State of Tennessee v. Julius Wiel Walton

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs March 11, 2015

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JULIUS WIEL WALTON

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Robertson County

No. 2013-CR-132 Michael R. Jones, Judge

No. M2014-01337-CCA-R3-CD – Filed May 12, 2015

The Defendant-Appellant, Julius Wiel Walton, was convicted by a Robertson County

jury of sexual battery for an incident involving his granddaughter. The trial court

sentenced the Defendant to two years to be served on probation. On appeal, the

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon

review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES

CURWOOD WITT, JR. and ROGER A. PAGE, JJ., joined.

Roger E. Nell, District Public Defender; Rosemary Thomas, Assistant District Public

Defender (on appeal); and Collier W. Goodlett, Assistant District Public Defender (at

trial), Springfield, Tennessee, for the Defendant-Appellant, Julius Wiel Walton.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael M. Stahl, Assistant

Attorney General; John W. Carney, District Attorney General; and Jason White, Assistant

District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On the evening of December 24, 2012, the victim, S.W.,1 was at her grandparents‟

house to celebrate Christmas Eve. It was a family tradition to celebrate the holiday at her

grandparents‟ house, and other family members were present that night, including her

father. The victim testified that she had visited her grandparents‟ home on many

1

It is the policy of this court to protect the victims of sex crimes by identifying them and their

relatives by their initials only.

occasions and regularly spent the night with her grandmother when her father was

traveling for work. She explained that her grandparents did not share a bedroom, and

although she had a “good relationship” with her grandfather, the Defendant in this case,

she did not talk with him often.

On the night of the incident, the family ate dinner together and then opened

presents. After opening presents, “everybody was sitting in the living room talking and

laughing and hanging out.” The victim was sitting with her grandmother when she

noticed the Defendant across the living room. He motioned to her to come over to him,

and when she complied, he told her “he had to show [her] a surprise,” and led her to his

bedroom. She testified that no one else was in the bedroom and that the Defendant

opened the top drawer of his dresser and pulled out a photograph of the victim. The

photograph was several years old and had been enlarged to an eight by ten size. The

victim testified that after the Defendant showed her the photograph, he “started talking

about how pretty [she] was” and told her that he would like to marry her. He stated that

“he especially likes it when he gets to hold [her],” and proceeded to “hug” her. He

attempted to kiss the victim, but she turned her head so he kissed her on the cheek. He

told her that she “was going to have to do better than that,” and then “tongue kissed” her

and “groped” one of her breasts over her clothes. The victim testified that the kiss lasted

“about three seconds” and that the Defendant stroked her breast “the time of the kiss.”

The victim testified that she was “kind of terrified” and “wanted to get out of there.” She

pulled away from the Defendant, and he told her, “I was just playing with you. I was just

messing.”

After the incident, the victim returned to the living room and asked her father if

they could leave. She did not say anything about the incident to anyone because she

“didn‟t want to ruin everybody‟s Christmas[.]” When she and her father arrived home,

she “got really emotional” and told her father what happened. Her father reported the

incident to the police later that evening, and she gave a statement at the Child Advocacy

Center several days later. The victim identified the Defendant in court as the man who

kissed her and stroked her breast on Christmas Eve 2012.

The Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial. He testified that he asked the

victim to follow him to his bedroom because he had an eight by ten photograph of her

that he wanted to give to her father. He testified that while she was in his bedroom, he

hugged her and gave her a “grandkid kiss,” but he denied sticking his tongue in her

mouth or touching her breast. He agreed that he touched the fabric on her dress near her

collar bone, explaining:

She had on a dress that had a thing across up here [near her collar bone] . . .

[and] I asked her, I said what is that honey? And she said it‟s leather. I

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said no, baby, it don‟t look like leather. And so I just over and touched it . .

. with one finger and I said it‟s not leather, baby. It‟s vinyl.

The Defendant also agreed that he complimented the victim on her appearance, stating,

“[A]ll my granddaughters I compliment because most of the time they dress and look

very decent and noble.” However, he denied telling the victim that he wanted to marry

her.

Following deliberations, the jury convicted the Defendant of sexual battery as

charged in the indictment. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years‟

supervised probation and ordered him to undergo a sex offender evaluation and register

on the Sex Offender Registry. On May 5, 2014, the Defendant filed a motion for new

trial, which was denied by the trial court on June 12, 2014. This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction for sexual battery. He contests the victim‟s characterization of their encounter

in his bedroom and insists that the State failed to establish that he touched the victim‟s

breast for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. The State responds that based

upon the evidence presented, a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that

the Defendant was guilty of sexual battery. We agree with the State.

