Sesay v. Attorney General of the United States

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-2996

___________

MUSA SESAY,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

____________________________________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA No. A094-244-759)

Immigration Judge: Honorable Annie S. Garcy

____________________________________

Argued on January 22, 2015

Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

(Filed: May 26, 2015)

_____________

Thomas V. Massucci, Esq. (Argued)

Suite 908

401 Broadway

New York, NY 10013

Counsel for Petitioner

Loretta Lynch, Esq.

Thomas W. Hussey, Esq.

Jeffrey L. Menkin, Esq. (Argued)

Benjamin Zeitlin, Esq.

United States Department of Justice

Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division

P.O. Box 878

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Respondent

___________

OPINION

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge:

In the midst of Sierra Leone’s catastrophic civil war,

Musa Sesay was forced to provide assistance to a terrorist

group while facing regular beatings and the barrel of a gun.

He resisted when possible and escaped when he could. In

short, he was himself a victim of terrorist violence, and, to the

extent he provided any aid to the group, he did so under

duress. However, because the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) concluded that there was no duress exception to the

bar on asylum or withholding of removal for aliens who

2

provide material support to terrorist groups, it found him

ineligible for relief.

Sesay now petitions for review of the BIA’s order

denying his application for asylum and ordering him removed

from the United States, and we must decide for the first time

whether there is a duress exception to the material support

bar. While we are sympathetic to Sesay’s plight, long-

standing canons of statutory construction and the opinions of

our sister Circuits on this issue convince us that there is no

such exception. Thus, we will deny the petition for review.

I. Facts1

The facts relevant here date back to early 2001, the

eleventh year of what is widely recognized as a brutal civil

war in Sierra Leone.2 Amid the humanitarian catastrophe,

1

We take our facts from the final order of the BIA,

and to the extent the BIA relied upon it, the Immigration

Judge’s decision. See Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781

F.3d 677, 684 n.5 (3d Cir. 2015).

2

As described by a contemporaneous State

Department report, the war was replete with a ghastly array of

atrocities against civilians, including the amputation of ears,

noses, hands, arms, and legs of noncombatants; the use of

rape as a terror tactic; the abduction and forced conscription

of children into service as soldiers and sexual slaves; the

massacre of fleeing civilians; and the coercion of citizens

under penalty of mutilation or death to commit atrocities

themselves. See U.S. Dep’t of State, 1999 Country Reports

on Human Rights Practices: Sierra Leone (2000), available at

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/270.htm, A.R. 228-

3

and at a time when a fragile peace accord had largely failed,

Sesay lived with his family in the country’s capital, Freetown.

One night in early 2001, three rebels from the Revolutionary

United Front (“RUF”) forcibly entered Sesay’s home and

demanded he join the RUF. When he refused, and while his

parents pleaded for his safety, the rebels blindfolded him and

took him away. Upon arriving at a windowless room, the

rebels again demanded he join the RUF, again beat him when

he said no, and imprisoned him. Over approximately the next

month, the rebels periodically asked whether he was ready to

join the RUF. Each time, he refused. And each time, they

beat him in response.

After about one month of imprisonment, the rebels

moved Sesay to a RUF encampment where he witnessed

some captives being executed and saw others with missing

body parts. While there, the rebels tried to train him to use a

machine gun. Again, he refused. Because Sesay was

untrained in weaponry, the rebels forced him instead to

provide menial assistance. Specifically, on approximately

five occasions, he entered the Sierra Leone jungle with the

rebels during active fighting. RUF trucks, however, had

trouble traversing the jungle terrain. As a result, the rebels

forced Sesay and others to carry their weapons, ammunition,

drinking water, and food, and to load and unload these

29, 233, 240. By the time the eleven-year-long war ended in

2002, as many as two million citizens were displaced. See

Mohammed Fofana, Sierra Leone: Political Rivalry Spills

over into Street Violence, Inter Press Service, August 18,

2008, A.R. 318.

4

provisions from the trucks. Sesay complied under

supervision of an armed guard.

After about one month in the encampment, Sesay used

the chaos of war to his advantage. When Guinean aircraft

approached the encampment, frightening the rebels, Sesay

escaped, fleeing to neighboring Guinea, and eventually,

Gambia. In May 2001, he entered the United States and soon

thereafter applied for asylum. Except for a permitted trip to

visit his ill mother, he has been in the United States ever

since. In December 2009, he was served with a Notice to

Appear, and proceedings before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

followed.

