Brenda A. Jakes v. Department of Defense

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

BRENDA A. JAKES, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, AT-0752-14-0614-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: April 1, 2015

Agency.

THIS ORDER IS NO NPRECEDENTIAL 1

Brenda A. Jakes, Phenix City, Alabama, pro se.

Cheryl Smith, Esquire, Peachtree City, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

REMAND ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

sustained her removal for physical inability to perform her Custodial Worker

position, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction her disability retirement claim.

For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review.

We AFFIRM the administrative judge’s finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

sign ificantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

over the appellant’s disability retirement claim. We also AFFIRM the

administrative judge’s finding that the agency proved the charge of inability to

perform AS MODIFIED to apply the correct legal standard for analyzing the

charge. We REMAND the appellant’s restoration claim, which the administrative

judge failed to address below, to the regional office for further adjudication in

accordance with this Order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant was employed as a Custodial Worker with the Department of

Defense Education Activity at Loyd Elementary School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 43, 139. At the beginning of the 2012-2013

school year, the appellant provided the agency with documentation indicating that

she suffered medical restrictions as the result of shoulder conditions. Id. at 49.

The appellant later claimed the conditions were job-related. IAF, Tab 6 at 8.

After the appellant filed a reasonable accommodation request, the agency

temporarily detailed her to an Educational Aide position, which offered a higher

rate of pay than her Custodial Worker position. 2 IAF, Tab 5 at 60-66, 68, Tab 7

at 34.

¶3 On January 25, 2013, approximately 5 months after the appellant was

temporarily detailed to the Educational Aide position, the agency issued her a

notice of proposed removal, charging her with physical inability to perform the

Custodial Worker position. IAF, Tab 5 at 43. After the appellant responded, the

deciding official sustained the removal. Id. at 39-40, 139, 151.

¶4 After the appellant received a final decision on an equal employment

opportunity (EEO) complaint concerning the issues in this appeal, she appealed to

the Board. IAF, Tab 1 at 1-8, Tab 5 at 31-38. She did not timely request a

2

The Educational Aide position only required a 7-hour workday. IAF, Tab 5 at 66. In

order for the appellant to continue working 8 hours per day, the agency instructed her to

work 1 hour per day on custodial duties that she was able to perform within her medical

restrictions. Id.

3

hearing. 3 See IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID) at 1. The

administrative judge issued an initial decision based on the written record finding

that the Board lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the appellant’s disability

retirement claim; the agency had proven the charge of inability to perform by

preponderant evidence; the appellant had failed to establish her race and

disability discrimination claims; and the penalty of removal was reasonable and

promoted the efficiency of the service. ID at 1-12.

¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has filed a

response. PFR File, Tabs 1, 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s claims regarding her disability

retirement.

¶6 On review, as below, the appellant requests that the Board “reconsider the

facts in determining [her] medical retirement.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 2; IAF, Tab 9

at 1 (the appellant’s request below). We agree with the administrative judge that

the Board lacks jurisdiction to review the appellant’s claims regarding her desire

for a disability retirement. See ID at 3 n.1; IAF, Tab 10 at 1 n.1. If the Office of

Personnel Management (OPM) has not issued a reconsideration decision on an

3

On her appeal form, the appellant indicated that she did not request a hearin g. IAF,

Tab 1 at 5. During a close of the record conference, the appellant represented that a

May 27, 2014 letter that she submitted to the administrative judge 2 weeks prior

constituted a request for a hearing. IAF, Tab 10 at 1 n.1. The appellant d id not raise

this issue on review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. We agree with the

administrative judge that the letter did not contain a hearing request. IAF, Tab 9 at 1

(the appellant’s letter). In addition, the admin istrative judge issued an April 21, 2014

acknowledgment order, which stated that if the appellant failed to request a hearing

with in 10 days of the order (i.e., by May 1, 2014), she would waive her right to a

hearing. IAF, Tab 2 at 1. The appellant did not request a hearing with in 10 days of the

order, and therefore, her right to a hearing was waived. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.24(e) (if

an appellant does not make a timely request for a hearing the right is waived); see a lso

Nugent v. U.S. Postal Service, 59 M.S.P.R. 444, 446-47 (1993) (finding that an

appellant waived his right to a hearing when he failed to request one either on his

appeal form or within the time frame estab lished by the administrative judge’s order).

4

appellant’s entitlement to a retirement benefit, the Board generally lacks

jurisdiction over an appeal of that matter. Fagone v. Office of Personnel

Management, 85 M.S.P.R. 49, ¶ 9 (2000). The Board may take jurisdiction over a

retirement appeal in the absence of an OPM reconsideration decision if the

appellant has made “repeated requests” for such a decision and the evidence

indicates that OPM does not intend to issue a final decision. Fletcher v. Office of

Personnel Management, 118 M.S.P.R. 632, ¶ 5 (2012). Here, the administrative

judge found that the appellant admitted during a June 12, 2014 status conference

that she had not applied for disability retirement with OPM. ID at 3 n.1; IAF,

Tab 10 at 1 n.1. The appellant has not challenged that finding on review and has

not submitted any evidence indicating that she either subsequently applied for

disability retirement with OPM, or that OPM issued a reconsideration decision on

such an application. See PFR File, Tab 1. Accordingly, we find that the Board

lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the appellant’s claims regarding her desire for a

disability retirement.

The agency proved the charge of physical inability to perform the Custodial

Worker position.

¶7 On review, the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s

finding that the agency proved the charge of physical inability to perform the

Custodial Worker position. 4 See PFR File, Tab 1. However, in his analysis of the

charge, the administrative judge cited Slater v. Department of Homeland

Security, 108 M.S.P.R. 419, ¶ 11 (2008), for the proposition that, in order to

remove an employee for physical inability to perform, the agency must show that

the disabling condition itself is disqualifying, its recurrence cannot be ruled out,

and the duties of the position are such that a recurrence would pose a reasonable

probability of substantial harm. ID at 4. The appellant did not hold a position

4

The appellant also does not challenge the adm inistrative judge’s finding that her

removal promoted the efficiency of the service. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2; ID at 5-6. We

discern no reason to disturb this finding on review.

5

with medical standards or physical requirements subject to medical evaluation

programs, and therefore, Slater does not govern this appeal. See IAF, Tab 6 at

13-17 (the position description); see also Clemens v. Department of the

Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 4 (2014) (Slater does not apply where an appellant

does not occupy a position with medical standards or physical requirements

subject to medical evaluation programs); Fox v. Department of the Army, 120

M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 24 (2014) (same).

¶8 Instead, to establish a charge of physical inability to perform in this matter,

the agency must prove a nexus between the appellant’s medical condition and

observed deficiencies in her performance or conduct, or a high probability, given

the nature of the work involved, that her condition may result in injury to herself

or others. Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 25 (citing Marshall-Carter v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, 94 M.S.P.R. 518, ¶ 10 (2003), aff’d, 122 F. App’x 513 (Fed.

Cir. 2005)). In other words, the agency must establish that the appellant’s

medical condition prevents her from being able to safely and efficiently perform

the core duties of her position. Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 25. The core duties of a

position are synonymous with its essential functions, i.e., the fundamental job

duties of the position, not including marginal functions. Id., ¶ 26

(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)). Evidence of whether a particular function is

essential includes, inter alia, the employer’s judgment as to which functions are

essential, written position descriptions, the amount of time spent performing the

function, and the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the

function. Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 26 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)).

¶9 In determining if the agency has met its burden, the Board will consider

whether a reasonable accommodation exists that would enable the appellant to

safely and efficiently perform those core duties. Fox, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 26.

However, for the limited purposes of proving the charge, the agency is not

required to show that it was unable to reasonably accommodate the appellant by

assigning her to a vacant position for which she was qualified; whether it could

6

do so goes to the affirmative defense of disability discrimination and/or the

reasonableness of the penalty. Id.

¶10 We find that the agency proved the charge of physical inability to perform

by preponderant evidence. In the notice of proposed removal, the agency

indicated that the essential duties of the appellant’s position included:

(1) sweeping, mopping, stripping, waxing and polishing floors using brooms,

mops, industrial-type floor scrubbers, and other heavy-powered cleaning

equipment; (2) dusting, waxing, and polishing office furniture and equipment; and

(3) cleaning ceiling surfaces and making minor repairs such as replacing light

bulbs and air filters. IAF, Tab 5 at 43. The Custodial Worker position

description confirms that these duties were among “Typical Work Performed” in

the position, and the appellant has not challenged the agency’s description of her

core duties. IAF, Tab 6 at 15; see IAF Tabs 1, 9; PFR File, Tab 1. Therefore, we

consider those duties to be the core duties of her position.

¶11 The medical documentation that the appellant submitted to the agency

indicated that, as the result of her shoulder injuries, she was unable to engage in

heavy lifting, pushing, pulling, or overhead activities with either arm for an

undetermined period of time. IAF, Tab 5 at 49, 72. In her reasonable

accommodation request, the appellant indicated that her medical condition caused

difficulties in performing the essential duties of her position, and that her

disability was expected to be permanent. Id. at 62-64. Further at the time that

the agency proposed her removal, the appellant had been unable to perform the

duties of the Custodial Worker position for approximately 5 months. Id. at 43,

66. The record contains no evidence suggesting that there was a foreseeable end

in sight to the appellant’s incapacity.

¶12 Moreover, both before and after she received the notice of proposed

removal, the appellant admitted that she was physically unable to perform the

duties of the Custodial Worker position. The agency presented evidence that on

January 9, 2013, approximately 2 weeks before the agency issued the notice of

7

proposed removal, the appellant’s supervisor met with her to discuss whether

there was anything that the agency could do to assist her in performing the duties

of the Custodial Worker position. IAF, Tab 5 at 43, 97, 143. According to the

agency, the appellant responded that she was unable to perform the position

duties, even with accommodation. Id. The appellant did not dispute these

assertions. IAF, Tabs 1, 9. In addition, in her February 11, 2013 response to the

notice of proposed removal, the appellant stated that she “[did] not contest” her

removal from the Custodial Worker position, and that it had been “medically

documented” that she was “physically unable to perform” the duties of the

position. IAF, Tab 5 at 41. Based upon this evidence, we find that the agency

met its burden of proving the charge of inability to perform.

The appellant did not establish that the agency discriminated against her by

failing to accommodate her disability.

¶13 On review, the appellant argues that, because her injuries were work-related

and permanent, the agency should have done more to assist her. 5 PFR File, Tab 1

at 2. This argument may be construed as a challenge to the administrative judge’s

finding that the appellant failed to establish that the agency engaged in disability

discrimination based upon a denial of a reasonable accommodation. See ID at

7-10.

¶14 The Rehabilitation Act requires an agency to provide a reasonable

accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise

qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can show that the

accommodation would cause an undue hardship on its business operations.

Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 10. With exceptions not applicable here, the term

“qualified” means that the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience,

5

The appellant does not challenge the admin istrative judge’s findings that she failed to

establish her affirmative defenses of disability discrim ination based on disparate

treatment and discrimination based on race. See ID at 10-12; PFR File, Tab 1. We

discern no basis to disturb these well-reasoned findings.

8

education and other job-related requirements of the employment position the

individual holds or desires and, with or without a reasonable accommodation, can

perform the essential functions of such position. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).

Reasonable accommodation includes modifications to the manner in which a

position is customarily performed in order to enable a qualified individual with a

disability to perform the essential job functions, or reassigning the employee to a

vacant position whose duties the employee can perform. Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R.

616, ¶ 10.

