The opinion
J-S57029-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: T.S.A., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER
No. 638 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree January 15, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000727-2013
CP-51-DP-0001514-2012
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.K.R., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER
No. 639 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree January 15, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000728-2013
CP-51-DP-0001512-2012
IN THE INTEREST OF: T.M.A., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER
No. 640 EDA 2014
J-S57029-14
Appeal from the Decree January 15, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000729-2013
CP-51-DP-0001513-2012
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MARCH 03, 2015
Appellant, J.B. (Mother), appeals from the January 15, 2014 decrees
involuntarily terminating her parental rights, and the January 15, 2014
orders changing the permanency goals to adoption with respect to her sons,
D.K.R., born in August 2006, and T.M.A., born in September 2009, and her
daughter, T.S.A., born in June 2012 (collectively, the Children). 1 After
careful review, we affirm.
The trial court aptly set forth the factual history of this case in its
opinion, which we adopt herein. See generally Trial Court Opinion,
4/21/14, at 1-9. We summarize the relevant procedural history of this case
as follows. On December 27, 2013, the Philadelphia Department of Human
Services, Children and Youth Division (DHS), filed separate petitions for the
involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights and for a goal change to
adoption. The trial court held a hearing on the petitions on January 15,
2014, during which DHS presented the testimony of its caseworker, Betsy
____________________________________________
1
On January 15, 2014, the trial court entered a decree involuntarily
terminating the parental rights of D.K.R.’s natural father, R.R. On March 12,
2014, the trial court entered decrees involuntarily terminating the parental
rights of T.M.A.’s and T.S.A.’s natural father, A.A. Mother testified that A.A.
died in October 2012, prior to the subject proceeding. N.T., 1/15/14, at 43-
44. Neither R.R. nor A.A. is a party to this appeal.
-2-
J-S57029-14
Lee, and foster care agency caseworker, Amina Huff.2 The Child Advocate
presented the testimony of T.M., the Children’s foster mother. Mother
testified on her own behalf.
By decrees dated and entered on January 15, 2014, the trial court
involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).3 By orders dated January 15, 2014, the
court changed the Children’s goal to adoption. On February 18, 2014,
Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i), which this Court consolidated sua sponte.4 See
generally Pa.R.A.P. 513.
____________________________________________
2
Counsel for the parties stipulated that, if called to testify by DHS, the
witnesses would testify consistent with the Statement of Facts attached as
Exhibit A to the involuntary termination petitions. N.T., 1/15/14, at 6.
3
We observe that the trial court sent the certified record to this Court more
than one month past the date it was due. Therefore, despite diligence by
this Court, the processing of this appeal has been delayed.
4
As noted above, the trial court entered its final decrees terminating
Mother’s parental rights to the Children and orders changing the
permanency goal to adoption on Thursday, January 15, 2014. The trial
court’s docket indicates that notices of entry of all of the decrees and orders
were served on Mother by hand delivery on that same day. See generally
Pa.R.C.P. 236 (directing the prothonotary to immediately provide each party
and/or counsel with notice of the entry of an order and to note the same in
the docket). Therefore, Mother’s notices of appeal were due on Friday,
February 14, 2014. See generally Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). However, upon
informal inquiry, this Court has learned that the trial court was closed on
February 14, 2014 due to inclement weather. Additionally, Monday,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-3-
J-S57029-14
On appeal, Mother presents the following two issues for our review.
1. Whether the trial court committed error by
involuntarily terminating [M]other’s parental rights
where such determination was not supported by
clear and convincing evidence establishing grounds
for termination under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8)?
2. Whether the trial court committed error by
involuntarily terminating [M]other’s parental rights
and changing the permanency goal from
reunification with the parent to adoption without
giving primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
children as required by the Adoption Act, 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
Mother’s Brief at 5.