II. Legal Standards and Procedural History

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),

an alien seeking asylum must demonstrate either (i) proof of

past persecution, or (ii) a well-founded fear of future

persecution in his home country “on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see Camara v.

Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2009). “Although

these two roads to asylum are doctrinally distinct from one

another, they intersect.” Camara, 580 F.3d at 202.

Specifically, a well-founded fear of future persecution,

without more, entitles an applicant to asylum. Id. But a

“demonstration of past persecution can be rebutted by the

government if the government ‘establishes by a

preponderance of the evidence that the applicant could

reasonably avoid persecution by relocating to another part of

his or her country or that conditions in the applicant’s country

have changed so as to make his or her fear no longer

5

reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d

587, 592 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003)).

An application for withholding of removal is reviewed

under a more stringent standard. In that case, an alien “must

establish a clear probability, that is, that it is more likely than

not that [his] life or freedom would be threatened if returned

to [his] country” because of his protected class. Kaita v. Att’y

Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Regardless of whether an alien demonstrates he is

eligible for relief, he will be deemed inadmissible and

ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal if he has

engaged in terrorist activities, including the provision of

material support for terrorist groups. 8 U.S.C. §§

1158(b)(2)(A)(v), 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), 1231(b)(3)(B),

1227(a)(4)(B).

A. Decision of the Immigration Judge

After conducting a hearing and considering evidence,

the IJ found Sesay credible and concluded that he was a

victim of past persecution on account of his membership in a

particular social group, i.e., those who vocally opposed forced

conscription into the RUF. As a result, he was entitled to a

rebuttable presumption of future persecution. See Camara,

580 F.3d at 202. The IJ found, however, that the Government

rebutted this presumption by demonstrating that in the years

since Sesay fled, the RUF disbanded, and reconciliation in

Sierra Leone generally has been successful. Accordingly,

with the presumption of future persecution rebutted, the IJ

found Sesay ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal.

6

In the alternative, the IJ also found Sesay ineligible for

asylum and withholding of removal because he provided

material support to the RUF, the same group that beat him,

imprisoned him, and forced him to provide menial labor

under threat of death. To reach this determination, the IJ

found that the RUF was an unclassified, or Tier III, terrorist

organization.3 Then, citing our holdings in McAllister v.

Attorney General, 444 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2006), and Singh-

Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004), the IJ found

that Sesay’s carrying of weapons, ammunition, food, and

water for the RUF constituted material support. Finally, the

IJ conducted a statutory analysis of the INA and concluded

that it does not contain a duress exception to the material

support bar. The fact that Sesay’s actions were involuntary,

the IJ found, was irrelevant.

B. Proceedings before the BIA

In a single-member, non-precedential opinion, the BIA

affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Sesay’s appeal. The

3

A Tier III terrorist organization is defined as a “group

of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which

engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, [terrorist

activities.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). The parties

agree that the RUF was a Tier III terrorist organization during

the relevant time period and that Sesay understood this for

purposes of the Act. After Sesay left Sierra Leone, the RUF

was designated as a Tier II terrorist organization. See

Designation of 39 “Terrorist Organizations” Under the

“PATRIOT USA Act,” 66 Fed. Reg. 63620-01 (Dec. 7,

2001). The distinction between these two categories is not

material to our disposition here.

7

BIA did not consider whether Sesay had a well-founded fear

of future persecution. Instead, it agreed with the IJ that

Sesay’s actions constituted material support for terrorism and

that there was no duress exception.

Sesay now petitions for review of the BIA decision.

The parties agree that two issues are presented: whether the

record supports that Sesay provided material support for

terrorism, and if so, whether there is a duress exception to the

material support bar.

III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Where, as here, the BIA

“relie[d] on an IJ’s legal conclusions and findings of fact, we

review the IJ’s decision and the Board’s decision.” Gonzalez-

Posadas, 781 F.3d at 684 n.5. In doing so, we “accept factual

findings if supported by substantial evidence,” a deferential

standard under which we “uphold the agency’s determination

unless the evidence would compel any reasonable fact finder

to reach a contrary result.” Id.4

4

The BIA adopted, or at minimum, expressed no

disagreement, with the IJ’s determination that Sesay was

credible. “As a practical matter, therefore, we must proceed

as if [Sesay’s] testimony were credible and determine

whether the BIA’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence in the face of his assumed (but not determined)

credibility.” Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir.

