The opinion
J-S67030-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: T.J.S. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.B., MOTHER No. 1064 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order May 20, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 23 of 2013
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: T.B.S. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.B., MOTHER No. 1065 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order May 20, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 24 of 2013
BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 2, 2015
Appellant, T.B. (Mother), appeals from the May 20, 2014 orders
involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her sons, T.J.S., born in
August 2007, and T.B.S., born in November 2011.1 After careful review, we
affirm.
This action arises from the filing of two petitions for the involuntary
termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) by the Westmoreland County Children’s
* Former Justice specially assigned to Superior Court.
1
By orders dated July 10, 2013, the parental rights of T.J.S. and T.B.S.’s
natural father, H.C.S., Jr. (Father), were voluntarily terminated. Father did
not file a notice of appeal, and he is not a party to this appeal.
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Bureau (WCCB) on February 15, 2013. Subsequently, Mother expressed the
desire to relinquish her parental rights to T.J.S. and T.B.S., and, following a
hearing, on July 10, 2013, the orphans’ court voluntarily terminated
Mother’s parental rights. Thereafter, on August 7, 2013, Mother filed timely
notices of appeal. This Court concluded that Mother’s waiver of her right to
counsel was invalid, and, therefore, her consent to voluntarily terminate her
parental rights was void. As such, on February 7, 2014, we reversed the
orders and remanded the case to the orphans’ court. See In re Adoption
of T.J.S. & T.B.S., 97 A.3d 797 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished
memorandum).
Upon remand, on May 15, 2014, the orphans’ court held an evidentiary
hearing for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights. WCCB
presented the testimony of the following witnesses: Lisa Wood, social worker
at Wesley Spectrum Services; Carol Hughes, M.A., a licensed psychologist
who performed a forensic bonding assessment; and Susan Storer, the WCCB
caseworker. Mother testified on her own behalf, and she presented the
testimony of her husband, R.B., and the Court-Appointed Special Advocate,
Rhonda Dean. At the conclusion of said hearing, the orphans’ court set forth
findings of fact pertaining to each child, that the competent record evidence
supports. Regarding T.J.S., the orphans’ court made the following findings
of fact pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
1) Mother’s repeated incapacity has caused
[T.J.S.] to be without essential parental care, control
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or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity cannot or will not be remedied by
[Mother].
2) Specifically, th[e orphans’ c]ourt finds that
WCCB has provided services since 2010 in an effort
to remedy Mother’s incapacity.
3) Prior to the WCCB assuming custody, the WCCB
began providing General Protective Services to
Mother and the family on May 26, 2010 due to
Mother’s mental health issues, parenting deficits,
and domestic violence reports.
4) Mother has received the following contracted
services since September of 2010: intensive family
reunification services, including hands-on parenting
and budgeting, supervised visitation with [T.J.S.],
anger management treatment, mental health
treatment and medication.
5) Ongoing reported concerns regarding [T.J.S.]’s
safety within Mother’s home include, pill bottles,
medication, lighters, poisonous cleaners, and sharp
objects on the floor and/or within [T.J.S.]’s reach.
On another occasion, Mother dressed [T.J.S.]’s infant
brother [T.B.S.] in clothing not appropriate for the
weather conditions. Mother failed to realize that
[T.B.S.] was overheating due to being dressed for
very cold temperatures during the unseasonably
warm December day and, on another occasion,
Mother allowed [T.J.S.] to walk around in snow while
only wearing footed pajamas. Mother also failed to
change [T.B.S.]’s diaper for approximately twelve
(12) hours, not realizing that he had clearly soiled
the diaper on multiple occasions.
6) [T.J.S.] was taken into agency custody on
March 15, 2011 and was returned to Mother’s
custody on May 15, 2011, with continued services.
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7) On December 5, 2011, [T.J.S.] and [T.B.S.]
were taken into custody when Mother violated the
established safety plan.
8) While [T.J.S.] has been in custody, Mother has
continued to receive intensive parenting instruction
in an effort to alleviate the circumstances which
necessitated placement.
9) Although Mother has complied moderately with
the Child Permanency Plan, th[e orphans’ c]ourt
finds that Mother has made no progress towards
alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
placement, in that, while Mother has received
intensive parenting services for over two (2) years,
Mother has been unable to demonstrate that she is
capable of implementing the parenting that has been
modeled for her and which is necessary to ensure
the safety and welfare of [T.J.S.]
10) During supervised visitation, Mother had
demonstrated concrete thinking and has been unable
to develop flexible thinking. Mother has consistently
demonstrated unsafe parenting with [T.J.S.], and
although Mother has been instructed extensively in
proper and safe parenting, Mother has been unable
or unwilling to implement the techniques modeled for
her. Mother does not react appropriately to matters
that would normally be concerning, such as a child
falling. Mother has a difficult time making
conversation with [T.J.S.] and requires prompting
during the visits to do so. Mother has difficulty with
multi-tasking and does not react well when
something occurs during the visit that is not planned.
Mother is still not able to care for and engage both of
her children at the same time. Mother has a lack of
understanding of appropriate developmental
expectations and in such regard, Mother
inappropriately disciplines [T.J.S.] for age-
appropriate behaviors.
