Opinion

Cycenas v. United States

Court: United States Court of Federal Claims
Filed: Mar 12, 2015
Status: Published
On the bench: Marian Blank Horn
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 34.2%

"[T]his court does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts, federal bankruptcy courts, federal district courts, or federal circuit courts of appeals."

How later courts described this case

"[T]his court does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts, federal bankruptcy courts, federal district courts, or federal circuit courts of appeals."
"[P]laintiff must ... identify a substantive source of law that creates the right to recovery of money damages against the United States."
"[A]ny party may challenge, or the court may raise sua sponte, subject matter jurisdiction at any time." (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 506; Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2004
"The facts as alleged 'must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)."' (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

ORI I Al

Jfn tbe mlniteb ~tates ~ourt of jfeberal ~laims

No. 14-544C FILED

Filed: March 12, 2015

MAR 12 2015

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

U.S. COURT OF

EDWARD JOSEPH CYCENAS, * FEDERAL CLAltv1S

Plaintiff, *

v. *

* Pro Se Plaintiff; Lack of Subject

UNITED STATES, * Matter Jurisdiction; Failure to State a

* Claim; Breach of Contract.

Defendant. *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Edward Joseph Cycenas, Siren, WI, prose.

Kenneth D. Woodrow, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. for the defendant.

With him were Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Robert E.

Kirschman, Jr., Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, and Peter B.

Jurgeleit, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Agriculture,

Milwaukee, WI, of counsel.

ORDER

HORN, J.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Pro se plaintiff Edward Joseph Cycenas filed suit in this court against

"Defendant, United States of America acting through the United States Department of

Agriculture Rural Housing Service," (Rural Housing Service). 1 Plaintiff alleges Gordon

Fick, "Chief Principal and Officer of St. Croix Valley Hardwoods, Inc.," (St. Criox) and St.

Croix are "co-conspirator[s]" with the Rural Housing Service. Plaintiff asserts various

claims in his complaint, including breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation to the

United States Bankruptcy Court, mortgage fraud, credit theft or fraud, identity theft, theft

of his social security number, and unauthorized use of his social security number,

In his submissions to the court, plaintiff appears to use a number of titles to refer to the

United States Department of Agriculture Rural Housing Service, including "USDA-RD,"

"RD," and "USDA-RH ."

mortgage accounts and credit. All of plaintiff's claims appear to relate to a property that

is subject to a mortgage note executed by plaintiff with the Rural Housing Service. Mr.

Cycenas alleges that

on or before February 1984, this Plaintiff created and executed,

acknowledge, granted, and delivered to the Defendant RD, a mortgage

note secured by the following described parcel of land; Lots Three(3) and

Four(4), Certified Survey Map, Volume Three(3), at Page 240, as

recorded in the office of the Recorder of Deeds for Burnett, Wisconsin.

Said CSM [Certified Survey Map] being located in the Northeast Quarter

of the Northwest Quarter (NE1/4 NW1/4), of Section Seventeen (17),

Township Thirty-eight (38) North, of Range Sixteen (16) West, in the

county of Burnett, Wisconsin.

Plaintiff requests that "if this court finds that this may be the wrong venue, ... the court

transfer this complaint to the proper court."

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the

United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) (2014). According to defendant's motion

to dismiss, "[i]n 1983, Mr. Cycenas applied to RHS (then known as the Farmers Home

Administration) for a residential home loan (the Property)." Further, according to

defendant, "[o]n November 8, 1983, Mr. Cycenas executed a $44,000 promissory note

in favor of RHS, used the proceeds to buy the Property and construct a home, and

granted RHS a first mortgage lien on the Property."

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that, "[o]n or before September 7, 2006,

Defendant SCVH, acting through Defendant Fick, took by hostile action the same parcel

of property, and moved the title of said property into the name of St. Croix Valley

Hardwoods, Inc., (SCVH)." According to defendant's motion to dismiss, St. Croix had

filed a complaint on September 12, 2005 in the Burnett County Circuit Court in

Wisconsin against Mr. Cycenas, and Siren Custom Woodworking, Inc, for which

defendant contends Mr. Cycenas is an officer and principal stockholder, and a Mr.

Spencer Cobb 2 seeking a money judgment of $30,301.67. On November 17, 2005, the

Burnett County Wisconsin Circuit Court entered a judgment against the plaintiff for that

amount. See St. Croix Valley Hardwoods, Inc. v. Siren Custom Woodworking, Inc. et al.,

No. 05-CV-227 (Burnett Cnty., Wis.). Plaintiff attaches to his complaint a copy of an

August 24, 2006 "Execution Against Property" from the Burnett County Circuit Court

ordering the Sheriff to satisfy St. Croix's judgment of $30,301.67 "out of the personal

property of the judgment debtor within your county" and "if sufficient personal property

cannot be found, satisfy the judgment out of the real property in your county belonging

to the judgment debtor." Plaintiff also attaches to his complaint a copy of an "Execution

Against Property" that was issued by the Burnett County Sheriff's Department in Siren,

Mr. Cobb's title and relation, if any, to the above captioned case is unclear from the

record before the court.

Wisconsin, which as indicated by a stamp on the document, appears to have been

recorded with the Burnett County Register of Deeds on September 7, 2006, as:

Lots 3 and 4 of Certified Survey Map No. 740, recorded in Volume 3, on

Page 240, as Document No. 191926, in the office of the Register of Deeds

for Burnett County, Wisconsin, being located in the NE % NW %, Section

17, Township 38 North, of Range 16 West, Burnett County, Wisconsin.

