Opinion

Leroy Alford v. Department of Defense

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Feb 6, 2015
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.0%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LEROY ALFORD, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DC-0432-13-0390-C-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: February 6, 2015

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NO NPRECEDENTIAL 1

John J. Rigby, Esquire, Arlington, Virginia, for the appellant.

Robert Schapler, Esquire, and William Christopher Horrigan, Esquire,

Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

denied his petition for enforcement of a settlement agreement. Generally, we

grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

sign ificantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to

the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or

the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an

abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or

new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the

petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5

of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).

After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following

points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any

basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we

DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the

Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶2 On July 16, 2013, the parties entered into a settlement agreement resolving

the appellant’s removal appeal and other pending disputes. Alford v. Department

of Defense, MSPB Docket No. DC-0432-13-0390-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF),

Tab 51 at 1, 4. The administrative judge accepted the agreement into the record

for enforcement purposes and issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal as

settled. IAF, Tab 53, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2. The initial decision became the

final decision of the Board on August 23, 2013, when neither party filed a

petition for review. ID at 2.

¶3 Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, the agency agreed to pay the

appellant wages covering nearly the entire 4-year period prior to the effective

date of the agreement offset by an amount directed by the Office of Personnel

Management (OPM) for disability retirement payments he had previously

received, and a lump sum for both compensatory damages and attorney fees. IAF,

Tab 51 at 2-4. The appellant subsequently filed a petition for enforcement

seeking to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. Alford v. Department

3

of Defense, MSPB Docket No. DC-0432-13-0390-C-1 (C-1), Compliance Appeal

File (CAF), Tab 1 at 4. In it, he alleged that the agency had delayed payment of

$11,372.48 of his “back pay” and he contended that the agency should be required

to pay interest on this amount. Id. at 4, 7. He further alleged that the agency had

failed to offset his back pay for disability retirement benefits previously provided

to him by OPM. Id. at 4.

¶4 After the parties briefed the issues, the administrative judge issued an initial

decision that denied the appellant’s petition for enforcement. CAF, Tabs 4-5,

7-8, Tab 9, Compliance Initial Decision (CID) at 1. The administrative judge

determined that the agency had complied with the agreement and that the delay in

the final back pay payment was reasonable. CID at 5. He also found that, even

had the appellant demonstrated noncompliance with the settlement, the agency’s

noncompliance was not material. CID at 5-6. Further, the administrative judge

found that the settlement agreement did not provide for interest on back pay; and

therefore, the Board could not grant the relief requested. CID at 6. The

administrative judge further determined that the agency did not breach the

settlement agreement when it did not offset the back pay to satisfy the appellant’s

debt to OPM. CID at 10. Finally, the administrative judge determined that, even

had the agency failed to properly offset the appellant’s back pay, he was not

entitled to relief because he pursued the petition in bad faith to obtain a benefit to

which he was not entitled, i.e., a $200,000 payment to satisfy his debts to OPM.

CID at 10-11.

¶5 The appellant has filed a timely petition for review of the compliance initial

decision. C-1, Compliance Petition for Review (CPFR) File, Tab 1. The agency

has responded in opposition to the petition for review, and the appellant has

replied. CPFR File, Tabs 3-4.

4

The administrative judge properly found the agency to be in material compliance

with the agreement because OPM did not provide the offset payment amount

within the agreement’s time frame for payment of back pay.

¶6 The appellant’s sole contention on review is that the administrative judge

erred when he found the agency in compliance with the settlement agreement

even though the agency failed to withhold the amount of disability retirement

payments from his back wages and forward that amount to OPM. CPFR File,

Tab 1 at 5. We disagree. 2

¶7 The Board has the authority to enforce a settlement agreement that has been

entered into the record in the same manner as any final Board decision or order.

Stasiuk v. Department of the Army, 118 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 5 (2012). A settlement

agreement is a contract, and the Board will therefore adjudicate a petition to

enforce a settlement agreement in accordance with contract law. Id. The party

seeking enforcement of the settlement agreement bears the ultimate burden of

showing that the other party breached the agreement. Walker-King v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, 119 M.S.P.R. 414, ¶ 9 (2013). To establish a breach of a

settlement agreement, the petitioning party must show material noncompliance

with a term of the contract. Id. A party’s breach of an agreement is material

when it relates to a matter of vital importance or goes to the essence of the

contract. Id. The Board is responsible for ensuring that the parties receive that

for which they bargained. Id., ¶ 10.

