Opinion

Richard Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC

  • 792 F.3d 1339
  • 2015 WL 3687459
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Jun 16, 2015
Status
Published
On the bench
Newman, Moore, Linn, Reyna
Cited by
361 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.6%

explaining that the “essential inquiry is not merely the presence or absence of the word ‘means,’ but whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that the “essential inquiry is not merely the presence or absence of the word ‘means,’ but whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure”
  • holding that it was improper to import limitations from the specification, which disclosed examples and embodiments that were so limited, because “nowhere [did] the specification limit the graphical display to those examples or embodiments.”
  • stating that means-plus-function does not apply if “the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.”
  • stating that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply when “the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

RICHARD A. WILLIAMSON, Trustee for At Home

Bondholders Liquidating Trust,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

CITRIX ONLINE, LLC, CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC.,

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

WEBEX COMMUNICATIONS, INC., CISCO WEBEX,

LLC, CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES

CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2013-1130

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of California in No. 11-CV-2409, Judge A.

Howard Matz.

______________________

Decided: June 16, 2015

______________________

2 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

BRETT JOHNSTON WILLIAMSON, O’Melveny & Myers

LLP, Newport Beach, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant.

Also represented by TIM D. BYRON; WILLIAM C. NORVELL,

JR., SCOTT DION MARRS, BRIAN T. BAGLEY, Beirne

Maynard & Parsons, LLP, Houston, TX.

KURT LOUIS GLITZENSTEIN, Fish & Richardson P.C.,

Boston, MA, argued for all defendants-appellees. Citrix

Online, LLC, Citrix Systems, Inc., Microsoft Corporation,

Adobe Systems, Inc., also represented by FRANK

SCHERKENBACH; INDRANIL MUKERJI, Washington, DC;

JONATHAN J. LAMBERSON, Redwood City, CA. Defendant-

appellee Microsoft Corporation also represented by

ISABELLA FU, Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA.

DOUGLAS M. KUBEHL, Baker Botts LLP, Dallas, TX,

for defendants-appellees Webex Communications, Inc.,

Cisco Webex, LLC, Cisco Systems, Inc. Also represented

by SAMARA KLINE, BRIAN DOUGLAS JOHNSTON.

MARK J. ABATE, Goodwin Procter LLP, New York, NY,

for defendant-appellee International Business Machines

Corporation. Also represented by CALVIN E. WINGFIELD,

JR.; WILLIAM F. SHEEHAN, Washington, DC.

______________________

Before MOORE, LINN, and REYNA, Circuit Judges. 1

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge LINN.

Opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and with

additional views filed by Circuit Judge REYNA.

1 The earlier opinion in this case, reported at 770

F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014), is withdrawn, and this opinion

substituted therefore. Part II.C.1. of this opinion has

been considered and decided by the court en banc. See

Order in this case issued this date.

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 3

PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE, LINN, DYK, MOORE,

O’MALLEY, REYNA, WALLACH, TARANTO, CHEN, and

HUGHES, Circuit Judges, have joined Part II.C.1. of this

opinion.

Opinion dissenting from Part II.C.1. filed by Circuit

Judge NEWMAN.

LINN, Circuit Judge.

Richard A. Williamson (“Williamson”), as trustee for

the At Home Corporation Bondholders’ Liquidating Trust,

owns U.S. Patent No. 6,155,840 (the “’840 patent”) and

appeals from the stipulated final judgment in favor of

defendants Citrix Online, LLC; Citrix Systems, Inc.;

Microsoft Corporation; Adobe Systems, Inc.; Webex Com-

munications, Inc.; Cisco Webex, LLC; Cisco Systems, Inc.;

and International Business Machines Corporation (collec-

tively, “Appellees”). Because the district court erroneous-

ly construed the limitations “graphical display

representative of a classroom” and “first graphical display

comprising . . . a classroom region,” we vacate the judg-

ment of non-infringement of claims 1–7 and 17–24 of

the ’840 patent. Because the district court correctly

construed the limitation “distributed learning control

module,” we affirm the judgment of invalidity of claims 8–

12 of the ’840 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 112 2, para. 2.

Accordingly, we remand.

2 35 U.S.C. § 112 was amended and subsections

were renamed by the America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.

112-29 (“AIA”), which took effect on September 16, 2012.

Because the application resulting in the ’840 patent was

filed before that date, this opinion refers to the pre-AIA

version of § 112.

4 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

I. BACKGROUND

A. The ’840 Patent

The ’840 patent describes methods and systems for

“distributed learning” that utilize industry standard

computer hardware and software linked by a network to

provide a classroom or auditorium-like metaphor—i.e., a

“virtual classroom” environment. The objective is to

connect one or more presenters with geographically

remote audience members. ’840 patent col.2 ll.10–14.

The disclosed inventions purport to provide “the benefits

of classroom interaction without the detrimental effects of

complicated hardware or software, or the costs and incon-

venience of convening in a separate place.” Id. at col.2

ll.4–7.

There are three main components of the “distributed

learning” system set forth in the ’840 patent: (1) a pre-

senter computer, (2) audience member computers, and (3)

a distributed learning server. The distributed learning

server implements a “virtual classroom” over a computer

network, such as the Internet, to facilitate communication

and interaction among the presenter and audience mem-

bers. The presenter computer is used by the presenter to

communicate with the audience members and control

information that appears on the audience member’s

computer screen. Id. at col.4 l.66–col.5 l.2. An audience

member’s computer is used to display the presentation

and can be used to communicate with the presenter and

other audience members. Id. at col.5 ll.11–14.

The ’840 patent includes the following three inde-

pendent claims, with disputed terms highlighted:

1. A method of conducting distributed learning

among a plurality of computer systems coupled to

a network, the method comprising the steps of:

providing instructions to a first computer sys-

tem coupled to the network for:

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 5

creating a graphical display representative

of a classroom;

creating a graphical display illustrating

controls for selecting first and second data

streams;

creating a first window for displaying the

first selected data stream; and

creating a second window for displaying

the second selected data stream, wherein

the first and second windows are dis-

played simultaneously; and

providing instructions to a second computer

system coupled to the network for:

creating a graphical display representative

of the classroom;

creating a third window for displaying the

first selected data stream; and

creating a fourth window for displaying

the second selected data stream, wherein

the third and fourth windows are dis-

played simultaneously.

8. A system for conducting distributed learning

among a plurality of computer systems coupled to

a network, the system comprising:

a presenter computer system of the plurality

of computer systems coupled to the network and

comprising:

a content selection control for defining at

least one remote streaming data source and

for selecting one of the remote streaming data

sources for viewing; and

6 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

a presenter streaming data viewer for dis-

playing data produced by the selected remote

streaming data source;

an audience member computer system of the

plurality of computer systems and coupled to the

presenter computer system via the network, the

audience member computer system comprising:

an audience member streaming data

viewer for displaying the data produced by the

selected remote streaming data source; and

a distributed learning server remote from the

presenter and audience member computer sys-

tems of the plurality of computer systems and

coupled to the presenter computer system and the

audience member computer system via the net-

work and comprising:

a streaming data module for providing the

streaming data from the remote streaming da-

ta source selected with the content selection

control to the presenter and audience member

computer systems; and

a distributed learning control module for

receiving communications transmitted be-

tween the presenter and the audience member

computer systems and for relaying the com-

munications to an intended receiving comput-

er system and for coordinating the operation

of the streaming data module.

