Opinion

Leo D. Washington v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
May 29, 2015
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.5%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LEO D. WASHINGTON, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, CH-3443-15-0089-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: May 29, 2015

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NO NPRECEDENTIAL *

Leo D. Washington, Countryside, Illinois, pro se.

Janet M. Kyte, Esquire, Hines, Illinois, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his appeal challenging his performance

appraisal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial

decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based

*

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

sign ificantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

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on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application

of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of

the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or

involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of

the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite

the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See

Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the

following points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,

which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

¶2 The preference-eligible appellant filed an appeal challenging his

performance rating of “Minimally Satisfactory” for fiscal year 2014, and he

requested a hearing. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2-3, 5. He also alleged

claims of retaliation for whistleblowing activity, harmful procedural error,

prohibited personnel practices, and unlawful discrimination. Id. at 4, 9. On his

appeal form, the appellant indicated that he did not file a whistleblowing

complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and he did not file a

complaint with the Department of Labor.

¶3 The administrative judge acknowledged the appeal and issued an order to

show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,

explaining that the Board might not have jurisdiction over the appellant’s action

challenging his performance appraisal and informing him of the criteria for

establishing jurisdiction over an individual right of action (IRA) appeal. IAF,

Tab 2 at 2, Tab 3. The administrative judge ordered the appellant to file evidence

and argument in support of his jurisdictional claim. IAF, Tab 3 at 6-8. The

appellant did not respond to the acknowledgment order or the jurisdiction order,

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and the agency responded by requesting that the administrative judge dismiss the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 7.

¶4 Without holding the hearing requested by the appellant, the administrative

judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID) at 6-7. In reaching his decision, the

administrative judge stated that the only basis for finding jurisdiction over the

appellant’s appeal challenging his performance appraisal would be as an IRA

appeal or an appeal under Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment

Rights Act of 1994 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4333) (USERRA), and that the

appellant failed to raise any matter within the Board’s jurisdiction. ID at 3. The

administrative judge found no evidence that the appellant filed a complaint with

OSC and satisfied the exhaustion requirement for an IRA appeal, and that the

appellant did not allege that the agency violated his rights under USERRA. ID

at 5-6.

¶5 The appellant filed a petition for review of the initial decision arguing the

merits of the claims he raised on appeal. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.

The appellant also submits, for the first time on review, a January 2012 email

chain sent to fraudnet@gao.gov and several individuals reporting a “VA FSS

Waste and Abuse of Non Appropriated Funds,” although the appellant submits no

evidence or argument that he exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC.

Id. at 11-14. The appellant notes that the administrative judge’s

acknowledgement and jurisdictional orders failed to address his claims of harmful

procedural error, prohibited personnel practices, and unlawful discrimination. Id.

at 7-8. The appellant also argues that the administrative judge focused on the

jurisdictional issue and his retaliation claim to avoid addressing his remaining

claims on appeal. Id. at 4. After the deadline stated in the Board’s

acknowledgement order, the agency filed a response in opposition to the

appellant’s petition. PFR File, Tab 3. The appellant responded by asking the

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Board to disregard the agency’s untimely reply and we have not considered it.

PFR File, Tab 4.

¶6 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been

given jurisdiction by law, rule or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection

Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Board generally lacks jurisdiction

over appeals from performance appraisal ratings. Wein v. Department of the

Navy, 37 M.S.P.R. 379, 381 (1988). Appealable actions under 5 U.S.C.

chapter 75 do not include performance appraisals. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512,

7513(d); see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3(a)(1). The only bases on which the Board

could have jurisdiction over such an appeal would be as a USERRA claim or as

an IRA appeal. Bambl v. Department of the Treasury, 113 M.S.P.R. 55, ¶ 9

(2010). In this case, the appellant expressly denies that he raised a claim under

USERRA, and therefore we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the

Board has no jurisdiction over this appeal under USERRA. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8;

ID at 3-6.

¶7 The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has

exhausted his or her administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous

allegations that: (1) he engaged in whistleblowing activity by making a protected

disclosure; and (2) the disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s

decision to take or fail to take a personnel action. Yunus v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001). An individual may bring

an IRA appeal claiming that the agency gave him a low performance rating in

retaliation for his whistleblowing activity, but the record reflects that the

appellant did not exhaust his administrative remedies before OSC regarding his

claim of whistleblower retaliation and he did not address the exhaustion issue on

appeal or on review. IAF, Tab 1 at 4; see Bambl, 113 M.S.P.R. 55, ¶ 9. We

therefore find that the administrative judge properly found that the Board has no

jurisdiction to consider the appellant’s claim of whistleblower retaliation as an

IRA appeal. ID at 6.

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¶8 Despite the appellant’s assertions on review, his remaining allegations of

harmful error, unlawful discrimination, and prohibited personnel practices

under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) are not independent sources of Board jurisdiction. See

Wren v. Department of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2 (1980), aff’d, 681 F.2d 867,

871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Latham v. U.S. Postal Service, 117 M.S.P.R.

400, ¶ 5 (2012). Accordingly, we find that because the appellant failed to

identify any matter within the Board’s jurisdiction, the administrative judge could

not consider the merits of the appellant’s claims on appeal. We therefore DENY

the petition for review.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.

27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has

held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline

and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See

Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you want to request review of the Board’s decision concerning your

claims of prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8),

(b)(9)(A)(i), (b)(9)(B), (b)(9)(C), or (b)(9)(D), but you do not want to challenge

the Board’s disposition of any other claims of prohibited personnel practices, you

may request review of this final decision by the United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. The

court of appeals must receive your petition for review within 60 days after the

date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 2012). If

you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. You may choose to request

review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the

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Federal Circuit or any other court of appeals of competent jurisdiction, but not

both. Once you choose to seek review in one court of appeals, you may be

precluded from seeking review in any other court.

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.

Additional information about the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants," which is

contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.

Additional information about other courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed

through http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website

at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono

representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal

Circuit. The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services

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provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation

in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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