¶8 The administrative judge found the agency in compliance with the

agreement when it provided the full back wages to the appellant because OPM

2

In light of our finding that the agency is in compliance with the settlement agreement,

we need not decide whether to apply the equitable doctrine of “unclean hands” to the

facts of this case and do not adopt that part of the administrative judge’s initial

decision. CID at 10-11; see, e.g., Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v.

Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945 (defining the

“unclean hands” doctrine and discussing its application). Neither party challenges on

review the administrative judge’s findings that the agency did not breach the agreement

when it delayed payment of $11,372.48, and the settlement agreement did not provide

for an interest payment on the back pay. CID at 5-6. We see no reason to disturb these

well-reasoned findings on review.

5

did not provide the agency with the offset amount. CID at 8-9. The settlement

agreement provides that, “the Agency will offset the amount [of back wages]

directed by OPM.” IAF, Tab 51 at 4 (emphasis added). The agency submitted a

declaration from its deputy chief of employee benefits and services division that

she and other staff in human resources attempted multiple times to contact OPM

to obtain the offset information. CAF, Tab 4 at 14. The deputy chief stated that,

as of the date of her declaration, OPM had not provided a response to the agency

regarding the amount of the appellant’s offset. Id. Although the appellant

questions the efforts made by the agency to obtain the information, he does not

dispute that OPM did not provide the offset amount. CAF, Tab 8 at 6-7; see also

Engel v. U.S. Postal Service, 114 M.S.P.R. 541, ¶ 8 (2010) (unrebutted affidavits

are sufficient to establish the matters asserted); Schaefer v. U.S. Postal Service,

42 M.S.P.R. 592, 595 (1989) (affidavits that are not rebutted constitute evidence

of matters asserted therein, and, if uncontested, such affidavits prove the facts

they assert). Because the agency was unable to obtain the amount from OPM and

the settlement agreement required payment to the appellant by 90 days after the

effective date, the agency complied with the essence of the agreement by

processing the entire back pay amount to be paid to the appellant. IAF, Tab 51

at 2; CAF, Tab 4 at 15. Accordingly, we find that the agency is in

material compliance.

¶9 The appellant argues on review that he provided an April 5, 2013 letter

from OPM to multiple individuals at the agency, and that his actions demonstrate

proof that the agency was aware of the offset amount. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 6-8.

We disagree. The letter reflects OPM’s calculations of the amount owed by the

appellant as of the date of the letter, a total of $199,293.70. CAF, Tab 1 at 24-30.

However, this letter was provided to the appellant over 3 months before the

parties entered into the settlement agreement on July 16, 2013. IAF, Tab 51 at 1.

As the administrative judge noted, intervening events or the passage of time may

have made the information inaccurate. CID at 9 n.4. The appellant has failed to

6

provide any current information regarding his debt. Even had the appellant

provided such information to the agency, the agreement requires OPM to provide

the offset amount to the agency, not the appellant. IAF, Tab 51 at 4. Therefore,

we reject the appellant’s argument that the agency was aware of the offset amount

to withhold and forward to OPM.

¶10 Because the agency was unable to obtain the offset amount from OPM, we

find the agency in compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement when it

paid the full back pay amount directly to the appellant. Therefore, we deny the

appellant’s petition for enforcement. 3

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your

request to the court at the following address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court

has held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory

deadline and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed.

See Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

3

The appellant requested that the Board invite OPM to intervene in this appeal. CPFR

File, Tab 1 at 14. The Board’s regulations do not provide for the invitation of

intervenors, though the Director of OPM may intervene in certain appeals as a matter of

right. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(d)(1); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.34(a)-(b)(1). We have received no

request from OPM to intervene. Therefore, we deny the appellant’s request.

7

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the

United States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.

Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.

Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and

Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5,

6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court

appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of

attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for

Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems

Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor

warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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