The crux of Mother’s argument on appeal is that DHS did not satisfy its
burden of proof with respect to the goal change to adoption and the
involuntary termination of her parental rights because DHS failed to provide
reasonable efforts to reunify her with the Children. Mother’s Brief at 18. We
first address Mother’s argument with respect to the change of goal orders,
which we review according to the following standard of review.
In cases involving a court’s order changing the
placement goal … to adoption, our standard of
review is abuse of discretion. To hold that the trial
court abused its discretion, we must determine its
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
February 17, 2014 was President’s Day, a Commonwealth holiday. It is
axiomatic that when calculating a filing period, government holidays are
excluded. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. Therefore, Mother had until Tuesday,
February 18, 2014 to timely file her notices of appeal. As a result, we are
satisfied that we possess appellate jurisdiction in this case.
-4-
J-S57029-14
judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the
court disregarded the law, or that its action was a
result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. While
this Court is bound by the facts determined in the
trial court, we are not tied to the court’s inferences,
deductions and conclusions; we have a responsibility
to ensure that the record represents a
comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge
has applied the appropriate legal principles to that
record. Therefore, our scope of review is broad.
In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted), appeal
denied, 959 A.2d 320 (Pa. 2008); accord In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190
(Pa. 2010).
This matter is controlled by the Juvenile Act5, which was amended in
1998 to conform to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA).6 In
re M.S., 980 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 985 A.2d 220
(Pa. 2009). With respect to the two acts, we have recognized the following.
Both statutes are compatible pieces of legislation
seeking to benefit the best interest of the child, not
the parent …. ASFA promotes the reunification of
foster care children with their natural parents when
feasible …. Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act focuses upon
reunification of the family, which means that the
unity of the family shall be preserved “whenever
possible.”
Id., citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(1). As such, child welfare agencies are
required to make reasonable efforts to return a foster child to his or her
____________________________________________
5
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6375.
6
42 U.S.C. §§ 671-679.
-5-
J-S57029-14
biological parent. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2006). When
those efforts fail, the agency “must redirect its efforts toward placing the
child in an adoptive home.” Id. (citation omitted).
At permanency review hearings for dependent children removed from
the parental home, a trial court must consider the following factors.
§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child
…
(f) Matters to be determined at permanency
hearing.—
At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine
all of the following:
(1) The continuing necessity for and
appropriateness of the placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent
of compliance with the permanency plan
developed for the child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward
alleviating the circumstances which
necessitated the original placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the
current placement goal for the child.
(5) The likely date by which the placement
goal for the child might be achieved.
(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to
finalize the permanency plan in effect.
(6) Whether the child is safe.
…
-6-
J-S57029-14
(9) If the child has been in placement for at
least 15 of the last 22 months or the court has
determined that aggravated circumstances
exist and that reasonable efforts to prevent or
eliminate the need to remove the child from
the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to
preserve and reunify the family need not be
made or continue to be made, whether the
county agency has filed or sought to join a
petition to terminate parental rights and to
identify, recruit, process and approve a
qualified family to adopt the child ….
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f). “These statutory mandates clearly place the trial
court’s focus on the best interests of the child.” S.B., supra at 978 (citation
omitted). We have stated, “[s]afety, permanency, and well-being of the
child must take precedence over all other considerations.” Id. (citation
omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the burden is on the child
welfare agency “to prove the change in goal would be in the child’s best
interest.” In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation
omitted).
Instantly, we conclude the record evidence demonstrates that DHS
made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with the Children. Further, the
trial court did not commit an error of law or abuse its discretion in changing
the Children’s permanency goals to adoption. Betsy Lee, the DHS
caseworker, testified that DHS provided In Home Protective Services to this
family after learning that Mother tested positive for cocaine when she gave
birth to her youngest child, T.S.A., in June 2012, and that Mother suffered
from bipolar disorder but was not receiving mental health care. N.T.,
-7-
J-S57029-14
1/15/14, at 9. On August 20, 2012, after Mother had missed multiple
medical appointments for T.S.A., DHS sent a nurse to Mother’s home who
found that T.S.A. had a low birth weight. Id. at 10; Petition for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights, Exhibit A, at ¶¶ f-j. As a result, T.S.A. was
admitted to St. Christopher’s Hospital.
