Opinion

David Zink v. George Lombardi

  • 783 F.3d 1089
  • 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3550
  • 2015 WL 968176
Court
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Filed
Mar 6, 2015
Status
Published
On the bench
Riley, Wollman, Loken, Murphy, Bye, Smith, Colloton, Gruender, Shepherd, Kelly
Cited by
229 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.1%

holding that successfully pleading facts to demonstrate a substantial risk of severe pain, as required to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim in the context of an attack upon a state’s execution protocol, requires the prisoner to plead more than just a hypothetical possibility that an execution could go wrong, resulting in severe pain to a prisoner; the Eighth Amendment prohibits an objectively intolerable risk of pain, rather than simply the possibility of pain

How later courts described this case

  • holding that successfully pleading facts to demonstrate a substantial risk of severe pain, as required to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim in the context of an attack upon a state’s execution protocol, requires the prisoner to plead more than just a hypothetical possibility that an execution could go wrong, resulting in severe pain to a prisoner; the Eighth Amendment prohibits an objectively intolerable risk of pain, rather than simply the possibility of pain
  • concluding that the Constitution does not require detailed disclosure about a state’s execution protocol and that a “prisoner’s assertion of necessity—that [the State] must disclose its protocol so he can challenge its conformity with the Eighth Amendment—does not substitute for the identification of a cognizable liberty interest” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)
  • holding that public access to the identity of suppliers of drugs for lethal injections does not play a significant role in the functioning of the process “given that the practical effect of public disclosure would likely be frustration of the State’s ability to carry out a lawful sentence”
  • noting that the court did not need to accept speculative facts on the potential deficiencies in compounded pentobarbital as an execution drug because the complaint did not show that the lethal-injection protocol was "sure or very likely” to'create a substantial risk of severe pain (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008) (plurality opinion))

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2220

___________________________

David Zink,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,

Michael S. Worthington; John E. Winfield,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs

Leon Taylor; Walter T. Storey; Earl Ringo; Roderick Nunley,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants,

John C. Middleton,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff,

Paul T. Goodwin; Andre Cole; Reginald Clemons; Cecil Clayton; Mark

Christeson; Russell Bucklew; David Barnett,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants,

Richard Strong; Marcellus S. Williams,

lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenors,

v.

George A. Lombardi; David R. Dormire; Terry Russell; John Does, 2-40,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees.

____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

____________

Submitted: September 9, 2014

Filed: March 6, 2015

[Published]

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, LOKEN, MURPHY, BYE, SMITH,

COLLOTON, GRUENDER, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges, En Banc.

____________

PER CURIAM.1

Several prisoners sentenced to death in Missouri appeal the district court’s2

dismissal of their complaint challenging the lethal-injection protocol of the Missouri

Department of Corrections. The prisoners sued state officials who are charged with

planning, supervising, and carrying out executions, and two independent contractors

who allegedly have prescribed, produced, or tested the compounded pentobarbital

used in the State’s current lethal-injection protocol. They sought a declaratory

judgment that the lethal-injection protocol violates the Constitution of the United

States, the Missouri Constitution, several provisions of state law, and Missouri

common law, and an injunction that prevents the defendants from executing them in

accordance with the protocol.

1

Chief Judge Riley and Judges Wollman, Loken, Smith, and Gruender join this

opinion. Judge Colloton joins all but Part II.A of this opinion. Judge Shepherd joins

all but Part II.B of this opinion.

2

The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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I.

This litigation commenced in 2012 when the prisoners challenged what was

then a new lethal-injection protocol. In prior years, Missouri’s lethal-injection

protocol involved the administration of three drugs: “[S]odium thiopental to

anesthetize the prisoner and render him unconscious, pancuronium bromide to

paralyze him and stop his breathing, and potassium chloride to stop the prisoner’s

heart.” Ringo v. Lombardi, 677 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 2012). In May 2012, after

sodium thiopental became unavailable, the State revised its protocol to use a single

drug—propofol—as the lethal agent.

In June 2012, the prisoners sued in state court to challenge the new protocol.

State officials removed the case to federal court and promptly moved to dismiss the

petition for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the motion in part and

granted it in part, ruling as relevant here that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded that

the protocol presented a risk of harm that violated the Eighth Amendment and that the

prisoners were not required to plead a reasonable alternative method of execution to

the use of propofol. The court also ruled that the allegedly higher risk of pain posed

by the protocol, compared to the State’s prior methods of execution, sufficed to state

a claim of unconstitutional ex post facto punishment.

In October 2013, the State informed the district court that it had revised its

protocol to use pentobarbital, rather than propofol, as the lethal agent. In late 2013,

after a discovery dispute, the district court ordered the State to disclose to counsel for

the prisoners the identities of the physician who prescribes the pentobarbital used in

Missouri executions, the pharmacist who compounds it, and the laboratory that tests

the compounded drug. In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888, 892 (8th Cir.) (en banc), reh’g

denied, 741 F.3d 903 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1790 (2014). This court

issued a writ of mandamus vacating the district court’s order requiring disclosure. Id.

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at 897. We determined that the complaint then pending failed to state any claim to

which the identities of those parties was relevant. Id. at 895-97.

In February 2014, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. That

complaint alleges ten separate claims, seven of which are at issue in this appeal: (1)

that the State’s use of compounded pentobarbital constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment, in violation of the United States Constitution; (2) that the defendants are

deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’ medical need for their executions not to inflict

gratuitous pain; (3) that the State’s use of compounded pentobarbital creates a

significant risk of increased punishment over previous methods and accordingly

amounts to ex post facto punishment, in violation of the United States Constitution;

(4) that the defendants have deprived them of due process under the United States

Constitution by not providing timely and adequate notice of the lethal injection

methods; (5) that the defendants have deprived them of equal protection under the

United States Constitution by deviating from the execution protocol in certain

instances; (6) that the defendants have violated their First Amendment rights under the

United States Constitution by refusing to disclose the identities of the pharmacy that

compounds the pentobarbital and its suppliers; and (7) that the defendants have

violated a number of federal laws by soliciting and using the compounded

pentobarbital in executions, all allegedly reviewable under Missouri’s Administrative

Procedure Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.150.

In May 2014, the district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the

complaint. The court dismissed all claims except for that alleging “cruel and unusual

punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment and its Missouri constitutional

analog. As for the remaining claim, the court ruled that the prisoners’ concession that

“other methods of lethal injection . . . would be constitutional” did not suffice to state

a claim under the Eighth Amendment. But the court allowed the prisoners seven days

to amend the claim and address that deficiency by presenting “factual allegations

permitting the Court to determine whether the alleged alternative method [of

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execution] is reasonably available and less likely to create a substantial risk of harm.”

The prisoners responded that they did not intend to plead an alternative method of

execution, because they believed the law did not require them to do so. In light of that

response, the district court dismissed the remaining claim and entered a final

judgment. This appeal followed.

II.

The prisoners’ lead argument on appeal is that they stated a claim under the

Eighth Amendment that Missouri’s lethal-injection protocol violates the prohibition

on cruel and unusual punishment.3 As in Lombardi, our analysis must begin with a

basic proposition: “[C]apital punishment is constitutional. It necessarily follows that

there must be a means of carrying it out.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008)

(plurality opinion) (internal citation omitted). Any allegation that all methods of

execution are unconstitutional, therefore, does not state a plausible claim under the

Eighth Amendment. Lombardi, 741 F.3d at 895.

Baze addressed an Eighth Amendment challenge to a lethal-injection protocol,

and our opinion in Lombardi summarized the rule of Baze as follows:

Where, as here, there is no assertion that the State acts purposefully to

inflict unnecessary pain in the execution process, the Supreme Court

recognized only a limited right under the Eighth Amendment to require

a State to change from one feasible method of execution to another. The

controlling opinion of the Chief Justice in Baze provides that if a State

refuses to adopt a readily available alternative method of execution that

would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain, then “a

State’s refusal to change its method can be viewed as ‘cruel and unusual’

under the Eighth Amendment.” 553 U.S. at 52 (plurality opinion)

3

The prisoners do not develop an argument on appeal concerning the dismissal

of their claim alleging cruel and unusual punishment under the Missouri Constitution.

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(emphasis added). In sum: “A stay of execution may not be granted on

grounds such as those asserted here unless the condemned prisoner

establishes that the State’s lethal injection protocol creates a

demonstrated risk of severe pain. He must show that the risk is

substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives.” Id.

at 61 (emphasis added).

741 F.3d at 895-96.

The district court, relying on Lombardi, concluded that the second amended

complaint adequately alleged that the protocol creates a substantial risk of severe pain.

The court ruled, however, that the prisoners failed to allege sufficiently the second

essential element of an Eighth Amendment claim—i.e., that there exists a feasible

alternative method of execution that would substantially reduce the risk of harm.