17. A distributed learning server for controlling a

presenter computer system and an audience

member computer system coupled to the distrib-

uted learning server via a network, the distribut-

ed learning server comprising:

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 7

a module for providing a first graphical dis-

play on the presenter computer system, the first

graphical display comprising:

a first presenter content selection control

for selecting a first source of streaming con-

tent representative of graphical information;

a first presenter content display region for

displaying the graphical information repre-

sented by the streaming content from the first

selected source;

a second presenter content selection con-

trol for selecting a second source of streaming

content representative of graphical infor-

mation; and

a second presenter content display region

for displaying the graphical information rep-

resented by the streaming content from the

second selected source, wherein the first and

second presenter content display regions are

adapted to display simultaneously; and

a classroom region for representing the

audience member computer system coupled to

the distributed learning server; and

a module for providing a second graphical dis-

play on the audience member computer system,

the second graphical display comprising:

a first audience member content display

region for displaying the graphical infor-

mation represented by the streaming content

from the first source selected by the content

selection control; and

a second audience member content display

region for displaying the graphical infor-

mation represented by the streaming content

8 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

from the second source selected by the content

selection control, wherein the first and second

audience member content display regions are

adapted to display simultaneously.

Id. at col.10 ll.28–52, col.11 ll.26–62, col.12 ll.29–65.

B. Procedural History

Williamson accused Appellees of infringing the ’840

patent based on their alleged manufacture, sale, offer for

sale, use, and importation of various systems and meth-

ods of online collaboration. On March 22, 2011, William-

son filed suit in the United States District Court for the

Central District of California specifically asserting in-

fringement of all 24 claims of the ’840 patent. On Sep-

tember 4, 2012, the district court issued a claim

construction order, construing, inter alia, the following

limitations of independent claims 1 and 17: “graphical

display representative of a classroom” and “first graphical

display comprising . . . a classroom region” (collectively,

the “graphical display” limitations). The district court

held that these terms require “a pictorial map illustrating

an at least partially virtual space in which participants

can interact, and that identifies the presenter(s) and the

audience member(s) by their locations on the map.”

In its claim construction order, the district court also

concluded that the limitation of claim 8, “distributed

learning control module,” was a means-plus-function term

under 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6. The district court then

evaluated the specification and concluded that it failed to

disclose the necessary algorithms for performing all of the

claimed functions. The district court thus held claim 8

and its dependent claims 9–16 invalid as indefinite under

§ 112, para. 2.

Williamson conceded that under the district court’s

claim constructions, none of Appellees’ accused products

infringed independent claims 1 and 17 and their respec-

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 9

tive dependent claims 2–7 and 18–24, and that claims 8–

16 were invalid. The parties stipulated to final judgment.

Williamson appeals the stipulated entry of judgment,

challenging these claim construction rulings. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Regarding questions of claim construction, including

whether claim language invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6,

the district court’s determinations based on evidence

intrinsic to the patent as well as its ultimate interpreta-

tions of the patent claims are legal questions that we

review de novo. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,

135 S. Ct. 831, 840-41 (2015). To the extent the district

court, in construing the claims, makes underlying find-

ings of fact based on extrinsic evidence, we review such

findings of fact for clear error. Id. Because the district

court’s claim constructions in this case were based solely

on the intrinsic record, the Supreme Court’s recent deci-

sion in Teva does not require us to review the district

court’s claim construction any differently than under the

de novo standard we have long applied. Fenner Invs., Ltd.

v. Cellco P’ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2015)

(“When the district court reviews only evidence intrinsic

to the patent . . . , the judge’s determination will amount

solely to a determination of law, and [we] review that

construction de novo.” (quoting Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841))

(internal citations removed).

B. The “graphical display” Limitations

Williamson asserts that the district court erred in its

construction of the graphical display terms by improperly

importing an extraneous “pictorial map” limitation into

the claim. Williamson argues that requiring a “map”

unduly narrows the claims to the preferred embodiment

disclosed in the written description and that there is no

10 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

support in the intrinsic record for confining the claims to

a “pictorial map” that identifies the location of the partic-

ipants. Williamson alleges that a proper definition must

require the audience members to be able to interact with

both the presenter and other audience members. He

therefore asserts that the proper construction of the

graphical display terms is “a viewable illustration of an at

least partially virtual space that allows audience mem-

bers to interact with both the presenter and other audi-

ence members.”

Appellees respond that the district court’s construc-

tion correctly limited the claims to a “pictorial map”

consistent with the teachings of the written description.

According to Appellees, this construction does not import

a limitation from the preferred embodiment, but simply

reflects the functional aspects of a “classroom” in a man-

ner that is consistent with what the patentee invented

and disclosed. Moreover, according to Appellees, it is

consistent with the only depiction of a classroom shown in

the ’840 patent, which shows a pictorial map as a seating

chart that identifies the presenters and audience mem-

bers by their locations on the map.

We agree with Williamson. The district court erred in

construing these terms as requiring a “pictorial map.”

First, the claim language itself contains no such “pictorial

map” limitation. “[I]t is the claims, not the written de-

scription, which define the scope of the patent right.”

Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed.

Cir. 1998); see also id. (“[A] court may not import limita-

tions from the written description into the claims.”).

While the specification discloses examples and embodi-

ments where the virtual classroom is depicted as a “map”

or “seating chart,” nowhere does the specification limit the

graphical display to those examples and embodiments.

This court has repeatedly “cautioned against limiting the

claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific

examples in the specification.” Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N.

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 11

Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting

cases) (citations omitted).

Here, there is no suggestion in the intrinsic record

that the applicant intended the claims to have the limited

scope determined by the district court. To the contrary,

the embodiments and examples in the specification of

classroom metaphors relating to “maps” are consistently

described in terms of preference. For example, the speci-

fication states that “[t]he classroom metaphor preferably

provides a map of the classroom showing the relative

relationships among the presenters and audience mem-

bers.” ’840 patent col.2 ll.37–39 (emphasis added). In

another example, the graphical display of Figure 6 is

described as an “exemplary display” on the presenter’s

computer. Id. at col.7 ll.35–36. That exemplary display

includes a window that “preferably provides a seating

chart showing the audience members and presenters in

the classroom or auditorium.” Id. at col.9 ll.5–7 (empha-

sis added).

The ’840 patent defines a classroom as “an at least

partially virtual space in which participants can interact.”

Id. at col.6 ll.5–6. Nothing further is required, and no

greater definition is mandated by the language of the

claims, the specification, or the prosecution history. As is

well settled, the claims must “not be read restrictively

unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to

limit the claim scope using words or expressions of mani-

fest exclusion or restriction.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc., v.

Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1117

(Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the dis-

trict court incorrectly construed the graphical display

terms to have a “pictorial map” limitation. We therefore

vacate the stipulated judgment of non-infringement of

claims 1–7 and 17–24. The “graphical display” limitations

in claims 1 and 17 are properly construed as “a graphical

12 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

representation of an at least partially virtual space in

which participants can interact.”

C. The “distributed learning control module”

Limitation

1. Applicability of 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 3

Means-plus-function claiming occurs when a claim

term is drafted in a manner that invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112,

para. 6, which states:

An element in a claim for a combination may be

expressed as a means or step for performing a

specified function without the recital of structure,

material, or acts in support thereof, and such

claim shall be construed to cover the correspond-

ing structure, material, or acts described in the

specification and equivalents thereof.

In enacting this provision, Congress struck a balance in

allowing patentees to express a claim limitation by recit-

ing a function to be performed rather than by reciting

structure for performing that function, while placing

specific constraints on how such a limitation is to be

construed, namely, by restricting the scope of coverage to

only the structure, materials, or acts described in the

specification as corresponding to the claimed function and

equivalents thereof. See Northrop Grumman Corp. v.

Intel Corp., 325 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

3 Because the overruling of prior precedent can only

be done by the court en banc, see South Corp. v. United

States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc),

Part II.C.1. of this opinion has been considered by an en

banc court formed of PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN,

LOURIE, LINN, DYK, MOORE, O’MALLEY, REYNA, WALLACH,

TARANTO, CHEN, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 13

To determine whether § 112, para. 6 applies to a claim

limitation, our precedent has long recognized the im-

portance of the presence or absence of the word “means.”

In Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. Interna-

tional Trade Commission, building upon a line of cases

interpreting § 112, para. 6, 4 we stated that the use of the

word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable

presumption that § 112, para. 6 applies. 161 F.3d 696,

703–04 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing cases). Applying the

converse, we stated that the failure to use the word

“means” also creates a rebuttable presumption—this time

that § 112, para. 6 does not apply. Id. We have not,

however, blindly elevated form over substance when

evaluating whether a claim limitation invokes § 112,

para. 6:

Merely because a named element of a patent

claim is followed by the word “means,” however,

does not automatically make that element a

“means-plus-function” element under 35 U.S.C.

§ 112, ¶ 6. . . . The converse is also true; merely

because an element does not include the word

“means” does not automatically prevent that ele-

ment from being construed as a means-plus-

function element.

Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed. Cir.

1996); see also Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.,

91 F.3d 1580, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“We do not mean to

4 See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d

1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery,

Inc., 91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Cole v. Kimberly-Clark

Corp., 102 F.3d 524 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Mas-Hamilton

Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1998);

Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods. Int’l, Ltd., 157

F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

14 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

suggest that section 112(6) is triggered only if the claim

uses the word ‘means.’”).

In making the assessment of whether the limitation

in question is a means-plus-function term subject to the

strictures of § 112, para. 6, our cases have emphasized

that the essential inquiry is not merely the presence or

absence of the word “means” but whether the words of the

claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the

art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for

structure. Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583 (“What is im-

portant is . . . that the term, as the name for structure,

has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art.”).

When the claim uses the word “means,” our cases have

been consistent in looking to the meaning of the language

of the limitation in assessing whether the presumption is

overcome. We have also traditionally held that when a

claim term lacks the word “means,” the presumption can

be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger

demonstrates that the claim term fails to “recite[] suffi-

ciently definite structure” or else recites “function without

reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.”

Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

In Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,

382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004), we applied for the

first time a different standard to the presumption flowing

from the absence of the word “means” and held that “the

presumption flowing from the absence of the term ‘means’

is a strong one that is not readily overcome” (emphasis

added), citing as examples, Al–Site Corp. v. VSI Interna-

tional, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 1999) and

Personalized Media Communications, 161 F.3d at 703–05.

A few years later, we reiterated Lighting World’s charac-

terization of the presumption as a “strong one that is not

readily overcome” in Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Eleva-

tor Americas Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

In Flo Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d

1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012), decided just a year after

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 15

Inventio, we raised the bar even further, declaring that

“[w]hen the claim drafter has not signaled his intent to

invoke § 112, ¶ 6 by using the term ‘means,’ we are un-

willing to apply that provision without a showing that the

limitation essentially is devoid of anything that can be

construed as structure” (emphasis added), citing Masco

Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir.

2002), a case involving the different term “step for” and

the unusual circumstances in which § 112, para. 6 relates

to the functional language of a method claim. Recently, in

Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1297 (Fed. Cir.

2014), we yet again observed that this presumption is

“‘strong’ and ‘not readily overcome’” and noted that, as

such, we have “‘seldom’ held that a limitation without

recitation of ‘means’ is a means-plus-function limitation,”

citing Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1358, 1362, Inventio,

649 F.3d at 1356, and Flo Healthcare, 697 F.3d at 1374.

Our opinions in Lighting World, Inventio, Flo Healthcare

and Apple have thus established a heightened bar to

overcoming the presumption that a limitation expressed

in functional language without using the word “means” is

not subject to § 112, para. 6.

Our consideration of this case has led us to conclude

that such a heightened burden is unjustified and that we

should abandon characterizing as “strong” the presump-

tion that a limitation lacking the word “means” is not

subject to § 112, para. 6. That characterization is unwar-

ranted, is uncertain in meaning and application, and has

the inappropriate practical effect of placing a thumb on

what should otherwise be a balanced analytical scale. It

has shifted the balance struck by Congress in passing

§ 112, para. 6 and has resulted in a proliferation of func-

tional claiming untethered to § 112, para. 6 and free of

the strictures set forth in the statute. Henceforth, we will

apply the presumption as we have done prior to Lighting

World, without requiring any heightened evidentiary

showing and expressly overrule the characterization of

16 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

that presumption as “strong.” We also overrule the strict

requirement of “a showing that the limitation essentially

is devoid of anything that can be construed as structure.”

The standard is whether the words of the claim are

understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have

a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.

Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583. When a claim term lacks the

word “means,” the presumption can be overcome and

§ 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates

that the claim term fails to “recite sufficiently definite

structure” or else recites “function without reciting suffi-

cient structure for performing that function.” Watts, 232

F.3d at 880. The converse presumption remains unaffect-

ed: “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that

§ 112, ¶ 6 applies.” Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 703.

2. Functional Nature of the Limitation

On appeal, Williamson argues that the district court

erred in construing the term “distributed learning control

module” as being governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6.

Williamson contends that the district court failed to give

appropriate weight to the “strong” presumption against

means-plus-function claiming that attaches to claim

terms that do not recite the word “means.” Williamson

also argues that the district court wrongly focused its

analysis on the word “module” instead of the full term,

ignored the detailed support provided in the written

description, and misapplied our law by failing to view the

term from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the

art.

