Stanek v. St. Charles Community Unit School District 303

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 14-3012

MATTHEW STANEK, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ST. CHARLES COMMUNITY UNIT

SCHOOL DISTRICT #303, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13-cv-3106 — John W. Darrah, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 23, 2015— DECIDED APRIL 9, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit

Judges.

WOOD, Chief Judge. Matthew Stanek, now 20 years old,

is autistic. While he was a high school student in the St.

Charles Community Unit School District #303 (“the Dis-

trict”), he received special-education services. Although he is

now in college, he and his parents, Bogdan and Sandra

Stanek, still have some accounts to settle with the District.

2 No. 14-3012

Invoking their rights under the federal Constitution and sev-

eral laws, they have sued both the District and various ad-

ministrators and teachers for failing to provide necessary

educational services to Matthew before his graduation. The

district court dismissed the action against Bogdan and San-

dra on the theory that they lack standing to sue. Although

Matthew did have standing, the court dismissed his case for

failure to sue an appropriate party. We conclude that some of

these rulings do not withstand scrutiny. We therefore vacate

the dismissal in part and remand for further proceedings.

I

Our recitation of the facts relies upon the Staneks’ com-

plaint, accepting as true their factual allegations and draw-

ing all reasonable inferences in their favor. See Virnich v. Vor-

wald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 2011). Matthew was an A and

B honors student through his sophomore year in the District.

He achieved this performance with the help of the accom-

modations specified in his Individualized Education Pro-

gram (“IEP”), which provided for a variety of services to ad-

dress his social and communicative deficits. For example, it

allowed him extra time to complete tests and homework and

required teachers to provide him with study guides. But

when Matthew entered his junior year of high school, sever-

al of his teachers stopped giving him study guides or extra

time. They justified this action with the argument that it was

wrong to provide study guides in advanced classes and that

the extra time hurt rather than helped Matthew. At the same

time, the teachers pressured him to drop his ad-

vanced-placement and honors courses, asserting that these

classes would be too difficult.

No. 14-3012 3

Without the measures specified in the IEP, Matthew

started receiving failing grades in the AP and honors classes,

but he refused to drop them. Concerned, Bogdan and Sandra

scheduled a meeting at the school to discuss the situation.

That only made matters worse: some of Matthew’s teachers

began neglecting to record good grades he had earned and

recording grades lower than those he actually had earned.

These teachers also refused to give Matthew credit for com-

pleted work and ignored his questions about his assign-

ments. Matthew became distressed and anxious, and he be-

gan to suffer headaches and nausea and to miss school. His

parents were forced to hire a tutor to compensate for the pe-

riods when he was out of school or too distraught to learn.

School administrators also began ignoring Bogdan and San-

dra’s requests for Matthew’s educational records and refused

to meet with them.

Six months into his junior year, Matthew came due for a

mandatory special-education reevaluation. By law the Dis-

trict was required to obtain Bogdan and Sandra’s consent to

proceed with the reevaluation. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(c). But

by then they did not trust his teachers, and so they refused

to consent. Unable to hold the reevaluation meeting, the

school administrators filed an administrative complaint to

overrule the need for parental consent. See id. § 300.507(a).

The three Staneks responded with a cross-complaint alleging

that the District and several teachers and administrators had

denied educational services to Matthew and had discrimi-

nated and retaliated against him and his parents. Mediation

proved fruitless, and eventually the hearing officer dis-

missed the Staneks’ complaint for failure to comply with

prehearing requirements. By then Matthew was 19 years old

and in college. As we understand matters, however, he still

4 No. 14-3012

would have been able to take advantage of some services

from the District despite that fact, and he was financially in-

jured because the District’s actions had forced his parents to

hire the tutor.