Although the prisoners conceded in the second amended complaint that “other

methods of lethal injection the Department could choose would be constitutional,” the

court reasoned that this “naked assertion” was insufficient to allege that an alternative

method is reasonably available and less likely to create a substantial risk of harm.

To state a claim under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A pleading need not include “detailed

factual allegations,” but it is not sufficient to tender “naked assertion[s]” that are

“devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A

complaint must do more than allege “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.

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A.

We first address whether the second amended complaint adequately alleges that

Missouri’s lethal-injection protocol creates a substantial risk of severe pain. We

review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. United States ex rel. Raynor v. Nat’l Rural Utils. Coop. Fin.,

Corp., 690 F.3d 951, 955 (8th Cir. 2012). We assume all facts in the complaint to be

true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id.

“[L]egal conclusions” and “threadbare recitations of the elements of a cause of

action supported by mere conclusory statements” are not entitled to a presumption of

truth when considering the sufficiency of a complaint. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A

complaint must be plausible on its face and “‘[a] claim has facial plausibility when the

pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Magee v. Trustees of Hamline Univ.,

Minn., 747 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Making

a plausibility determination is a “‘context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679).

Stating a plausible Eighth Amendment claim in the context of the prisoners’

attack upon Missouri’s execution protocol first requires the prisoners to plead

sufficient facts indicating that the protocol creates a “substantial risk of serious harm.”

See Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (“We have explained that to prevail on such a claim there

must be a ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ an ‘objectively intolerable risk of harm’

that prevents prison officials from pleading that they were ‘subjectively blameless for

purposes of the Eighth Amendment.’” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

842, 846 & n.9 (1994))). Indeed, the prisoners allege the lethal-injection protocol

creates a substantial risk of serious harm in that it inflicts a “substantial risk of severe

pain.” See id. at 52. However, successfully pleading facts to demonstrate a

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substantial risk of severe pain requires the prisoners to plead more than just a

hypothetical possibility that an execution could go wrong, resulting in severe pain to

a prisoner. The Eighth Amendment prohibits an “‘objectively intolerable risk’” of

pain, rather than “simply the possibility of pain.” Id. at 61-62 (quoting Farmer, 511

U.S. at 846). The plurality opinion in Baze acknowledged that the nature of

executions necessarily involves the risk of pain: “Some risk of pain is inherent in any

method of execution—no matter how humane—if only from the prospect of error in

following the required procedure.” Id. at 47. But “the Constitution does not demand

the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions.” Id. Instead, the Eighth

Amendment requires that the prisoners show the intended protocol is “‘sure or very

likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering.’” Id. at 50 (quoting Helling v.

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)).

Relying on this court’s decision in Lombardi, the district court found the

prisoners’ second amended complaint adequately alleged that the protocol created a

substantial risk of severe pain:

The Eighth Circuit specifically referenced the language used in

Plaintiffs’ previous complaints regarding the risk and level of pain

necessary to plead an Eighth Amendment violation, and gave no

indication such language was insufficient. Based on that fact and

the case law cited by Plaintiffs, the Court concludes Plaintiffs

sufficiently plead an Eighth Amendment claim regarding the risk

and level of pain that the current execution protocol carries.

R. Doc. 437, at 8. Our decision in Lombardi addressed the pleading requirement of

a feasible alternative to the current lethal-injection protocol. It did not address the

sufficiency of the complaint regarding the allegation of a substantial risk of severe

pain. Because the district court relied upon our decision in Lombardi as the basis for

finding the prisoners had satisfied this pleading burden, a determination of the

sufficiency of the prisoners’ complaint regarding the allegation of a substantial risk

of severe pain now requires a more thorough analysis.

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When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, we review the complaint itself

and any exhibits attached to the complaint. Meehan v. United Consumers Club

Franchising Corp., 312 F.3d 909, 913 (8th Cir. 2002) (“‘[M]aterials attached to the

complaint as exhibits may be considered in construing the sufficiency of the

complaint.’” (quoting Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986))). The

prisoners filed a second amended complaint with 32 exhibits attached, including

declarations and affidavits from medical professionals.

1.

In the second amended complaint the prisoners rely on analysis from a

pharmacology expert and an anesthesiologist in alleging that the use of a

compounding pharmacy to produce the execution drug creates an “objectively

intolerable risk of pain.” It is alleged that “[c]ompounding pharmacy products do not

meet the requirements for identity, purity, efficacy, and safety that pharmaceuticals

produced under FDA regulations must meet.” R. Doc. 338, at 44. The prisoners

identify four distinct potential risks which they believe could result from the State’s

use of compounded pentobarbital. First, they allege that the compounded

pentobarbital could be sub- or super-potent. According to the second amended

complaint, sub-potent pentobarbital could fail to cause the death of the prisoner,

leaving him unconscious with a lower rate of respiration, causing irreversible brain

damage. R. Doc. 338, at Ex. 5. Super-potent pentobarbital could result in suffocation

and difficulty breathing before losing consciousness. R. Doc. 338, at Ex. 5. Second,

the prisoners allege that the pentobarbital could easily be contaminated with allergens,

toxins, bacteria, or fungus. The prisoners allege that the injection of pentobarbital so

contaminated could cause a painful allergic reaction in the blood. R. Doc. 338, at 45.

Third, the prisoners allege that foreign particles could contaminate the compounded

pentobarbital, creating the risk that a prisoner could experience serious pain upon

injection or could suffer from a pulmonary embolism. R. Doc. 338, at 45. Finally, the

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prisoners allege that the drug may not maintain the proper pH,4 potentially resulting

in numerous complications, most notably severe burning upon injection or a

pulmonary embolism. R. Doc. 338, at 45. The prisoners also allege that improper

storage of the pentobarbital and use beyond its expiration date could exacerbate the

potential for these harms. R. Doc. 338, at 49-51.

Asserting that compounding pharmacies commonly lack oversight and

regulation, it is alleged that the use of compounding pharmacies “often results in drugs

which are contaminated, sub-potent or super-potent, or which do not have the

strength, quality or purity” of FDA-regulated drugs. R. Doc. 338, at. Ex. 6. These

compounding pharmacies are alleged to be an “emerging, substandard drug industry”

that are responsible for the creation of “large quantities of unregulated, unpredictable

and potentially unsafe drugs.” R. Doc. 338, at Ex. 6. Noting that the lack of

regulation allows compounding pharmacies to obtain ingredients from countries with

little pharmaceutical oversight, it is alleged that it is impossible to trace the origin of

the drugs, resulting in no guarantee that the drugs are what they purport to be. It is

alleged that Missouri’s current compounded pentobarbital lethal-injection protocol is

“replete with flaws that present a substantial risk of causing severe and unacceptable

levels of pain and suffering during the execution.” R. Doc. 338, at Ex. 5.

The prisoners also allege that the State might administer the execution drugs via

central venous access rather than peripheral venous access.5 R. Doc. 338, at 30. The

4

pH is a measure of the acidity or basicity of a solution. See Taber’s Cyclopedic

Medical Dictionary 1377 (Clayton L. Thomas ed., 16th ed. 1989). According to the

affidavits attached to the prisoners’ second amended complaint, maintaining a proper

pH is an important aspect of a properly produced drug. If a drug is too acidic or too

basic, it may be incompatible with human blood, causing various unintended

reactions. See R. Doc. 338, at Ex. 6.

5

Central venous access involves the insertion of a catheter into a large vein in

a person’s neck, chest, or groin. Peripheral venous access involves the placement of

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prisoners allege that the use of a central line carries a higher risk of complication in

following the lethal-injection protocol, increases the length of the execution, and is

more invasive and painful than peripheral venous access. R. Doc. 338, at 32.

Notably, the prisoners make no mention of the central vein issues in their briefing

before this court, instead focusing on alleged issues relating to the use of compounded

pentobarbital. Because the prisoners have failed to brief this issue before our court,

we decline to consider it here. See Neb. State Legislative Bd., United Transp. Union

v. Slater, 245 F.3d 656, 658 n.3 (8th Cir. 2001) (explaining that claims not raised in

an initial brief are waived).

2.

None of the alleged potentialities the prisoners identify in the second amended

complaint relating to compounded pentobarbital rises to the level of “sure or very

likely” to cause serious harm or severe pain. The prisoners’ allegations are limited to

descriptions of hypothetical situations in which a potential flaw in the production of

the pentobarbital or in the lethal-injection protocol could cause pain. This speculation

is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Brewer v. Landrigan, 131

S.Ct. 445, 445 (2010) (“[S]peculation cannot substitute for evidence that the use of

the drug is ‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering.’”

(quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 50)). By noting that the use of compounding pharmacies

“often results” in “potentially unsafe drugs,” the experts whose views have been

incorporated into the second amended complaint underscore that the harms they have

identified are hypothetical and not “sure or very likely” to occur. R. Doc. 338, at Ex.