Appellees respond that the district court properly con-

strued “distributed learning control module” as a means-

plus-function claim term despite the absence of the word

“means.” Appellees assert that the presumption against

means-plus-function claiming was rebutted because

“distributed learning control module” does not have a well

understood structural meaning in the computer technolo-

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 17

gy field. Appellees note that the “distributed learning

control module” limitation is drafted in the same format

as a traditional means-plus-function limitation, and

merely replaces the term “means” with “nonce” word

“module,” thereby connoting a generic “black box” for

performing the recited computer-implemented functions.

In Appellees’ view, since the term should be treated as a

means-plus-function claim term and there is no algorith-

mic structure for implementing the claimed functions in

the written description, the finding of indefiniteness

should be affirmed.

We begin with the observation that the claim limita-

tion in question is not merely the introductory phrase

“distributed learning control module,” but the entire

passage “distributed learning control module for receiving

communications transmitted between the presenter and

the audience member computer systems and for relaying

the communications to an intended receiving computer

system and for coordinating the operation of the stream-

ing data module.” This passage, as lengthy as it is, is

nonetheless in a format consistent with traditional

means-plus-function claim limitations. It replaces the

term “means” with the term “module” and recites three

functions performed by the “distributed learning control

module.”

“Module” is a well-known nonce word that can operate

as a substitute for “means” in the context of § 112, para. 6.

As the district court found, “‘module’ is simply a generic

description for software or hardware that performs a

specified function.” J.A. 31. Generic terms such as

“mechanism,” “element,” “device,” and other nonce words

that reflect nothing more than verbal constructs may be

used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to using

the word “means” because they “typically do not connote

sufficiently definite structure” and therefore may invoke

§ 112, para. 6. Mass. Inst. of Tech. & Elecs. for Imaging,

18 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

Inc. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir.

2006); see generally M.P.E.P. § 2181.

Here, the word “module” does not provide any indica-

tion of structure because it sets forth the same black box

recitation of structure for providing the same specified

function as if the term “means” had been used. 5 Indeed,

Williamson himself acknowledges that “the term ‘module,’

standing alone is capable of operating as a ‘nonce word’

substitute for ‘means.’” Op. Br. at 43.

The prefix “distributed learning control” does not im-

part structure into the term “module.” These words do

not describe a sufficiently definite structure. Although

the “distributed learning control module” is described in a

certain level of detail in the written description, the

written description fails to impart any structural signifi-

cance to the term. At bottom, we find nothing in the

specification or prosecution history that might lead us to

5 We have addressed the use of the word “module”

in a means-plus-function dispute in the unpublished

decision Ranpak Corp. v. Storopack, Inc., 168 F.3d 1316,

No. 98-1009, 1998 WL 513598 (Fed. Cir. July 15, 1998)

(unpublished). In Ranpak, we were presented with two

closely related claim terms, a “settable control means,”

which indisputably invoked means-plus-function claim-

ing, and a “settable control module.” Id. at *2. In the

context of the patent at issue, we found that the word

“module” in the term “settable control module” did not

connote structure. Id. We came to this conclusion be-

cause “module” merely sets forth “the same black box

without recitation of structure for providing the same

specified function” as did “means.” Id. Since there was no

difference in the structural implications of the terms, we

held that the presumption against means-plus-function

claiming was rebutted and the “settable control module”

was properly construed as a means-plus-function term.

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 19

construe that expression as the name of a sufficiently

definite structure as to take the overall claim limitation

out of the ambit of § 112, para. 6. While Williamson is

correct that the presence of modifiers can change the

meaning of “module,” the presence of these particular

terms does not provide any structural significance to the

term “module” in this case.

While portions of the claim do describe certain inputs

and outputs at a very high level (e.g., communications

between the presenter and audience member computer

systems), the claim does not describe how the “distributed

learning control module” interacts with other components

in the distributed learning control server in a way that

might inform the structural character of the limitation-in-

question or otherwise impart structure to the “distributed

learning control module” as recited in the claim.

Williamson also points to the declaration of Dr. Shuk-

ri Souri to show that one of ordinary skill in the art would

understand the term “distributed learning control mod-

ule” to connote structure. The district court did not

discuss Dr. Souri’s testimony in its claim construction

ruling. We have considered it but do not find it persua-

sive. Dr. Souri’s declaration, like the claim language and

portions of the written description Williamson identifies,

fails to describe how the distributed learning control

module, by its interaction with the other components in

the distributed learning control server, is understood as

the name for structure. Dr. Souri also testified that, “as

one of ordinary skill in the art, reading the specification, I

would know exactly how to program” a computer to per-

form the recited functions and further testified that

structure “could be in software or it could be in hard-

ware.” J.A. 1391 (256:12–258:16). But the fact that one

of skill in the art could program a computer to perform

the recited functions cannot create structure where none

otherwise is disclosed. See Function Media, L.L.C. v.

Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

20 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the “dis-

tributed learning control module” limitation fails to recite

sufficiently definite structure and that the presumption

against means-plus-function claiming is rebutted. We

therefore agree with the district court that this limitation

is subject to the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6.

3. Disclosure of Corresponding Structure

Having found that the “distributed learning control

module” is subject to application of § 112, para. 6, we next

determine whether the specification discloses sufficient

structure that corresponds to the claimed function. We

conclude that it does not.

Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a

two-step process. The court must first identify the

claimed function. Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d

1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Then, the court must deter-

mine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification

corresponds to the claimed function. Where there are

multiple claimed functions, as we have here, the patentee

must disclose adequate corresponding structure to per-

form all of the claimed functions. Id. at 1318–19. If the

patentee fails to disclose adequate corresponding struc-

ture, the claim is indefinite. Id. at 1311–12.

The district court identified three claimed functions

associated with the “distributed learning control module”

term: (1) receiving communications transmitted between

the presenter and the audience member computer sys-

tems; (2) relaying the communications to an intended

receiving computer system; and (3) coordinating the

operation of the streaming data module. The district

court then found that the specification fails to disclose

structure corresponding to the “coordinating” function.

On appeal, it is undisputed that the claimed “coordinat-

ing” function is associated with the “distributed learning

control module.” Thus, we must ascertain whether ade-

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 21

quate structure corresponding to this function is disclosed

in the specification. Id. at 1311.

Structure disclosed in the specification qualifies as

“corresponding structure” if the intrinsic evidence clearly

links or associates that structure to the function recited in

the claim. Id. (citing B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,

124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Even if the specifi-

cation discloses corresponding structure, the disclosure

must be of “adequate” corresponding structure to achieve

the claimed function. Id. at 1311–12 (citing In re Don-

aldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)).

Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paras. 2 and 6, therefore, if a

person of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to

recognize the structure in the specification and associate

it with the corresponding function in the claim, a means-

plus-function clause is indefinite. Id. at 1312 (citing

AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504

F.3d 1236, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).

The district court was correct that the specification of

the ’840 patent fails to disclose corresponding structure.