2003). Regardless, Sesay’s unchallenged credibility is not

significant to the disposition of our case. See id.

8

We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo,

ordinarily subject to the principles of deference set forth in

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984). Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602

F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010). We do not, however, give

Chevron deference to unpublished, single-member BIA

decisions such as the one here. Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d

170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014). At most, we treat those decisions as

persuasive authority. Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323

U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).

IV. Discussion

A. The Material Support Bar

The INA prevents an alien from receiving a grant of

asylum or withholding of removal if that alien has engaged in,

is engaged in, or is likely to engage in terrorism. “The INA

defines [these terms] broadly.” Haile v. Holder, 658 F.3d

1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2011). Engaging in terrorist activities,

for example, includes “commit[ting] an act that the actor

knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support .

. . . to a terrorist organization . . . or to any member of such an

organization, unless the actor can demonstrate by clear and

convincing evidence that the actor did not know, and should

not reasonably have known, that the organization was a

terrorist organization.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).

We first considered the meaning of material support in

Singh-Kaur. 385 F.3d at 298-301. There, the asylum

applicant, Singh-Kaur, was a member of a Sikh separatist

group in India that was “fighting the Indian government,” for

which he provided food and set up tents at the group’s

religious meetings. Id. at 296, 299-301. We concluded that

9

Singh-Kaur’s actions, even if non-violent and tangential to

any specific terrorist acts, were sufficient to count as material

support and thus to render him ineligible for a grant of

asylum. Id. at 300-01. It was enough, we held, that he

provided general support to a group that had terrorist aims.

Id. at 301.5

Since Singh-Kaur, the BIA and Courts of Appeals

have repeatedly upheld findings that an alien’s support was

material, even if it was relatively low-level. See Bojnoordi v.

Holder, 757 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding

finding of material support because the alien “passed out

flyers, wrote articles, and trained [a terrorist group’s]

5

The Supreme Court has taken a similarly expansive

view of what constitutes material support in the context of the

criminal statute banning material support, stating that

“[m]aterial support meant to promote peaceable, lawful

conduct can further terrorism by foreign groups in multiple

ways.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 30

(2010) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation

omitted); id. at 36 (“At bottom, plaintiffs simply disagree

with the considered judgment of Congress and the Executive

that providing material support to a designated foreign

terrorist organization—even seemingly benign support—

bolsters the terrorist activities of that organization. That

judgment, however, is entitled to significant weight, and we

have persuasive evidence before us to sustain it.”); see also

McAllister, 444 F.3d at 187 (observing that “the INA’s

definition of ‘terrorist activity’ certainly encompasses more

conduct than our society, and perhaps even Congress, has

come to associate with traditional acts of terrorism, e.g., car

bombs and assassinations”).

10

members on the use of guns in the mountains outside Tehran,

knowing that this training would further [the terrorist group’s]

goals”); Viegas v. Holder, 699 F.3d 798, 803 (4th Cir. 2012)

(upholding finding of material support because the alien “paid

dues and hung posters” for a terrorist group); Barahona v.

Holder, 691 F.3d 349, 351-52, 356 (4th Cir. 2012) (upholding

finding of material support because the alien, under threat,

allowed terrorists to use his kitchen, gave them directions

through the jungle, and occasionally allowed them to stay

overnight); Haile, 658 F.3d at 1129 (upholding finding of

material support because the alien collected funds, passed

along secret documents and supplied the terrorist organization

with sugar, shoes, and cigarettes); Hussain v. Mukasey, 518

F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding finding of material

support because the alien recruited and solicited funds for a

terrorist group); In Re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 945-46 (BIA

2006) (upholding finding of material support because the

alien contributed a total of 1,100 Singapore dollars to a

terrorist group).

In the face of this case law, Sesay struggles to explain

why his actions do not qualify as material support. His

argument seems to be that the support he provided was so

small in size that it was not “material,” pursuant to the plain

meaning of that word. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary

1124 (10th ed. 2014) (defining material as “[h]aving some

logical connection with the consequential facts” and “[o]f

such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a

person’s decision-making; significant; essential”).

The BIA and Courts of Appeals have not squarely

addressed whether a de minimis exception exists in the

statute, although the BIA has held in a well-reasoned, not

precedential opinion that assistance must be more than de

11

minimis in order to give “material” some independent effect.

