Opinion

In Re Dorothy Elizabeth Sprinkle McSpadden

Court
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Feb 12, 2015
Status
Published
On the bench
Judge D. Michael Swiney
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.0%

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

October 30, 2014 Session

IN RE: DOROTHY ELIZABETH SPRINKLE MCSPADDEN

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Knox County

No. M-10-178134 John Weaver, Chancellor

No. E2013-02024-COA-R3-CV-FILED-FEBRUARY 12, 2015

Lloyde Susanne McSpadden Marcum (“Daughter”) appealed the judgment of the Chancery

Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) appointing Katie Loftin and Emily McSpadden

(“Granddaughters”) as co-conservators of Dorothy Elizabeth Sprinkle McSpadden

(“Mother”). Mother died during the pendency of this appeal. We find and hold that

Mother’s death rendered this appeal moot. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal, decline to

address whether the appeal is frivolous, and decline to award either party attorney’s fees on

appeal.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed As Moot

Case Remanded

D. M ICHAEL S WINEY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which C HARLES D. S USANO,

J R., C.J., and T HOMAS R. F RIERSON, II, J., joined.

Donald K. Vowell, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Lloyde Susanne McSpadden

Marcum.

Robin M. McNabb, William A. Reeves, and Robert W. Weismueller, Jr., Knoxville,

Tennessee, for the appellees, Katie Loftin and Emily McSpadden, Co-conservators of

Dorothy Elizabeth Sprinkle McSpadden, Deceased.

MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

In June of 2010 Daughter filed a petition seeking the appointment of a

conservator for Mother and requesting that Daughter be appointed as the conservator.

Mother answered the petition admitting that she was in need of a conservator, but denying

that Daughter was a proper person to appoint as conservator. Daughter conceded that she

was not a proper person to be appointed as conservator of Mother’s estate, but asserted that

she should be appointed as the conservator of Mother’s person. Mother requested that

Granddaughters be appointed as her conservators.

The case was tried without a jury, and after trial the Trial Court entered its

extremely detailed sixty-two page Memorandum Opinion on March 28, 2013, but stated that

it would not enter its order pending resolution of a motion made by Daughter. The Trial

Court entered its order on June 4, 2013 incorporating its Memorandum Opinion and, inter

alia, appointing Granddaughters as the co-conservators of Mother’s person and estate and

certifying the judgment as final pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02.

Daughter appealed the Trial Court’s judgment. The record on appeal contains

no transcript and no statement of the evidence. The case was argued before this Court on

October 30, 2014. In December of 2014 Daughter filed a notice of Mother’s death with this

Court but asserted that Mother’s death did not render the appeal moot. Granddaughters

responded to the notice of death asserting that Mother’s death did render the appeal moot.

By order entered on December 19, 2014 this Court ordered briefing on the sole issue of

whether Mother’s death rendered this appeal moot, and both sides filed briefs on this issue.

The dispositive issue before us is whether Mother’s death rendered this appeal

moot. As this Court has explained:

A case must remain justiciable through the entire course of litigation, including

any appeal. State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 716 n.3 (Tenn. 2001); Cashion v.

Robertson, 955 S.W.2d 60, 62-63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). A case is not

justiciable if it does not involve a genuine, existing controversy requiring the

adjudication of presently existing rights. State v. Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corp., 18 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tenn. 2000); Ford Consumer Fin. Co.

v. Clay, 984 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

1

Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals provides: “This Court, with the concurrence of all judges

participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a

formal opinion would have no precedential value. W hen a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated

‘MEMORANDUM OPINION,’ shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated

case.”

-2-

A moot case is one that has lost its justiciability because it no longer

involves a present, ongoing controversy. McCanless v. Klein, 182 Tenn. 631,

637, 188 S.W.2d 745, 747 (1945); County of Shelby v. McWherter, 936

S.W.2d 923, 931 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). A case will be considered moot if it

no longer serves as a means to provide some sort of judicial relief to the

prevailing party. Knott v. Stewart County, 185 Tenn. 623, 626, 207 S.W.2d

337, 338-39 (1948); Ford Consumer Fin. Co. v. Clay, 984 S.W.2d at 616.

Determining whether a case is moot is a question of law. Charter Lakeside

Behavioral Health Sys. v. Tennessee Health Facilities Comm’n, 2001 WL

72342, at *5; Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Nashville Lodging Co., No.

M1999-00943-COA-R3-CV, 1999 WL 1040544, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.

17, 1999) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

Alliance for Native American Indian Rights in Tennessee, Inc. v. Nicely, 182 S.W.3d 333,

338 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

We find and hold that Mother’s death rendered this appeal moot. Mother is no

longer in need of a conservator except to wind up the conservatorship. Daughter conceded

in the Trial Court that she was not a proper party to be named as the conservator of Mother’s

estate. As such, Daughter is not a proper party to wind up the conservatorship. As Mother

is no longer in need of a conservator of her person, and Daughter has conceded that she is

not a proper party to be named as conservator of Mother’s estate, there remains no present

ongoing controversy in this case. As such, this appeal is dismissed as moot.

As we are not addressing the merits of Daughter’s appeal, we decline to

address the issue raised by Granddaughters regarding whether Daughter’s appeal is frivolous.

In the exercise of our discretion, we further decline to award attorney’s fees on appeal to

either party.

This appeal is dismissed as moot, and this cause is remanded to the Trial Court

for collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed one-half against the

appellant, Lloyde Susanne McSpadden Marcum and her surety; and one-half against the

appellees, Katie Loftin and Emily McSpadden, Co-conservators of Dorothy Elizabeth

Sprinkle McSpadden, Deceased.

_________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, JUDGE

-3-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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