II

The Staneks turned to state court, where they sought re-

view of the hearing officer’s decision as well as relief against

the District and several administrators and teachers in their

individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in-

voking the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 to 1418, the Rehabilitation Act,

29 U.S.C. §§ 701 to 796l, the Americans with Disabilities Act,

42 U.S.C. §§ 12201 to 12213 (“ADA”), and the Fourteenth

Amendment. They contended that the defendants had de-

nied Matthew a “free appropriate public education,” dis-

criminated against him based on his disabilities, retaliated

against him based on his parents’ advocacy, denied the par-

ents their right to participate in Matthew’s special-education

process, and retaliated against the parents for asserting that

right.

The defendants removed the suit to federal court and

promptly filed a motion to dismiss. They argued that the

Staneks have sued the wrong parties, that the parents are

trying to litigate claims belonging to Matthew, and that the

parents fail to state any claim of their own. They did not con-

tend, however, that Matthew fails to state a claim for relief,

assuming that the complaint names proper defendants. And

although the individual defendants asserted qualified im-

munity as a defense to the plaintiffs’ individual-capacity

theories under § 1983, none of the defendants raised lack of

exhaustion as an affirmative defense.

No. 14-3012 5

The district court for the most part was persuaded by the

defendants’ arguments. Characterizing the lawsuit as one

brought by the parents “only on behalf of Matthew,” the

court first concluded that Bogdan and Sandra lacked stand-

ing to sue. It reasoned that their only possible claim arose

under IDEA, but their right to press that claim had reverted

to Matthew when he turned 18 years old. It dismissed each

of the individual defendants in their individual capacities.

With respect to the statutory claims, the court held that the

plaintiffs had no right of action against individual persons;

with respect to the constitutional claim, the court held that

the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Turning

to the official-capacity claims, the court found that the inclu-

sion of the individual defendants was “redundant and un-

necessary” since their employer, the District, is a named de-

fendant “who has had an opportunity to respond to the

suit.” Nevertheless, the court did not permit the suit against

the District to go forward, because it thought that the school

board, not the District, was the “proper party to be sued.” It

gave Matthew, though not his parents, leave to file an

amended complaint against the board within 30 days. When

Matthew chose not to do so, the court closed the case.

III

All three Staneks have appealed. The defendants assert

that the principal issue on appeal is whether the district

court abused its discretion in terminating the lawsuit after

Matthew ignored the court’s deadline for filing an amended

complaint. They analogize the court’s order to a dismissal for

failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(b). That is both incorrect and, in this case, a self-defeating

strategy. If we thought that the district court had imposed

6 No. 14-3012

such a drastic sanction without an explicit warning, we

would probably conclude that the court abused its discre-

tion. See Sroga v. Huberman, 722 F.3d 980, 982–83 (7th Cir.

2013); Gabriel v. Hamlin, 514 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 2008). But

the district court in fact simply followed decisions from this

court encouraging district judges to allow time to file poten-

tially curative amendments before closing a good lawsuit

with a defective complaint. See Williams v. Wahner, 731 F.3d

731, 734 (7th Cir. 2013). In this instance, the court had dis-

missed a good portion of the Staneks’ complaint with preju-

dice, plainly foreclosing the possibility of a successful

amendment to that part of the case. And only Matthew, not

his parents, was invited to amend. He was under no obliga-

tion to do so, however. Like any plaintiff, he was entitled to

accept the dismissal as one with prejudice and take an ap-

peal in which he could test the legal sufficiency of his com-

plaint. Cf. Anderson v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 759 F.3d 645, 649

(7th Cir. 2014); Furnace v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 218 F.3d

666, 669–70 (7th Cir. 2000). Matthew’s choice not to file an

amended complaint is irrelevant to this appeal, and so we

move on to the Staneks’ arguments.