On October 24, 2006, plaintiff appears to have petitioned for Chapter 7

bankruptcy protection. See In re Edward J. Cycenas, No. 06-12697 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.).

Plaintiff contends that "[o]n or before, February 15, 2007, this Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7

Complete Discharge Bankruptcy." Plaintiff attaches to his complaint, a copy of a Form

B 18 from the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Western District of Wisconsin to

plaintiff, dated February 15, 2007, ordering that "[t]he debtor is granted a discharge

under section 727 of title 11, United States Code, (the Bankruptcy Code)." See In re

Edward J. Cycenas, No. 06-12697.

The docket and filings in the Bankruptcy Court reflect that, on February 14, 2007,

St. Croix had moved for relief from the automatic stay, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d),

in order to foreclose on its judgment lien on the plaintiff's property. See In re Edward J.

Cycenas, No. 06-12697. Plaintiff attaches to his complaint the Bankruptcy Court Order

dated March 23, 2007, mandating that:

the automatic stay be terminated as to St. Croix Valley Hardwoods, Inc.,

with respect to property of the debtors described as follows: Lots 3 and 4

of Certified Survey Map No. 740, recorded in Volume 3, on Page 240,

as Document No. 191926, in the office of the Register of Deeds for

Burnett County, Wisconsin, being located in the NE % NW%, Section

17, Township 38 North, of Range 16 West, Burnett County,

Wisconsin.

(emphasis in original). The March 23, 2007 Order explained that:

The Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay was

served upon all interested parties, and no objections or other responses

thereto was served or filed within fifteen (15) days after the service of such

notice and motion (plus three days mailing) or filed within a reasonable

time thereafter.

The March 23, 2007 Order stated that: "The Court being fully advised in the premises,

and upon all the files and records herein, finds that cause exists entitling the Movant to

relief from the automatic stay."

Plaintiff also cites to and attaches to his complaint an affidavit from Zandra Kirby,

who, from her affidavit, appears to have stayed on the property as a tenant and to have

paid rent to plaintiff starting in 2000. Ms. Kirby indicates in her affidavit that "my late

husband Allen and I rented from Edward Joseph Cycenas, a house located at 7632

Anderson Street, in the Village of Siren, WI, from sometime in the spring of 2000." She

also indicated that "[w]hen the same house we were renting was foreclosed on by St.

Croix Valley Hardwoods sometime on or before 2006, my husband and I began renting

from St. Croix Valley Hardwoods." Ms. Kirby also indicates, "I continued renting this

same house after my husband Allen died from St. Croix Valley Hardwoods through

September 2012." Defendant asserts in its motion to dismiss that, "[i]n May 2007, RHS

visited the Property 'for foreclosure action' and discovered that someone other than

Plaintiff was living there."

Plaintiff also cites to and attaches to his complaint a copy of a letter dated July 9,

2013 from Thomas E. Hannah, the Rural Housing Service Deputy Administrator of

Centralized Servicing Center, to Congressman Sean P. Duffy in response to an inquiry

regarding Mr. Cycenas as Congressman Duffy's constituent. The July 9, 2013 letter

provides that "[y]our constituent is concerned about the remaining debt on his RD

housing loan and the possibility that l.D. theft/fraud may have occurred." The July 9,

2013 letter states in part,

USDA remains as the mortgagee of the property located at 7632

Anderson Street, Siren, Wisconsin. It is RD's understanding that St. Croix

Valley Hardwoods obtained a judgment against Mr. Cycenas that resulted

in the sale of his home. Mr. Cycenas however remains responsible for the

repayment of his RD debt until the loan has paid [sic] in full. RD remains

vested as the owner of the property until St. Croix Hardwoods pays RD in

full or RD forecloses on the property.

St. Croix Valley Hardwoods filed a judgment lien against Mr. Cycenas and

his property in Burnett County. Subsequently the property was sold

through a foreclosure/sheriff sale, in which St. Croix Valley Hardwoods

was the highest bidder. As a result of the sale, St. Croix Valley Hardwoods

became the legal owner of the property, subject to RD's first mortgage

estate lien. Currently RD is working with St. Croix Valley Hardwoods for

them to obtain a payoff balance to satisfy RD's mortgage lien. To date RD

has been unsuccessful in obtaining the required funds from St. Croix

Valley Hardwoods.

RD has mailed your office a letter on March 15, 2013, which stated the

issue that Mr. Cycenas is disputing is a legal matter between Mr. Cycenas

and St. Croix Valley Hardwoods; USDA has no reasonable justification to

get involved. In addition RD has found no reasonable reason to identify

that any fraud occurred on Mr. Cycenas' RD loan.

Since St. Croix Valley Hardwoods foreclosed on the property as a junior

lien holder and subsequently became owner of the property, RD will

continue its collection efforts from St. Croix Valley Hardwoods to pay off

Mr. Cycenas' loan; however Mr. Cycenas remains liable for the debt until it

is paid in full. If payment is not received from St. Croix Valley Hardwoods,

the eventual outcome will be that RD, as first lien holder, ceases [sic] the

property and sells it as foreclose sale to pay off the remaining debt.