6. The prisoners rely on allegations of generalized harms resulting from the use of a

compounding pharmacy to produce the pentobarbital and have failed to provide

a catheter in a peripheral vein, most commonly in the hand or arm. See 6 The Gale

Encyclopedia of Medicine 4571-72 (Laurie J. Fundukian ed., 4th ed. 2011).

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anything more than speculation that the current protocol carries a substantial risk of

severe pain.

Even if one of the harms the prisoners identify were to occur, the prisoners offer

nothing in their pleading to support the allegation that it would be more than an

isolated incident. The prospect of an isolated incident does not satisfy the requirement

that prisoners adequately plead a substantial risk of severe pain to survive a motion

to dismiss their Eighth Amendment claim. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (“[A]n isolated

mishap alone does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation, precisely because

such an event, while regrettable, does not suggest cruelty, or that the procedure at

issue gives rise to a ‘substantial risk of serious harm.’” (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at

842)). Accepting as true the factual matter alleged in the second amended complaint,

if any of the hypothetical situations the prisoners identify came to pass, it would

amount to an “isolated mishap” that, “while regrettable,” would not result in an Eighth

Amendment violation.

3.

Case law from other circuits also supports our conclusion that the prisoners’

allegation of a substantial risk of severe pain is inadequate. At least one court has

found that an Eighth Amendment challenge to an execution protocol was properly

dismissed after the plaintiff-prisoner failed to sufficiently plead a plausible claim that

the lethal-injection protocol was sure or very likely to create a substantial risk of

severe pain. See Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). In Cook, the

Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to Arizona’s lethal-injection protocol, a three

drug protocol involving the use of sodium thiopental. Id. The court found that the

prisoner’s “reliance on speculative and conclusory allegations [was] insufficient to

state a facially plausible claim” when he alleged that the use of non-FDA approved

sodium thiopental created a substantial risk of severe pain. Id. The prisoner alleged

that the unregulated drug could be ineffective, contaminated, and could differ greatly

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in potency, quality, and formation from other FDA regulated drugs. Id. at 1006. The

court rejected these claims as “speculative and overly generalized,” finding that the

prisoner failed to make any specific factual allegations regarding the alleged harms

arising from the use of an unregulated drug. Id. Instead, he only identified

hypothetical harms that would be “applicable to every drug produced outside the

United States.” Id. The court thus held that the bare allegations that the sodium

thiopental was imported and non-FDA approved did not plausibly show that the drug

was “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering,” and the

district court had properly dismissed the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at

1007.

The same prisoner mounted a second challenge to Arizona’s use of sodium

thiopental in its three drug lethal-injection protocol, alleging that the drug created a

substantial risk of severe pain because there had been 12 adverse drug reaction

reports, the drug had been manufactured for use on animals, it had caused problems

in three executions in the United States, and the State obtained it unlawfully. Cook

v. Brewer, 649 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit again upheld the

dismissal of the prisoner’s complaint, finding that he had failed to satisfy the pleading

requirements to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 918-19. “Because Cook’s

four new allegations do not support the drawing of any non-speculative conclusions,

Cook has failed to state a facially plausible claim that Arizona’s planned execution is

‘sure or very likely to cause . . . needless suffering.’” Id. (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at

50).

Other circuits have also denied prisoners relief when challenging a compounded

pentobarbital lethal-injection protocol. See Whitaker v. Livingston, 732 F.3d 465, 468

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 417 (2013) (affirming denial of motion for

preliminary injunction when plaintiff-prisoners failed to show state’s execution

protocol of compounded pentobarbital caused a substantial risk of severe pain when

they had “pointed to only hypothetical possibilities” and were unable to “point to

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some hypothetical situation, based on science and fact, showing a likelihood of severe

pain”); Wellons v. Comm’r Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2014)

(affirming the denial of injunctive relief and declaratory judgment and denying a stay

of execution when prisoner did not sufficiently allege that the use of compounded

pentobarbital in the state’s execution protocol amounted to an Eighth Amendment

violation because “speculation that a drug that has not been approved will lead to

severe pain or suffering ‘cannot substitute for evidence that the use of the drug is sure

or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering’” (quoting Mann v.

Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2013)).

4.

The prisoners have failed to include factual allegations in the second amended

complaint which permit the reasonable inference that Missouri’s lethal-injection

protocol is “sure or very likely” to create a substantial risk of severe pain. Accepting

the factual allegations in the complaint as true, the prisoners fail to satisfy their burden

under the Eighth Amendment because they rely entirely on hypothetical and

speculative harms that, if they were to occur, would only result from isolated mishaps.

Like the prisoner in Cook, the prisoners here fail to make any specific factual

allegations regarding the production of the pentobarbital that would lead to its

contamination, potency problems, or improper pH, and instead rely on general risks

associated with compounding pharmacies. Without such specific allegations, the

prisoners’ complaint contains no more than speculative and hypothetical generalized

assertions about the nature of compounding pharmacies. Likewise, the prisoners’

allegation describing concerns arising from the method of venous access selected by

the State amounts to no more than speculation. In sum, the prisoners have failed to

plead sufficient factual matter, consistent with Twombly and Iqbal, necessary to state

a plausible claim for relief. We conclude, therefore, that their claim regarding the

substantial risk of severe pain allegedly imposed by Missouri’s execution protocol is

inadequately pled as a matter of law.

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B.

Prisoners challenging a method of execution must do more than allege a

substantial risk of serious harm to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. As we

explained in Lombardi, 741 F.3d at 895-96, to establish a constitutional violation, an

inmate ultimately must prove that another execution procedure exists that is feasible

and readily implemented, and that the alternative method will significantly reduce a

substantial risk of severe pain. Lombardi, 741 F.3d at 895-96; see Baze, 553 U.S. at

52 (plurality opinion); id. at 63 (Alito, J., concurring); Raby v. Livingston, 600 F.3d

552, 560-61 (5th Cir. 2010); Cooey v. Strickland, 589 F.3d 210, 220 (6th Cir. 2009).

The existence of such an alternative method of execution, therefore, is a necessary

element of an Eighth Amendment claim, and this element—like any element of a

claim—must be pleaded adequately.

To address this point, the prisoners’ second amended complaint merely

“concede[s] that other methods of lethal injection the Department could choose to use

would be constitutional.” R. Doc. 338, at 148. In our view, this “concession” is

insufficient to allege the second element of an Eighth Amendment claim that

challenges a method of lethal injection. The complaint does not assert that the “other

methods of lethal injection” it references are feasible and readily implemented, or that

they would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain allegedly caused by

the present method. Even a barebones allegation to that effect, moreover, would not

be adequate: a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is

insufficient to state a claim under Rule 8(a)(2). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The pleading

must include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The second amended

complaint includes no factual matter that even hints at how the State—drawing on

feasible and readily implemented alternatives—could modify its lethal-injection

protocol to reduce significantly the alleged substantial risk of severe pain. We

therefore agree with the district court that the prisoners’ “naked assertion” that other

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methods would be constitutional, devoid of further factual enhancement, fails to state

a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

The prisoners respond that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill v. McDonough,

547 U.S. 573 (2006), illustrates the sufficiency of their complaint. The issue in Hill

was whether a prisoner’s challenge to the constitutionality of Florida’s lethal-injection

protocol could proceed as an action for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or whether it

must be brought as an action for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Id.

at 576. Hill’s complaint conceded that “other methods of lethal injection the

Department could choose to use would be constitutional,” and the State had not

argued that enjoining the present method “would leave the State without any other

practicable, legal method of executing Hill by lethal injection.” Id. at 580. The Court

held under those circumstances that the action could proceed under § 1983, because

“Hill’s action if successful would not necessarily prevent the State from executing him

by lethal injection.” Id. at 580.

