearing Defendant's argument presented in
open court, the written pleadings filed by both the Defendant and the Commonwealth, and upon
consideration of the comprehensive No-Merit letter submitted by PCRA counsel, James E.
Robinson, Esq., (a copy of which has been attached to this Order) and after a thorough review of
the record in this case, it appears to this Court that there are no genuine issues of material fact, no
entitlement to relief and no purpose to be served in further proceedings.
PROCEDURALHISTORY
The defendant, David M. Shadle ("Shadle") was charged by Criminal Information filed
on April 26, 2006, at No. 1469 C 2006 in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County,
Pennsylvania with Murder of the First Degree ( 18 Pa.C.S. 2502(a)), Criminal Homicide (18
Pa.C.S. §2501 (a)), Theft by Unlawful Taking (18 Pa.C.S. §3921 (a)), Receiving Stolen Property
(18 Pa.C.S. §392S(a)) and Access Fraud Device (18 Pa.C.S. §4106 (a)(l)(ii)).
At the trial held before Judge Richard E. McC0tmick, Jr., Shadle was represented by
attorneys Chris Haidze and Gregory Cecchetti. He was convicted by the jury on March 16,
2007 at all counts. Shadle was sentenced on June 11, 2007 to the mandatory sentence of life
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imprisonment. Because he expressed a desire to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
against his trial attorneys, Judge McCormick agreed to appoint new counsel to represent the
defendant. (ST 21-25).1 Attorney Jeffrey Monzo, Esq. was appointed to represent Shadle the
following day.
Shadle, through his new attorney, filed post-sentence motions for a new trial on June 21,
2007. Therein, Shadle claimed that he was entitled to a new trial because the verdict was
contrary to the weight of the evidence, and claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective for
failing to call forensic psychiatrist Dr. Donald P. Breneman as a witness for the defense
regarding a report that he had authored as to intoxication/diminished capacity as a defense, and
for failing to develop the defense of heat of passion as to First Degree Murder. A hearing was
held before Judge McCormick on October 17, 2007, at which time Attorney Cecchetti and
Attorney Haidze testified. Shadle's Motion for a New Trial was denied by Judge McCormick on
November 7, 2007.
Shadle thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal to the Superior Court, raising the issue of
counsels' ineffectiveness for failing to call Dr. Breneman. His conviction and judgment of
sentence were affirmed by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania by memorandum Order issued on
October 27, 2008. No subsequent Petition for Allowance of Appeal was filed.
Shadle filed a pro-se PCRA petition on October 7, 2009 raising claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel as follows:
l. Failed to put a professional witness on the stand.
2. Did not have murder trial experience.
3. Didn't bring out "information" on cross-examination of Commonwealth's
witnesses (unspecified issue).
4. Misguided him not to take the stand.
5. Failed to prepare character witnesses.
I
Numerals in parenthesis preceded by the letters "ST" refer to specific pages of the transcript of the sentencing held
in this matter on June 11, 2007 before Judge Riachrd E. McCormick, Jr., and made a part of the record in this case.
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6. Failed to "use the defense I told them to use."
He also raised the following claims of ineffective assistance of post-sentence/appellate counsel
Jeffrey Monzo, Esq.:
1. Failed to file direct appeal; instead, elected to file a PSM alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel.
2. Only used one issue to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
3. Failed to communicate with defendant during appeal.
4. Failed to appeal Superior Court decision to Supreme Court.
5. Failed to give defendant copies of transcripts.
6. Failed to show "provocation" in appeals.
Judge McCormick appointed Jeffrey Miller, Esq., to represent the defendant in his first
PCRA proceeding.i After reviewing the case, Attorney Miller filed an Amended PCRA Petition
on December 9, 2009. Therein, the defendant raised two issues: whether trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of prior bad acts evidence and for failing to
request a limiting instruction regarding that evidence; and, whether post-sentence/appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court following the Superior Court's October 27, 2008 Memorandum Order.
Following a hearing, this court granted in part and denied in part Shadle's first PCRA petition,
granting Shadle's right to file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Supreme Court, but
denying his claim to post-collateral relief on the issue of trial counsel's failure to object to the
introduction of prior bad acts evidence and failure to request a limiting instruction regarding that
evidence.3
2
The case was reassigned to the undersigned on November 25, 2009.