See In Re: * * *, 2009 WL 9133770, at *2 (BIA July 10,

2009) (observing that even if the items taken from the alien,

including “one packed lunch and the equivalent of about $4

U.S. dollars, which the terrorists expressly stated would be

used to buy beer,” constituted “‘support’ for the terrorists, it

cannot be said to be material”). We too, have held that

“material” must be ascribed some meaning. See Singh-Kaur,

385 F.3d at 298 (examining Black’s Law Dictionary

definition of the word).

We need not define the outer boundaries of materiality

today, however, because we conclude that Sesay’s actions

exceeded a de minimis threshold. That is, if providing food

and setting up tents at religious meetings constituted material

support in Singh-Kaur, 385 F.3d at 298-301, then so too does

carrying weapons and ammunition for a terrorist group during

a brutally violent conflict. Accordingly, the IJ and the BIA

were correct to find that Sesay provided material support to a

terrorist organization.

B. A Duress Exception to the Material

Support Bar

Sesay did not voluntarily provide material support to a

terrorist group. To the contrary, he did so while being

regularly assaulted and under the threat of death or severe

bodily harm. Thus, we must grapple with an issue that our

Circuit has yet to address: whether involuntary material

support, even when provided under threat of death, bars an

alien from receiving asylum or withholding of removal. We

conclude that it does.

12

We begin with the plain text of the statute, which does

not provide for a duress exception to the material support bar.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (stating that an alien is

inadmissible if he “commit[s] an act that [he] knows, or

reasonably should know, affords material support” to a

terrorist organization). In isolation, statutory silence may not

be conclusive. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 518

(2009). The silence here, however, speaks volumes, given the

express exception to the material support bar for aliens who

“demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [they] did

not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the

organization was a terrorist organization.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd). Thus, we agree with the

observation of the Ninth Circuit in addressing this issue:

“That Congress included this express [knowledge] exception

within the provision is some indication that it would have

likewise expressly excepted involuntary support if it intended

to do so.” Annachamy v. Holder, 733 F.3d 254, 260 (9th Cir.

2013), overruled on other grounds by Abdisalan v. Holder,

774 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 2014).

Moreover, a neighboring subsection of the statute

contains an exception precisely for involuntariness. That

subsection, the so-called “totalitarian bar,” renders

inadmissible any alien who “has been a member of or

affiliated with the Communist or any other totalitarian party

(or subdivision or affiliate thereof), domestic or foreign,” but

expressly excepts an alien who demonstrates “that the

membership or affiliation is or was involuntary.” 8 U.S.C §

1182(a)(3)(D)(i)-(ii); see also Alturo v. Att’y Gen., 716 F.3d

1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2013) (observing that the lack of duress

exception “stands in marked contrast to a neighboring

provision in the INA that includes an explicit involuntariness

13

exception for aliens who have been affiliated with a

totalitarian party”); Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 261 (same).

Thus, the omission of such an exception in §

1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) is telling, for “the Supreme Court [has]

observed that ‘[w]here Congress includes particular language

in one section of a statute but omits it from another, it is

generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and

purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” Shalom

Pentecostal Church v. Acting Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland

Sec., 783 F.3d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Russello v.

United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).6

Subsequent events also throw Congress’s intent into

sharp relief. In 2005, Congress amended the INA to grant the

Secretaries of State and Homeland Security the “sole

unreviewable discretion” to waive the material support bar’s

restrictions in limited circumstances. Emergency

Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global

War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-

13, § 104, 119 Stat. 231, 309. Pursuant to this authority, the

Secretary of Homeland Security announced that the material

support bar could be waived for aliens who provided material

support under duress, pursuant to a number of different

factors. See Exercise of Authority Under Section

6

And while the canon is arguably less applicable,

given that the material support bar and the totalitarian bar

were enacted by different Congresses, see Singh-Kaur, 385

F.3d at 299, it is telling that Congress “updated the

totalitarian party membership provision in the same

legislation in which it created the material support bar.”

Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 261 n.7 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing H.R.

Conf. Rep. No. 101-955, 1990 WL 201613, at § 601).

14

212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 72

Fed. Reg. 26138-02 (May 8, 2007) (announcing waiver

scheme for Tier I and II terrorist groups); Exercise of

Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration

and Nationality Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 9958–01 (Mar. 6, 2007)

(announcing waiver scheme for Tier III terrorist groups).