In reaching that conclusion, the Hill Court rejected a suggestion from the

United States that a prisoner seeking to proceed under § 1983 rather than through

habeas corpus must identify an alternative, authorized method of execution. Id. at

582. The Court explained that it would not impose a “heightened pleading

requirement[]” as a prerequisite to the prisoner proceeding under § 1983, because

“[s]pecific pleading requirements are mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and not, as a general rule, through case-by-case determinations of the

federal courts.” Id. at 582 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 9; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,

534 U.S. 506, 512-14 (2002)).

The Hill opinion’s references to Rule 8 and Swierkiewicz, and a later citation

of Hill in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 213 (2007), have prompted our careful

consideration. We think the better reading, however, is that Hill did not address the

elements of a successful claim under the Eighth Amendment or establish that Hill’s

-16-

complaint stated a claim that would survive a motion to dismiss. The question

decided in Hill concerned only the cognizability of a complaint under § 1983, as

opposed to habeas corpus. The Court said specifically that “the merits of Hill’s

underlying action are . . . not before us.” Hill, 547 U.S. at 585. Whether Hill’s

complaint stated a claim for relief under Rule 8 and the Eighth Amendment is a

question that “goes to the merits” of the underlying action. Bond v. United States, 131

S. Ct. 2355, 2362 (2011). It was not until two years after Hill, in Baze, when the

Court eventually addressed the substance of the Eighth Amendment and the elements

of a claim challenging a lethal-injection protocol. Jones, also decided before Baze,

simply reaffirmed a proposition with which we do not quarrel—i.e., that specific

pleading requirements are mandated by the federal rules and generally not through

case-by-case determinations of the courts. 549 U.S. at 213. We disagree with Judge

Shepherd, post, at 44, and the dissenting judges, post, at 38-40, that requiring a

plaintiff to plead the elements of an Eighth Amendment claim as defined in Baze is

a “heightened pleading requirement” that exceeds the requirements of Rule 8 as

explained in Iqbal and Twombly.6

The inference that Hill did not address the sufficiency of Hill’s complaint is

strengthened by the opinions in Baze, where two Justices opined that “a method of

execution violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict

6

Judge Bye, post, at 40-41, suggests incorrectly that this court’s order denying

rehearing in Lombardi established that a prisoner could state an Eighth Amendment

claim without identifying a feasible alternative if he merely conceded that other

methods of lethal injection the State could choose to use would be constitutional. The

Lombardi order simply recited the concession made by the plaintiffs in Hill, and

observed that the plaintiffs in Lombardi did not make such an allegation. In re

Lombardi, 741 F.3d 903, 905 (8th Cir. 2014). The order declared that “[w]e were not

required to address whether alleging that the current method of execution creates a

substantial risk of harm when compared to known and available alternatives, without

specifying an alternative, would be sufficient to state a claim in light of Hill and

Baze.” Id. (emphasis added).

-17-

pain.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring). Hill alleged only that Florida’s

method of execution created a risk of severe pain and that other unspecified methods

of execution would be constitutional; there is no indication in the opinion that he

alleged a deliberate design by the State of Florida to inflict pain during an execution.

That Hill was a unanimous opinion—joined by the concurring Justices in

Baze—fortifies our view that the decision addressed only cognizability under § 1983,

not the plausibility of the prisoner’s claim under Rule 8 and the Eighth Amendment.

The prisoners contend alternatively that the rule announced in Baze applies only

where—as in Baze itself—a prisoner alleges that a lethal-injection protocol is

unconstitutional because the State easily could change to an alternative method of

execution that is likely to reduce a significant risk of pain. We think that is an

implausible reading of the Baze plurality opinion. On the prisoners’ view, a plaintiff

who alleges a significant risk of severe pain and an alternative that would reduce the

risk must satisfy the Baze standard for an alternative method of execution, but a

prisoner who alleges only a significant risk of severe pain need not propose an

alternative method. The suggested rule would render the Baze plurality’s extensive

discussion of alternative methods superfluous, and we are loathe to assume that the

plurality engaged in such a meaningless exercise. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 56-61.

The prisoners also urge that the Supreme Court’s grant of a stay of execution

in Bucklew v. Lombardi, 134 S. Ct. 2333 (2014), “repudiates the rule of Lombardi,”

and shows that a prisoner need not allege an alternative method of execution to state

a claim under the Eighth Amendment. In May 2014, the Court granted a stay of

Russell Bucklew’s execution pending appeal in an order that stated as follows:

Application for stay of execution of sentence of death presented to

Justice ALITO and by him referred to the Court treated as an application

for stay pending appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit. Application granted pending disposition of petitioner’s

-18-

appeal. We leave for further consideration in the lower courts whether

an evidentiary hearing is necessary.

Id.

The Court’s brief order does not address the substance of Bucklew’s appeal or

the basis for possible success on the merits. Although Bucklew urged that the district

court erred in requiring him to allege a feasible and more humane method of

execution, he also asserted that “[t]o the extent that this Court, or any lower court,

believes that pleading an ‘alternative method’ is necessary, Mr. Bucklew has indeed

proposed an ‘alternative.’” App. 821-22. The unexplained order in Bucklew thus does

not resolve whether the prisoners must plead the existence of an alternative method

of execution that meets the criteria of Baze.

The prisoners further contend that they cannot propose a reasonably available

alternative method of execution without discovery of information about the State’s

present suppliers of lethal drugs, so the Lombardi rule is unworkable in practice. We

doubt the rule is as “unworkable” as the prisoners suggest. Their complaint is

accompanied by affidavits from experts who criticize the use of compounded

pentobarbital as a lethal drug. These or similar experts presumably are in a position

to know and to inform the prisoners whether some other lethal drug exists that would

significantly reduce the alleged risk of pain arising from the current method. In any

event, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that discovery must be available to

a plaintiff who cannot allege sufficient factual matter to suggest plausibly an

entitlement to relief. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57. “Rule 8 marks a notable and

generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but

it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than

conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

-19-

Although policy reasons do not justify imposing a heightened pleading

requirement, see Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513, “the practical significance of the Rule

8 entitlement requirement” should not be ignored. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557-58. In

Twombly, the Court illustrated the practical significance of the Rule 8 requirement by

adverting to the high cost of discovery in antitrust cases and the modest success of

judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse. Id. at 558-59. In this capital

litigation, it should be remembered that one stated objective of the prisoners’ lawsuit

is to pressure the State’s suppliers and agents to discontinue providing the drugs and

other assistance necessary to carry out lawful capital sentences. The second amended

complaint alleges that confidentiality of the States’ drug manufacturers and suppliers

“prevents the . . . suppliers’ associations, customers, and prescribing or referring

physicians from censuring or boycotting them,” and that protecting the identity of the

State’s health care professionals unreasonably restricts their “associations and

colleagues from de-certifying or otherwise censuring them or boycotting them.” R.

Doc. 338, at 140-41.

In this very case, after the State’s former drug supplier was identified through

information in the public domain, a Missouri prisoner sued the supplier in Oklahoma.

The supplier then elected to discontinue providing drugs to the State rather than

endure the expense and burdens of litigation. R. Doc. 353, at 1-2, 10-13, 190-93. As

for the possibility of protecting the confidentiality of sensitive identities after

discovery in litigation, counsel for the prisoners expressed concern that it could be

very difficult to investigate the physician, pharmacist, and laboratory without

disclosing their roles in the execution process, and suggested there were “many ways

in which investigating the pharmacy might place the pharmacy’s identity, status, and

role at issue before whoever we would be talking to.” R. Doc. 224, at 12-16. The

district court acknowledged that “it may be that there’s just no way given the

circumstances to keep it confidential because of the central nature of these people to

the current dispute.” Id. at 16.

-20-

The real potential that unwarranted discovery would serve as a back-door means

to frustrate the State’s ability to carry out executions by lethal injection counsels in

favor of careful adherence to the requirements of Rule 8, as explicated in Iqbal and

Twombly. A groundless Eighth Amendment claim should not be permitted to achieve

indirectly a de facto injunction against a lawful method of execution.

For these reasons, we adhere to our conclusion in Lombardi that without a

plausible allegation of a feasible alternative method of execution that would

significantly reduce a substantial risk of serious pain, or a purposeful design by the

State to inflict unnecessary pain, the prisoners have not stated an Eighth Amendment

claim based on the State’s use of compounded pentobarbital in executions. We further

conclude that the allegation in the second amended complaint that “other methods of

lethal injection the Department could choose would be constitutional” does not

contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

The district court thus properly dismissed the prisoners’ Eighth Amendment claim.7

7

Judge Shepherd, while voting to affirm, also files a “dissenting” opinion on the

ground that Part II.B is unnecessary to the decision. It is not uncommon for courts to

decide cases on alternative grounds, e.g., United States v. Farlee, 757 F.3d 810, 820

(8th Cir. 2014), and the Supreme Court recently noted the “unremarkable proposition”

that a court’s decision to rely on one of two possible alternative grounds does not strip

it of power to decide the second question, particularly when the court’s decree is

subject to review by the Supreme Court. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721,

729 (2013). Given our conclusion in Part II.B, moreover, it could just as well be said

that Part II.A concerning the complaint’s allegations of a substantial risk of severe

pain is unnecessary. Indeed, this court in Lombardi (joined by Judge Shepherd)

concluded that a previous complaint filed by the prisoners failed to state a claim solely

because the prisoners did not make a sufficient allegation about an alternative method

of execution. 741 F.3d at 895-96.

-21-

III.

The prisoners next argue that they have a serious medical need to be free from

gratuitous pain during their executions, and that the state officials act with deliberate

indifference to their need by using compounded pentobarbital as the lethal drug in the

State’s execution procedure. The district court rejected this claim on two grounds: (1)

that the officials are not addressing medical needs of the prisoners in carrying out

executions, and (2) that the prisoners have not pleaded adequately that the State’s

lethal-injection protocol inflicts unnecessary pain in violation of the Eighth

Amendment.

