Opinion

Manuel v. Custodio v. Office of Personnel Management

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
May 28, 2015
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.5%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MANUEL V. CUSTODIO, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, SF-0831-15-0018-I-1

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DATE: May 28, 2015

MANAGEMENT,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NO NPRECEDENTIAL 1

Rodelio V. Mendoza, Camarines Sur, Philippines, for the appellant.

Cynthia Reinhold, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed his retirement appeal as barred by res judicata. Generally, we grant

petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

sign ificantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to

the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or

the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an

abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or

new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the

petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5

of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).

After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following

points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any

basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we

DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by this Final

Order, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

¶2 On July 10, 2014, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) sent a letter

to the appellant stating that it had received his application to make a redeposit

under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). Initial Appeal File (IAF),

Tab 9 at 5. However, OPM determined that the appellant was not entitled to

make a redeposit because he had received a refund of all deductions that had been

withheld during his employment. Id. OPM also informed the appellant that it

would include MSPB documents from his prior appeal and of his right to request

reconsideration. 2 Id. OPM stated that the letter represented an initial decision.

Id. The appellant claims that he requested reconsideration, IAF, Tab 1 at 9, but

there is no evidence of any such request in the record in this appeal.

¶3 The appellant filed the instant appeal on October 4, 2014, and asserted that

OPM had refused to issue him a reconsideration decision despite repeated

requests. IAF, Tab 1 at 9. The administrative judge issued orders stating that the

2

OPM informed the appellant that, if he became re-employed in the federal service in a

position subject to retirement deductions, he could file another application to make a

redeposit. IAF, Tab 9 at 5. The record does not reflect that the appellant has been

employed in the federal government subsequent to his receipt of the refund.

3

Board may lack jurisdiction over the appeal, IAF, Tab 2, and that the claim may

be barred by res judicata, IAF, Tab 10. The appellant responded to both orders.

IAF, Tabs 4, 11. OPM responded that the Board may lack jurisdiction because

OPM had not issued a reconsideration decision and that the issuance of a July 10,

2014 letter as an initial decision may have been in error because the Board had

already ruled on the appellant’s ability to make a redeposit. IAF, Tab 9 at 4.

¶4 In her initial decision, the administrative judge suggested that the Board

could exercise jurisdiction over the appeal because OPM did not intend to issue a

reconsideration decision, but found that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the

appellant’s claims of entitlement to make a redeposit for his federal service and to

a deferred annuity were barred by res judicata. IAF, Tab 12, Initial Decision

(ID). The appellant has filed a timely petition for review in which he asserts that

his claim is not barred by res judicata because the prior appeal did not address his

entitlement to a deferred annuity. 3 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-5.

The agency has filed a response, PFR File, Tab 3, and the appellant has filed a

reply, PFR File, Tab 5. 4

¶5 In the appellant’s previous appeal, the administrative judge found that the

appellant had asserted before OPM that he was entitled to (1) an annuity under

the CSRS, (2) a disability annuity under the CSRS, and (3) an opportunity to

make a redeposit under the CSRS. Custodio v. Office of Personnel Management,

MSPB Docket No. SF-0831-09-0810-B-1 (Custodio I), Initial Decision (ID) at 3

3

Although the appellant presents general arguments concerning equitable estoppel, PFR

File, Tab 1 at 4-5, we find that these arguments do not affect the result in this case

because he has presented no evidence or argument establishing affirmative misconduct

on the part of government officials or that he reasonably relied, to his detriment, on

misrepresentation or misconduct of government officials, see Perez Peraza v. Office of

Personnel Management, 114 M.S.P.R. 457, ¶ 9 (2010).

4

After h is reply, the appellant filed a motion for leave to file an additional pleading.

PFR File, Tab 8. We DENY the appellant’s request because he has not shown the need

for such a pleading or that it is based upon evidence that was not readily available

before the record closed. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114.

4

(Aug. 20, 2010). In relevant part, the administrative judge found that the

appellant had not established his eligibility to receive an annuity under the CSRS

or to make a redeposit under the CSRS because he had received a refund of his

retirement contributions. 5 Custodio I, ID at 4-7.

¶6 Based upon our consideration of the prior appeal, we find that this appeal is

barred by res judicata. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a valid, final judgment

on the merits of an action bars a second action involving the same parties or their

privies based on the same cause of action. Encarnado v. Office of Personnel

Management, 116 M.S.P.R. 301, ¶ 10 (2011). Res judicata precludes parties from

relitigating issues that were, or could have been, raised in the prior action, and is

applicable if: (1) the prior judgment was rendered by a forum with competent

jurisdiction; (2) the prior judgment was a final judgment on the merits; and

(3) the same cause of action and the same parties or their privies were involved in

both cases. Id.

¶7 We find that the criteria for the application of res judicata are met here.

There is no dispute that the Board had jurisdiction to decide the prior appeal

under 5 U.S.C. § 8347(d) and 5 C.F.R. § 831.110. We also find that the

administrative judge’s prior initial decision was a final judgment on the merits

regarding the issue of the appellant’s right to an annuity under the CSRS and his

right to make a redeposit. Custodio I, ID. The administrative judge issued an

initial decision on these issues that became final when the appellant did not file a

petition for review as to the issues. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(a); see Custodio I, ID.

It is also undisputed that the two actions involve the same parties.

¶8 As to whether the prior appeal and the current appeal involve the same

causes of action, the appellant argues that the two causes of action are different

5

The appellant filed petitions for review as to the administrative judge’s finding

concerning the timeliness of his application for disability retirement but did not file a

petition for review as to his right to an annuity under the CSRS or his right to make a

redeposit. See Custodio v. Office of Personnel Management, 116 M.S.P.R. 350 (Table),

aff’d, 468 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 411 (Mem.) (2012).