A

The Staneks first contend that the district court improper-

ly dismissed the District in the belief that a school district is

not itself amenable to suit and can be sued only through its

board. We agree with the Staneks here. IDEA designates the

“local educational agency” as the proper defendant. 20

U.S.C. § 1413. Illinois, in turn, defines the “local educational

agency” for purposes of IDEA to include a school board or

school district. 20 U.S.C. § 7801(26); 105 ILCS 105/3(d); see

also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(A). We have not faced the question

No. 14-3012 7

whether an Illinois school district may be sued in its own

name, but see 105 ILCS 5/10-2 (providing that the “directors

of each district” may sue and be sued), though we have ad-

judicated many special-education suits brought by and

against school districts in Illinois, see, e.g., M.B. v. Hamilton

Se. Schs., 668 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2011); McCormick v. Waukegan

Sch. Dist. No. 60, 374 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2004); Evanston Cmty.

Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 65 v. Michael M., 356 F.3d 798 (7th Cir.

2004); Rodiriecus L. v. Waukegan Sch. Dist. No. 60, 90 F.3d 249

(7th Cir. 1996); Gary A. v. New Trier High Sch. Dist. No. 203,

796 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1986). We freely acknowledge that the

unexamined assumptions of prior cases do not control the

disposition of a contested issue. See, e.g., Dahlstrom v. Sun-

Times Media, 777 F.3d 937, 945 (7th Cir. 2015). This case, how-

ever, does not require us to break any new ground. The

Staneks named as a defendant the superintendent in his offi-

cial capacity, in which he “stands in for the agency he man-

ages”—in this case the school board. See Walker v. Snyder,

213 F.3d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000) (abrogated on other grounds

by Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 536 (2001)); see also

Malone v. Nielson, 474 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2007) (lead defendant

is superintendent in official capacity, and neither district nor

school board are named defendants); Sanville v. McCaughtry,

266 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Official capacity suits are

actions against the government entity of which the official is

a part.”). The defendants more or less concede this by mak-

ing the circular argument that all of the individual defend-

ants named in their official capacity—the superintendent

among them—are “redundant and unnecessary parties” be-

cause their “employer, the School District, is a named party.”

The court therefore should not have cast aside the suit, inso-

8 No. 14-3012

far as it ran against the District or the school board, so quick-

ly.

B

1

With at least one proper plaintiff and proper defendant,

we are now ready to consider whether the Staneks’ com-

plaint states a claim for relief. We start with Matthew’s statu-

tory claims. Matthew contends that the complaint sufficient-

ly alleges that the District denied him a free appropriate

public education. Again, we agree with him. There is more

than enough detail in this complaint to put the defendants

on notice. Matthew alleges that his school denied him the

study guides and extra time to complete tests and home-

work that his IEP required, and that as a result he began fail-

ing classes in subjects in which he had received As and Bs in

previous years. That is sufficient to state a claim for a denial

of a free appropriate public education. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2); Bd. of Educ. of

Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189

(1982) (“[T]he definition also requires that such instruction

and services … comport with the child’s IEP.”); Van Duyn v.

Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 821–22 (9th Cir. 2007). It is

also easy to envision an appropriate remedy, since the Dis-

trict can be compelled to provide current services to address

deficits caused by past unlawful conduct. See McCormick,

374 F.3d at 568 n.1.

Matthew also argues that it was error to dismiss his dis-

crimination claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29

U.S.C. § 794, and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A disabled

plaintiff making a discrimination claim under either § 504 or

No. 14-3012 9

the ADA must allege that he was qualified under the statute

for a particular program and was discriminated against be-

cause of his disability. See S.S. v. E. Ky. Univ., 532 F.3d 445,

453 (6th Cir. 2008); Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir.

1999); see also Jaros v. Ill. Dep't of Corrs., 684 F.3d 667, 671–73

(7th Cir. 2012). It is true that something more than a bare vio-

lation of IDEA is required to establish disability discrimina-

tion in an educational program. CTL v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743

F.3d 524, 529–30 (7th Cir. 2014); Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas,

141 F.3d 524, 528–29 (4th Cir. 1998). But Matthew has alleged

enough to state a plausible claim. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). He says that because of his

autism and the extra attention he needed, his teachers tried

to push him out of their classes, refused to comply with his

IEP, and even required him to work on group projects when

his disability prevents him from being able to work with

peers. This treatment caused him extreme anxiety, loss of

self-esteem, emotional stress, and physical pain, and pre-

vented him from attending school every day, resulting in lost

educational opportunity. At this stage in the litigation, that is

sufficient. See CTL, 743 F.3d at 529–30; Sellers, 141 F.3d at

528–29.

Matthew’s retaliation claim, on the other hand, was cor-

rectly dismissed. Matthew, like his parents, contends that the

District retaliated after Bogdan and Sandra asserted their

rights under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. The ques-

tion here is whose rights Matthew is trying to assert. Both

the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA make it unlawful to re-

taliate for the exercise of rights conferred by those statutes.

See Cassimy v. Bd. of Educ. of Rockford Pub. Schs. Dist. #205,

461 F.3d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 2006). Matthew’s allegation focuses

on actions the District took against his parents after they at-

10 No. 14-3012

tempted to assert their own statutory rights concerning his

education. Crucially, Matthew does not say that the District

retaliated against him based on any protected action that he

took. Without such an allegation, he has not stated a claim

for retaliation. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct.

863, 867–68 (2011) (holding that employer’s adverse action

taken against third party is retaliation against employee, not

third party); Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office,

530 F.3d 368, 374 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting third-party retalia-

tion claims under ADA and Age Discrimination in Employ-

ment Act). This does not, however, foreclose a retaliation

claim by Bogdan and Sandra, as we will see.

2

We turn next to Bogdan and Sandra’s statutory claims.

They begin by arguing that the dismissal of their IDEA claim

was premature. They urge that they are real parties in inter-

est because, contrary to the district court’s understanding,

the District also violated their rights under statute, not just

Matthew’s. A careful reading of the complaint shows this to

be true. To state a claim under IDEA they needed to allege

that the District denied them the procedural rights that IDEA

guarantees to parents, including participation in meetings

and access to records, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(6); 1414(d), (e);

1415(a), (b)(1); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S.

516, 524, 531 (2007); Mosely v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 434

F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2006), and that the District’s actions

caused Matthew to lose an educational opportunity,

see Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755,

765 (6th Cir. 2001). Bogdan and Sandra allege that the Dis-

trict intentionally kept them from participating in spe-

cial-education procedures when teachers and administrators

No. 14-3012 11

ignored their phone calls and attempts to schedule meetings

and ignored eight requests for Matthew’s records. These ac-

tions, they allege, enabled the school to continue neglecting

Matthew, causing him emotional distress and academic loss.

This is enough to state a claim that their own rights under

IDEA were violated. We have presumed that IDEA authoriz-

es a claim for reimbursement when resources are expended

to compensate for a school district’s noncompliance with an

IEP. Malone, 474 F.3d at 935–37. And “standing to pursue a

reimbursement claim belongs to that party, whether parents

or child, ‘who actually expend[ed] resources.’” Id. at 937.

Bogdan and Sandra allege that they paid for tutors for Mat-

thew, giving them an easily observable stake in this case.

The district court realized that Bogdan and Sandra at one

time had their own rights, but it thought that those rights

shifted to Matthew when he turned 18. The dispute on this

point centers on a Delegation of Rights form that Matthew

executed in April 2013, before this lawsuit was filed; the

form authorized his parents to act for him. Under IDEA,

states may provide that all rights assigned to a parent under

the statute will become rights of the child receiving services

when that child reaches the age of majority. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(m). Illinois has directed that “all rights accorded to

the student’s parents” under IDEA “transfer to the student”

except in limited circumstances. 105 ILCS 5/14-6.10; 23 ILL.

ADMIN. CODE § 226.690. One of those circumstances is the

execution by the adult child of a Delegation of Rights, the

form which is prescribed by statute. 105 ILCS 5/14-6.10. This

is the form Matthew executed.

Bogdan and Sandra contend that Matthew’s delegation of

rights permits them to continue pursuing their claim for re-

12 No. 14-3012

dress of violations of their rights under IDEA. The district

court, with encouragement from the defendants, decided to

split hairs and hold that the delegation did not include Mat-

thew’s right to sue. It reasoned that the form speaks only to

“decisions concerning my education,” which, it thought, do

not include litigation. Neither the court nor the defendants

cite any authority for this interpretation. To our knowledge

no Illinois court has spoken on the subject. But this is a writ-

ten document, and we are free to construe it for ourselves.

Doing so, we are not persuaded by the district court’s po-

sition. Under the statute, Illinois directs that “all rights” of

the parent revert to the child absent a delegation, and the de-

fendants do not assert that the state intended—without say-

ing so and in the very same statutory provision—to pre-

scribe language for a form delegation which would give the

parents so little. The defendants’ reading would not even

give to parents the procedural rights they once held and

would need to exercise their child’s right to make education-

al decisions. That leads to the second point: IDEA is en-

forced, when necessary, through litigation, and we have no

reason to think that the Illinois statute was intended to per-

mit a child receiving IDEA benefits to give control over edu-

cational decisions to a parent but not allow the parent to fol-

low through with litigation if necessary. It is telling, more-

over, that the defendants have never asserted that Matthew’s

participation in this lawsuit on his own behalf constitutes an

implicit termination of his written delegation to his parents.

Bogdan and Sandra also sufficiently allege that the Dis-

trict retaliated against them by shutting them out of the spe-

cial-education process, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act

and the ADA. The circuits that have addressed the question

No. 14-3012 13

agree that these statutes protect a parent’s request for a

school to accommodate a child’s disability. See, e.g., A.C. v.

Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 711 F.3d 687, 698 & n.4 (6th Cir.

2013) (collecting cases); Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509

F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that parent can sue

under Rehabilitation Act and ADA “at least insofar as she is

asserting and enforcing the rights of son and incurring ex-

penses for his benefit”). Bogdan and Sandra do not catalog

in their complaint the adverse actions taken against Matthew

as a result of their requests, but they do allege that the school

froze them out after their requests. This is enough.

See Mosely, 434 F.3d at 533–34. As an aside, we note that the

defendants assert that Bogdan and Sandra have attempted,

but failed, to claim that the District discriminated against

them personally. We do not read their complaint to encom-

pass a claim for discrimination, in contrast to retaliation. On-

ly Matthew has alleged discrimination.

3

We turn next to all three plaintiffs’ invocation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The district court construed that claim broadly to in-

clude both constitutional and statutory claims. It concluded

that § 1983 cannot be used to enforce IDEA, the Rehabilita-

tion Act, or the ADA. This conclusion, at least with respect to

IDEA, was incorrect. It is true that the federal courts of ap-

peal are split on whether parties can bring claims under

§ 1983 for violations of IDEA. Compare N.B. v. Alachua Cnty.

Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1996) (assuming availa-

bility of § 1983 for IDEA violation); Angela L. v. Pasadena In-

dep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d 1188, 1193 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990) (§ 1983

actions permissible); and Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 (2d

Cir. 1987) (same), with A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d

14 No. 14-3012

791, 803 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (IDEA’s comprehensive re-

medial scheme forecloses § 1983 actions); Diaz-Fonseca v.

Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 28 (1st Cir. 2006) (same); Robb v.

Bethel Sch. Dist., 308 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Padilla v.

Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000) (same); and

Sellers, 141 F.3d at 529 (same). Some circuits have been inter-

nally inconsistent on the issue. See Blanchard, 509 F.3d at 937

(collecting cases); compare Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021

(8th Cir. 1996), and Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Schs. Athletic

Ass’n, 980 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1992), with Gean v. Hattaway, 330

F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2003) and Digre v. Roseville Schs. Indep. Dist.

No. 623, 841 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1988).

This court, however, has come down on the side of hold-

ing that § 1983 can be an avenue for pursuing remedies un-

der IDEA. See Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 621–22 (7th

Cir. 1997) (concluding that plaintiffs had cognizable class-

action claim under § 1983 to enforce IDEA rights, and imply-

ing that Congress intended to make § 1983 remedy available

to beneficiaries of IDEA); Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie

Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996) (assuming possibility

of § 1983 remedy for IDEA violations). These decisions may

need to be revisited in light of City of Rancho Palos Verdes v.

Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005), see A.W., 486 F.3d at 792, but this

is not the time to do so, as neither the district court nor the

defendants relied on them. On the other hand, our sister cir-

cuits have uniformly held that § 1983 cannot be used to ob-

tain damages under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.

See Okwu v. McKim, 682 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2012) (Title I

of ADA); Latasha v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 456–

57 (5th Cir. 2010) (ADA and Rehabilitation Act); M.M.R.-Z v.

Puerto Rico, 528 F.3d 9, 13 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) (ADA); Alsbrook

v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010–11 (8th Cir. 1999)

No. 14-3012 15

(en banc) (Title II of ADA); Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 608–

10 (5th Cir. 1999) (Rehabilitation Act); Holbrook v. City of Al-

pharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1531 (11th Cir. 1997) (Rehabilitation

Act and ADA).

We think it best to refrain from deciding at this time

whether any of the Staneks might be able to seek recourse

under § 1983. It is not clear that resolution of this question

will make any practical difference in this case. Furthermore,

the question of liability comes first, and unless the Staneks

muster sufficient evidence during discovery to survive a mo-

tion for summary judgment on their statutory claims, the

scope of available remedies is unimportant. We leave this

issue for the district court to revisit and develop on remand,

if necessary.

4

Finally we turn to the individual defendants other than

the superintendent. The district court correctly dismissed

these defendants in their official capacity because the

Staneks also sued the District. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 439

(7th Cir. 2001). The district court was also correct to dismiss

them in their individual capacity for the discrimination and

retaliation claims arising directly under the Rehabilitation

Act and the ADA. See Walker, 213 F.3d at 346 (explaining that

“as a rule there is no personal liability under Title II” of the

ADA); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 797 n.5, 798 n.7

(7th Cir. 1999) (finding no individual liability under ADA,

and explaining that Rehabilitation Act is nearly identical);

see also Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 189–90 (3d Cir.

2002) (Title III of ADA and Rehabilitation Act); Garcia v.

S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.

16 No. 14-3012

2001) (ADA and Rehabilitation Act); Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at

1005 n.8 (ADA); Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 546–47 (6th Cir.

1999) (Rehabilitation Act).

We draw the line, however, at the IDEA claims, which

should have gone forward at this stage. We have not found a

decision from any circuit holding that individual school em-

ployees cannot be personally liable for violating IDEA.

See Padilla, 233 F.3d at 1274 (declining to “address whether

the IDEA imposes individual liability or permits damage

awards”). We offer no opinion on the issue now, because it is

relatively undeveloped. It was also premature to dispense

with the Staneks’ § 1983 claims on qualified-immunity

grounds with such an undeveloped record. See Kiddy-Brown

v. Blagojevich, 408 F.3d 346, 357 (7th Cir. 2005).

IV

We have considered the Staneks’ remaining contentions

and conclude that none has merit. The judgment is AFFIRMED

as to Matthew Stanek’s claim of retaliation under the Reha-

bilitation Act and the ADA, all plaintiffs’ official-capacity

claims against the individual defendants except for Superin-

tendent Donald Schlomann, the individual-capacity claims

arising under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, and any

further claims not addressed explicitly in this decision. In all

other respects the judgment is VACATED, and the case is

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this deci-

sion.