3
Based upon the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the court was unable to find that Jeffrey Monzo,
Esq. was ineffective for failing to file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tune in this matter. However,
given the severity of the crimes for which the defendant was convicted and the mandatory life sentence which was
imposed in this case, in the interests of justice, the court granted the defendant's requested relief and permitted him
to file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Nuno Pro Tune, appealing the
decision of the Superior Court filed on October 27, 2008.
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Shadle appealed the June 8, 2010 Order of Court denying his requested relief to the
Superior Court, and simultaneously filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. The Superior Court quashed his appeal, noting that they had no
jurisdiction to reach a conclusion on the merits of the issue raised by Shadle regarding trial
counsel's ineffectiveness as his right to seek review in the Supreme Court had been granted. The
Superior Court specifically noted that "Appellant may raise claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel by filing another PCRA Petition following the disposition of his petition for allowance
of appeal." His Petition for Allowance of Appeal was denied by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania on March 16, 2011, and his judgment of sentence became final thirty days
thereafter.
Shadle, through attorney Miller, filed a second PCRA Petition on April 25, 2011, raising
those same allegations of the ineffective assistance of counsel as he had previously raised. This
PCRA, which was treated by the court as a first PCRA given the procedural history of the case,
was denied by Order of Court dated May 6, 2011. Shadle appealed the denial of his PCRA
Petition, and the Superior Court affirmed this court's denial of his request for relief under the
PCRA on December 12, 2011. His subsequent Petition for Allowance of Appeal was denied by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on July 23, 2012.
Shadle filed a pro-se PCRA Petition on or about September 30, 2012. Even though this
was a second or subsequent PCRA Petition, Attorney James Robinson was appointed to
represent him. After receiving numerous extensions of time within which to file an Amended
PCRA Petition or a No-Merit letter, Attorney Robinson filed a comprehensive No-Merit letter on
November 7, 2014. A hearing was held following Shadle's submission of s pro-se "Objection to
the No-Merit Letter filed by Attorney Robinson.
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FACTUAL HISTORY
The facts presented at trial established the following:
David M. Shadle was involved in a romantic relationship with Jessica Aaron, a 19 year-
old sophomore at Indiana University of Pennsylvania from approximately September 2005
through January 2006. The initially loving relationship eventually deteriorated into what was
described by Jessica's roommate, Nicole Hofrichter, as "more fighting, more intensity in
fighting, a lot of yelling, screaming." (TT 80-81 ). 4 Hofrichter testified that Jessica had left their
dorm room on the morning of January 24, 2006 to pick up David Shadle. When Jessica returned
at approximately 5:30 p.m., she was hysterical, and took Hofrichter to see her car windshield,
which had been smashed. (TT 83-84). Hofrichter never saw Shadle with Jessica again. (TI 85).
Trooper Douglas Snyder testified that he was dispatched to the Advance Auto Supply in
Indiana, Pa., for a report of a boyfriend/girlfriend dispute and a broken windshield. (TT 287-288)
He testified that he observed Shadle in Jessica's car, spoke with him, and that he admitted to
breaking the windshield. (TT 289-291 ). He transported Shadle to the State Police Barracks in
Indiana and issued him a non-traffic citation for the damage to the windshield. Shadle pled
guilty to that citation and paid a fine on February 7, 2006. (TT 291-297).
Nicole Hofrichter testified that she knew that Shadle called Jessica repeatedly on her cell
phone after the January 24, 2006 incident. She testified that Jessica would sometimes answer the
phone, sometimes she would hang up, and eventually, she ignored Shadle's calls. (TI 85-88).
Hofrichter indicated that the last time she saw Jessica Aaron was about 6:30 p.m. on February
27, 2006. (TT 89).
4
Numerals in parenthesis preceded by the letters "TT" refer to specific pages of the transcript of the trial in this
mater, held before Judge Richard E. McConnick, Jr., and made a part of the record herein.
5
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Shadle resided at the time with his uncle, George Cline, in Slickville, Westmoreland
County, Pennsylvania. (IT 98-99). Cline testified that he was familiar with Jessica Aaron, knew
what type of car she drove, and knew that she was Shadle's girlfriend. (TT 102-103). Cline
stated that Shadle and Jessica came into his Slickville house around 6:00 p.m., spent some time
there, and then left for dinner. (IT 104-105). He testified that he was watching television when
they returned around 10:30 p.m. and went straight to Shadle's room. Cline heard the two
arguing in Shadle's room, so he turned up the volume on the television and eventually fell
asleep. (TT 108-109).