In its motion to dismiss, defendant asserts a chain of events similar to those

reflected in the July 9, 2013 letter quoted above, alleging that, on May 18, 2007, "the

Burnett County Sheriff conducted a sheriff sale of the Property." According to defendant,

"SCVH was the winning bidder, and so the Property was sold to SCVH for $34,982,

subject to a fifteen-month redemption period and RHS's mortgage lien." Defendant

contends that, on August 25, 2008, "the Burnett County Sheriff conveyed the Property

to SCVH via sheriff's deed, and later recorded the deed on September 19, 2008."

According to defendant, "[s]ince 2008, SCVH has owned (and still owns) the Property in

fee simple, subject to RHS's mortgage lien." Defendant asserts that plaintiff "holds

absolutely no interest in the Property,'' and that St. Croix and the Rural Housing Service

have entered into negotiations "to collect the proceeds necessary to pay off Mr.

Cycenas's loan,'' although defendant urges that "Mr. Cycenas remains liable for the debt

until it is paid in full and RHS possesses the right to sell the property at a foreclosure

sale."

Although not entirely clear from the complaint whether intended as an assertion

or a request, plaintiff states that "[t]his Plaintiff received the payoff immediately,'' and

then cites another exhibit to the complaint, which appears to be a March 15, 2013 letter

from the Rural Housing Service Payoff/Research Section "in response to your

[plaintiff's] request for information regarding the above mentioned Rural Development

loan," Loan Number 0001587796. The March 15, 2013 letter explains that the letter

"includes a Statement of Loan Balances, instructions on how to receive a payoff

statement, and information about subsidy recapture and capital improvements." The

March 15, 2013 letter, however, states clearly that "[t]his is not a payoff statement.

Instructions on how to receive a payoff statement are on Page 2 of this letter." The

record does not otherwise suggest or reflect that plaintiff received a payoff.

Although plaintiff's filings are, at times, confusing and difficult to follow, because

Mr. Cycenas has filed this action as a prose plaintiff, the court attempts to separate and

address each of plaintiff's allegations. Plaintiff appears first to claim that "on or before,

March 23, 2007, the Defendant's Fick and SCVH, Fraudulently misrepresented to the

U.S. Bankruptcy Court a request for Lift of Stay, which was granted by the Court."

Plaintiff's second claim appears to assert that "Defendant's RD, Fick, and SCVH,

Conspired to use this Plaintiff's name, Social Security Number, Mortgage Account

Number 0001587796, Interest Credit Account, and Credit, without any Authorization of

any sort from this Plaintiff, to continue to make monthly payments to RD and to profit by

rental receipts from said property," citing Ms. Kirby's affidavit. Plaintiff's third claim

seems to contend that "the mortgage is still in the Plaintiff's name, and that the Plaintiff

is still responsible for said mortgage and that mortgage is in line for foreclosure creating

an improper and incomplete bankruptcy." Plaintiff's fourth claim appears to assert that

"Defendants, continue in their Cover Up by RD stating 'RD is currently working with

SCVH for them to obtain a payoff balance to satisfy RD's mortgage lien."' (emphasis in

original). Plaintiff indicates he "wants to know why it takes seven years to get that

balance and further proves that co-conspirator Defendants, RD, Fick, and SCVH have

and continue to use this Plaintiff's name, Social Security Number, Mortgage Account

Number 0001587796, Interest Credit Account, and Credit, without any Authorization of

any sort from this Plaintiff." (emphasis in original). Plaintiff also asserts, in what appears

to be a fifth claim, that "Identity Theft, Mortgage Fraud, Theft of Social Security

Numbers and the un-authorized use of that number, credit theft or fraud, and Breach of

Contract by anyone including the United States is against the law" and that "Defendant

RD is in BREACH of Contract, becoming a co-conspirator with Fick and SCVH, by not

getting written authorization from this Plaintiff." In an asserted sixth claim, plaintiff asks

whether, "by Lifting the Stay, did the U.S. Bankruptcy Court alter the Plaintiff's

Bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy Court is liable for all damages." Finally, in his alleged

seventh claim suggests allegations of trespass and contends he "published and

recorded in the Burnett County Register of Deeds a PUBLIC NOTICE with all fees and

fines for anyone who trespassed on private property or rights of this Plaintiff, including a

$10,000.00 fee/fine per day per person." 3 (capitalization in original).

Based on these allegations, plaintiff seeks relief from this court to (1) immediately

stop the defendant' alleged "unauthorized use of this Plaintiff's Identity, Social Security

Number, Mortgage Accounts, and Credit," (2) provide that plaintiff "will not be held

responsible for USDA-RD Mortgage Account number 0001587796, that would have

been dismissed in Plaintiff's bankruptcy," (3) grant judgment in favor of plaintiff for "no

less than $6,000,000.00 (Six Million Dollars) for the unauthorized use of this Plaintiff's

Identity," and (4) find "a larger settlement is due or if any prosecution should be charged

against the Defendants."