Assuming without deciding that an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference

claim based on medical needs is not limited to cases involving medical procedures,

see Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644-45 (2004); Helling, 509 U.S. at 29-30, we

agree with the district court that the prisoners have not stated a claim. The Eighth

Amendment protects against the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A prisoner must allege both that a deprivation

of rights is “objectively, sufficiently serious,” and that a state official is deliberately

indifferent to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation

omitted). For reasons discussed in Part II, the prisoners have not pleaded that the use

of compounded pentobarbital will result in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain.

IV.

The prisoners contend that the state officials violated the Ex Post Facto Clause

of the federal Constitution when they changed the execution protocol to provide for

the use of compounded pentobarbital, because the change allegedly increased the risk

of a painful execution. The Ex Post Facto Clause forbids enactment of a “law that

changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to

-22-

the crime, when committed.” Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 516

(1995) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798)). The prisoners’ claim fails

in light of Lombardi, where this court held that an identical ex post facto claim

asserted in an earlier complaint failed to state a claim. 741 F.3d at 896-97. We

reasoned that “[t]he manner of punishment for capital murder in Missouri at all

relevant times . . . has been death by lethal injection or lethal gas.” Lombardi, 741

F.3d at 896 (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 546.720.1). Where, as here, “only the mode of

producing death has changed, with no allegation of superadded punishment or

superior alternatives, the Ex Post Facto Clause[ is] not implicated.” Id. at 897

(internal quotation mark omitted).

The prisoners also complain that they did not have fair notice that Director

Lombardi could change the method of execution to include compounded

pentobarbital, because that method allegedly violates the federal Food, Drug, and

Cosmetics Act and the Controlled Substances Act. The prisoners note Lombardi’s

statement that when the prisoners committed their crime, they “had fair notice” that

death was the prescribed punishment, and fair notice “of the Director’s discretion to

determine the method of execution.” 741 F.3d at 897. The Ex Post Facto Clause,

however, is concerned with “lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the

legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was

consummated.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 (1981). Whether the prisoners

had specific notice that the Director might select a particular lethal drug is not

dispositive, so long as the State has not increased the punishment for the offenses of

conviction. We therefore adhere to our conclusion in Lombardi that the prisoners fail

to state a plausible ex post facto claim because the punishment—death—has remained

the same; “only the mode of producing death has changed,” and the prisoners have not

alleged “superadded punishment or superior alternatives.” 741 F.3d at 897 (internal

quotation mark omitted).

-23-

V.

The prisoners next contend that the Missouri state officials violated their right

of access to the courts under the Due Process Clause by failing to provide them with

the timely and adequate notice of the proposed execution method needed to litigate

the lawfulness of the execution protocol. We agree with the district court that the

prisoners failed to state a claim based on alleged infringement of their right to access

the courts. State prisoners have a constitutional “right of access to the courts,” Lewis

v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996) (emphasis omitted), but this right does not

guarantee the ability “to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court.”

Id. at 354. The right of access to the courts is satisfied if the prisoner has “the

capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of

confinement before the courts.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. The prisoners’ claim that

they are unable to discover information regarding the execution protocol is thus

insufficient as a matter of law to state a due process claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354;

Williams v. Hobbs, 658 F.3d 842, 851-52 (8th Cir. 2011); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521

F.3d 298, 306 (4th Cir. 2008). “The prisoners do not assert that they are physically

unable to file an Eighth Amendment claim, only that they are unable to obtain the

information needed to discover a potential Eighth Amendment violation.” Williams,

658 F.3d at 852.

On appeal, the prisoners present a new argument—that their “life interest

entitles them to notice of material information about the lethal drug with which they

will be executed.” They rely on the procedural due process decision of Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and urge that the private interests served by disclosure

and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of rights without disclosure outweigh the

State’s interest in avoiding disclosure of details about the lethal drug and its

provenance.

-24-

The prisoners did not develop an argument based on Mathews in the district

court, and it is too late to raise it for the first time on appeal. In any event, the analogy

to Mathews is inapt. Mathews involved an undisputed deprivation of a property

interest (denial of social security benefits), and the question was whether the claimant

was entitled by the Due Process Clause to a pre-deprivation hearing as opposed to

merely a post-deprivation hearing. Id. at 332-33. The prisoners in this case already

have received due process for the deprivation of their life interests: They were

convicted and sentenced to death after a trial in Missouri court, and their convictions

and sentences were upheld on appeal.

At this point, the prisoners seek to discover information about the State’s lethal-

injection protocol in order to determine whether the protocol violates the Eighth

Amendment. The prisoners, however, have not pleaded a deprivation of rights under

the Eighth Amendment. This is not a case like Mathews, therefore, where there was

an undisputed deprivation of an interest protected by the Due Process Clause, and the

question was what process is due before the State may accomplish the deprivation.

Id. Rather, the prisoners here—like the plaintiffs in Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1267, and

Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 419-20 (5th Cir. 2013)—claim a freestanding right

to detailed disclosure about Missouri’s execution protocol. We agree with the

Eleventh and Fifth Circuits that the Constitution does not require such disclosure.

Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1267; Sepulvado, 729 F.3d at 419-20. A prisoner’s “assertion

of necessity—that [the State] must disclose its protocol so he can challenge its

conformity with the Eighth Amendment—does not substitute for the identification of

a cognizable liberty interest.” Sepulvado, 729 F.3d at 419.

VI.

The prisoners next press a claim that the Missouri officials violate the Equal

Protection Clause by executing prisoners while legal activity seeking to stay their

executions is pending, because the practice contravenes the State’s written

-25-

Chronological Sequence of Execution policy. They cite the executions of Joseph

Franklin, Alan Nicklasson, and Herbert Smulls, which were carried out while a

pleading was pending in the district court, the court of appeals, or the Supreme Court.

The prisoners’ theory is that forestalling executions until all litigation is finished is a

“core” provision of the execution protocol, and that deviating from a “core” provision

violates their rights to equal protection of the laws.

The relevant portion of the execution policy provides that at 11:15 p.m. on the

eve of an execution:

Director of the Department of Corrections/designee advises (ERDCC

Warden) that (Inmate Name) may be escorted to the execution room if

no stay is in place and no legal activity is in progress to prevent the

execution.

If there is pending legal activity to halt the execution process, (Inmate

Name) will remain in his holding cell and there will be no IV or line

established until authority is granted to do so by the Director of the

Department of Corrections/designee.

App. 335-36.

The prisoners contend that the policy permits the Director to grant the Warden

authority to escort a prisoner from his cell to the execution chamber only if there is no

legal activity in progress designed to halt the execution. They reason that if the

second paragraph of the policy allowed the Director to initiate an execution procedure

even while legal proceedings were pending, then the first paragraph concerning

actions taken when “no legal activity is in progress” would be superfluous.

The prisoners’ reading of the policy is unlikely: It would allow an inmate to

thwart the State’s ability to carry out a lawful sentence simply by making repeated

court filings designed to prevent an execution during the 24-hour period designated

-26-

by the Supreme Court of Missouri for carrying out the sentence. One can imagine

counsel for a prisoner even asserting an ethical obligation to ensure that some legal

activity remains in progress for a full twenty-four hours. We are skeptical of an

interpretation of the State’s policy that could effectively foreclose the State’s ability

to carry out lawful sentences.

The policy is not a model of clarity, but it should not be understood to forbid

an execution whenever there is pending legal activity designed to stop the execution.

The policy does not expressly require the Director to refrain from carrying out a

sentence until legal activity has ceased. To the contrary, the second paragraph quoted

above contemplates that the Director may grant the Warden authority to begin

preparations for an execution even when legal activity is ongoing. The first quoted

provision—that the Director may advise the Warden to escort the inmate to the

execution room if no legal activity is in progress—applies by its terms only at 11:15

p.m. on the eve of a date of execution. The chronology does not address a

circumstance in which legal activity delays an execution until later in the 24-hour

period. The second quoted paragraph implies that the Director retains authority to

begin preparations for an execution at a later time despite ongoing legal activity. The

prisoners do not allege that the officials have escorted inmates to the execution room

on the eve of the execution while legal activity is pending: In the cases of Franklin,

Nicklasson, and Smulls, a district court or a panel of this court entered a stay of

execution that was later vacated, and the State eventually proceeded later in the 24-

hour period authorized for the execution. We therefore conclude that the prisoners

have not stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause based on alleged violations

of the Department’s execution policy.

Assuming for the sake of analysis, however, that the state officials deviate from

the execution protocol by carrying out sentences while legal activity is pending, the

practice does not violate the Constitution. “The Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its

-27-

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all

persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne

Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “If a legislative classification or distinction

neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold it so

long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.