Cline saw Shadle emerge from his room at about 1 :00 p.m. He told Cline that he would
return in an hour, and then drove away in Jessica's car. He never again returned to the residence.
5
(TT 115-116). Cline testified that as he sat down to eat dinner, he recalled that Jessica had not
left with Shadle, so he thought to wake her up and see if she wanted something to eat. When
Jessica did not answer his knocks on the door, Cline unlocked the door and discovered Jessica's
body lying on the floor of Shadle's bedroom. (TT 117-119). He recalled that she had a sleeping
bag over her body, and that her head was covered with a plastic grocery bag. Cline and his
girlfriend immediately called 9-1-1. He believed that it was approximately 4:30 p.m. when he
discovered Jessica's body. (TT 119-121).
Members of the Pennsylvania State Police arrived at the Cline residence in response to
the 9-1-1 call. Trooper Stepinski testified that he processed and photographed the scene on
February 28, 2006. He testified that his examination of Jessica's body showed that the bag
which covered her head was actually tied tightly, "pulled tight and tied to a knot on the left
cheek ... it was tight around her neck." (TT 191). The bag was filled with blood, and Jessica's
.s There was additional evidence that established that Shadle had used Jessica's S&T bank card in Delmont,
Westmoreland County on Febrnary 28, 2006 at approximately 7:55 p.m, as captured through ATM camera
surveillance. He withdrew $300.00 in cash from Jessica's account. (TI 4 78-486).
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face and head showed signs of trauma, including lacerations and bruising. (TI 192-193). An
autopsy was performed by Dr. Cyril Wecht, who opined that although Jessica had sustained
injuries to her head which resulted in a fracture of her skull and swelling in her brain, the cause
of her death was asphyxiation due to manual strangulation and smothering. (TT 399-400, 404).
Shadle was arrested by Pennsylvania State Police officers on March 1, 2006. Following
his arrest, Shadle made numerous verbal and written statements regarding the death of Jessica
Aaron. All of Shadle's statements consistently related that he and Jessica had had an argument
on the evening of February 27th. He stated that Jessica became enraged and came after him and
started to claw and scratch at him. He stated that Jessica jumped at him, but that he moved out of
the way and Jessica hit her head on a piece of fumiture.6 She started to bleed and was
unresponsive. Shadle then reported that he shook her to wake her up, but she was not breathing.
He stated that he placed the plastic bag under her head to catch the blood, and, eventually, he left
the residence. (TT129-130, 307-309, 334-335, 346-348, 351-353). Joseph Lee Cline, Jr.,
Shadle's cousin, testified that Shadle had called him on February 281h and told him that he was
going to stop at his house at about 1 :30 p.m. Indeed, Shadle arrived as he said he would, driving
Jessica's car. The two watched television and played video games until they went out to get beer
and cigarettes. Joseph Lee Cline Jr., testified that Shadle told him that Jessica had jumped off
the bed at him and hit her head, and she went limp. He told him that Jessica was hurt. When he
was told to call the police for help, he stated that he was scared and, eventually, asked for Cline
Jr. 's help to "get rid of" Jessica's car and her body. (TT 161-175).
6
To Tpr. Danny Moy, he stated that Jessica hit her head on an end table. (TI 309). To Cpl. Kenny Karas, he stated
that it was the dresser. (IT 334). In a letter written to his uncle George Cline, it was the TV stand. (TT 129).
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DISCUSSION:
Shadle's present Petition for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act
(42 Pa.C.S. §9541, et. seq.) is his third such petition, his second since his judgment of sentence
became final. Any petition filed under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, including second and
subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of the date that the judgment of sentence
becomes final. 42 Pa.CS. §9545(b)(2). To be eligible for post-conviction relief, a PCRA
petition, including second and subsequent Petitions, must be filed within one year from the date
that the judgment became final. 42 Pa.CS §9545(b)(l); Pa.RiCrim.P. Rule 901. "A judgment
becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review." Commonwealth v. Breaklron, 566 Pa. 323, 329, 781 A.2d 94, 97 (2001) (citing 42
Pa.C.S. §9545(b)(3)). Shadle's judgment of sentence became final on March 16, 201 L The first
PCRA Petition, filed on April 25, 2011, was therefore timely. The instant PCRA Petition, filed
on September 20, 2012, is clearly untimely; therefore, unless an exception applies, Shadle is not
eligible for relief Indeed, unless such an exception applies, this court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain Shadle's untimely-filed second PCRA petition.