As noted above, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant

to RCFC 12(b)(1) and RCFC 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant first argues that only the

United States is properly named as a defendant in this court and, as such, Mr. Fick and

St. Croix are not properly named as co-defendants by plaintiff in the above captioned

case. Moreover, defendant argues that this court is without jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's

case because the Tucker Act expressly excludes tort and criminal claims, and, thus,

excludes plaintiff's claims of conspiracy, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud, identity

theft, un-authorized disclosure of private information, or invasion of privacy. In addition,

defendant argues that this court is without jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claims to review

actions of the Bankruptcy Court for any alleged liability and damages resulting from the

Bankruptcy Court's grant of St Croix's motion to lift the stay in the bankruptcy

proceedings. According to defendant, "[e]ven if the Court possessed jurisdiction to

entertain these claims, the Court would lack jurisdiction to grant Mr. Cycenas much of

Plaintiff attaches to his complaint a copy of an alleged "PUBLIC NOTICE,"

(capitalization in original), providing "the liabilities for real and/or constructive

trespass/infringement of the private property or interest(s) therein of Edward Joseph

Cycenas," which included a printer's affidavit indicating the public notice was printed on

four separate occasions during the summer of 2003 in the Inter-County Leader, a

weekly newspaper printed and published in Frederic, Wisconsin.

the specific relief he seeks," including the injunctive and declaratory relief that plaintiff

requested. Finally, according to defendant, plaintiff's claim for breach of contract should

be dismissed pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim because plaintiff

"failed to allege any facts demonstrating the existence of a duty and a breach of that

duty on the part of the United States. In particular, Mr. Cycenas has not alleged any

obligation or duty arising out of the mortgage, much less one specifically prohibiting the

disclosure of the personal information he claims RHS provided to SCVH." Defendant

also argues plaintiff fails to "identify any provision of the mortgage contract that fairly

can be construed as money-mandating, as necessary for this Court's jurisdiction,"

where here "the payment obligations of the mortgage loan run from Mr. Cycenas to

RHS, not the other way around."

Plaintiff filed a "Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and Request to

Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion for Default Summary Judgment." Although plaintiff's

argument in his response, as in his complaint, are at times difficult to follow, he seems

to argue that this court has jurisdiction because defendant's alleged conspiracy or other

tortious or criminal actions are themselves a breach of the mortgage contract and all

banking regulations. Plaintiff argues:

The Court has jurisdiction based on the Tucker Act which was established

for contractual obligations of the United States, which Breach of Contract

is a major part of a contractual obligation that includes those contractual

obligations of tort based on conspiracy, alleged criminal conduct and

fraud. The USDA-RH as well as SCVH and Fick conspired well before this

Plaintiff's Chapter Seven Bankruptcy to use this Plaintiff's name, social

security number, mortgage account and credit, without Authorization of

this Plaintiff, clearly to the benefit of the defendants, Breaching the

Mortgage Contract between this Plaintiff and USDA-RH and all Banking

Regulations.

Moreover, plaintiff's response argues that the defendants owed an obligation to the

plaintiff to disclose that "the first mortgage was not being fully satisfied and extinguished

in June 2007" and "that they were continuing Plaintiff's mortgage such that Plaintiff

remained in the right of possession and liable for the USDA mortgage on an ongoing

basis."

Plaintiff alleges continued unauthorized use of his identity and mortgage account,

citing to section 943.201 of Wisconsin Statute, which covers "[u]nauthorized use of an

individual's personal identifying information or documents." Wis. Stat. § 943.201 (2014).

Mr. Cycenas asserts that "[o]n August 25, 2014 this Plaintiff received from USDA-RH a

notice of insurance again using this Plaintiff's Identity for property this Plaintiff does not

even own," and he attaches to his response a letter from USDA-RH to Mr. Cycenas,

indicating "[b]ecause we did not have evidence that you had hazard insurance on the

property listed above, we bought insurance on your property [7632 Anderson St. Siren,

WI 54872, Loan Number 0001587796] and added the cost to your mortgage loan

account." Plaintiff appears to argue that defendants have the burden of proving that they

have the authority to use plaintiff's identifying information, including his mortgage

contract. Plaintiff contends that:

On the auspice that the Defendant's [sic] had extinguished the first

mortgage such that the Plaintiff ridded himself of an over encumbered

property and a judgment debt against himself allowing a "fresh start" in

bankruptcy; that the same extinguishment, had the Defendants followed

through and not disguised the fact of their failure or refusal, was the basis

of the Plaintiff's acquiescence to the benefit of the Defendants: that the

Defendants knew they were getting the benefit and expected to extinguish

the first mortgage is clear through their disguising of the fact that they did

not extinguish it.

Finally, plaintiff also requests "the Court to throw out the Defendants' Motions as

non-compliant and for Summary Judgment against the Defendants' Failure to Answer

the Complaint" because "[t]he Summons clearly noticed and warned the defendants that

an answer complying was required with-in [sic] 60 days and Defendants required an

additional 21 days and they chose not to, knowing default judgment was due this

Plaintiff if they failed." 4 He further asserts summary judgment is proper because the

"Defendants' rights were 'Subject to' the First Mortgage holder," and they "admitted and

confessed they did not extinguish the first mortgage." According to plaintiff, the

defendant never denied the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name and identity. In his

response, plaintiff, thus, asks this court to order defendant, United States by "Default

Summary Judgment ... to comply with the Pray [sic] of Relief in the Original Complaint

for the amount of Six Million Dollars to be paid to this Plaintiff and a Satisfaction of

Mortgage to be given to this Plaintiff."

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff filed his case in this court pro se. Despite that plaintiff's filings are difficult

to follow, when determining whether a complaint filed by a prose plaintiff is sufficient to

invoke review by a court, QIQ se plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction of their

pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (requiring that allegations

contained in a QIQ se complaint be held to "less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers"), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); see also Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); Matthews v.