5

because he currently appeals the right to make a redeposit in order to be entitled

to a deferred annuity while his prior appeal involved his right to make a redeposit

in order to be entitled to an immediate annuity. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. We find

that the prior decision did address the appellant’s entitlement to a deferred

annuity and his right to make a redeposit in order to receive a deferred annuity

because the administrative judge stated that the appellant had applied for a

deferred annuity but found that he was ineligible to make a redeposit and was not

entitled to any of his requested benefits under the CSRS. Custodio I, ID at 2, 5,

7.

¶9 Even if the appellant had not previously raised the issue of his right to make

a redeposit in order to receive a deferred annuity, that claim would still be barred.

The Board held in Encarnado, 116 M.S.P.R. 301, ¶ 12, that a claim of entitlement

to make a redeposit for the purpose of receiving CSRS annuity benefits was

barred by res judicata where, in a prior appeal, the Board affirmed OPM’s

decision denying entitlement to CSRS annuity benefits based upon the same

period of service. See Encarnado v. Office of Personnel

Management, 91 M.S.P.R. 666 (2002) (Table). In so holding, the Board stated

that the causes of action were the same because both involved the appellant’s goal

of receiving a CSRS retirement annuity based upon the same period of service

and the appellant could have raised his entitlement to make a redeposit in the

prior appeal. Encarnado, 116 M.S.P.R. 301, ¶ 12. Similarly, even if the

appellant in the present case had not previously raised his right to make a

redeposit in order to receive a deferred annuity, he could have done so in the

earlier proceedings. Additionally, the causes of action are the same because both

involve the appellant’s goal of receiving a CSRS retirement annuity based upon

6

the same period of service. Accordingly, we find that the appeal is barred by res

judicata and must be dismissed. 6

¶10 To the extent that the administrative judge may have found that the Board

would have jurisdiction over the present appeal because OPM does not intend to

issue a reconsideration decision, we modify the initial decision regarding the

basis for the Board’s jurisdiction. See ID at 2-3. Generally, the Board has

jurisdiction over OPM determinations affecting an appellant’s rights and interests

under the CSRS only after OPM has issued a final decision in the matter. Reid v.

Office of Personnel Management, 120 M.S.P.R. 83, ¶ 6 (2013). In finding

jurisdiction over this appeal, the administrative judge applied an exception to that

general rule that permits the Board to take jurisdiction where the evidence

indicates that OPM did not intend to issue a reconsideration decision. See ID

at 2-3 (citing Johnson v. Office of Personnel Management, 97 M.S.P.R. 193, ¶ 6

(2004)). However, we find that no exception to the general rule is necessary in

this case. In Muyco v. Office of Personnel Management, 104 M.S.P.R. 557, ¶ 3

(2007), the Board affirmed the administrative judge’s determination that, to the

extent that the appellant’s appeal was an attempt to re-litigate a prior

reconsideration decision, the appeal was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Id., ¶ 8. Because the Board must have jurisdiction in order to apply the doctrine

of res judicata, see Noble v. U.S. Postal Service, 93 M.S.P.R. 693, ¶ 7 (2003), the

Board in Muyco implicitly held that OPM’s original reconsideration decision was

sufficient to confer jurisdiction, see Muyco, 104 M.S.P.R. 557, ¶ 8. 7 Consistent

6

We modify the initial decision to the extent that the administrative judge found that

the Board lacks jurisdiction because the appellant’s claims are barred by res judicata,

ID at 3, and instead find that the appeal is barred by res judicata, see Noble v. U.S.

Postal Service, 93 M.S.P.R. 693, ¶ 7 (2003) (the doctrine of res judicata is not grounds

upon which to dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction but, rather, is a basis to dismiss

an appeal over which the Board has jurisdiction).

7

The Board in Muyco rejected the appellant’s argument that OPM had issued a new

appealable decision when it informed him that it would not change its prior decision.

7

with Muyco, we find that the Board has jurisdiction based upon the same OPM

decision that provided the basis for jurisdiction in Custodio I. 8

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You have the right to

request the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to review this

final decision. You must submit your request to the court at the following

address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.

27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has

held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline

and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See

Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

Muyco, 104 M.S.P.R. 557, ¶¶ 9-11. Thus, the original reconsideration decision was the

only available basis for Board jurisd iction.

8

We are not convinced on the existing record that OPM does not intend to issue a

reconsideration decision. See ID at 2-3. Although the appellant asserted in h is initial

appeal that he made repeated requests for reconsideration of OPM’s initial decision,

IAF, Tab 1 at 9, there is no evidence of such requests in the record. In addition, we

note that OPM’s July 10, 2014 initial decision gave the appellant 30 days to request

reconsideration. IAF, Tab 9 at 5. Thus, the appellant could have timely requested

reconsideration as late as August 9, 2014. The appellant filed his appeal less than

2 months later on October 4, 2014. IAF, Tab 1. Given the relatively short period of

time between the deadline for requesting reconsideration and the filing of the initial

appeal, we do not interpret the absence of a reconsideration decision as an indication

that OPM does not intend to issue such a decision. Cf. Okello v. Office of Personnel

Management, 120 M.S.P.R. 498, ¶ 15 (2014) (taking jurisdiction based on OPM’s

failure to issue a final decision despite repeated requests over the course of 6 years).

8

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.

Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.

Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and

Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5,

6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website

at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono

representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal

Circuit. The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services

provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation

in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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