Certain exceptions set forth in the Post-Conviction Relief Act can act to excuse the
untimely filing of a PCRA petition:
( 1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent
petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes
final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim
in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the
petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by
the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has
been held by that court to apply retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) shall be
filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.
42 Pa.CS.A. §9545(b).
"It is imperative to note that the timeliness requirements of the PCRA are jurisdictional
in nature. Statutory time restrictions may not be altered or disregarded to reach the merits of the
claims raised in the petition." Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d l I 96, 1199 (Pa.Super.2009)
(internal citations omitted). See also, Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 742 (Pa.Super.
2008).
Further,
Title 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(I) requires that any PCRA petition,
including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of
the date that the petitioner's judgment of sentence becomes final, unless a
petitioner pleads or proves that one of the exceptions to the timeliness
requirement enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 954S(b)(l)(i)-(iii) is applicable.
The timeliness requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional; therefore, no
court may disregard, alter, or create equitable exceptions to the timeliness
requirement in order to reach the substance of a petitioner's arguments.
See Commonwealth v. Davis, 916 A.2d 1206 (Pa.Super.2007).
Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 784-785 (Pa.Super. 2008). Although this second
PCRA Petition is untimely filed, Shadle argues that the newly discovered evidence exception
excuses the untimely filing. 42 Pa.CS.A. §9545(b)(J)(ii).
In support of this theory, Shadle suggests that Dr. Cyril Wecht's testimony at trial, which
referenced Newton's Second Law of Motion, discredited Shadle's account of the events that
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transpired in the Cline household that led to the death of Jessica Aaron. Shadle contends that Dr.
Wecht misstated Newton's Second Law of Motion, and that this incorrect recitation of Newton's
formula caused the jury to disbelieve his explanation of these events. Absent this testimony, he
believes, the jury would not have convicted him of first degree murder.
Assuming, arguendo, that Dr. Wecht did misstate the formula that is Newton's Second
Law of Motion, it is clear that the newly discovered evidence exception to the timeliness
requirements of the PCRA does not apply here. In order to qualify for the exception set forth in
42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b)(l)(ii),
to constitute facts which were unknown to a petitioner and could not have
been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, the information must not
be of public record and must not be facts that were previously known but
are now presented through a newly discovered source.
Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 619 Pa. 549, 570-571, 65 A.3d 339, 352 (Pa. 2013). It is
abundantly clear that Shadle's claim cannot meet this requirement. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has repeatedly found that matters of public record cannot be said to be "unknown." See
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245 (Pa.2013); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 51 A.3d 195, 196
(Pa.2012) ( per curiam ); Commonwealth v. Chester, 586 Pa. 468, 895 A.2d 520, 523 (2006);
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 582 Pa. 276, 870 A.2d 864 (2005). Commonwealth v. Whitney, 572
Pa. 468, 817 A.2d 473, 476 (2003); Commonwealth v. Lark, 560 Pa. 487, 746 A.2d 585, 588 n.
4 (2000). Dr. Wecht's testimony occurred in 2007 at the time of trial. The trial transcript has
been available since at least 2008, when his case was before the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
The laws of physics and motion have been in existence for many, many years prior to that. The
fact that this "issue" was not discovered and raised by Shadle or any of his previous counsel does
not mean that it could not have been discovered or raised. Both facts are matters of public record
and cannot be considered to have been unknown. Therefore, Shadle cannot meet the
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requirements of the time-bar exception found in 42 Pa.C.S .A. §9545(b )(1 )(ii), and this court does
not have jurisdiction to entertain his petition for Post-Conviction Relief.'
In the alternative, Shadle suggests that his untimely filing of the PCRA should be
excused based upon governmental interference exception to the timeliness requirement set forth
in 42 Pa.C. S.A. §9545(b )(1 )(i). This is so because, he contends, "the Commonwealth refused
defendant Notice of this 'expert' testimony (in physics) and left, unchecked, the fraud, albeit
unintentional or otherwise, committed upon the court, and defendant." However, Shadle's
argument in the regard fails as well. As stated previously, any claims under the PCRA must be
raised within one year of the date that the judgment of sentence became final, or by April 15,
2012. The governmental interference that is contemplated is not alleged prosecutorial
7
Even if Shadle could overcome the jurisdictional hurdle in this matter, his claim for relief based upon "newly-
discovered evidence" is meritless.