793, 799 (1997) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

The prisoners apparently invoke the “fundamental right” strand of equal

protection analysis. They argue that it is unconstitutional for the State to disregard a

“core provision” of its execution protocol, and that a prohibition on executions before

legal activity has ceased is a “core provision.” The prisoners draw the term “core

provision” from two decisions of a district court concerning Ohio’s execution

protocol. See Cooey v. Kasich, 801 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D. Ohio 2011); In re Ohio

Execution Protocol Litig., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (S.D. Ohio), aff’d, 671 F.3d 601 (6th

Cir. 2012). The Ohio district court reasoned that because certain “core” provisions

of the State’s execution protocol were the “precise procedural safeguards” that had

been “heralded in prior discussions of Eighth Amendment claims” in the same

litigation, “core deviations” from the protocol burdened a prisoner’s “fundamental

right” for purposes of equal protection analysis. Cooey, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 652-53.

The court thought certain “core deviations . . . subverted the key constitutional

principles that control the execution process.” In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig.,

840 F. Supp. 2d at 1049. See also Arthur v. Thomas, 674 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir.

2012) (concluding that an inmate stated an equal protection claim by alleging that the

State of Alabama substantially deviated from an execution protocol, because

“[s]ignificant deviations from a protocol that protects inmates from cruel and unusual

punishment can violate the Eighth Amendment”).

Whatever the merits of the Ohio district court’s analysis with regard to the

execution protocol at issue in those decisions, the prisoners here have not stated a

claim that Missouri’s alleged deviations from its protocol burden a fundamental right.

-28-

There is no “fundamental right” to avoid execution while no judicial stay is in effect

but legal activity is pending. E.g., Hamilton v. Texas, 497 U.S. 1016 (1990) (denying

stay of execution despite four votes to grant writ of certiorari). Fundamental rights

consist of only those rights that are “explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the

Constitution.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32-34 (1973).

The State’s decision to carry out a lawful sentence when there is no judicial stay in

place does not burden a prisoner’s rights under the Eighth Amendment or other

constitutional provision. If a prisoner advances an eleventh-hour challenge to an

execution, the courts have authority to enter temporary administrative stays of

execution when necessary and appropriate to allow consideration of constitutional

claims. The State may deem it prudent to delay an execution while litigation is

pending, especially when final resolution is likely to occur before time expires for

carrying out the sentence on the appointed date. But the Constitution does not require

the State to implement a self-imposed stay when a state or federal court has declined

to act.

VII.

The prisoners also argue that they stated a claim that the First Amendment

entitles them to information regarding the source of the drug to be used in their

executions. A Missouri statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 546.720.2, provides that “[t]he

identities of members of the execution team, as defined in the execution protocol of

the department of corrections, shall be kept confidential.” The prisoners contend that

the statute violates their First Amendment rights insofar as it permits Missouri to

conceal the identity of the compounding pharmacy that provides the pentobarbital and

the identities of the pharmacy’s suppliers of ingredients for the compounding process.

The prisoners argue that concealing this information violates their right of access to

records associated with governmental execution proceedings and constitutes an

impermissible content-based restriction on access to information.

-29-

A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit, considering a comparable First

Amendment claim, recently enjoined the execution of an Arizona inmate until the

State provided him with the name and provenance of drugs to be used in his

execution. The Supreme Court promptly vacated the injunction without dissent.

Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir.), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014). The

Eleventh Circuit has ruled that the First Amendment does not grant a prisoner a right

“to know where, how, and by whom the lethal injection drugs will be manufactured.”

Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1266-67. See also Owens v. Hill, 758 S.E.2d 794, 805-06 (Ga.

2014). We agree with the Eleventh Circuit and the dissenting opinion in the Ninth

Circuit and conclude that the prisoners failed to state a claim under the First

Amendment.

The Supreme Court held in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S.

1, 8-13 (1986), that the public enjoys a qualified right of access to certain criminal

proceedings. The Court has recognized this right of access in preliminary hearings,

id. at 10, criminal trials, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80

(1980), and voir dire, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505-11

(1984). This court has held that the First Amendment right of access applies to some

records filed in criminal proceedings—specifically, documents filed in support of

search warrant applications—see In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside

Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1988), but unlike the Ninth Circuit, we

have not ruled that an execution constitutes the kind of criminal proceeding to which

the public enjoys a qualified right of access under the First Amendment. Cf. Cal. First

Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 2002).

Assuming for the sake of analysis, however, that the Press-Enterprise analysis

applies to executions, and even to information regarding the source of drugs to be

used in lethal injections, the prisoners fail to state a claim for a qualified right of

public access. To determine whether a First Amendment public right of access

attaches to a particular proceeding, courts consider “whether the place and process

-30-

have historically been open to the press and general public” and “whether public

access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in

question.” Press-Enterprise, 478 U.S. at 8. In Press-Enterprise, the Court evaluated

whether the preliminary hearings at issue had a “tradition of accessibility” under the

first prong of the analysis, and concluded that from the early nineteenth century “until

the present day, the near uniform practice of state and federal courts has been to

conduct preliminary hearings in open court.” 478 U.S. at 10.

The prisoners assert that they have a similar right to know the identities of the

pharmacy that compounds the pentobarbital and of its suppliers of chemicals, yet they

fail to allege a “tradition of accessibility” to that information. We have reserved

judgment about whether even an execution itself must be made public, Rice v.

Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 678 n.2 (8th Cir. 2004), and the prisoners have not alleged

facts or cited authority establishing that the particulars of execution methods have

“historically been open to the press and general public.” Press-Enterprise, 478 U.S.

at 8. The prisoners have alleged only that Missouri did not include the suppliers of

drugs for lethal injections as members of the confidential execution team before

October 2013. That the identities of the drug suppliers were not made confidential by

statute or regulation before October 2013 falls well short of the required “tradition of

accessibility” that might give rise to a right of access. Indeed, the prisoners do not

even allege that the information was accessible to the public before October 2013.

Even if the prisoners can show, moreover, that Missouri “at one time voluntarily

disclosed such information, it does not a tradition make.” Wood, 759 F.3d at 1095

(Bybee, J., dissenting). In sum, the prisoners fail to state a claim of a qualified right

of public access to information regarding the source of the compounded pentobarbital

to be used in their executions because they do not plausibly allege a history of

openness to the general public. The complaint likewise provides no basis to conclude

that public access to detailed information about execution protocols plays a significant

positive role in the functioning of the process in question, given that the practical

-31-

effect of public disclosure would likely be frustration of the State’s ability to carry out

lawful sentences.

The prisoners also argue that the confidentiality requirements of § 546.720.2

constitute a content-based restriction on access to information that merits strict

scrutiny. They rely on Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011), where the

Court held that a Vermont law prohibiting the sale and use of pharmaceutical

prescriber-identifying information was a restriction on “speech with a particular

content,” because sale of that information was permitted in certain exceptional

situations “based in large part on the content of a purchaser’s speech,” and subsequent

use of the information was limited to non-marketing purposes. Id. at 2662-63. The

Missouri statute challenged by the prisoners is different. The statute does not limit the

dissemination of identities of execution team members based on the identity of the

individual seeking that information and the likely content of that individual’s speech,

and the law does not limit the use of any such information to certain types of speech.

The prisoners thus fail to state a claim that § 546.720.2 is a content-based restriction

on access to information that merits strict scrutiny.

VIII.

The prisoners complain that the use of compounded pentobarbital as a lethal

drug in executions violates the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.

§§ 301, et seq., and the Controlled Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, et seq. They

acknowledge, however, that there is no private right of action under federal law to

enforce these alleged violations. 23 U.S.C. § 337(a); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal

Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349 n.4 (2001); Durr v. Strickland, No. 2:10-cv-288, 2010 WL

1610592, at *2-3 (S.D. Ohio), aff’d, 602 F.3d 788, 789 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming

district court’s holding that no private right of action exists under the Controlled

Substances Act). Instead, they assert that the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act

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gives them a private right of action to sue for alleged violations of the federal statutes.

The district court ruled that the prisoners failed to state a claim.

Under the Missouri APA, where there is no formal hearing before a state

agency in a contested case, a court may review a decision of an administrative officer

or body that “determin[es] the legal rights, duties or privileges of any person.” Mo.

Rev. Stat. § 536.150.1; see City of Valley Park v. Armstrong, 273 S.W.3d 504, 506-07

(Mo. 2009) (en banc); State ex rel. Yarber v. McHenry, 915 S.W.2d 325, 327-28 (Mo.

1995) (en banc). The court may determine whether the decision is “unconstitutional,

unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious or involves an abuse of discretion.”

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.150.1.

The prisoners fail to state a claim under the Missouri APA because they have

not alleged that the decision of corrections officials to adopt the execution protocol

determines their “legal rights, duties or privileges.” “Section 536.150 pertains only

to review of decisions affecting private rights and interests.” St. Louis Cnty v. State

Tax Comm’n, 608 S.W.2d 413, 414 (Mo. 1980) (en banc). “[T]o make a prima facie

case under Section 536.150, an individual must plead facts that, if true, would show

that he has been denied some legal right or entitlement to a privilege.” McIntosh v.

