The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FEB 11 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICIA F. BROWN, No. 14-35214
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00048-SEH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2015 **
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, D.W. NELSON and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Patricia F. Brown appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
1110 (9th Cir. 2012), and affirm.
Contrary to Brown’s contention, the ALJ did not err at step two of the
sequential evaluation when the ALJ did not identify pes planus (flat foot), regional
pain syndrome, and foot and ankle pain among Brown’s severe impairments.
There was no evidence that pes planus significantly limited Brown’s ability to do
basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (defining “severe impairment”
as “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits
[one’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities”). Pain syndrome is
not clearly diagnosed in the record, and pain by itself is a symptom, not an
impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b) (“Your symptoms, such as pain . . . will
not be found to affect your ability to do basic work activities unless medical signs
or laboratory findings show that a medically determinable impairment(s) is
present.”). Moreover, the ALJ appropriately considered all of Brown’s conditions
in the sequential analysis.
Brown also contends that the ALJ failed to offer specific, clear and
convincing reasons for discrediting her statements concerning the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms. This contention fails because
the ALJ identified inconsistencies between Brown’s statements and the medical
2 14-35214
evidence. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007)
(discussing legal standard). The ALJ noted that, by late 2002 or early 2003, Brown
was no longer complaining of significant right ankle and hip pain and did not
receive any treatment or evaluation related to her right ankle from April 2003 to
February 2005, during which time she was pregnant and gave birth to her son. The
ALJ also noted that the record did not support Brown’s claims of having difficulty
sitting before June 2005, the date that Brown was last insured for disability
insurance benefits.
We reject Brown’s contention that the ALJ failed to consider opinions of
treating physician Dr. Michael Schabacker because the statements at issue reflect
Brown’s subjective complaints, not Dr. Schabacker’s medical opinions.
Brown contends that the hypothetical questions that the ALJ asked of the
vocational expert did not include all of Brown’s impairments. This contention fails
because the ALJ did not rely on the vocational expert’s responses to the
hypothetical questions in determining that Brown could perform a full range of
sedentary work, including her past work as a legal assistant.
AFFIRMED.
3 14-35214