Opinion

United States v. Christopher Brown

  • 597 F. App'x 269
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Mar 13, 2015
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Prado, Owen, Graves
Nature of suit
Direct Criminal
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 44.2%

indicating an argument’s futility absent supporting precedent

How later courts described this case

  • indicating an argument’s futility absent supporting precedent

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 14-30558 Document: 00512968357 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/13/2015

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-30558

Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 13, 2015

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER L. BROWN,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:13-CR-146-1

Before PRADO, OWEN, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Christopher L. Brown pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent

to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession

of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, see 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, see U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). The convictions arose from a sting operation involving a putative

robbery of a fictitious stash house. Brown appeals his 270-month cumulative

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

Case: 14-30558 Document: 00512968357 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/13/2015

No. 14-30558

sentence, which consisted of concurrent 210-month terms each on the

conspiracy and felon-in-possession convictions and a consecutive 60-month

term on the conviction for possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug

trafficking crime. Pretermitting the question whether this appeal is barred by

the appeal waiver in the plea agreement, we affirm. See United States v.

Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Story, 439 F.3d

226, 230-31 (5th Cir. 2006).

To the extent that Brown may be understood to assert a procedural

challenge under the bifurcated process for reasonableness review, the

challenge fails. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 49-50 (2007).

Because he did not raise a procedural issue in the district court, Brown is

required to show plain error. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135

(2009). If he does, we may exercise our discretion “to remedy the error . . . if

the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Id. A claim “subject to reasonable dispute” cannot constitute

plain error. Id.; United States v. Ellis, 564 F.3d 370, 377-78 (5th Cir. 2009).

Brown cites no precedent of this circuit for his contentions that it was

error and a miscarriage of justice to ascribe 12 kilograms of cocaine to him

when calculating his guidelines range under the 2013 edition of the Sentencing

Guidelines. Brown stipulated that he conspired to steal 12 to 25 kilograms of

cocaine. A conspiracy defendant is accountable for the drug quantity

foreseeable by him. United States v. Quiroz-Hernandez, 48 F.3d 858, 870 (5th

Cir. 1995); cf. United States v. Burke, 431 F.3d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 2005).

Because Brown’s contentions are subject to reasonable dispute, there can be no

plain error. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135; Ellis, 564 F.3d at 377-78.

We reject also Brown’s contention that the sentence is substantively

unreasonable because the district court ought to have sentenced him below the

2

Case: 14-30558 Document: 00512968357 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/13/2015

No. 14-30558

guidelines range in light of what he deems to be the Government’s arbitrary

selection of drug quantity. Brown cites no circuit precedent to support his

contentions. Moreover, the district court emphasized that drug quantity was

hardly the most important consideration when selecting Brown’s sentence,

given Brown’s insistence that murdering all occupants of the stash house was

a necessity. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Because his sentence is “within a properly calculated Guideline range,”

an inference arises that the district court considered “all the factors for a fair

sentence set forth in the Guidelines.” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511,

519 (5th Cir. 2005). Such a sentence “is presumptively reasonable.” United

States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006). Brown’s suggestion that a

below-guidelines variance sentence would have been reasonable is not basis

enough “to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

AFFIRMED.

3

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