The written description of the ’840 patent makes clear

that the distributed learning control module cannot be

implemented in a general purpose computer, but instead

must be implemented in a special purpose computer—a

general purpose computer programmed to perform partic-

ular functions pursuant to instructions from program

software. A special purpose computer is required because

the distributed learning control module has specialized

functions as outlined in the written description. See,

e.g., ’840 patent col.5 ll.48–64. In cases such as this,

involving a claim limitation that is subject to § 112,

para. 6 that must be implemented in a special purpose

computer, this court has consistently required that the

structure disclosed in the specification be more than

simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor.

E.g., Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech.,

521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing WMS Gam-

22 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

ing, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir.

1999)). We require that the specification disclose an

algorithm for performing the claimed function. Net Mon-

eyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir.

2008). The algorithm may be expressed as a mathemati-

cal formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other

manner that provides sufficient structure. Noah, 675

F.3d at 1312 (citing Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc.,

523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).

Williamson points to certain disclosures in the specifi-

cation that, it claims, meet the § 112, para. 6 require-

ments. Williamson argues that the “distributed learning

control module” controls communications among the

various computer systems and that the “coordinating”

function provides a presenter with streaming media

selection functionality. These disclosures, however, are

merely functions of the “distributed learning control

module.” The specification does not set forth an algorithm

for performing the claimed functions.

Williamson argues that figures 4 and 5 disclose the

required algorithm. This is not the case. Figure 4 is a

representative display from the presenter computer

system under the direction of the “distributed learning

control module.” ’840 patent col.7 ll.1–3.

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 23

Id. figure 4. This display includes an address or uniform

resource locator or URL field, a channel field, an “add this

node” button, and a “back” link. Id. col.7 ll.5–7, 13–15,

18–19. This is not a disclosure of an algorithm corre-

sponding to the claimed “coordinating” function; it is a

description of a presenter display interface.

Figure 5 similarly fails to disclose an algorithm, as it

is another representative display on the presenter com-

puter system. Id. col.7 ll.20–24. This display allows the

presenter to preview data before presenting it to the

audience. Id. col.7 ll.32–34.

24 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

Id. figure 5. This figure contains a box listing the sources

of data and a media window that displays the current feed

received from the source of data selected in the list box.

Id. col.7 ll.24–28. Again, this figure is a description of a

presenter display interface; it is not a disclosure of an

algorithm corresponding to the claimed functions. Wil-

liamson has failed to point to an adequate disclosure of

corresponding structure in the specification.

Williamson points to the declaration of Dr. Souri to

show that the ’840 patent discloses structure. The testi-

mony of one of ordinary skill in the art cannot supplant

the total absence of structure from the specification.

Noah, 675 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Default Proof Credit

Card Sys., Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d 1291,

1302 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The prohibition against using

expert testimony to create structure where none other-

wise exists is a direct consequence of the requirement that

the specification adequately disclose corresponding struc-

ture. Id. (quoting AllVoice Computing, 504 F.3d at 1240).

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 25

Thus, the testimony of Dr. Souri cannot create structure

where none otherwise exists.

Because the ’840 patent fails to disclose any structure

corresponding to the “coordinating” function of the “dis-

tributed learning control module,” we affirm the judgment

that claims 8–16 are invalid for indefiniteness under 35

U.S.C. § 112, para. 2.

CONCLUSION

The district court erred in construing the “graphical

display representative of a classroom” terms in claims 1–7

and 17–24. The district court did not err in construing

the term “distributed learning control module” in claims

8–16 of the ’840 patent as a means-plus-function claim

term lacking corresponding structure. We therefore

vacate the final judgment of non-infringement with re-

spect to claims 1–7 and 17–24 and affirm the final judg-

ment of invalidity of claims 8–16. We remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND

REMANDED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs for this appeal.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

RICHARD A. WILLIAMSON, Trustee for At Home

Bondholders Liquidating Trust,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

CITRIX ONLINE, LLC, CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC.,

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

WEBEX COMMUNICATIONS, INC., CISCO WEBEX,

LLC, CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES

CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2013-1130

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of California in No. 11-CV-2409, Judge A.

Howard Matz.

______________________

2 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

REYNA, Circuit Judge, concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-

part, and additional views.

This is the second time around for this case. In the

first, Williamson I, I dissented from the majority conclu-

sion that the “distributed learning control module” term

of claim 8 of the ’840 patent recites sufficient structure to

keep the claim limitation “distributed learning control

module” outside of the purview of 35 U.S.C. § 112, para-

graph 6. 1

In this second time around, Williamson II, the majori-

ty reverses itself to conclude that the “distributed learn-

ing control module” term does not recite sufficient

structure, is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6,

and is indefinite under paragraph 2. Because this con-

clusion is the correct result, I concur. To explain my

concurrence, I rely on the reasons I laid out in my dissent

in Williamson I.

The majority, however, continues to ignore critical ev-

idence showing that an image of a visually depicted

virtual classroom is required by claim 8 of the ‘840 patent.

I dissent from that portion of this opinion.

In addition, the majority embraces this case as an op-

portune vehicle to overrule as improper certain adjectives

used in prior opinions in describing the § 112, paragraph

6 presumption. See e.g., Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp

Elevator Americas Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir.

2011) (describing a “strong” presumption in favor of § 112,

paragraph 6 application where a claim recites “means”).

I cannot say that I disagree with those statements, but I

question whether those statements sidestep underlying

fundamental issues involving the development of func-

1 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 770 F.3d 1371,

1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014)

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 3

tional claiming law since 1952 when 35 U.S.C. § 112,

paragraph 6 was passed.

For these and the reasons set forth below,

I respectfully concur-in-part, dissent in part, and provide

certain comments concerning means-plus-function claim-

ing.

I. The “Graphical Display” Limitations.

The majority reverses the district court’s conclusion

that the “graphical display representative of a classroom”

terms require a pictorial map and construes the terms as

“a graphical representation of an at least partially virtual

space in which participants can interact.” While the

majority is correct that the claims of the ’840 patent do

not require a pictorial map, the majority’s construction

ignores a critical limitation. As reviewed below, the

specification and prosecution history make clear that the

“graphical display representative of a classroom” terms

are properly construed as requiring a visually depicted

virtual classroom.

During prosecution, the applicant explained that the

invention is distinct from the prior art because the patent

requires a “visual virtual classroom” displayed on both a

first and second computer system:

Additionally, [the prior art] does not disclose the

claimed feature of “creating a graphical display

representative of the classroom” on a second com-

puter system coupled to the network. The present

invention allows both a first computer system (for

example, the presenter computer system) and a

second computer system (for example, an audience

member) to view a graphical display of the class-

room. This claimed feature of the present inven-

tion allows the audience members to interact in a

visual virtual classroom environment with both

the presenter and other audience members.

4 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

By contrast, [the prior art] merely discloses “[as]

the students log in, their seating locations in the

classroom are shown by a highlighted icon in the

classroom map on the teacher’s screen.” . . . [The

prior art] does not teach or suggest displaying a

graphical display representative of a classroom on

a student’s screen.