United States, 750 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Diamond v. United States, 115

Fed. Cl. 516, 524 (2014), aff'd, 2015 WL 527500 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2015). "However,

"'[t]here is no duty on the part of the trial court to create a claim which [the plaintiff] has

not spelled out in his [or her] pleading.""' Lengen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317, 328

(2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Scogin v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 293

(1995) (quoting Clark v. Nat'I Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.

Upon defendant's request, by court order, with a copy mailed to plaintiff, the court

granted defendant 21 days enlargement of time to respond to the plaintiff's original

complaint.

1975))); see also Bussie v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 89, 94, aff'd, 443 F. App'x 542

(Fed. Cir. 2011 ); Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007). "While a prose

plaintiff is held to a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an

attorney, the QIQ se plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing the Court's

jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl.

163, 165 (2010) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at 9 and Taylor v. United States, 303

F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir.) ("Plaintiff bears the burden of showing jurisdiction by a

preponderance of the evidence."), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see

also Shelkofsky v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 133, 139 (2014) ("[W]hile the court may

excuse ambiguities in a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the court 'does not excuse [a

complaint's] failures."' (quoting Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir.

1995)); Harris v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 290, 292 (2013) ("Although plaintiff's

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard, such leniency 'with respect to mere

formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements."' (quoting

Minehan v. United States , 75 Fed. Cl. at 253)) .

It is well established that "'subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a

court's power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived."' Arbaugh v. Y & H

Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630

(2002)). "[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not

exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide

jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press." Henderson

ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011); see also Hertz Corp. v.

Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) ("Courts have an independent obligation to determine

whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it." (citing

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 514)); Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 269 F.3d

1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[A] court has a duty to inquire into its jurisdiction to hear

and decide a case." (citing Johannsen v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., Inc., 918 F.2d

160, 161 (Fed. Cir. 1990))); View Eng'g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 115 F.3d 962,

963 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[C]ourts must always look to their jurisdiction, whether the parties

raise the issue or not."). "The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction ... may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage

in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment." Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546

U.S. at 506; see also Cent. Pines Land Co., L.L.C. v. United States, 697 F.3d 1360,

1364 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("An objection to a court's subject matter jurisdiction can be

raised by any party or the court at any stage of litigation, including after trial and the

entry of judgment." (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 506)); Rick's Mushroom

Serv., Inc. v. United States , 521 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[A]ny party may

challenge, or the court may raise sua sponte, subject matter jurisdiction at any time."

(citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 506; Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d

1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied,

545 U.S. 1127 (2005); and Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed.

Cir. 1998))); Pikulin v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 71, 76, appeal dismissed, 425 F. App'x

902 (Fed. Cir. 2011 ). In fact, "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is an inquiry that this court

must raise sua sponte, even where ... neither party has raised this issue." Metabolite

Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Textile

Prods., Inc. v. Mead Corp. , 134 F.3d 1481 , 1485 (Fed. Cir.) , reh'g denied and en bane

suggestion declined (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 826 (1998)) , reh'g and reh'g en

bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted in part sub. nom Lab . Corp. of Am. Holdings

v. Meta bolite Labs ., Inc., 546 U.S. 975 (2005), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,

548 U.S. 124 (2006) .

Pursuant to the RCFC and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff need

only state in the complaint "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's

jurisdiction, " and "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief." RCFC 8(a)(1), (2) (2014) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2) (2014); see also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp . v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555-57, 570 (2007)). "Determination of jurisdiction starts with the complaint,

which must be well-pleaded in that it must state the necessary elements of the plaintiff's

claim, independent of any defense that may be interposed." Holley v. United States, 124

F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation

Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983)), reh 'g denied (Fed . Cir. 1997); see also Klamath Tribe Claims

Comm . v. United States , 97 Fed . Cl. 203, 208 (2011); Gonzalez-Mccaulley Inv. Grp.,

Inc. v. United States , 93 Fed . Cl. 710, 713 (2010). "Conclusory allegations of law and

unwarranted inferences of fact do not suffice to support a claim." Bradley v. Chiron

Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Mczeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp. ,

501 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)

(quoting C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1286 (3d ed. 2004)) .

"A plaintiff's factual allegations must 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level'

and cross 'the line from conceivable to plausible."' Three S Consulting v. United States ,

104 Fed. Cl. 510, 523 (2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp . v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), aff'd,

562 F. App'x 964 (Fed . Cir.) , reh'g denied (Fed . Cir. 2014). As stated in Ashcroft v.

Igbal, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do. ' 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice

if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v.

J.g_Qfil, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp . v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

When deciding a case based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure

to state a claim, this court must assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the

complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 ("In addition, when ruling on a defendant's

motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in

the complaint." (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (citing

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A. , 534 U.S. 506 , 508 n.1 (2002)))); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

U.S. 232, 236 (1974) ("Moreover, it is well established that, in passing on a motion to

dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for

failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint should be construed

favorably to the pleader."), abrogated on other grounds Q.y Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800 (1982), recognized Q.y Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190 (1984); United Pac.

Ins. Co. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1325, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Samish Indian

Nation v. United States , 419 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Boise Cascade Corp. v.

United States , 296 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed .

Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 906 (2003) .

The Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to this court as follows:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render

judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon

the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive

department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United

States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in

tort.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the

Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity to allow jurisdiction over claims against the

United States (1) founded on an express or implied contract with the United States, (2)

seeking a refund from a prior payment made to the government, or (3) based on federal

constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law mandating compensation by the federal

government for damages sustained. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287,

289-90 (2009); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); see also Greenlee

Cnty., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 875 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en bane

denied (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1142 (2008); Palmer v. United States,

168 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

"Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is

cognizable under the Tucker Act. The claim must be one for money damages against

the United States .... " United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216; see also United

States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003); Smith v. United

States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 259 (2013);

RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rick's

Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d at 1343 ("[P]laintiff must ... identify a

substantive source of law that creates the right to recovery of money damages against

the United States."). In Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit identified three types of monetary claims

for which jurisdiction is lodged in the United States Court of Federal Claims. The court

wrote:

The underlying monetary claims are of three types. . . . First, claims

alleging the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the

government fall within the Tucker Act's waiver .... Second, the Tucker

Act's waiver encompasses claims where "the plaintiff has paid money over

to the Government, directly or in effect, and seeks return of all or part of

that sum." Eastport S.S. [Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605-06,]

372 F.2d [1002,] 1007-08 [(1967)] (describing illegal exaction claims as

claims "in which 'the Government has the citizen's money in its pocket"'

(quoting Clapp v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 505, 117 F. Supp. 576, 580

(1954)) .... Third, the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over those

claims where "money has not been paid but the plaintiff asserts that he is

nevertheless entitled to a payment from the treasury." Eastport S.S ., 372

F.2d at 1007. Claims in this third category, where no payment has been

made to the government, either directly or in effect, require that the

"particular provision of law relied upon grants the claimant, expressly or by

implication, a right to be paid a certain sum." kl; see also [United States

yJ Testan, 424 U.S. [392,] 401-02 [1976] ("Where the United States is the

defendant and the plaintiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or

retained, the basis of the federal claim-whether it be the Constitution, a

statute, or a regulation-does not create a cause of action for money

damages unless, as the Court of Claims has stated, that basis 'in itself ...

can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal

Government for the damage sustained."' (quoting Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d

at 1009)). This category is commonly referred to as claims brought under

a "money-mandating" statute.

Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004);

see also Twp. of Saddle Brook v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 101, 106 (2012).

To prove that a statute or regulation is money-mandating, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that an independent source of substantive law relied upon '"can fairly be

interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government."' United States v.

Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. at 400); see

also United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 472; United States v.

Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 217; Blueport Co., LLC v. United States, 533 F.3d 1374, 1383

(Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1153 (2009). The source of law granting

monetary relief must be distinct from the Tucker Act itself. See United States v. Navajo

Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (The Tucker Act does not create "substantive rights; [it is simply

a] jurisdictional provision[] that operate[s] to waive sovereign immunity for claims

premised on other sources of law (e.g., statutes or contracts)."). "'If the statute is not

money-mandating, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction, and the dismissal

should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."' Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed.

Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Greenlee Cnty .. Ariz. v.

United States, 487 F.3d at 876); Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir.

2005) (The absence of a money-mandating source is "fatal to the court's jurisdiction

under the Tucker Act."); Peoples v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 553, 565-66 (2009).

The United States is Only Proper Defendant in this Court

This court lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's allegations against Mr. Fick and St.

Croix Valley Hardwoods, Inc., both of which plaintiff named as defendants. The

government is correct that when a complaint filed in this court names private parties,

this court is without jurisdiction to hear those allegations not against the United States.

All claims filed in the United States Court of Federal Claims must be filed against the

United States as the defendant. See RCFC 1O(a) (2014); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a).

The United States Supreme Court has indicated that for suits filed in the United States

Court of Federal Claims and its predecessors, "[i]f the relief sought is against others

than the United States the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of

the court." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588, (1941) (citation omitted).

Stated differently, "the only proper defendant for any matter before this court is the

United States, not its officers, nor any other individual." Stephenson v. United States, 58

Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Sherwood,

312 U.S. at 588; Anderson v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 330, 331 (2014) ("This court

does not have jurisdiction over any claims alleged against states, localities, state and

local government entities, or state and local government officials and employees;

jurisdiction only extends to suits against the United States itself."); Warren v. United

States, 106 Fed. Cl. 507, 510-11 (2012) ("It is well settled that the United States is the

only proper defendant in the Court of Federal Claims."); Eskridge Research Corp. v.

United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 88, 95 (2010) (citing Howard v. United States, 230 F. App'x

975, 976 (Fed. Cir.) ("The United States is the only proper defendant before the Court of

Federal Claims."), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 2007)); Hufford v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl.

607, 608 (2009) ("[T]his Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain

controversies between private parties."); May v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 442, 444

("Jurisdiction, then, is limited to suits against the United States."), aff'd, 293 F. App'x

775 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2008); Delmarva Power &

Light Co. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 205, 213 (2007) ("The Court of Federal Claims

and its predecessor courts have never possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes

between private parties .... The court lacks jurisdiction over private rights implicated in

a dispute between private parties."), aff'd, 542 F.3d 889 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied,

556 U.S. 1219 (2009); Shalhoub v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 584, 585 (2007) ("When a

plaintiff's complaint names private parties, or state agencies, rather than federal

agencies, this court has no jurisdiction to hear those allegations.").