¶15 We agree with the administrative judge that, although the appellant

demonstrated that she is an individual with a disability, she failed to establish that

she is a qualified individual with a disability. See ID at 8-9; see also Henson v.

U.S. Postal Service, 110 M.S.P.R. 624, ¶ 7 (2009) (the appellant has the burden to

show that she is a qualified individual with a disability). As discussed above, the

record below establishes, and the appellant does not dispute, that she is unable to

perform the essential functions of the Custodial Worker position, even with a

reasonable accommodation. See IAF, Tab 5 at 41, 43, 97, 143; PFR File, Tab 1.

¶16 The appellant was entitled to be considered for reassignment to a vacant

position for which she was otherwise qualified as a form of reasonable

accommodation. See Gonzalez-Acosta v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 277, ¶ 14 (2010); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). However,

the agency’s obligation to accommodate an employee with a disability includes

reassignment only to a vacant position at or below the employee’s current grade

or level. Gonzalez-Acosta, 113 M.S.P.R. 277, ¶ 14; Narcum v. Department of the

Interior, 98 M.S.P.R. 645, ¶ 8 (2005). The agency provided statements from

three managers that there were no vacant positions to which the appellant could

have been assigned at or below the grade level of her Custodial Worker position.

IAF, Tab 5 at 176, 179, Tab 6 at 19. These statements were conclusory, and did

9

not explain the extent or nature of the agency’s search for vacant positions. 6 IAF,

Tab 5 at 176, 179, Tab 6 at 19. However, the appellant has not disputed the

agency’s assertions, and has not identified any vacant positions at the same or

lower grade level to which she could have been reassigned. See IAF, Tabs 1, 9;

PFR File, Tab 1. Therefore, the administrative judge correctly found that the

appellant failed to establish her claim of disability discrimination based upon

denial of reasonable accommodation. ID at 7-10; see also Massey v. Department

of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 226, ¶ 12 (2013) (the agency’s failure to fulfill its

obligation to search for a position as a reasonable accommodation does not

relieve the appellant of her burden of ultimately showing that such positions

existed and were available); Jackson v. U.S. Postal Service, 79 M.S.P.R. 46,

53-54 (1998) (same).

¶17 On review, as she did below, the appellant asserts that the agency originally

led her to believe that she would be permanently placed in the Educational Aide

position. 7 PFR File, Tab 1 at 2; IAF, Tab 1 at 8. We agree with the

6

The agency’s obligation to reassign the appellant to a vacant position for which she

was otherwise qualified as a form of reasonable accommodation was not lim ited to

positions in the particular office, branch of the agency, or commuting area to which she

was assigned when her need for an accommodation arose. See Sanchez v. Department

of Energy, 117 M.S.P.R. 155, ¶ 18 (2011). “Rather, the extent to which an employer

must search for a vacant position will be an issue of undue hardship.” I d. (quoting

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable

Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,

Reassignment at Question 27 (Oct. 17, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/

policy/docs/accommodation.html#reassignment).

7

The appellant alleges that she “provided witnesses,” but they “were never contacted.”

PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. She contends that these witnesses could have provided proof that

the agency offered and then rescinded a position as an Educational Aide. I d. However,

the administrative judge was not obligated to contact witnesses on her behalf. By order

dated June 12, 2014, the administrative judge advised the appellant of the burden and

elements of proof of her claim and affirmative defenses, and informed her that the

record would close on June 30, 2014. IAF, Tab 10. The administrative judge further

informed the appellant that she could submit witness statements. Id. at 12. After

receiving this information, the appellant elected not to submit any such statements.

10

administrative judge that, even assuming that the appellant was initially

misinformed, the agency was not obligated to permanently reassign her to the

Educational Aide position, because the reassignment would have constituted a

promotion. See ID at 9 n.2; IAF, Tab 7 at 34 (containing the agency’s

explanation that the appellant could not be reassigned to the Educational Aide

position without using competitive promotion procedures). An agency is not

required to promote an employee with a disability in order to provide a

reasonable accommodation. See Taylor v. Department of Homeland

Security, 107 M.S.P.R. 306, ¶ 8 (2007) (an agency’s obligation to provide a

reasonable accommodation does not entitle the employee to a position at a higher

grade level); Sheehan v. Department of the Navy, 66 M.S.P.R. 490, 494 (1995)

(same).

The administrative judge failed to provide jurisdictional notice regarding the

appellant’s restoration claim.

¶18 We find that the appellant’s allegation that the agency should have done

more to assist her because her injuries were work-related could alternatively be

construed as a claim that the agency denied her restoration rights as a physically

disqualified individual under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(c). 8 See IAF, Tab 9 at 1; PFR

File, Tab 1 at 2. To be entitled to a hearing on Board jurisdiction over a

restoration claim, the appellant must make nonfrivolous allegations that, inter

alia, she suffered a compensable injury and that her separation was substantially

related to the compensable injury. Norwood v. U.S. Postal Service, 100 M.S.P.R.

494, ¶ 4 (2005); see Bledsoe v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 659 F.3d 1097,

1102 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussing the two-step process for establishing Board

jurisdiction over restoration appeals). A compensable injury is defined as one

8

A physically disqualified individual includes an employee who, for medical reasons, is

unable to perform the duties of the position formerly held or an equivalent one, and the

condition is considered permanent with little likelihood for improvement or recovery.

5 C.F.R. § 353.102.

11

that is accepted by the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) as

job-related, for which medical monetary benefits are payable from the

Employees’ Compensation Fund. King v. Department of the Navy, 90 M.S.P.R.

341, ¶ 6 (2001).

¶19 Here, the appellant argued below that her injuries were work-related. IAF,

Tab 9 at 1 (the appellant’s argument below). In addition, the agency submitted

evidence that on February 7, 2013, approximately 2 weeks after it issued the

notice of proposed removal, OWCP accepted the appellant’s claim that her

shoulder injuries were work-related. IAF, Tab 6 at 35. Four days after OWCP

accepted her claim, the appellant responded to the notice of proposed removal,

requesting reassignment to “a comparable position at [her] current pay.” IAF,

Tab 5 at 151. We find that, in light of the liberal pleading standard for pro se

appellants, and the evidence submitted by the agency below, the appellant’s

allegations should have put the administrative judge on notice that the appellant

was alleging that the agency had violated her restoration rights. See Roche v.

U.S. Postal Service, 828 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (pro se petitioners are

not expected to frame issues with the precision of a common law pleading);

Deloach v. Department of the Treasury, 58 M.S.P.R. 574, 578 (1993) (finding

that a pro se appellant’s citation to the law regarding restoration rights, evidence

that he was absent for a compensable injury, and his allegation that he could

perform light-duty work should have put the administrative judge on notice that

he intended to allege a violation of his restoration rights).

¶20 Therefore, we find that the appellant was entitled to receive explicit

information on the burden and elements of proof required to establish jurisdiction

over a restoration appeal. See Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection

Board, 758 F.2d 641 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (an appellant must receive explicit

information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional issue);

Ballesteros v. U.S. Postal Service, 88 M.S.P.R. 428, ¶ 6 (2001). The

administrative judge failed to provide the appellant with such notice, and the

12

agency’s submissions below did not place the appellant on notice of what was

required to establish jurisdiction. See IAF, Tabs 2, 5-11. Accordingly, we find it

necessary to remand this appeal so that the administrative judge can apprise the

appellant of how to establish jurisdiction over her restoration claim and provide

her with an opportunity to file evidence and argument on this issue. See Colleran

v. U.S. Postal Service, 112 M.S.P.R. 650, ¶¶ 9-10 (2009) (remanding a restoration

claim where the administrative judge failed to provide the appellant with Burgess

notice).

ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the initial decision in part,

and REMAND the appellant’s restoration claim to the regional office for further

adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.