When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the State is entitled to

the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be

drawn from that evidence. State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011) (citing

State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Tenn. 2010)). When a defendant challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review applied by this court is “whether, after

reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Similarly, Rule 13(e) of the Tennessee

Rules of Appellate Procedure states, “Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the

trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the finding by

the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” “Because a verdict of guilt removes

the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the criminal defendant

bears the burden on appeal of showing that the evidence was legally insufficient to

sustain a guilty verdict.” State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009).

Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence,

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d

776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (citing State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn.

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1977); Farmer v. State, 343 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1961)). The standard of review for

sufficiency of the evidence “„is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or

circumstantial evidence.‟” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting

State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)). The jury as the trier of fact must

evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight given to witnesses‟

testimony, and reconcile all conflicts in the evidence. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d

331, 335 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1978)). Moreover, the jury determines the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence

and the inferences to be drawn from this evidence, and the extent to which the

circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence are questions

primarily for the jury. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379 (citing State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d

646, 662 (Tenn. 2006)). When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this court

shall not reweigh the evidence or substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of

fact. Id.

In the case sub judice, the Defendant was convicted of sexual battery, which is

defined, as relevant to this case, as the “unlawful sexual contact with a victim by the

defendant . . . accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defendant knows or

has reason to know at the time of the contact that the victim did not consent.” T.C.A. §

39-13-505. Sexual contact includes “the intentional touching of the victim‟s . . . intimate

parts, or the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim‟s . . . intimate parts, if

that intentional touching can be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual

arousal or gratification[.]” Id. § 39-13-501(6). Intimate parts includes “semen, vaginal

fluid, the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttock or breast of a human being.” Id.

§ 39-13-501(2).

The determination of whether the contact was for the purpose of sexual arousal or

gratification is a question of fact for the jury. State v. Mahlon Johnson, No. W2011-

01786-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 501779, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 7, 2013) (citing

State v. Anthony Lee Hill, No. E2003-02998-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 623244, at *5

(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 10, 2005)). Further,

intent in sexual battery cases is often proved by circumstantial evidence, State v. Hayes,

899 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), and jurors may “use their common

knowledge and experience in making reasonable inferences from evidence,” State v.

Meeks, 876 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (concluding that the jury could

have drawn on common knowledge to reasonably infer that the defendant grabbed the

victim‟s breast for the purpose of sexual gratification). Additionally, this court has

previously held that “there is no requirement that the sexual contact itself be for sexual

arousal or gratification.” State v. Roy Chisenhall, No. M2003-00956-CCA-R3-CD, 2004

WL 1217118, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 3, 2004). The statute does not require that

the defendant become sexually aroused or gratified but merely requires touching that may

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be “reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The testimony of a minor victim, alone,

is sufficient to uphold a conviction for sexual battery so long as it establishes the

elements of the offense. See State v. Smith, 42 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tenn. Crim. App.

2000).

Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence in this case established

that the Defendant led the victim to his bedroom where the two were alone. The victim

testified that once inside of the Defendant‟s room, the Defendant told her that she was

pretty and that he would like to marry her. He then hugged her and kissed her on the

mouth. She testified that he put his tongue in her mouth while kissing her and groped or

stroked her breast. After the victim pulled away from the Defendant, the Defendant told

her that he was “just playing” with her. Based on this evidence, we conclude that a

rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant

touched the victim‟s “intimate parts” and that the touching “can be reasonably construed

as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification[.]” T.C.A. § 39-13-501(2), (6);

see Hayes, 899 S.W.2d at 180 (reasoning that the defendant‟s attempt to put his tongue in

the victim‟s mouth while kissing her provided circumstantial evidence of his intent); see

also State v. Michael A. Miller, No. E2000-00930-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 483410, at *6

(Tenn. Crim. App. May 8, 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 5, 2001) (reasoning that

circumstances surrounding the encounter, including the defendant‟s abruptly ending the

encounter upon hearing the victim‟s older brother walking up the stairs and the

defendant‟s instruction to the victim not to tell his parents what had occurred, provided

circumstantial evidence of his intent to touch the victim‟s penis for the purpose of sexual

arousal or gratification). Although the Defendant contested the victim‟s characterization

of their encounter in his bedroom, the jury clearly accredited the victim‟s account over

that of the Defendant as was their prerogative. We will not reweigh or reevaluate this

evidence on appeal. See Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379. The Defendant is not entitled to

relief.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and analysis, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

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CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE

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