J.A. 1267-68 (original emphasis removed and emphases

added). These statements in conjunction with the pa-

tent’s claim terms confirm the significance of displaying

visually depicted virtual classroom.

The “classroom metaphor” is used extensively in

characterizing the operation, and touting the benefits, of

the inventions embodied in the ’840 patent. The Abstract

teaches that “[t]he classroom environment module pro-

vides a classroom metaphor having a podium and rows of

seats to the presenter and audience computer systems.”

’840 patent Abstract. The Summary of the Invention

states that the drawbacks of the prior art are overcome

“by a distributed learning system that uses industry-

standard computer hardware and software linked by a

network like the Internet to provide a classroom- or

auditorium-like metaphor to at least one presenter and at

least one audience member.” Id. col. 2 ll. 10-14. The

patent further teaches that a “feedback region” on the

presenter’s computer “preferably displays a graphical

representation of the classroom” and the “classroom

environment module” is used to provide “a classroom- or

auditorium-like metaphor to the presenter and audience

members.” Id. col. 3 ll. 11-13, col. 5 l. 67-col. 6 l. 1.

The repeated mention of the classroom metaphor

within the context of the invention and the importance of

a visually depicted virtual classroom in the prosecution

history indicate that the “graphical display representative

of a classroom” terms require a visually depicted virtual

classroom. The construction derived by the majority

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 5

reads out this important limitation that distinguishes the

invention from the prior art. See Callicrate v. Wadsworth

Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding

that it was error for the district court to read out a limita-

tion clearly required by the claim language and specifica-

tion). It is error to read a claim too broadly, as it is to

read a claim too narrowly. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH

Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In reading

out this important limitation on the “graphical display

representative of a classroom” terms, the majority side-

steps our well established rules of claim construction,

causing them to reach an erroneous result.

II. Functional Claiming

The majority switches course from its prior decision,

Williamson I, and now affirms the district court’s conclu-

sion that the term “distributed learning control module” is

governed by § 112 para. 6 and is indefinite under § 112

para. 2 because the specification of the ’840 patent fails to

disclose corresponding structure. The majority goes on to

explicitly “overrule the characterization of th[e] presump-

tion [that § 112 para. 6 does not apply when the term

“means” is not used] as ‘strong.’” Maj. Op. at 15–16.

While I agree with that conclusion, we stop short of

addressing other equally fundamental concerns about

functional claiming.

Our use of § 112, para. 6 presumptions relies on a rig-

id framework, where a flexible one is arguably more apt.

A “presumption” is a procedural tool that shifts the bur-

den of proof on a substantive issue: if a basic fact is estab-

lished, a court accepts a conclusion on the issue unless the

presumption is rebutted with evidence that meets the

presumption’s associated standard of proof. 1-301 Wein-

6 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

stein’s Federal Evidence § 301.02 (2015). 2 Our § 112

para. 6 presumptions come from the notion that, all else

being equal, it is more likely that a party is covered by a

statute when it uses the words of the statute. The use of

formal presumptions, the argument goes, takes this

concept to the extreme, supplying one substantive test for

a claim that recites “means” and another for a claim that

recites other non-structural terms like “module.” The

statute admits no such variation, supplying only one test:

is the element “expressed as a means or step for perform-

ing a specified function without the recital of structure,

material, or acts in support thereof.” What arguably

changes is the weight we attach to different recitations in

meeting this test: “means” weighs heavily, non-structural

terms like “module” weigh a little less, and, at the other

end of the spectrum, purely structural terms weigh heavi-

ly in the opposite direction.

A related concern is, assuming that a presumption is

the right tool to analyze the statute, should a presump-

tion arise based on the word “means.” Almost twenty

years ago, this court adopted a presumption that a claim

term that recites “means” invokes § 112, para. 6. York

2 One familiar presumption is the presumption of

patent validity. Under this presumption, a court accepts

the conclusion that an issued patent is valid absent clear

and convincing evidence negating that presumption, i.e.,

evidence showing that the patent is invalid. Microsoft

Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011);

Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No. 13-896, slip

op. at 10–11 (U.S. May 26, 2015). I note that the majority

opinion does not provide an associated standard of proof

for the § 112 para. 6 presumptions. Indeed, I remain

unconvinced that this court has applied a different stand-

ard of proof dependent on how the presumption is labeled

or characterized.

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 7

Products, Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Center,

99 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-

Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Appellees’

petition for rehearing en banc argues that § 112 para. 6

provides no basis for adopting a presumption that a claim

term is governed by this statute when the term “means” is

used. Appellees argue that “[w]hat started out as a

straightforward issue of substance. . . has morphed into

an issue of form.” Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En

Banc at 6. Appellees argue that “the text of [§ 112 para.

6], the Supreme Court authority leading to it, and its

legislative history universally confirm that [the statute]

applies to all claims that do not recite sufficient structure

for performing the recited function—regardless of wheth-

er the word ‘means’ is used.” Id. at 11. Moreover, the fact

that the statute uses both terms—“means” and “step”—

would suggest that any presumption should apply to the

use of either word. Yet, it is arguably not clear to what

extent this court attaches a presumption to the word

“step.”

Finally, it is generally accepted that § 112, para. 6

was passed in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in

Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1

(1946). See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis

Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997) (collecting cases);

Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 550 F.2d 992, 998

n. 5 (4th Cir. 1977). In Halliburton, the Supreme Court

made the following observations in holding certain claims

that recite “means” language invalid:

The language of the claim . . . describes this . . .

element in the ‘new’ combination in terms of what

it will do rather than in terms of its own physical

characteristics or its arrangement in the new

combination apparatus. We have held that a claim

with such a description of a product is invalid . . . .

Id. at 8.

8 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

Arguably, this rationale applies to functional claiming

generally, not just to claims that recite “means.” Indeed,

the Halliburton Court relied on precedent invalidating

functional claims that did not recite the term “means.”

Id. at 9 (citing Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co.,

277 U.S. 245, 256–57 (1928).) The continued viability of

this rationale, and its impact on how this Court applies

§ 112, para. 6 merits attention.

In sum, my view is that perhaps we need to revisit our

judicially-created § 112, para. 6 presumptions.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

RICHARD A. WILLIAMSON, Trustee for At Home

Bondholders Liquidating Trust,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

CITRIX ONLINE, LLC, CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC.,

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellee

WEBEX COMMUNICATIONS, INC., CISCO WEBEX,

LLC, CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES

CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2013-1130

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of California in No. 11-CV-2409, Judge A.

Howard Matz.

______________________

2 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the en banc ruling that is

inserted into this panel opinion at Section II.C.1. The

court en banc changes the law and practice of 35 U.S.C.

§ 112 paragraph 6, by eliminating the statutory signal of

the word “means.” The purpose of this change, the bene-

fit, is obscure. The result, however, is clear: additional

uncertainty of the patent grant, confusion in its interpre-

tation, invitation to litigation, and disincentive to patent-

based innovation.