[The PCRA petitioner] must demonstrate that the evidence: (I) could not have been
obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is
no! merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the
credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial
were granted.
Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1218 (Pa.Super.,2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Pagan, 597 Pa. 69, 950
A.2d 270, 292 (2008), cert. denied, Pagan v. Pennsylvania, 555 U.S. 1198, 129 s.o. 1378, 173 L.Ed.2d 633
(2009); accord Commonwealth v. Castro, 55 A.3d 1242, 1246 (Pa.Super.2012) (en bane), appeal granted, 65 A.3d
291 (Pa.2013)).
Dr. Wecht testified that the cause of death in this case was asphyxiation due to manual strangulation and
smothering. (TT 399-400, 404). While it is true that he noted that Jessica Aaron had sustained injuries to her head
which resulted in a fracture of her skull and swelling in her brain, these injuries were not the cause of death. The
statement or misstatement of Newton's Second Law of Motion was in no way determinative of his expert opinion as
to cause of death. Had Shadle pointed out an error in his recitation of the Law of Motion, it would have served only
to impeach Dr. Wecht's credibility at trial, and would not have resulted in a different verdict given the volume of
evidence against Shadle.
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... ; ·,·.~~.:-.,·· .
Circulated 06/16/2015 11:27 AM
misconducfattrial.
:-;.,·:
::··,· ·:·
Rather, in order to establish the requirements under the exception set forth in
.. :. ,·;}::, ...
42 Pa.ds.A.:§9545(b)Cl)(i),
.: . :'. :\·.i<.~:.· .. . : > ·.
, , ;:\.th~:jJetitioner must plead and prove that the failure to previously raise
. ; :,'·'::> thesf
claims was the result of interference by government officials, and
,\:v::tlia{the'.information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise
• _}if:';Sf\i~~diligence. ·
Co#,~:ljw~JjJkv. Hawkins, 598 Pa. 85, 93, 953 A.2d 1248, 1253 (2006). Shadle has failed to
-.;: /3iWiI'?\]-;\:::, . :. _
estabH~K}fow:the\iovernrnent interfered with and impeded his ability to raise the evidence of Dr.
-: . :· :/:''.·>\\/:\:/:'.:.(i.\·:.;· ·./·:·,:
Wecht;·i&ffiissf~iefuent of Newton's Second Law of Motion under the PCRA in a timely fashion.
- · - ;,'., ::'!},cj:/:);:',;::~:'.{ -
Furthef;')pjsj@tili:has previously determined that this fact, alleged as "newly-discovered" by
. .•.·-, - -::.·;.·._:<.:-: ='.x . .-w. ,~>:~-/;.:.-irt .,:< ·.· .
Sha41~,\iit!bi£i0~~ht;eJhat could not have been discovered by him or any of his prior counsel
-_- • l\S?E{:&'.ii:-J:~tiifl() ::' .-
witlrlii:ili&Ji '.!,,;,:tH.Af Ba~ allowable under the PCRA. 8
' -.:, : ::f{(ft . . Ji{f':(, ·- .
:·,: sh:aa1e::$jfiict:si.iggests that he is entitled to review of his post-conviction claims due to an
· ,::;1/\:?:Itt(:11:tfJs:?ffii\f?X> _ .- . ,
alleged;,gµ''''"' 'JV/'J•\'i'·:yered" conflict of interest on the part of Jeffery Monzo, Esq. Shadle
._: :,<· \\\···it:( :._:i/:.: /· ·:·> . ·.·..
, coriJ~~i}}W-;,~ :',fn~(to post-conviction relief because Attorney Monzo was employed by
tiit{law firm that also represented the W estrnoreland County Prison. In
{,-/~-...: . I
',-Jlie
'.<:·,<:,: . .>:
Commonwealth's
.
Brief in Opposition to PCRA Petition, Shadle
; ,tlf:-llowever,- for the same reasons set forth previously, Belden Law's
·i,1f
1;:t~preland County Prison was a matter of public record and certainly
gh an exercise of due.diligence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
,:i\¥.Q.!})(counsel' s representation of third party in unrelated matters was
~HfZ~\-k:?-~<.-,~. _ . . -
, , , ';;Bl~
·· · •. c.7'.',·, .· v
With the clerk of court, and readily available; therefore, the
•
-:::,~)iis post-sentence motion, in his direct appeal, or in either of his two
!f?f;error has been waived. A defendant is not eligible for post-conviction
'gor has been previously raised and litigated or has been waived. 42 Pa. C.S.