To the extent that any of plaintiff's claims are against Mr. Fick and St. Croix, the

court has no jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's suit as to them. Plaintiff's first claim in his

complaint, that "on or before, March 23, 2007, the Defendant's Fick and SCVH,

Fraudulently misrepresented to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court a request for Lift of Stay,

which was granted by the Court," which only states claims against private parties, Mr.

Fick and St. Croix, and, thus, must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff's Claims that Sound in Tort or Allege Criminal Conduct

Plaintiff's second claim in his complaint asserts that "Defendant's RD, Fick, and

SCVH, Conspired to use this Plaintiff's name, Social Security Number, Mortgage

Account Number 0001587796, Interest Credit Account, and Credit, without any

Authorization of any sort from this Plaintiff, to continue to make monthly payments to RD

and to profit by rental receipts from said property." Plaintiff's fourth claim in his

complaint alleges "Defendants, continue in their Cover Up by RD stating 'RD is

currently working with SCVH for them to obtain a payoff balance to satisfy RD's

mortgage lien."' (emphasis in original). Plaintiff's fifth claim suggests allegations of

"Identify Theft, Mortgage Fraud, Theft of Social Security Numbers and the un-authorized

use of that [social security] number, credit theft or fraud." Plaintiff's seventh claim

suggests potential allegations of trespass and contends plaintiff "published and

recorded in the Burnett County Register of Deeds a PUBLIC NOTICE with all fees and

fines for anyone who trespassed on private property or rights of this Plaintiff, including a

$10,000.00 fee/fine per day per person," (capitalization in original), which plaintiff

appears to believe should have resulted in those fines being paid to him.

To the extent plaintiff's complaint asserts claims of conspiracy,

misrepresentation, identity theft, mortgage fraud, credit theft or fraud, and trespass,

those claims sound in tort, or allege criminal conduct. As such, this court lacks

jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims. The Tucker Act expressly excludes tort claims,

including those committed by federal officials, from the jurisdiction of the United States

Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) ("The United States Court of Federal

Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United

States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of

an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United

States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."); see

also Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993); Rick's Mushroom Serv.,

Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d at 1343; Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1459

(Fed. Cir. 1998); Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir.) ("Because

Brown and Darnell's complaints for 'fraudulent assessment[s]' are grounded upon fraud,

which is a tort, the court lacks jurisdiction over those claims."), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir.

1997); Golden Pac. Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1070 n.8 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g

denied, en bane suggestion declined (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 961 (1994);

Hampel v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 235, 238, aff'd, 429 F. App'x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2011),

cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1105 (2012); Jumah v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 603, 607

(2009) ("[l]t is well-established that the Court of Federal Claims does not have

jurisdiction over tort claims. Here, Mr. Jumah seeks damages for '[n]eglect,

[m]isrepresentation, [f]alse [i]mprisonment, [c]onspiracy, [i]ntentional [i]nfliction of

emotional [d]istress, [i]nvasion of [p]rivacy, [n]egligence and [t]respass and [p]unitive

[d]amages.' These are all claims sounding in tort." (internal citation omitted; all brackets

in original)), aff'd, 385 F. App'x 987 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Woodson v. United States, 89 Fed.

Cl. 640, 650 (2009); Fullard v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 226, 230 (2007) ("This court

lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's conspiracy claim because the Tucker Act specifically

states that the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over claims 'sounding

in tort."'); Edelmann v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 376, 379-80 (2007) ("This Court 'does

not have jurisdiction over claims that defendant engaged in negligent, fraudulent, or

other wrongful conduct when discharging its official duties' ... [and] Plaintiffs' claims of

fraud, misrepresentation, slander, perjury, harassment, intimidation, coercion, theft, and

defamation, and their claims that the Government deprived Ms. Edelmann of her right to

a fair trial, are tort claims." (quoting Cottrell v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 144, 149

(1998)); McCullough v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 1, 3 (2006), appeal dismissed, 236 F.

App'x 615 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1050 (2007); Agee

v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 284, 290 (2006); Zhengxing v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl.

732, 739, aff'd, 204 F. App'x 885 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 2006). Plaintiff's

claims of conspiracy, misrepresentation, fraud, and trespass all sound in tort and,

accordingly must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff is alleging criminal conduct by the Rural

Housing Service, this court also lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims. See

Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Cooper v. United

States, 104 Fed. Cl. 306, 312 (2012) (holding that "this court does not have jurisdiction

over [plaintiff's] claims because the court may review neither criminal matters, nor the

decisions of district courts.") (internal citations omitted); Mendes v. United States, 88

Fed. Cl. 759, 762, appeal dismissed, 375 F. App'x 4 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Hufford v. United

States, 87 Fed. Cl. 696, 702 (2009) (holding that the United States Court of Federal

Claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute);

Matthews v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 274, 282 (finding that the court lacked

jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's criminal claims), recons. denied, 73 Fed. Cl. 524

(2006); McCullough v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. at 4 (finding that the court lacked

jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's criminal claims). In plaintiff's response to defendant's

motion to dismiss, plaintiff quotes section 943.201 of Chapter 943 of Wisconsin Statute,

which covers "Crimes Against Property," specifically "Unauthorized use of an

individual's personal identifying information or documents," to seemingly support his

claims regarding unauthorized use of his identity and documents. See Wis. Stat. §

943.201. Plaintiff's criminal allegations of identity theft, mortgage fraud, theft or

unauthorized use of his social security number, or credit theft or fraud, and, thus, also

his request for judgment against defendants for "no less than $6,000,000.00 (Six Million

Dollars) for the unauthorized use of this Plaintiff's identify," must be dismissed pursuant

to RCFC 12(b)(1) as outside the court's jurisdiction. In sum, the court lacks jurisdiction

to review plaintiff's second, fourth, fifth, and seventh claims that sound in tort or allege

criminal conduct.