Curiously, the court acknowledges that it “has long

recognized the importance of the presence or absence of

the word ‘means.’” Maj. Op. at 13. Nonetheless, the court

rejects the meaning and usage of “means” to signal

means-plus-function claim construction. The court now

overrules dozens of cases referring to a “strong presump-

tion” of means-plus-function usage, and goes to the oppo-

site extreme, holding that this court will create such

usage from “[g]eneric terms such as ‘mechanism,’ ‘ele-

ment,’ ‘device,’ and other nonce words.” Maj. Op. at 17.

In the case before us, the so-called “nonce” word is “mod-

ule.” Thus the court erases the statutory text, and holds

that no one will know whether a patentee intended

means-plus-function claiming until this court tells us.

I dissent from the majority’s reasoning and the major-

ity’s holding that “distributed learning control module”

falls under paragraph 6. I express no opinion on the

ultimate validity of the claim; the claim must stand or fall

on its merit, but does not fall under paragraph 6.

I urge the court to recognize that it is the applicant’s

choice during prosecution whether or not to invoke para-

graph 6, and the court’s job is to hold the patentee to his

or her choice. This approach is clear, easy to administer

by the USPTO in examination and the courts in litigation,

and does no harm, for patent applicants know how to

invoke paragraph 6 if they choose.

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 3

The statute is clear

When the statute is clear, judicial interpretation is

unnecessary. See Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1896

(2013) (“[R]ules of thumb give way when the words of a

statute are unambiguous . . .”) (internal quotations omit-

ted); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy,

548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) (“When the statutory ‘language

is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the

disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to

enforce it according to its terms.’”) (quoting Hartford

Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530

U.S. 1, 6 (2000)); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525

U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (“As in any case of statutory con-

struction, our analysis begins with the language of the

statute. And where the statutory language provides a

clear answer, it ends there as well.”) (internal citations

and quotations omitted); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos

Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) (“[W]hen a statute

speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the

statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary

circumstance, is finished.”).

35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 6 authorizes and limits the

claiming of a function:

¶ 6 An element in a claim for a combination may

be expressed as a means or step for performing

a specified function without the recital of struc-

ture, material, or acts in support thereof, and such

claim shall be construed to cover the corre-

sponding structure, material, or acts described in

the specification and equivalents thereof.

(Boldface added. Paragraph 6 was redesignated para-

graph “f” in 2012 – I retain the earlier designation here,

for concordance with precedent.).

The statute is clear. To claim an element by the func-

tion performed, the element is “expressed as” a “means

4 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

for,” as the statute provides. The court’s holding that

“distributed learning control module” is “a means-plus-

function claim term despite the absence of the word

‘means’,” maj. op. at 16, is not only unclear – it also vio-

lates the statute.

The signal “means for” is clear – and is clearly

understood

When the statutory signal “means for” is given, the

entire patent-concerned community: the patent attorney,

the patent examiner, the competitor, the infringer, the

inventor, and the judge, know “the subject matter which

the applicant regards as his invention,” 35 U.S.C. § 112

¶ 2, and know how the means-plus-function term is

required to be construed. When an applicant claims a

“means for” performing a function, the statute limits the

scope of the claim to the structure in the specification and

its equivalents. With today’s en banc change of law, as

the case sub judice illustrates, everyone must guess

whether the claimed “module” is claimed as a function or

an apparatus or something else, and whether it is to be

limited by the “structure, material, or acts described in

the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C.

§ 112, ¶ 6.

Until today, the signal “means for” instructed the

claim interpretation. There was no ambiguity about how

the claim was to be interpreted. I discern no groundswell

for this change in the law of claiming – indeed, the public

voice has been silent. I know of no legal or public interest

served by introducing this uncertainty into claim con-

struction. I urge the court to restore this claim construc-

tion to its clear and effective role.

Legislation by footnote

An unheralded footnote, announcing en banc change

of law, without notice to and participation of the interest-

ed public, is not the optimum judicial path. There is

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 5

indeed a need for judicial consistency concerning the

construction of means-plus-function claims. The answer

is not to strain the statute and reject consistency, but to

enforce the statute as it is written.

We should act en banc to correct this departure from

statute. If the statute is to be changed, that is not the

judicial prerogative. Indeed, it is noteworthy that in eight

years of congressional study of proposals for legislative

change, culminating in the America Invents Act of 2012,

the legislative record shows no proposal to depart from

the “strong presumption” embodied in section 112 para-

graph 6 and the statutory signal “means for.”

The burden is on the applicant, not the judge

The burden of determining whether paragraph 6 ap-

plies to a particular element is on the applicant, not the

court. As the Faber/Landis treatise states: “To be sure you

are under section 112, paragraph 6, use the pure ‘means

for . . .’ Other words lead to ambiguity and the need for

the court to decide. Use of clear structure words avoids

ambiguity.” ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF

PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING at 3-201 (5th ed. 2008).

The Donner treatise teaches by example:

For example, suppose an invention relates to a

new television set. The television set includes a

new transistor-based picture tube, as well as other

new features. The picture tube can be recited two

ways in the claim for the television:

Standard claim element format:

A television, comprising:

A picture tube; . . .

Means-plus-function format:

A television comprising:

Picture tube means for displaying a televi-

sion picture; . . .

6 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

IRAH H. DONNER, PATENT PROSECUTION: PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE BEFORE THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK

OFFICE at 46-47 (2d ed. 1999).

My colleagues protest that the statutory presumption

of “means” “has resulted in a proliferation of functional

claiming untethered to § 112, para. 6 and free of the

strictures set forth in the statute.” Maj. Op. at 15. This is

an indictment of the court’s fidelity to the statute, not a

flaw in the statute itself. The court’s reasoning today that

there is no “algorithm” for “module” in the specification,

and the word “module” is a “nonce word” for “means,” and

thus the claim is written in accordance with paragraph 6,

is not easy to fathom.

The enactment in 1952

This paragraph was enacted to overturn several Su-

preme Court rulings rejecting “functional” claiming. The

statute authorizes claiming a function or step in a combi-

nation, while safeguarding against the Court’s stated

concerns. P.J. Federico’s Commentary explains:

The last paragraph of section 112 relating to so-

called functional claims is new. It provides that

an element of a claim for a combination (and a

combination may be not only a combination of me-

chanical elements, but also a combination of sub-

stances in a composition claim, or steps in a

process claim) may be expressed as a means or

step for performing a specified function, without

the recital of structure, material or acts in support

thereof.

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 7

P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, in 35

U.S.C.A. 1, 25 (West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. &

TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161 (1993). 1

The Commentary made clear that the statute was

intended to overrule some Court decisions:

It is unquestionable that some measure of greater

liberality in the use of functional expressions in

combination claims is authorized than had been

permitted by some court decisions and that deci-

sions such as that in Halliburton Oil Well Cement-

ing Co. v. Walker, 67 S.Ct. 6, 329 U.S. 1, 91 L. Ed.

3 (1946), are modified or rendered obsolete, but

the exact limits of the enlargement remain to be

determined.

Id. Federico explained that paragraph 6 enlarges the

opportunity to claim a function, but limits how that

function is supported and construed:

The paragraph ends by stating that such a claim

shall be construed to cover the corresponding

structure, material, or acts described in the speci-

fication and equivalents thereof. This relates

primarily to the construction of such claims for

the purpose of determining when the claim is in-

fringed (note the use of the word “cover”), and

1 See Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intent—or, Who

wrote the Patent Act of 1952?, in PATENT PROCUREMENT

AND EXPLOITATION 61, 66 (BNA Inc., 1963) (“Mr. Federico

received a letter . . . saying the [House] committee re-

quested him to undertake the preparation of ‘an overall

patent revision bill’ at his earliest convenience. . . .”); see

also Louis S. Zarfas, Notes from the Editor, J. PAT. &

TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 160 (1993) (“Examiner-in-Chief

Federico was the primary author of the Patent Act of

1952.”).

8 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

would not appear to have much, if any, applicabil-

ity in determining the patentability of such claims

over the prior art, that is, the Patent Office is not

authorized to allow a claim which “reads on” the

prior art.

Id. at 26.

Thus this paragraph of the 1952 Act overruled the

Halliburton case, which had been supported by earlier

precedent, as the Court discussed. Halliburton, 329 U.S.

at 10 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp.,

304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938) for the proposition that claims

are indefinite for using “conveniently functional language

at the exact point of novelty.”).

This paragraph established that an inventor could

claim a function, and the “means for” signal entered the

patent lexicon, where it has reposed ever since, as a

universally understood signal of a functional claim.

The Examination Guidelines

The PTO Examination Guidelines instruct examiners

and practitioners in accordance with law. The 2000

Guidelines dealt with means-plus-function claiming as

follows:

The PTO must apply 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶6 in appro-

priate cases, and give claims their broadest rea-

sonable interpretation, in light of and consistent

with the written description of the invention in

the application. [2] Thus, a claim limitation will

be interpreted to invoke 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6 if it

meets the following 3-prong analysis:

(1) The claim limitations must use the

phrase “means for” or “step for;”

(2) the “means for” or “step for” must be

modified by functional language; and

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 9

(3) the phrase “means for” or “step for”

must not be modified by structure, material or

acts for achieving the specified function.

Supplemental Examination Guidelines for Determining

the Applicability of 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6, 65 Fed. Reg. 38510,

38514 (June 21, 2000). Endnote 2 cites In re Donaldson

for “stating that 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6 sets a limit on how

broadly the PTO may construe means-plus-function

language under the rubric of ‘reasonable interpretation’.”

Id. at 38515. The Guidelines further explained:

With respect to the first prong of this analysis, a

claim element that does not include the phrase

“means for” or “step for” will not be considered to

invoke 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6. If an applicant wishes

to have the claim limitation treated under 35

U.S.C. 112 ¶ 6, applicant must either: (1) Amend

the claim to include the phrase “means for” or

“step for” in accordance with these interim guide-

lines; or (2) show that even though the phrase

“means for” or “step for” is not used, the claim lim-

itation is written as a function to be performed

and does not provide any structure, material, or

acts which would preclude application of 35 U.S.C.

112 ¶ 6.

Id. at 38514.

The 2000 Guidelines place the burden for invoking

paragraph 6 on the applicant by way of the “means”

signal. Id. at 38514 (citing Notice, Means or Step Plus

Function Limitation under 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶6, 1162

OFFICIAL GAZETTE U.S. PAT. OFF. 59 (May 17, 1994)). The

Revised Examination Guidelines in 2011 attempted to

incorporate this court’s intervening decisions, for the

Federal Circuit had begun its retreat from clarity. See

Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining

Compliance With 35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of

10 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162

(Feb. 9, 2011).

Examiners are now instructed to scrutinize claims for

“a nonce word or verbal construct that is not recognized as

the name of a structure.” Id. at 7167 (citing Lighting

World, 382 F.3d at 1360). The examiner is instructed to

“determine whether the claim limitation uses a non-

structural term (a term that is simply a substitute for the

term “means for”).” Id. (citing Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD,

Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The examiner

must guess whether the term is intended as a means-

plus-function term, now that the court holds that the

signal “means for” need not be used. Paragraph 6 has

morphed from a clear legal instruction into a litigator’s

delight.

Federal Circuit precedent, on and off

This court has recognized that the absence of “means

for” signals the patentee’s intent not to invoke section

112, para. 6, and that this intent should not be rejected

lightly. E.g., Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286,

1297 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“We have repeatedly characterized

this presumption as ‘strong’ and ‘not readily overcome’

and, as such, have ‘seldom’ held that a limitation without

recitation of “means” is a means-plus-function limita-

tion.”); Flo Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d

1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Our cases make clear ... that

the presumption flowing from the absence of the term

‘means' is a strong one that is not readily overcome.”)

(quoting Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,

382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); Inventio AG v.

ThyssenKrupp Elevator Americas Corp., 649 F.3d 1350,

1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Thus, the presumption flowing

from the absence of the term “means” is a strong one that

is not readily overcome”); Al–Site Corp. v. VSI Interna-

tional, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen

an element of a claim does not use the term “means,”

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 11

treatment as a means-plus-function claim element is

generally not appropriate.”); Personalized Media Commu-

nications, LLC v. International Trade Commission, 161

F.3d 696, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“failure to use the word

“means” creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not

apply.”). On this weighty precedent, the court’s en banc

rejection of this simple signal is not readily understood.

The en banc court still permits use of the “means” sig-

nal, although without a “strong presumption” of signifi-

cance. The result is fresh uncertainty, for the judge can

invoke paragraph 6 although the patentee chose other-

wise and wrote the specification and claims on a different

legal standard.

All claims must meet the requirements of patenta-

bility

The court states its concern with overly broad inter-

pretation of software claims. The court is not powerless to

require software claims to comply with the statutory

requirements of description, enablement, definiteness,

unobviousness, etc. If there have been abuses, as the

majority states, the remedy is not to eliminate the stat-

ute, but to apply the statute.

Today’s ruling is an example. The court holds that

the clause “distributed learning control module” is subject

to paragraph 6 because “module” is a “nonce word.” The

court then finds no “algorithm” for “module” in the specifi-

cation, and invalidates the claim for failing to comply with

paragraph 6. However, contrary to the apparent belief of

the majority, the presence or absence of the paragraph 6

signal does not affect the requirements of patentability.

All claims must meet the requirements of patentabil-

ity. Paragraph 6 is a statute of authorization and limita-

tion; it does not annul the other provisions of the statute.

The problem with today’s ruling is that the court has

rejected the rigor and simplicity of paragraph 6 and the

12 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC

patentee’s intent, replacing it with arbitrary judicial

subjectivity.

CONCLUSION

Paragraph 6 was designed to authorize and provide

the rules for claiming a functional element or step. No

purpose is served by discarding the statutory signal. The

result is further inroad into stability of claim construc-

tion. I respectfully dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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