/'.if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial,
J)?:or
:.,.-.- . . ·.
state postconviction proceeding.': 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b).
12
Circulated 06/16/2015 11:27 AM
evidence presented would not meet the requirement the information be unknown at the time the
petition was filed). Therefore, even had Shadle not withdrawn this issue, this court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain the merits of this claim.
Finally, Shadle contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he was not
afforded credit for time served on his sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
He alleges that the failure of the court to grant credit for time served renders the sentence illegal.
The PCRA provides the sole means for obtaining collateral review of a
judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 591
(Pa.Super.2007), appeal denied, 596 Pa. 715, 944 A.2d 756 (2008); 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. "[A] court may entertain a challenge to the legality of
the sentence so long as the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim. In the
PCRA context, jurisdiction is tied to the filing of a timely PCRA petition."
Id. at 592 (quoting Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 A.2d 479, 482
(Pa.Super.2005) ( en bane ), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 688, 917 A.2d 844
(2007)). "Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within
the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA's time limits or one of
the exceptions thereto." Fowler, supra. Pennsylvania law makes clear no
court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth
v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837 A.2d 1157 (2003). Thus, a collateral claim
regarding the legality of a sentence can be lost for failure to raise it in a
timely manner under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Wojtaszek, 951 A.2d
1169, 1173 n. 9 (Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 733, 963 A.2d
470 (2009).
Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 365 (Pa.Super. 2013). Shadle does not set forth any
reason why he could not have raised this issue within one year of the date that the judgment of
sentence became final. For this reason, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the merits of
this claim.
NOW THEREFORE, having determined that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the
merits of Shadle's claims based upon the untimely filing of the instant PCRA Petition, the
following Order shall enter:
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WESTMORELAND COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA - CRIMINAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA )
)
vs. ) No. 1469 C 2006
)
DAVID M. SHADLE, )
Defendant. )
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this /...Jday of August, 2014, for the reasons set forth in the preceding
Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
I. For the reasons set forth in the foregoing Opinion, the defendant's pro-se Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, (42 Pa.C.S. §9541,
et. seq.) is hereby DISMISSED.
2. This court has determined that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the
defendant's pro-se PCRA petition, and therefore no further purpose would be served by
affording the Defendant an evidentiary hearing. Further, having reviewed the comprehensive
No-Merit Letter submitted by former PCRA Counsel James E. Robinson, Esq., and having
previously determined that PCRA counsel satisfied the requirements of Commonwealth v.
Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 330 Pa.Super. 313,
479 A.2d 568 (1984) and having granted counsel's request to withdraw as PCRA counsel for the
defendant, and having considered defendant's requests to afford him the time to hire private
counsel, his request for court-appointed counsel is DENIED.
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3. THE DEFENDANT IS NOTIFIED THAT ANY APPEAL TO THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM THIS COURT'S DISMISSAL OF HIS
SECOND PRO-SE PCRA PETITION MUST BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAVS
FROM THE DATE OF THIS ORDER OF COURT.
4. The defendant is further advised that based upon this court's determination that
former PCRA counsel satisfied the Turner/Finley requirements, he is not entitled to the
assistance of court-appointed counsel should he elect to appeal this court's decision to dismiss
his PCRA Petition and to permit PCRA counsel to withdraw. The defendant is free to proceed
on appeal pro-se or with private counsel of his choice. Commonwealth v. Turner, supra;
Commonwealth v. Maple, 385 Pa.Super. 314, 559 A.2d 953 (1989). Should he desire to pursue
an appeal pro-se, he should also file the required Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis with this
C0\111.
BY THE COURT:
····-····~-~ .... -~-----
ATTEST:
Clerk of Courts
cc: File
John W. Peck, Esq., District Attorney of Westmoreland County
James E. Robinson, Esq., former PCRA Counsel for Defendant
Pamela Neiderheiser, Esq., Court Administrator's Office·
James M. Shadle, Defendant (#HC-8564)- . '
SCI Graterford, P.O. Box. 244, Gratcrford, PA 19426-0244
15