On August 23, 2012, DHS removed the Children from Mother’s custody
after learning that she refused to comply with a safety plan developed by
DHS for the Children. N.T., 1/15/14, at 11; Petition for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights, Exhibit A, at ¶¶ o-q. On August 24, 2012,
DHS referred Mother to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU). Petition for
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, Exhibit A, at ¶ r. Following an
evaluation at the CEU, Mother was diagnosed with cocaine and alcohol
dependence. Id. at ¶ s. The CEU recommended that Mother participate in
inpatient treatment at the Gaudenzia Diagnostic Rehabilitation Center
(Gaudenzia) in Philadelphia. Id.
On August 29, 2012, the trial court adjudicated the Children
dependent. Lee testified that the permanency goal for this family was
reunification. N.T., 1/15/14, at 12. DHS established Family Service Plan
(FSP) objectives for Mother including participating in a parenting program
and in a drug and alcohol program. Id. at 13. Further, Mother was to
obtain a psychological evaluation and to follow all recommendations. Id.;
Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, Exhibit A, at ¶ u. In
-8-
J-S57029-14
addition, DHS arranged for supervised visits on a biweekly basis for Mother
and the Children. Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights,
Exhibit A, at ¶ t. In total, DHS held FSP meetings in September and
December of 2012, and in July of 2013. Id. at ¶¶ u, x, bb.
In September of 2012, DHS referred Mother to the Achieving
Reunification Center (ARC) for parenting classes. N.T., 1/15/14, at 13. Lee
testified that she met with Mother after becoming the caseworker for this
family in January 2013 and that Mother told her she did not want to continue
participating with ARC. Id. at 15. On March 7, 2013, ARC closed Mother’s
case for non-participation. Id. at 16-17; Petition for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights, Exhibit A, at ¶ z. Lee testified that DHS
provided Mother tokens for transportation but that she reduced Mother’s
tokens upon learning that she had stopped participating with ARC. N.T.,
1/15/14, at 27-28. Lee testified that after she reduced Mother’s tokens, she
never heard from Mother again. Id.
In addition, the record reveals that the foster care agency established
an Individual Service Plan (ISP) for Mother including attending visits with the
Children, attending and completing parenting classes, securing appropriate
housing, and attending and completing drug rehabilitation. Id. at DHS
Exhibit 11. Lee testified that DHS changed the Children’s goal to adoption
two days before the subject proceeding because Mother failed to comply
with her objectives. Id. at 21-22. The competent testimonial evidence
-9-
J-S57029-14
reveals that the only FSP and ISP objective Mother satisfied was consistently
attending supervised visits. Id. at 30.
Indeed, with respect to her mental health objective, Mother testified
she is diagnosed with “bipolar depressive” disorder, and she is not receiving
treatment for it. N.T., 1/15/14, at 50-51. Mother implied she does not have
medical insurance. Id. at 51. Moreover, Mother testified she has not
requested that DHS help her acquire medication for her mental health
needs. Id. With respect to housing, Mother testified she lives in a room
that she rents and that the room is not large enough for the Children to live
with her. Id. at 51-52. With respect to parenting classes, Mother testified
she did not complete the program at ARC. Id. at 52. Further, with respect
to the drug and alcohol program, Mother testified that, although she
completed the program at Gaudenzia, she did not complete the program at
ACT Recovery House, which Gaudenzia had recommended. Id. at 52-54,
57.
Based on the foregoing record evidence, we conclude that DHS made
reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with the Children by providing in-home
services, developing a safety plan, setting the Children’s permanency goal as
reunification, establishing FSP objectives, holding FSP meetings to review
Mother’s progress, and providing transportation tokens to help her comply
with her objectives. Our case law is clear that the Commonwealth has not
“made itself guarantor of the success of the efforts to help parents assume
- 10 -
J-S57029-14
their parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(citation omitted). Likewise, a parent has an affirmative duty to cooperate
with DHS. Id. Here, the record demonstrates Mother has failed to
cooperate with DHS in satisfying her FSP and ISP objectives and by stopping
all communication with Lee in early 2013. N.T., 1/15/14, at 27-28. We
therefore conclude DHS fulfilled its mandate to provide reasonable efforts.
In addition, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in changing
the Children’s permanency goals to adoption. Lee testified that the Children
reside in a pre-adoptive foster home, where their needs are met. N.T.,
1/15/14, at 3, 5. The oldest child, D.K.R., who was in first grade at the time
of the hearing, receives therapy for extreme sexual behavior. Id. at 3-4.
Lee testified that, as a result of his behavior, DHS planned to move him to
another foster home where he will be the only child or the youngest child.
Id. at 4. Lee testified she is “hoping that [D.K.R.’s] behaviors will get better
with therapy, as therapy goes along. He just began medication so we hope
that his behaviors will get better and he can soon return to … his brother.”
Id. T.M., the Children’s foster mother, testified that, “once they get some
help for [D.K.R.], he is welcome back into my home.” Id. at 44. Lee
testified that T.M.A. does not have any special needs. Id. at 4-5. With
respect to T.S.A., although Child Link Services monitors her because of her
diagnosis of failure to thrive during infancy, Lee testified that T.S.A. is doing
fine. Id. at 5. Based on the totality of the record evidence, we conclude
- 11 -
J-S57029-14
that changing the permanency goals to adoption furthers the safety,
permanency, and well-being of the Children who had been in placement for
nearly seventeen months at the time of the hearing. See S.B., supra.
We next review the termination decrees according to the following
standard of review.
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s
determination of a petition for termination of
parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to
accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. In re R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if
the trial court made an error of law or abused its
discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa.
2011) (plurality)]. As has been often stated, an
abuse of discretion does not result merely because
the reviewing court might have reached a different
conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia
Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 ([Pa.] 2011);
Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003).
Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in
these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts,
appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-
specific determinations on a cold record, where the
trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous
other hearings regarding the child and parents.
R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the
facts could support an opposite result, as is often the
case in dependency and termination cases, an
- 12 -
J-S57029-14
appellate court must resist the urge to second guess
the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer
to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are
supported by the record and the court’s legal
conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an
abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio,
539 Pa. 161, 165, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Our case law has made clear that under Section
2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process
prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the
focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and
child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007), citing 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511. The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of
parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super.
2009).
- 13 -
J-S57029-14
It is well-established that child welfare agencies must make reasonable
efforts to reunify a parent with his or her child prior to filing a termination
petition. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(citation omitted). However, the failure of an agency to provide such efforts
for reunification does not preclude the termination of parental rights. In the
Interest of D.C.D., --- A.3d ---, 2014 WL 7089267, *10 (Pa. 2014). We
also note that the duties of agencies have reasonable limits. “If a parent
fails to cooperate or appears incapable of benefiting from reasonable efforts
supplied over a realistic period of time, the agency has fulfilled its mandate
and upon proof of satisfaction of the reasonable good faith effort, the
termination petition may be granted.” A.L.D., supra.
Instantly, as discussed above, we conclude that DHS made reasonable
efforts to reunify Mother with the Children prior to filing the termination
petitions. Further, we conclude that the trial court properly terminated
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which
provide as follows.
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard
to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on
any of the following grounds:
…
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary
- 14 -
J-S57029-14
for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
…
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are first initiated
subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the
petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b); see also In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384
(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (stating that this Court need only agree with
any one subsection of 2511(a), in addition to Section 2511(b), in order to
affirm the termination of parental rights), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa.
2004).
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following.
(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and
(3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
- 15 -
J-S57029-14
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination [of parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2),] due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not
limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include
acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” A.L.D.,
supra at 337 (citation omitted).
With respect to Section 2511(b), the requisite analysis is as follows.
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination
of parental rights would best serve the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d
1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,
“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs
and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
that the trial court must also discern the nature and
status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
attention to the effect on the child of permanently
severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where
there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and
child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super.
2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect
analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
the particular case. Id. at 63.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
In this case, the record evidence demonstrates that Mother’s repeated
and continued incapacity, neglect, and refusal to comply with her FSP and
ISP objectives have caused the Children to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental well-
being. Further, the causes of the incapacity, neglect or refusal cannot or will
- 16 -
J-S57029-14
not be remedied.7 As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 2511(a)(2). See S.P.,
supra.
With respect to Section 2511(b), Mother argues the record evidence
does not support termination because DHS did not present expert testimony
or a bonding evaluation. We disagree. It is well-established that, when
evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use expert
testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well.
Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.”
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115-1116 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal citations
omitted).
Moreover, our Supreme Court has explained that, “the mere existence
of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in
the denial of a termination petition.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa.
2013). The Court further stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts
considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a
pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”
Id. at 268 (citation omitted). The Court directed that, in weighing the bond
considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking
____________________________________________
7
Notably, Lee testified that Mother has eleven children in total, and that
none of them reside with her. N.T., 1/15/14, at 34. Mother’s parental rights
have been terminated as to three of her older children. Petition for
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, Exhibit A, at ¶¶ a-c.
- 17 -
J-S57029-14
clock of childhood ever in mind.” The Court observed that, “[c]hildren are
young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their
healthy development quickly. When courts fail … the result, all too often, is
catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id. at 269.
In this case, the testimonial evidence reveals the Children know
Mother who consistently attended supervised visits with them during their
placement.8 Indeed, they refer to Mother as “Mom.” N.T., 1/15/14, at 31,
41. However, Amina Huff, who supervised visits for the foster care agency,
testified that the Children are “[v]ery attached to the foster [m]om.” Id. at
39. Huff testified as follows.
Q. Do you feel there would be any detrimental effect
on any one of the three children if the parental rights
were terminated?
A. No.
Q. Why do you say that?
A. Because just with the attachment they have with
the foster parent. I don’t see it ever being like that
with either of the parents.
Id. at 40. Likewise, Lee testified there would not be any negative effect on
the Children if Mother’s parental rights are terminated. Id. at 25. She
____________________________________________
8
Lee testified that Mother was incarcerated from September to December of
2013, and that she did maintain communication with the Children during
that time. N.T., 1/15/14, at 19-20. Mother testified that she was arrested
for aggravated assault as a result of a dispute with R.R., the father of D.K.R.
Mother testified that she is not on probation or parole and that the charge
resulting from the domestic dispute is fully resolved. Id. at 49.
- 18 -
J-S57029-14
testified the Children exhibit a mother/child bond with their foster mother.
Id. at 24. Lee explained why it would not be detrimental to the Children to
terminate Mother’s parental rights as follows.
The [C]hildren don’t seem like they are really
attached to Mom on that level. They go about their
everyday life when I see them. It doesn’t make a
difference. They are not asking about Mom. They
are not saying, when can I see my Mom again?
When she was incarcerated, they didn’t ask to see
her or anything. They seemed to do just fine
without [her].
Id. at 25.
Based upon our thorough review, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court in concluding that terminating Mother’s parental rights “would
best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare” of
the Children. The record testimony reveals the existence of a bond with the
foster mother and more importantly, a lack of bond between Mother and the
Children. See, e.g., J.M., supra. We further observe that, although the
Child Advocate did not file a brief in this appeal, the Child Advocate stated
on the record in open court at the conclusion of the hearing that DHS met its
burden of proof with respect to the involuntary termination of Mother’s
parental rights. See S.P., supra. As a result, Mother’s issues on appeal
fail.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude all of Mother’s issues are devoid
of merit. Accordingly, the trial court’s January 15, 2014 decrees
- 19 -
J-S57029-14
involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights and orders changing the
permanency goals to adoption are affirmed.
Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/3/2015
- 20 -