Congress reacted quickly to those regulations. First, it

expanded the Secretaries’ ability to grant waivers,

“permit[ting] the Secretar[ies] to waive almost all of the

terrorism-related bars,” Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 263 n.10, but

not extending that power to waivers for aliens who

“voluntarily and knowingly” were members of Tier I or Tier

II organizations or who “voluntarily and knowingly” provided

support to those same organizations. 7 See Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 691(a), 121

Stat. 1844. Second, it created a mechanism for the Secretary

of Homeland Security to report to Congress on the number of

7

Sesay did not apply for a waiver early on for a reason

that gives us considerable pause. As the Government

acknowledged at argument, almost ten years after Congress

granted the Executive Branch the power to grant waivers,

there remains no published process for requesting one,

although as represented by government counsel, numerous

requests have been granted through ad hoc submissions to

counsel for the Department of Homeland Security. See also

Ay, 743 F.3d at 321 (“At oral argument in the case at bar . . .

the Government was unable to identify any published process

for seeking such a waiver.”). After argument, Sesay’s

counsel did request a waiver through a letter to opposing

counsel, but, as he subsequently informed the Court, the

request was denied.

15

persons subject to removal for providing material support

under duress.8 See id. at § 691(e).

Given that the 2007 Amendments discussed duress

waivers and voluntariness, and required reporting on persons

removed for having provided material support under duress,

Congress clearly legislated on the premise that the material

support bar otherwise applied to support given under duress.

See Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 176-77 (3d

Cir. 2015) (observing that subsequent Congressional

amendments to a statute provide insight on Congressional

intent to the statute generally); Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 262

n.8 (“Although the waiver provision was not enacted until 15

years after the creation of the material support bar, the waiver

provision is still relevant in determining the earlier

congressional intent.”). To read the statute in any other way

would make Congress’s reporting requirement meaningless

and would contravene unambiguous legislative intent.

In sum, Congress has “delegat[ed] to the Secretary the

sole authority to waive the applicability of terrorist-related

bars, . . . has paid specific attention to duress waivers,” and

“has appreciated the distinction between voluntary and

8

In recent years, the Secretaries of State and

Homeland Security have continued to expand the categories

of activities eligible for waiver. See Exercise of Authority

Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 6914-01 (Feb. 5, 2014)

(creating waiver authority for aliens who provided “limited

material support” under “substantial pressure that does not

rise to the level of duress”).

16

involuntary conduct.” Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 263-64.9

Thus, absent a waiver from the Executive Branch, the INA

precludes asylum or withholding of removal for any alien

who provided material support, voluntarily or involuntarily.

***

We recognize the harsh consequence of our holding,

but it is compelled by policy decisions that reside with

Congress and the Executive Branch. See Humanitarian Law

Project, 561 U.S. at 33-34 (stating that the Judiciary must

often defer to Congress when considering legislation dealing

with the “sensitive and weighty interests of national security

9

Our conclusion is squarely in line with the Fourth

Circuit, Barahona, 691 F.3d at 353-56, the Ninth Circuit,

Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 260-66, and the Eleventh Circuit,

Alturo, 716 F.3d at 1314. The only court to have veered

somewhat from this path is the Second Circuit, which did not

reach a conclusion on the issue and instead remanded to the

BIA to issue a precedential decision on the matter. Ay v.

Holder, 743 F.3d 317, 320-21 (2d Cir. 2014). In a series of

not precedential opinions following Ay, the Second Circuit

has continued to remand for the same reason. See Gurung v.

Holder, 591 F. App’x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2014); Hernandez v.

Holder, 579 F. App’x 12, 15 (2d Cir. 2014); Ayvaz v. Holder,

564 F. App’x 625, 628 (2d Cir. 2014). We decline to take the

Second Circuit’s approach, for while we accord Chevron

deference to the BIA’s interpretations of ambiguity in the

INA, Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 551 (3d Cir. 2001),

we have no need to await a precedential decision from the

BIA when the issue is one of unambiguous statutory

interpretation.

17

and foreign affairs”). Accordingly, we join with our sister

Courts of Appeals and conclude that the material support bar

does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary

support. The BIA correctly held that Sesay is ineligible for

asylum or withholding of removal for having provided

material support to a terrorist group, and his petition for

review therefore will be denied.

18