LaBundy, 161 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). The plaintiff must thus identify

a “rule, statute, or other authority creating a legal right or entitlement.” Id. at 417.

The prisoners allege a right not to “be executed in a manner that violates federal

laws protecting the end-users of regulated pharmaceuticals.” They fail, however, to

identify a statute or other authority that creates a private legal right or entitlement.

The federal statutes cited in the complaint do not create private rights of action. The

prisoners cannot employ the Missouri APA to allege the denial of a private legal right

under the federal statutes when the federal statutes themselves do not create such a

private legal right.

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* * *

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

BYE, Circuit Judge, with whom MURPHY and KELLY, Circuit Judges, join,

dissenting.

The constitutionality of the death penalty itself is not before us in this case, and

we proceed on the assumption the death penalty is constitutional. While it follows

there must be a constitutional means of carrying out a death sentence, it has not been

determined that Missouri's current execution protocol is constitutional. The district

court erred in dismissing the death-row inmates' suit, and the death-row inmates

should have the opportunity to conduct discovery and fully litigate their claims. I

therefore respectfully dissent.

I

I disagree with the entirety of Part II of the majority's opinion, which dismisses

the death-row inmates' Eighth Amendment claim. The majority provides two

alternative reasons for dismissing the suit: (1) as a matter of law, the death-row

inmates' claim regarding the substantial risk of severe pain imposed by Missouri's

execution protocol is inadequately pled; and (2) the death-row inmates have failed to

adequately plead a readily-available alternative method of execution.

A

The majority first holds the death-row inmates have failed to plead sufficient

factual matter on the risk of harm to state a plausible claim of relief. Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." To withstand the State's Rule 12(b)(6)

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motion, the complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to "state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547

(2007). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

"[T]aking all facts alleged in the complaint as true, and making reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party," the death-row inmates have sufficiently

pled their Eighth Amendment claim. Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 397

(8th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 361 (2014). The death-row inmates' complaint

alleges the compounded pentobarbital used by Missouri creates a substantial risk of

harm and inflicts a substantial risk of severe pain. The death-row inmates have also

shown the risk of pain is objectively intolerable.

The death-row inmates' second amended complaint includes thirty-two attached

exhibits, including declarations and affidavits from medical professionals. The

pleadings demonstrate substantial concerns with compounded pentobarbital, including

potency levels, contamination, pH levels, and shelf-life. Despite such pleadings, the

majority concludes these potentialities are hypothetical and do not "rise[] to the level

of 'sure or very likely' to cause serious harm or severe pain." The majority takes

offense at the death-row inmates' "allegations of generalized harms" from

compounded pentobarbital, but such allegations are exactly what must be pled to

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Rule 8 only requires "a short and plain

statement" showing the death-row inmates are entitled to relief. No higher pleading

standard is applicable to this suit. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (establishing heightened

pleading standards in certain cases, such as fraud or mistake). The death-row inmates

could not possibly include allegations more specific to the compounding done for or

by Missouri without the benefit of discovery. To know about Missouri's particular

compounding procedure and the particular dangers of such a procedure, the death-row

inmates need discovery about the various sources of the drugs, how the drugs are

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compounded, whether the compounded drugs are tested for potency, contamination,

or pH levels, and how and for how long the compounded drugs are stored. Missouri

has steadfastly refused to disclose any information related to the compounded

pentobarbital. See e.g., In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888, 889 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied,

741 F.3d 903 (8th Cir.) and cert. denied sub nom. Zink v. Lombardi, 134 S. Ct. 1790

(2014) (ruling in favor of Missouri in an appeal "to prohibit the district court from

enforcing orders that [the State] must disclose in civil discovery, for use by opposing

counsel, the identities of (1) the physician who prescribes the chemical used in

Missouri executions, (2) the pharmacist who compounds the chemical, and (3) the

laboratory that tests the chemical for potency, purity, and sterility"). It is not the

death-row inmates' burden at the pleading stage to show their claims are "sure or very

likely;" the death-row inmates must merely show they have stated a claim for relief.

The majority is unconcerned with expert opinions and a host of other evidence

which shows improperly compounded pentobarbital would "sure or very likely" cause

unconstitutionally painful deaths. The majority acknowledges this evidence exists but

focuses on the one thing the death-row inmates cannot know at this stage: "specific

factual allegations regarding the production of the pentobarbital" to be used in their

executions. Because the death-row inmates have adequately pled that improperly

compounded pentobarbital is sure or very likely to cause pain and suffering at an

unconstitutional level, the death-row inmates have pled enough to survive a motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Thus, the death-row inmates should be allowed to

utilize discovery in the normal course of litigation to determine the actual process used

by Missouri's current compounding pharmacies.

B

In an alternative holding on the death-row inmates' Eighth Amendment claim,

the majority finds the death-row inmates failed to plead a specific readily-available

alternative method of execution and finds such a failure fatal to this suit. I disagree.

-36-

In Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 576 (2006), the Supreme Court examined

whether a death-row inmate challenging Florida's execution protocol had a cognizable

suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or whether such a claim needed to be brought under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. The Supreme Court clarified that a challenge to a state's execution

procedure may proceed under § 1983, particularly when a "[c]omplaint does not

challenge the lethal injection sentence as a general matter but seeks instead only to

enjoin [the State] from executing [the plaintiff] in the manner they currently intend."

Hill, 547 U.S. at 580 (internal quotation marks omitted). In explaining the

requirements for a § 1983 challenge to execution protocols, the Supreme Court

considered and rejected the proposition that "a capital litigant's § 1983 action can

proceed [only] if . . . the prisoner identified an alternative, authorized method of

execution." Id. at 582. In rejecting that proposition, the Supreme Court explained

"[i]f the relief sought would foreclose execution, recharacterizing a complaint as an

action for habeas corpus might be proper." Id. "Imposition of heightened pleading

requirements, however, is quite a different matter. Specific pleading requirements are

mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not, as a general rule, through

case-by-case determinations of the federal courts." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and

9; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-14 (2002)).

A year later, the Supreme Court addressed the pleading requirements of

exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199

(2007). The Supreme Court, relying on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

rejecting a heightened pleading requirement, found the usual practice under the

Federal Rules should be followed in § 1983 suits. The Supreme Court thereafter

reaffirmed the pleading requirements for death-row inmates: "And just last Term, in

Hill . . . , we unanimously rejected a proposal that § 1983 suits challenging a method

of execution must identify an acceptable alternative." Id. at 212. In addressing the

pleading requirements for death-row inmates challenging a method of execution, the

Supreme Court has been clear: there is no heightened pleading rule requiring inmates

to identify any alternative method of execution.

-37-

The majority dismisses these clear statements by the Supreme Court, and

instead relies on Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), to justify the imposition of a

heightened pleading standard. The Baze challenge to Kentucky's three-drug execution

protocol came to the Supreme Court in a declaratory judgment action after "[t]he trial

court held extensive hearings and entered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of

law." Id. at 41. The death-row inmates in Baze, challenging Kentucky's execution

protocol, alleged a readily-available alternative. The Supreme Court held "a

condemned prisoner cannot successfully challenge a State's method of execution

merely by showing a slightly or marginally safer alternative." Id. at 51. Rather, the

Supreme Court established that when an alternative method of execution is proposed,

"the proffered alternatives must effectively address a substantial risk of serious harm."

Id. at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted). And, if a death-row inmate puts forward

such a proposed alternative, it must be "feasible, readily implemented, and . . .

significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain." Id.

Baze does not establish the standard for all execution-protocol challenges.

Instead, Baze establishes that when death-row inmates can show a readily-available

alternative with sufficient documented advantages, "a State's refusal to change its

method can be viewed as 'cruel and unusual' under the Eighth Amendment." 553 U.S.

at 52. Baze reaches no further than this holding. Baze did not purport to limit Eighth

Amendment challenges of execution protocols to only those cases where death-row

inmates propose an alternative method, and Baze did not change the pleading

requirements for Eighth Amendment cases.

Despite the limited nature of Baze, the majority relies on Baze to establish that

death-row inmates must plead a feasible and readily-available alternative method of

execution. It is troubling the majority relies on Baze when Baze does not mention

pleading requirements or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Webster v. Fall, 266

U.S. 507, 511 (1925) ("Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to

the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so

-38-

decided as to constitute precedents."). But perhaps most troubling is the majority's

reliance on Baze when Baze does not even mention Hill or Jones. Shalala v. Ill.

Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 18 (2000) ("Th[e Supreme Court] does

not normally overturn . . . earlier authority sub silentio . . . .").

The Supreme Court warns "that courts should generally not depart from the

usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of perceived policy concerns."

Jones, 549 U.S. at 212. Despite this rule, the majority bases its decision on policy

considerations: whether discovery and litigation would pressure Missouri's suppliers

and agents to discontinue providing the drugs for executions. The question of whether

discovery is appropriate or necessary is not currently before this court. Neither is the

question of an injunction about the potential harm the State might suffer from

disclosure of drug providers. The majority appears to impose a heightened pleading

standard for fear that this suit would otherwise eventually require the disclosure of

information which it fears would hamper Missouri's ability to carry out executions.

This is not a reason to impose a heightened pleading standard in opposition to

Supreme Court precedent and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If policy concerns were relevant to the establishment of case-by-case pleading

standards, policy concerns would weigh in favor of allowing this suit to proceed. It

is troubling that under the majority's rule, the constitutionality of an execution method

is determined not by the pain and suffering caused by that method, but rather by what

resources a death-row inmate can garner to show an available alternative. If the

manufacturers of safer drugs were willing to provide Missouri with execution drugs,

Missouri's current execution protocol would likely be held unconstitutional. See

Baze, 553 U.S. at 52 (discussing requirements for a § 1983 suit when an alternative

method of execution is readily available). In no other area do the private acts of third-

parties so influence the determination of whether a government act is unconstitutional.

Making it even more difficult for death-row inmates, they now must surpass these

-39-

barriers at the pleading stage, rather than at the summary judgment stage after the

completion of discovery.

Simply put, neither the Constitution nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

require a plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of government actions to

simultaneously suggest a remedy–a remedy which cannot be to simply stop the

unconstitutional activity. Such a heightened pleading standard has not been required

in other constitutional cases, and should not be required here. Based on the foregoing

reasons, I dissent from the imposition of any heightened pleading standards when

death-row inmates challenge a state's method of execution.

C

Although I believe the pleading requirement imposed by the majority is an

incorrect application of the law, I recognize my position in the minority and therefore

find it prudent to comment on the resolution of this case. Even if the majority is

correct in imposing this additional pleading requirement, it is improper to dismiss the

death-row inmates' suit at this juncture. Rather, the matter should be remanded for the

death-row inmates to amend their complaint because the death-row inmates' second

amended complaint does, in fact, satisfy the pleading requirements previously

suggested by the Eighth Circuit.

In my view, in denying rehearing in the case of In re Lombardi the Eighth

Circuit clarified that death-row inmates alleging an Eighth Amendment violation

based on the method of execution must, in their pleadings, (1) "concede[] that 'other

methods of lethal injection the Department could choose to use would be

constitutional,'" In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 903, 905 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting

Hill, 547 U.S. at 580); and (2) "allege[] 'that the challenged procedure presents a risk

of pain the State can avoid while still being able to enforce the sentence ordering a

lethal injection,'" id. (quoting Hill, 547 U.S. at 581). In their second amended

-40-

complaint, the death-row inmates "concede that other methods of lethal injection the

Department could choose to use would be constitutional." Zink v. Lombardi, No. 12-

4209, Doc. 338 at 202 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 2, 2014). Thus, the death-row inmates pleaded

exactly what In re Lombardi required of them: a concession "that other methods of

lethal injection the Department could choose to use would be constitutional." 741

F.3d at 905 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Eighth Circuit now changes, once again, the pleading requirements for an

Eighth Amendment claim. Because the death-row inmates complied with In re

Lombardi, and because the Eighth Circuit is for the first time imposing a stricter

pleading requirement, a remand is proper. The death-row inmates should have the

opportunity to plead a named alternative method before the complaint is dismissed.

However, in light of today's ruling dismissing the complaint, the death-row inmates,

if they choose to do so, will have to settle for initiating new litigation in the district

court and filing a complaint which complies with the newly-established pleading

standards. For example, if the death-row inmates desire, the death-row inmates could

propose as an available alternative an execution protocol using pentobarbital which

was properly compounded at an FDA-approved compounding pharmacy, and has

thereafter been tested for identity, potency, purity, and contamination.

D

The majority also extends the imposition of a heightened pleading requirement

beyond the death-row inmates' Eighth Amendment claims. Without an explanation

of this extension, the majority resolves the death-row inmates' medical needs claim

"[f]or reasons discussed in Part II." The majority also dismisses the death-row

inmates' due process claim at least in part based on the death-row inmates' failure to

"plead[] a deprivation of rights under the Eighth Amendment." I disagree with any

extension of the heightened pleading requirement, and dissent from these portions of

the majority's opinion.

-41-

III

The majority opinion establishes heightened pleading requirements for death-

row inmates challenging a state's method of execution under the Eighth Amendment.

This imposition is in opposition to governing Supreme Court precedent and the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In other words, the Eighth Circuit now prevents

death-row inmates from truly accessing the federal courts: a death-row inmate cannot

benefit from discovery and is prohibited from challenging even a truly unconscionable

method of execution if no other methods are readily available and obvious at the

pleading stage.

The death-row inmates have established the risk of using alleged compounded

pentobarbital to carry out an execution, and have conceded other forms of execution

are constitutional. Therefore, I would reverse the district court, stay the executions

of the death-row inmates pending resolution of the suit, and remand for the district

court to conduct discovery in its usual and normal course of business.

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.

In Lombardi, because the prisoners had not conceded that other methods of

lethal injection which the state of Missouri could choose would be constitutional,

“[w]e were not required to address whether alleging that the current method of

execution creates a substantial risk of harm when compared to known and available

alternatives, without specifying an alternative, would be sufficient to state a claim in

light of Hill and Baze.” In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d. 903, 905 (8th Cir. 2014). The

court now holds, in Part II.B. of this opinion, that even with such a concession the

prisoners must indeed identify an alternative method of execution that is feasible, can

be readily implemented, and will significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain

in order to state an Eighth Amendment claim. I cannot agree with this conclusion.

-42-

First, it is not necessary for the court to reach this issue. In Part II.A. of this

opinion we explain that the second amended complaint’s Eighth Amendment

challenge to Missouri’s method of execution by lethal injection fails to state a claim

because it does not include the requisite plausible allegations that the lethal execution

protocol creates a substantial risk of severe pain. So holding, we need not reach the

issue of the sufficiency of the second amended complaint’s allegation of an alternative

method of execution. See Raby v. Livingston, 600 F.3d 552, 560-61 (5th Cir. 2010)

(“Because we find that Raby has failed to establish that the Texas lethal injection

protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain, we do not reach the second step

of the Baze test, whether the risk created by the current protocol is substantial when

compared to the known and available alternatives.”).

Second, if in fact the issue is be addressed, I disagree substantively with the

court’s holding. In Hill v. McDonough, the Supreme Court considered whether a

prisoner’s Eighth Amendment challenge to Florida’s lethal-injection protocol could

proceed as a § 1983 action or must proceed as a habeas action. 547 U.S. 573, 576

(2006). In finding that the action could proceed under § 1983, the Court rejected the

government’s contention that the prisoner must plead an alternative means of

execution to state a § 1983 claim. Id. at 582. The Hill Court noted that “[s]pecific

pleading requirements are mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not,

as a general rule, through case-by-case determinations of the federal court.” Id. (citing

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-14 (2002)).

Lest there be any confusion about underpinnings of the holding, in its very next

term, in Jones v. Bock, the Supreme Court explained, “[J]ust last Term, in Hill v.

McDonough, we unanimously rejected a proposal that § 1983 suits challenging a

method of execution must identify an acceptable alternative.” 519 U.S. 199, 213

(2007) (internal citation omitted).

-43-

Reading Hill and Jones together, I cannot conclude that the Supreme Court has

mandated a heightened pleading standard requiring identification of an alternative

method of execution in this § 1983 action asserting an Eighth Amendment claim. The

Supreme Court explicitly rejected such a requirement in Jones, and I take the Court

to mean what it says. In Part II.B., this court attempts to confine Hill to its holding

that an Eighth Amendment challenge to a lethal injection protocol may proceed under

§ 1983 action rather than a decision relating to the sufficiency of a complaint under

the Federal Rules. In Jones, however, the Supreme Court addresses the adequacy of

a complaint under Rule 8 and rejects court devised heightened pleading requirements.

Finally, in Part II.B., the court identifies the risk that allowing protracted

discovery could have the practical effect of thwarting the State’s ability to carry out

any executions. Although I am cognizant of such a possibility, the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure govern the sufficiency of the second amended complaint rather than

policy considerations. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 212 (“[C]ourts should generally not

depart from the usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of perceived policy

concerns.”).

For the reasons set forth in Part II.A. of the court’s opinion, the second

amended complaint’s Eighth Amendment challenge to Missouri’s lethal injection

protocol must be dismissed because it does not include the requisite plausible

allegations that the protocol creates the substantial risk of severe pain. However, I

cannot agree with the court’s conclusion that the prisoners must also identify an

alternative method of execution in the complaint.

Accordingly, I join in all but Part II.B. of this opinion.

______________________________

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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