Plaintiff's Claims Against Actions by the Bankruptcy Court

To the extent that plaintiff is asking this court to review the decisions or actions of

the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Western District of Wisconsin, this court does

not have jurisdiction to do so. Plaintiff writes in his complaint that "by Lifting the Stay, did

the U.S. Bankruptcy Court alter the Plaintiff's Bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy Court is

liable for all damages." Plaintiff further contends that "the mortgage is still in the

Plaintiff's name, and that the Plaintiff is still responsible for said mortgage and that

mortgage is in line for foreclosure creating an improper and incomplete bankruptcy."

"[T]he Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to review decisions of federal

bankruptcy courts." Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d 1349, 1350 (Fed. Cir.), cert.

denied , 534 U.S. 1042 (2001); see also Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d at 380 (finding

that the United States Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the

decisions of federal district courts); Mora v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 713, 716 (2014)

("[T]his court does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts, federal

bankruptcy courts, federal district courts, or federal circuit courts of appeals.").

Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction to review plaintiff's third and sixth claims.

Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claims

To the extent that plaintiff alleges a breach of contract, plaintiff fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that "Identity

Theft, Mortgage Fraud, Theft of Social Security Numbers and the un-authorized use of

that number, credit theft or fraud, and Breach of Contract by anyone including the

United States is against the law" and that "Defendant RD is in BREACH of Contract,

becoming a co-conspirator with Fick and SCVH, by not getting written authorization

from this Plaintiff." (capitalization in original).

In examining what must be pied in order to state a claim, under both RCFC

8(a)(2) and Rule (8)(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff need only

state in the complaint "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief." RCFC 8(a)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The United States Supreme Court stated: "While a complaint

attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief'

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of

a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations

omitted, brackets in original); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57, 570); A&D Auto Sales. Inc. v. United

States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Bell/Heery v. United States, 739 F.3d

1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2014); Kam-Almaz v.

United States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("The facts as alleged 'must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all

the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)."' (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)); Totes-lsotoner Corp. v. United States, 594 F.3d

1346, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 92 (201 O); Bank of Guam v. United

States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir.) ("In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a

claim, the complaint must allege facts 'plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)'

a showing of entitlement to relief." (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at

557)), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1006

(2010).

To have privity of contract with the United States government, and, therefore,

invoke the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims for a breach of

contract claim, plaintiff "must show that either an express or implied-in-fact contract

underlies [the] claim." Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed.

Cir. 1997). "For there to be an express contract, the parties must have intended to be

bound and must have expressed their intention in a manner capable of understanding.

A definite offer and an unconditional acceptance must be established ." Russell Corp. v.

United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 596, 606, 537 F.2d 474, 481 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.

1073 (1977). Implied-in-fact contracts are agreements ""'founded upon a meeting of the

minds, which, although not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from

conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit

understanding.""' Traum a Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d at 1325 (quoting

Hercules. Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 424 (1996) (quoting Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co.

v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923))); see also Kam-Almaz v. United States, 682

F.3d at 1368; Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d at 1329 (citing Trauma Serv.

Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d at 1326); Bay View. Inc. v. United States, 278 F.3d

1259, 1265-66 (Fed. Cir. 2001 ), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied, 285 F.3d 1035 (Fed.

Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 826 (2002); Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 109

Fed. Cl. 177, 203 (2013); Peninsula Grp. Capital Corp. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl.

720, 728 (2010) (citing Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. at 597), appeal

dismissed , 454 F. App'x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Russell Corp. v. United States, 210 Ct.

Cl. at 609, 537 F.2d at 482. Such an agreement will not be implied "unless the meeting

of minds was indicated by some intelligible conduct, act or sign." Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co.

v. United States, 261 U.S. at 598; see also Russell Corp. v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. at

609, 537 F.2d at 48.

It is well settled that "[t]o recover for breach of contract, a party must allege and

establish: (1) a valid contract between the parties, (2) an obligation or duty arising out of

the contract, (3) a breach of that duty, and (4) damages caused by the breach." San

Carlos Irr. & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see

also Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 597, 620 (2014). A breach of

contract claim requires: "(1) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract and (2)

factual allegations sufficient to support the conclusion that there has been a breach of

the identified contractual duty." Bell/Heery v. United States, 739 F.3d at 1330 (citing

Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 188, 198 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied and en bane

suggestion declined (Fed. Cir. 1994), aff'd, 516 U.S. 1049 (1996); San Carlos Irr. &

Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d at 959).

From plaintiff's filings, most particularly his response to defendant's motion to

dismiss, it appears plaintiff is alleging breach of the mortgage document he entered into

with the Rural Housing Service. It appears plaintiff is arguing that defendant's alleged

conspiracy and other tortious conduct are in themselves breaches of contractual

obligations based on the mortgage. Plaintiff argues: