Opinion

Red River Computer Co., Inc. v. United States

  • 120 Fed. Cl. 227
  • 2015 U.S. Claims LEXIS 189
  • 2015 WL 868996
Court
United States Court of Federal Claims
Filed
Feb 27, 2015
Status
Published
Author
Bruggink
On the bench
Bruggink
Cited by
9 cases
Authority
More cited than 60.8%

The opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 14-1092C

(Re-filed: February 27, 2015)1

************************

RED RIVER COMPUTER CO., INC.,

Bid protest; Competitive range

Plaintiff,

determination; Past

Performance; Prejudice.

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

************************

H. Todd Whay, Sterling, VA, for plaintiff.

Robert C. Bigler, Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington,

DC, with whom were Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General,

Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, and Allison Kidd-Miller, Assistant

Director, for defendant. Cameron R. Edlefson, Major, United States Army

Legal Services Agency, of counsel.

OPINION

BRUGGINK, Judge.

This action is brought pursuant to the court’s bid protest jurisdiction.

Plaintiff, Red River Computer Co., Inc., an unsuccessful offeror for an

information technology (“IT”) supply contract, alleges that the United States

Department of the Army (hereinafter the “agency,” or “army”), through its

1. The materials submitted in this case were subject to a protective order. We

directed the parties to confer and propose any redactions to chambers by

February 17, 2015. The parties did not propose any redactions. The opinion

thus appears as in the original.

Rock Island Contracting Center, acted arbitrarily when it excluded plaintiff

from the competitive range. The parties have filed cross-motions for judgment

on the administrative record. Those motions are fully briefed. Oral argument

was held on February 3, 2015. Because defendant did not act arbitrarily,

capriciously, or otherwise in violation of the law, we deny plaintiff’s motion

and grant defendant’s motion.

BACKGROUND

On September 25, 2012, the agency issued the “Information

Technology Enterprise Solutions-3 Hardware” (“ITES-3H”) Solicitation

W52P1J-11-R-0171 (hereinafter the “Solicitation” or “RFP”) to furnish the

agency with IT equipment and solutions at a reasonable price. Administrative

Record (“AR”) 72-74. The agency plans to award to at least eight offerors

under an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (“IDIQ”) contract with up to

four awards reserved for small businesses. It reserves the right to make no

awards or more than eight awards.

The ceiling cost for the ITES-3H project is $5 billion over a five-year

period of performance, which consists of a base period of three years and two

one-year agency options. Each offeror is guaranteed a minimum of $10,700 in

orders under the IDIQ contract.

The army is utilizing a two-phase evaluation process for the acquisition.

The first phase has been completed, and the agency is currently conducting the

second phase. Phase I required bidders to demonstrate their capabilities in

supplying commercial IT hardware in compliance with the operating

environment. The agency evaluated the Phase I proposals on an

acceptable/unacceptable basis and eliminated any offerors that failed to receive

an acceptable rating. As a result of the Phase I evaluation, 39 out of 50 initial

offerors were invited to submit a Phase II proposal. Phase II proposals consist

of information regarding managerial and technical capability, track record of

handling similar projects, and the price proposed for the work. Eight of the

offerors that moved on to Phase II were large businesses, and the remaining 31

offerors, including plaintiff, were small businesses.

Phase II is a best value tradeoff process in which offerors with

proposals that are determined to be the most beneficial to the agency are

awarded a contract. The agency’s decision is made based on its assessment of

a set of factors and subfactors set forth in the solicitation. The first factor,

Mission Support, is the most important of the three main factors. The second

2

factor, Past Performance, is more important than the last, Price. Price is

important, the solicitation states, but the non-price factors combined are

significantly more important than Price. The solicitation provides that Price

will be evaluated but not rated.

The Mission Support factor has three subfactors. Subfactor 1,

Management, is more important than Subfactor 2, Technology; and

Technology is more important than Subfactor 3, Small Business Participation.

The solicitation provides that the Mission Support factor and the three

subfactors would be rated using one of the following adjectives: (1)

“Outstanding;” (2) “Good;” (3) “Acceptable;” (4) “Marginal;” and (5)

“Unacceptable.” AR 186. In order to be considered for an award, an offeror

must receive a rating of no less than “Acceptable” for the Mission Support

factor and all of its subfactors. “Acceptable” is defined as follows: “Proposal

meets requirements and indicates an adequate approach and understanding of

the requirements. Strengths and weaknesses are offsetting or will have little or

no impact on contract performance. Risk of unsuccessful performance is no

worse than moderate.” Id.

When evaluating the Past Performance factor, the agency inquired of

offerors’ recent track record in performing similar contracts in order to satisfy

the agency’s minimum confidence requirement that the work could be

performed by a particular offeror. The solicitation calls for a bidder to submit

no more than five previous contracts with an annual minimum dollar value of

$5 million for equipment and related incidental services that would represent

the offeror’s recent and relevant performance of similar government (federal,

state, or local) and/or commercial contracts.2 Each reference was required to

2. A “recent contract” is defined by the solicitation as “prime contracts,

delivery orders, or subcontracts where services or deliverables were

performed, or are still being performed within approximately three years of

issuance of” the solicitation. AR 178. “Relevant performance” means

“performance that demonstrates the offeror, as a prime and/or first tier

subcontractor, has successfully performed or is currently performing on

contracts/delivery orders that encompass commercial IT equipment and

incidental services that are the same or similar in complexity as described in”

the solicitation. Id.

3

contain a specific narrative explaining how the effort was relevant to the

requirements of the present solicitation.3

The relevance of an offeror’s past performance was rated using one of

the following terms:

Very Relevant Present/past performance effort involved

essentially the same scope and magnitude of effort

and complexities this solicitation requires.

Relevant Present/past performance effort involved similar

scope and magnitude of effort and complexities

this solicitation requires.

Somewhat Relevant Present/past performance effort involved some of

the scope and magnitude of effort and

complexities this solicitation requires.

Not Relevant Present/past performance effort involved little or

none of the scope and magnitude of effort and

complexities this solicitation requires.

AR 187.

In addition to the recent relevant contract references, the solicitation

requires offerors to also identify and report any contract in which the offeror

“experienced any performance problems related to deliverables, warranties, or

services” and any recent contracts that were terminated or cancelled in whole

or in part for any reason within the past three years. AR 179.

The solicitation further provides that the agency reserves the right to

use both data provided in the offerors’ proposals and data obtained by the

agency from other sources. The burden of providing “thorough and complete

past performance information” rests with the offeror. Id.

The Past Performance factor was rated using the following adjective

ratings:

3. The requirements include aspects of schedule and performance in areas such

as: program management; delivery of products; warranties; related incidental

services; problem resolution; compliance and conformance to contract

requirements; personal management; and cost controls. AR 187.

4

Substantial Confidence Based on the offeror’s recent/relevant

performance record, the agency has a high

expectation that the offeror will successfully

perform the required effort.

Satisfactory Confidence Based on the offeror’s recent/relevant

performance record, the agency has a

reasonable expectation that the offeror will

successfully perform the required effort.

Limited Confidence Based on the recent/relevant performance

record, the agency has a low expectation that

the offeror will successfully perform the

required effort.

No Confidence Based on the offeror’s recent/relevant

performance record, the agency has no

expectation that the offeror will be able to

successfully perform the required effort.

Unknown Confidence No recent/relevant performance record is

(Neutral) available or the offeror’s performance record

is so sparse that no meaningful confidence

assessment rating can be reasonably assigned.

AR 187-88.

The solicitation states that Price is an evaluation factor but is not

adjectively scored. The solicitation adheres to the Federal Acquisition

Regulation’s (“FAR”) requirement that contracts be awarded at prices that are

fair and reasonable. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.402(a) (2014). The solicitation

provides that the agency reserves the right to make an award to other than the

lowest priced offeror.

Plaintiff submitted its Phase II proposal on May 14, 2013. In the

proposal, plaintiff included five projects which it had previously undertaken

as recent and relevant contract references. Additionally, plaintiff submitted

two contract references reflecting adverse performance. The initial Phase II

evaluation was performed by the agency’s Source Selection Evaluation Board

(“SSEB”), which presented its ratings on May 29, 2014, to the Source

5

Selection Advisory Council (“SSAC”), and on June 4, 2014, to the Source

Selection Authority (“SSA”), the ultimate decision maker.

On July 11, 2014, the agency established a competitive range under 48

C.F.R. § 15.306(c)(2), as contemplated in the RFP, to allow the Contracting

Officer (“CO”) to “limit the number of proposals in the competitive range to

the greatest number that will permit an efficient competition among the most

highly rated proposals.” AR 890. The solicitation states that the agency would

engage in discussions only with offerors within the competitive range and ask

them to submit a final proposal revision before awarding contracts. AR 171.

In order to be included in the competitive range, an offeror had to

achieve, at minimum, the following ratings: A Mission Support factor rating

of “Good;” a Past Performance factor rating of “Satisfactory Confidence;” and

a price among the twelve lowest offerors meeting the technical and past

performance criteria. AR 938. As a result, the agency initially included 12

offerors in the competitive range.4 Plaintiff was not one of them.

Plaintiff’s proposal garnered an overall rating of “Good” for the

Mission Support factor, scoring the same rating for all three subfactors. In

assigning the “Good” rating to all three subfactors, the agency identified four

strengths for the Management subfactor and no weaknesses, two strengths and

no weaknesses for the Technology subfactor, and five strengths that

outweighed two weaknesses and one significant weakness for the Small

Business Participation subfactor. AR 918.

For the Past Performance factor, the agency rated three of the five

contract references plaintiff submitted in its proposal as “Relevant” and the

remaining two as “Somewhat Relevant.” AR 957. Plaintiff self-reported two

previous contracts with adverse performance issues.5 The agency also found

4. The total number of offerors in the competitive range now stands at 16 after

the agency took corrective action and added four offerors, all of whom

protested their initial exclusions with the Government Accountability Office.

5. See AR 711-15. The first contract reference that plaintiff reported as having

an adverse performance issue was with the United States Department of State,

in which it missed the original shipment date. Plaintiff explained that the delay

was beyond its control due to a shortage of raw materials and a supply chain

(continued...)

6

five previous federal contracts for which plaintiff did not report performance

related issues. See AR 744-45. The SSEB stated in its evaluation for the Past

Performance factor that these five unreported contract references “had a

significant negative influence in assigning the past performance rating.” AR

746. As a result of the SSEB’s assessment, plaintiff initially received a rating

of “Limited Confidence” with respect to past performance from the SSEB. AR

918. When the recommendations reached the SSA, however, she downgraded

the rating to “No Confidence” based on the five adverse contract references

that the agency independently “found for the last twelve months.” AR 936.

Plaintiff’s proposed price was ranked tenth lowest among all 39 offerors. AR

919. As a result of its poor past performance rating, the SSA did not include

plaintiff in the competitive range.

Plaintiff received a debriefing from the agency on July 29, 2014. The

agency stated in its presentation that “[a]dverse performance information

found in a few recent [contract references] that were not self-reported by the

Offeror illustrated a trend of concern.” AR 957 (Debriefing presentation

slides). Furthermore, the agency stated in the slides that “[t]he five [contract

references] found within the last year revealed negative performance issues .

. . . These recent negative performance issues definitely had a negative impact

on the Offeror’s performance rating.” Id.

Plaintiff filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office

(“GAO”) on August 8, 2014, making two arguments: (1) The agency

unreasonably evaluated plaintiff under the Past Performance factor;6 and (2)

5(...continued)

disruption caused by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. The second

adverse contract reference plaintiff reported was with the Air Force, in which

the contract was terminated as a result of corrective action in response to

protests filed against the Air Force. Plaintiff emphasized that “all contract

awards were terminated for the same reason.” AR 713. The SSEB reported

that it was unconcerned with the two negative references supplied by Red

River because it accepted Red River’s explanation of events beyond its

control.

6. See AR 28-36. Plaintiff made two sub-arguments under the first main

argument. First, it asserted that the agency’s “No Confidence” rating under the

Past Performance factor was unreasonable. Second, plaintiff contended that the

(continued...)

7

The agency unreasonably evaluated plaintiff under the Small Business

Participation technical subfactor. On September 18, 2014, plaintiff filed a

supplemental protest with the GAO, contending that the agency: (1) failed to

properly consider price in establishing the competitive range; (2) failed to

properly document its evaluations; (3) disparately treated information when

evaluating plaintiff’s past performance; and (4) evaluated offerors’ proposals

in an unreasonable and unequal manner. See AR 1110-19. In a consolidated

decision, GAO denied plaintiff’s protests, finding that the “agency reasonably

determined that [plaintiff’s] past performance merited a rating of no more than

limited confidence (in the view of the evaluators), or even no confidence (in

the SSA’s view) and reasonably excluded [plaintiff] from the competitive

range.” AR 3421.

Plaintiff then filed its complaint here on November 10, 2014, making

four allegations: (1) defendant’s assignment of a “No Confidence” rating to

plaintiff’s past performance was improper; (2) defendant utilized unstated

evaluation criteria in evaluating plaintiff’s past performance; (3) defendant

treated plaintiff unequally; and (4) defendant failed to consider plaintiff’s price

when it established the competitive range. Compl. ¶¶ 7-11. Plaintiff did not

request a preliminary injunction. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion for

judgment on the administrative record and defendant filed a cross-motion.

DISCUSSION

The Tucker Act, as amended by the Administrative Dispute Resolution

Act, confers jurisdiction upon this court “to render judgment on an action by

an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or

proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a

contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a

procurement or a proposed procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2012). An

“interested party” is “an actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct

economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure

to award the contract.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. Local 1482 v. United States,

258 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

6(...continued)

agency’s rating of “Relevant” for one of the five contract references it

submitted in its proposal was unreasonable.

8

In exercising our bid protest jurisdiction, we adhere to the standards set

forth in section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which

means that we will vacate an agency’s decision only if it is “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the

law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). An agency’s action would be considered

“arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress

has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect

of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the

evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed

to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle

Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983). Thus, the agency’s action will be set aside if it lacked a rational basis

or if it involved a prejudicial violation of procedure. Impresa Construzioni

Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir.

2001). Because the IDIQ contract will be awarded based on “best value,” the

agency has greater discretion than if the contract were to be awarded on the

basis of price alone. Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1324,

1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 77 F.3d 445, 449

(Fed. Cir. 1996)). “The greater the discretion granted to a contracting officer,

the more difficult it will be to prove the decision was arbitrary and capricious.”

Burroughs Corp. v. United States, 617 F.2d 590, 597 (Ct. Cl. 1980).

Accordingly, this court’s review should be “highly deferential” to the agency’s

determination. Femme Comp Inc. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 704, 726 (2008)

(citing Advanced Data Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1054, 1058

(Fed. Cir. 2000)).

Plaintiff protests that the agency acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or

unlawful manner and raises the following issues for disposition: (1) whether

the “No Confidence” rating under the Past Performance factor was improperly

given to plaintiff; (2) whether the evaluation resulted in the unequal treatment

of offerors; (3) whether the agency improperly failed to consider plaintiff’s

proposed price when it established the competitive range; and (4) whether the

agency’s assigned rating of “Relevant” rather than “Very Relevant” to one of

five contract references plaintiff submitted in its proposal was improper.7

I. “No Confidence” Rating On Plaintiff’s Past Performance

7. Plaintiff made an additional argument–that the agency failed to adequately

document its evaluations–which is related to its third and fourth arguments and

will be considered in connection with those arguments.

9

Plaintiff’s primary argument is that the agency’s “No Confidence”

rating for plaintiff’s past performance was irrational because it was based on

a mistake of fact and reflects the application of an unstated evaluation

criterion. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the agency (1) was mistaken in its

belief that the five unreported references were performed in the year 2013,

rather than earlier, and (2) utilized an unstated evaluation criterion–that

plaintiff failed to self-report the five adverse references–to rate plaintiff lower

than it deserved.

A. The Army’s Evaluation Comments

We begin with the agency’s statements regarding plaintiff’s past

performance. The SSEB, in its Past Performance Report, examined the five

positive and two negative contract references submitted by Red River. The

report also includes review of five Contract Performance Assessment Reports

(“CPAR”) that the SSEB’s Past Performance Team independently located:

“The Past Performance team found other less than favorable performance that

was found in the PPIRS database. The offeror did not self-report the following

CPARs.” AR 744. The SSEB considered all the references, reported and

unreported, and concluded, based primarily on the five unreported references,

that it had “Limited Confidence” in Red River’s ability to successfully perform

the work in light of its past performance. AR 747. It concluded that,“the

performance found on the CPARs that reported less [than] favorable

performance . . . and was not self-reported by the Offeror, had a significant

negative influence in assigning the past performance rating.” Id.

The SSAC reviewed the SSEB’s reports and generated a slide show

summarizing Red River’s past performance in this way: “The five CPAR

reports found within the last year, revealed negative performance issues

concerning quality, scheduling, late deliveries, damaged equipment,

inconsistent communications with the government and management of key

personnel. These recent negative performance issues definitely had a negative

impact on the Offeror’s performance rating.” AR 846.

The SSA, in her Memorandum For Record regarding the competitive

range determination, summarized the SSEB’s findings as follows:

The five CPAR reports found within the last year revealed

negative performance issues concerning quality, scheduling, late

deliveries, damaged equipment, inconsistent communications

with the Government and management of key personnel. These

10

recent negative performance issues definitely had a negative

impact on the Offeror’s performance rating. Of the references

submitted, the performance information that was received or

found revealed that the Offeror received some favorable

performance ratings and comments. However, based on the

Offerors recent/relevant performance record, the Government

has a low expectation that the Offeror will successfully perform

the required effort. No strengths, weaknesses or deficiencies

were found. The Offeror was given an opportunity to respond to

an IFC regarding the issues of less than favorable quality and

delivery performance that were not self-reported by the Offeror.

The IFC was responded to, but the response did not affect the

Offeror’s initial past performance rating.

AR 918-19.

The SSA conducted her own review of Red River’s contract references

and downgraded plaintiff to a rating of “No Confidence” based on “the five

CPARs found for the last twelve months (which revealed negative

performance issues concerning quality, scheduling, late deliveries, damaged

equipment, inconsistent communications with the Government and

management of key personnel) and my having no expectation that the Offeror

will be able to successfully perform the required effort.” AR 936.

The subsequent protests by plaintiff and others at GAO generated two

agency reports authored by the CO.8 The first report contains a statement as

to one of the negative references that this “information was not self-reported

by Red River (as required by the Solicitation), and this fact was taken into

consideration as well in assessing the negative rating.” AR 9. On the next

page of the first report, she summarized the SSA’s rating of “No Confidence”

as based on the five negative contract references “found for the last twelve

months,” AR 9, which reflected a “trend of recent activity in the last year [that]

was especially concerning, and reflected poorly on expectations for Red

River’s performance if it had received an ITES-3H award.” AR 10. In the

second report, the CO stated generally that “it was reasonable for the Army to

8. Plaintiff filed a supplemental protest at GAO, which prompted a second

agency report authored by the CO. Although none of the evaluations at issue

were performed by the CO, she was the author of the reports to GAO per

GAO’s governing regulations.

11

consider the nature of this information itself, along with the fact that it was not

self-reported, when assigning Red River a poor rating under the Past

Performance factor.” AR 1099. As to the timing of performance, she stated

that the “SSA also considered the fact these elements of negative performance

all occurred in the last 12 months. . . . This could be seen as a trend of poor

management and control. . . . Red River appeared to have a trend of negative

performance that was not outweighed by other positive information in its

record.” AR 1100.

B. The Timing of the Five Adverse Contract References

Plaintiff asserts that statements by the SSEB, SSA, and CO demonstrate

that the agency’s assessment of Red River’s past performance was based on

a misunderstanding of the facts, because, contrary to the agency’s

understanding, the performance of four of the five contracts did not occur

within the twelve months prior to the evaluation. Plaintiff argues that the

agency gave greater weight to those adverse references due to a mistaken

understanding of how recent the performance was and gave insufficient weight

to the positive references supplied by plaintiff. Plaintiff points out that four

out of the five additional contract references were, in fact, performed in 2011,

and only one was performed in 2013.9 Plaintiff does not dispute that it was

proper for the agency to consider the five negative references–they were

within the period deemed relevant by the solicitation–but urges that the army

acted arbitrarily by finding the additional references to be particularly relevant

based on a mistake as to the timing of performance of those contracts and to

have relied on this mistake in downgrading plaintiff.

Defendant’s principal response is that, even if the SSA and CO were

operating under a false impression, which it does not concede, plaintiff was not

prejudiced by it. The SSEB, defendant points out, rated plaintiff “Limited

Confidence” for Past Performance, a failing grade. Plaintiff thus would have

been excluded from the competitive range regardless of the SSA’s further

downgrade of plaintiff’s past performance rating. The critical assumption

behind defendant’s argument is that the SSEB was not also wrong about when

four of the five unreported contracts were performed.

9. Four out of the five contracts were IT equipment orders by the Department

of State, three of which were filled in 2011 and the fourth in 2013. The fifth

was an order by the Department of Justice and was performed in 2011.

12

We agree. We do not read the record to establish that the SSEB was

operating under the misconception that plaintiff’s performance of all five of

the unreported contracts occurred in 2013. The SSEB’s statement, quoted

below, is factually accurate:

The five [contract references] found within the last year,

revealed negative performance issues concerning quality,

scheduling late deliveries, damaged equipment, inconsistent

communications the the Government and management of key

personnel. These recent negative performance issues definitely

had a negative impact on the Offeror’s performance rating.

AR 846. The five references were, indeed, “found” by the agency within the

last year. This explains why they were unreported by plaintiff, at least as to

four of the references. The Department of State did not submit its CPARs for

its four orders to the multi-agency past performance database where the army

found them until after the date for submission of proposals in this acquisition.10

We also have no grounds to read into the word “recent” a reference solely to

the year 2013. Plaintiff does not question the agency’s right to consider

performance going back to 2009; the contracts in question were performed in

2011 and 2013. Other references to statements by the SSEB are equally

unavailing. See, e.g., AR 918 (“found within the last year” and “recent

negative performance issues”). In short, plaintiff has not established that the

SSEB was operating on a mistaken assumption with respect to when the

deficient performance occurred.

That leaves us, however, with the decision of the SSA. In further

downgrading Red River’s past performance rating to “No Confidence,” she

wrote that “this Offeror’s Past Performance rating should be No Confidence,

based on the five [contract references] found for the last twelve months.”

(Emphasis added). AR 936. If the word used instead had been “in,” then the

government could argue that the SSA was literally correct. But “for” is

different than “in,” and words matter. We read the SSA’s statement for its

natural meaning, and we conclude that she was therefore incorrect in her

10. Plaintiff did not offer an explanation as to why it neglected to report the

CPAR from the Department of Justice, which was submitted in 2012. It did,

however, provide a narrative explanation, as it did to the agency after the army

inquired, as to why the performance problems encountered in that effort were

the agency’s fault, not its own.

13

assumption. The question remains whether that matters given the SSEB’s

view that plaintiff should have been rated “Limited Confidence.” The

government contends that plaintiff was not prejudiced because it cannot

demonstrate that it should have received a “Satisfactory Confidence” rating,

which is what it would have taken to place plaintiff in the competitive range.

Before considering that question, we want to address plaintiff’s other

primary argument with respect to past performance, which is that the agency

erred in taking into account an unexpressed evaluation factor, namely, that

offerors could be criticized for not reporting post-solicitation bad performance

reports.

C. The Unstated Evaluation Criteria

Plaintiff argues that both the SSEB and the SSA relied on the fact that

plaintiff did not report the five negative contract references in rating Red River

as poorly as they did. Plaintiff correctly points out that it did not fail to report

four of the five of these negative references because it did not receive them

until after the closing date for proposal submission. The army’s error was

compounded, according to plaintiff, because, although the solicitation required

offerors to self-report recent negative performance, the lack thereof was not a

stated criteria for evaluation of past performance.

There is nothing in the analysis of the SSEB, however, which clearly

establishes that it penalized plaintiff for not reporting the results of the five

more recent contracts. Defendant concedes that it would have been improper

if it had done so. Plaintiff did not receive the negative reports, at least for four

of the disputed contracts,11 until after the deadline for submission of proposals.

The agency’s consideration of the newly discovered information, on the other

hand, was also not improper. The agency reserved “the right to use data

provided in the offerors proposal and data obtained from other sources.” AR

180. In addition, the solicitation states that the agency may consider “general

trends in performances and demonstrated corrective actions.” AR 187. The

army, in fact, gave plaintiff an opportunity to comment on those later negative

evaluations by making it an item for clarification (“IFC”). Plaintiff did so, and

the army considered its explanation but found it insufficient to upgrade Red

11. Four references issued by the Department of State were dated November,

2013, and the remaining reference, issued by the Department of Justice, was

dated February, 2012.

14

River’s rating. See AR 747-50. (SSEB Past Performance Report); AR 918-19

(“The IFC was responded to, but the response did not affect the Offeror’s

initial past performance rating.”)

Plaintiff points to a statement in the agency’s debriefing after it had

been told of its exclusion from the competitive range. Notes from that

discussion, authored by a Contract Specialist, not the SSEB, SSA or CO, state

that, when Red River asked, “How do you get No Confidence from two

client’s CPARs? Does Past Performance completely outweigh the other

factors?”, the agency’s response is summarized as: “No. DESCRIBED THE

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EVALUATION FACTORS. Also

12

considered was the fact that the CPARs were not reported.” AR 964.

Moreover, when plaintiff protested at GAO, the agency’s report in response

to the protest, written by the CO, states that “Another CPAR reference

contained negative information and had a ‘marginal’ rating from the assessing

official. This information was not self-reported by Red River (as required by

the Solicitation), and this fact was taken into consideration as well in assessing

the negative rating.” AR 9.

In sum, the most direct evidence of the SSEB’s thinking in coming up

with a rating of “Limited Confidence” reflects no markdown because plaintiff

did not self-report the later-discovered poor performance references. The

debriefing and the report at GAO, however, suggest that the SSA improperly

took that factor into account. This is consistent with her decision to lower Red

River’s past performance score to “No Confidence.”

D. Plaintiff Was Not Prejudiced By The SSA’s Mistakes

Plaintiff has thus established at least one and probably two mistakes by

the SSA in her final decision. This leaves us with the question of whether this

entitles plaintiff to the remedy of being reintroduced into the competitive range

or reevaluated. We think not. Given the broad discretion given to the agency

in evaluating past performance, in the final analysis, the question is whether

the assignment of a past performance rating was reasonable in light of the

record and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria. See Todd Constr.,

12. Powerpoint slides authored by the CO and presented during the debriefing

do not mention the lack of reporting as a factor in the SSA’s “No Confidence”

rating for Red River’s Past Performance factor. See AR 957.

15

L.P. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 235, 247 (2009); see also E.W. Bliss Co., 77

F.3d at 449.

The SSA reasonably determined that, “[g]iven the large number of

Offerors that had a Past Performance rating better than Limited Confidence or

No Confidence, there was no reason to consider Offerors with a rating of

Limited Confidence or No Confidence, regardless of how low those Offeror’s

proposed prices may be.” AR 940. Plaintiff was eliminated from the Phase II

consideration because it did not achieve a “Satisfactory Confidence” rating.

Plaintiff has to be able to demonstrate, not only that there was a mistake, but

also that, but for the mistake, it would have had a high likelihood of getting

into the competitive range. See Labatt Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577

F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Galen Med. Assocs., 369 F.3d at 1331.

We believe it is appropriate to answer this question mindful of the

general context of how this sort of large procurement is often conducted by

federal agencies, and more particularly, how this particular evaluation was

conducted. It is common for an agency to assign the detailed fact gathering

and analysis to an entity like the SSEB and for that entity to present its work

to a final decision maker, like the SSA in this case. There is no clear reason

here to question the work of the SSEB. The SSEB found, as memorialized in

the SSAC slides, that the evaluation of Red River “revealed negative

performance issues concerning quality, scheduling, late deliveries, damaged

equipment, inconsistent communications with the government and

management of key personnel.” AR 846; see also AR 747 (SSEB Past

Performance Report listing problematic elements of plaintiff’s past

performance record). It came to the conclusion it did in a reasonable and non-

arbitrary way, and, as we conclude below, there would no basis for us to

second guess the substance of its past performance analysis, including its

considered judgments regarding how relevant plaintiff’s prior contracts were

or how bad deficiencies in performance really were.

Although plaintiff understandably makes the argument that we should

be focusing on the final decision maker, the SSA, who probably was operating

under a false assumption or two, plaintiff is still obligated to persuade us that,

given the entire record, there is a reason to think the outcome would have been

different if the SSA had not erred. It has not done so. The SSA further

downgraded plaintiff’s past performance rating. She did not question any of

the SSEB’s analysis. There is no reason to speculate that, on remand, the SSA

would disagree with the SSEB and upgrade the rating. The SSEB’s own rating

of “Limited Confidence” was not enough to give plaintiff entry to the

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competitive range. Under these circumstances, it would be futile to remand for

reconsideration, and there certainly would be no basis for inserting plaintiff

into the competitive range. Plaintiff therefore has not established that it was

prejudiced by the SSA’s mistake.

II. Unequal Treatment of Offerors

Plaintiff also alleges that the agency’s evaluation of proposals resulted

in unequal treatment of offerors. Specifically, it argues that compared to

plaintiff, other offerors that received the same rating (“Limited Confidence”)

under the Past Performance factor had more severe performance issues, and

that the agency held plaintiff to a different evaluation standard under the Past

Performance factor.

Plaintiff first argues that it was treated unequally because the two other

offerors also assigned a “No Confidence” rating under the Past Performance

factor had “catastrophic issues.” It attributes one offeror’s “No Confidence”

rating to that offeror’s failure to submit any past performance information its

proposal,13 and the other to the agency’s discovery of multiple contract

terminations.14 Plaintiff contends that it is unlike those two offerors because

it submitted all the required information in its proposal and had no

terminations for default. Plaintiff also directs our attention to several offerors

which arguably had past performance issues similar to plaintiff but had been

rated higher and included in the competitive range.

Defendant counters that plaintiff’s claims simply demonstrate a mere

disagreement with the rating it received. It points out that past performance

is not an assessment of the severity of plaintiff’s prior performance issues but

is instead an assessment of “the degree of confidence the Government has with

the probability an offeror will successfully perform the solicitation

requirements as based on the offerors record of recent and relevant contract

performance.” AR 178. “The fact that other offerors’ proposals may have

13. The agency assigned a rating of “No Confidence” for one offeror for “not

submitting a Volume IV Past Performance proposal . . . and not complying

with the instructions.” AR 915.

14. Another offeror initially received a rating of “Unknown Confidence,”

which was later downgraded by the SSA to “No Confidence.” See AR 924,

938.

17

deficiencies similar to the protester’s, but were not excluded from the

competitive range, does not, in and of itself, demonstrate unequal treatment.”

Hamilton Sundstrand Power Sys. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 512, 519 (2007).

Contracting officers are merely required to ensure that offerors “receive

impartial, fair, and equitable treatment.” 48 C.F.R. § 1.602-2(b) (2014). All

the offerors’ proposals, however, “need not be treated the same.” 48 C.F.R. §

1.102-2(c)(3) (2014). The inclusion in or exclusion from the competitive range

is based, not on comparison of the magnitude of deficiencies in offerors’

proposals, but on evaluation of the overall proposal. See Hamilton

Sundstrand, 75 Fed. Cl. at 519.

We have carefully examined the numerous particular instances plaintiff

points to of alleged disparate treatment and conclude that we are in no position

to criticize the agency’s analysis. Perhaps in the abstract there would be room,

for example, to argue that identical performance on the same work was rated

differently, but there are no such clear examples here. Plaintiff’s critique

amounts to a request that we undertake a complete, subjective reevaluation of

plaintiff’s proposal, and, in doing so, compare Red River’s past performance

to each other offerors’ for a magnitude of error analysis. The agency was not

required to do that, and we are certainly in no position to do so.

III. The Agency’s Failure To Consider Plaintiff’s Price

Next, we consider plaintiff’s argument that the agency did not properly

consider its price when it established the competitive range. Plaintiff contends

that the SSA excluded its proposal from the competitive range because it was

below a breakpoint that the SSA established without first giving any

meaningful consideration to price. Defendant responds that the administrative

record demonstrates that the agency did consider price and that plaintiff was

not irrationally eliminated from the competitive range. We agree with

defendant.

Generally, an agency is required to consider price before eliminating a

technically acceptable proposal from the competitive range. Femme Comp

Inc., 83 Fed. Cl. at 731. An agency is not required, however, to accept all

technically sound proposals in the competitive range, even if they have a low

price, because “[s]uch a requirement would be contrary to the discretion

afforded to the agency.” Id. As we stated before, an agency has a broad

discretion to choose among qualified offerors in doing a best-value

determination. In making the competitive range determination based on best-

value, the agency must document “the rationale for any business judgments

18

and tradeoffs made or relied on by the SSA, including benefits associated with

additional costs.” 48 C.F.R.§ 15.308 (2014). The agency must avoid making

any “[c]onclusory statements, devoid of any substantive content.” Serco Inc.

v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 463, 497 (2008). It must “explain the reasons for

that conclusion.” Bahr. Mar. & Mercantile Int’l BSC (C) v. United States, 118

Fed. Cl. 462, 481 (2014) (citing FirstLine Transp. Sec., Inc. v. United States,

100 Fed. Cl. 359, 381 (2011)).

In her competitive range determination, the SSA considered the

offerors’ Mission Support and Past Performance factors in conjunction with

their proposed prices. The SSA eliminated offerors with a rating of “Limited

Confidence” and “No Confidence” regardless of how low their proposed prices

were because there were a large number of offerors with a rating better than

“Limited Confidence.” She rationalized her decision. stating, “[e]ven though

some of these offerors have relatively low prices, I would be willing to pay a

significant premium for offerors who do not have such negative Past

Performance ratings.” AR 940. Her rationale with respect to the Mission

Support factor is similar: “Given the large number of Offerors with Mission

Support ratings of Good, and with prices which are relatively low, I do not

consider any Offerors with a Mission Support rating of Acceptable to be

among the most highly rated proposals.” Id.

As we explain above, the agency does not have to include all

technically acceptable proposals that have a low price in the competitive range.

As the administrative record clearly shows, plaintiff’s proposal failed to

advance to Phase II, not because its proposed price was not taken into account,

but because the agency lacked confidence in plaintiff’s ability to perform the

contract work given its past performance and because the agency had many

other better-rated proposals.

IV. Not Assigning A “Very Relevant” Rating To The SEWP IV Contract

Finally, plaintiff argues that the agency’s rating of “Relevant” with

respect to one of its positive contract references, SEWP IV,15 was improper

and that the rating should have been “Very Relevant.” Plaintiff provides its

own comparison between that particular contract and ITES-3H. The agency

15. Under Contract NNG07DA25B, NASA, for its Solutions for Enterprise-

Wide Procurement (“SEWP”) IV acquisition, made an IDIQ contract award

to plaintiff in May 2007. AR 739.

19

responds that its rating was rational and that plaintiff has not demonstrated that

it lacked a rational basis. Defendant also argues that, in any event, upgrading

the rating to “Very Relevant” would be insufficient to insert plaintiff into the

competitive range.

We agree with the agency on both points. When evaluating the

relevance of an offeror’s past performance, the agency is entrusted “with broad

discretion in determining what information is relevant for consideration.” Linc

Govt. Servs., LLC v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 672, 718 (2010). Accordingly,

we are not “empowered to substitute (our) judgment for that of the agency.”

Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). For

us to conclude that the rating should have been “Very Relevant” instead of

“Relevant,” plaintiff must demonstrate “a significant error in the procurement

process,” and “that the error prejudiced” plaintiff. Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson,

78 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

We are not convinced that plaintiff’s challenge has met this burden. In

finding the contract reference in question as “Relevant,” the agency

commented that it “involves [the] similar scope, magnitude of effort and

complexities [as] this solicitation requires.” AR 739. The detailed description

of the nature of that contract, along with a lengthy assessment of plaintiff’s

performance, suggests that the agency was fully aware of what it entailed.

Plaintiff’s assurances that it amounts to the same work as the contract being

bid and thus was “very” relevant is a matter of subjective judgment which the

court is in no position to critique. Additionally, even if the characterization is

too measured, we would have no basis for saying that the mistake merits

advancing plaintiff to a “Satisfactory Confidence” rating.16

16. In connection with its allegations regarding price and the SWEP IV

contract, plaintiff also argued that the agency failed to adequately document

its evaluation: in the case of the price issue, failed to document that it

considered price in its exclusion of Red River from the competitive range; and

with respect to the SWEP IV contract, failed to document why plaintiff

received only a rating of “Relevant” for that contract. This ancillary argument

is as unavailing as plaintiff’s principal arguments regarding these issues. As

detailed above, we were able to discern how and why the agency made its

ratings and competitive range determination as it did. This is all that the law

requires. That plaintiff fundamentally disagrees with the underlying decisions

is not a reason to find them inadequately documented.

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CONCLUSION

The errors plaintiff has demonstrated in the agency’s evaluation of

plaintiff’s proposal do not warrant reversal. Plaintiff’s motion for judgment

on the administrative record is therefore denied. Defendant’s cross motion is

granted. The clerk is directed to dismiss the complaint with prejudice and

enter judgment accordingly. No costs.

s/Eric G. Bruggink

ERIC G. BRUGGINK

Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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