11) Psychologist, Carol A. Hughes, completed a
Forensic Bonding Assessment in June of 2013 and
updated that Assessment in April/May of 2014. At
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the termination hearing, the parties stipulated to Ms.
Hughes being qualified as an expert in the area of
bonding and attachment. Th[e orphans’ c]ourt
accepts and relies upon Ms. Hughes’ analysis of the
bond between Mother and [T.J.S.]
12) Based upon Ms. Hughes’ observation of [T.J.S.]
and Mother’s interaction during supervised visitation,
th[e orphans’ c]ourt finds as follows: [T.J.S.] does
not perceive Mother as being available to reliably and
consistently meet his needs. Therefore, he does not
turn to her to do so. Specifically, during visits,
[T.J.S.] did not approach Mother to greet her with a
physical display of affection. When Mother
approached [T.J.S.] and picked him up, [T.J.S.]
“went limp” and did not reciprocate Mother’s
embrace. [T.J.S.] mostly engaged in solitary play
during Mother’s visitation and placed himself out of
social distance from Mother. [T.J.S.] demonstrates
an “insecure avoidant relational pattern” with
Mother. Mother continues to present with significant
parenting deficits.
Findings of Fact, 5/20/14, at 1-3 (1064 WDA 2014).2 The findings of fact
regarding T.B.S. are substantially similar to the above quoted findings in the
matter of T.J.S. See Findings of Fact, 5/20/14, at ¶¶ 1-11 (1065 WDA
2014). Pertinent to this appeal we note the orphans’ court’s 12th finding of
fact differs regarding T.B.S., as follows.
12) Based upon Ms. Hughes’ observation of
[T.B.S.] and Mother’s interaction during supervised
visitation, th[e orphans’ c]ourt finds that, because
[T.B.S.] was one (1) month of age when he came
into the custody of the WCCB, Mother has no long-
term history of providing caregiver responsibilities
for [T.B.S.] As such, there is no development of an
2
We note the orphans’ court’s findings of fact do not contain pagination.
Therefore, for ease of review, we have assigned each page a corresponding
page number.
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attachment bond for [T.B.S.] and Mother. Mother
lacks the skill and ability to form that attachment
and bond. For example, she is not able to initiate
playful interaction with [T.B.S.] [T.B.S.] on occasion
moved away from Mother when Mother attempted to
create physical contact. [T.B.S.] demonstrated no
preference for proximity to Mother. [T.B.S.] did not
look to Mother for shared positive affect[ion], did not
engage in activity to seek Mother’s attention or to
bring Mother into proximity. Mother continues to
present with significant parenting deficits.
Id. at ¶ 12.
By orders dated May 20, 2014, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.§§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). On
June 18, 2014, Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), which
this Court consolidated sua sponte.3 See generally Pa.R.A.P. 513.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review.
I. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding by
clear and convincing evidence that the moving party
met its burden as to terminating the parental rights
of [M]other under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)?
II. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding by
clear and convincing evidence that the moving party
met its burden as to terminating the parental rights
of [M]other under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5)?
III. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding by
clear and convincing evidence that the moving party
3
In lieu of filing Rule 1925(a) opinions, the orphans’ court adopted its May
20, 2014 findings of fact for T.J.S. and T.B.S. We further note that the
orphans’ court states it adopts its May 15, 2014 findings of fact, but said
orders were not filed until May 20, 2014.
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met its burden as to terminating the parental rights
of [M]other under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8)?
Mother’s Brief at 4.
We review a termination order according to the following standard.
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s
determination of a petition for termination of
parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to
accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190
([Pa.] 2010). If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.;
[In re] R.I.S., 36 A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 2011)
(plurality)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the
reviewing court might have reached a different
conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel-Bassett v. Kia
Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 ([Pa.] 2011);
Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 ([Pa.]
2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice,
bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear
reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard
of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike
trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to
make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the
parties during the relevant hearing and often
presiding over numerous other hearings regarding
the child and parents. R.J.T., [supra]. Therefore,
even where the facts could support an opposite
result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the
urge to second guess the trial court and impose its
own credibility determinations and judgment;
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instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as
the factual findings are supported by the record and
the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re
Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 ([Pa.]
1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012) (parallel citations
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Our case law has made clear that under Section
2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process
prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the
focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and
child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007), citing 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511. The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of
parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super.
2009).
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Instantly, we conclude the orphans’ court properly terminated Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides as
follows.
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.--The rights of a parent in regard
to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on
any of the following grounds:
…
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
…
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are first initiated
subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the
petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b); see also In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384
(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (stating that this Court need only agree with
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any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in addition to Section 2511(b), in
order to affirm the termination of parental rights).
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following
elements: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825
A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). “The grounds for termination of
parental rights [under Section 2511(a)(2),] due to parental incapacity that
cannot be remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct … [t]o the
contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to
perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super.
2002).
With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite
analysis as follows.
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination
of parental rights would best serve the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d
1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,
“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs
and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
that the trial court must also discern the nature and
status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
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attention to the effect on the child of permanently
severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where
there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and
child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super.
2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect
analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
the particular case. Id. at 63.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
On appeal, Mother argues that the evidence does not support
termination under Section 2511(a)(2) because there is a “reasonable
possibility that the causes and conditions which have led to separation,
namely parenting issues, can be remedied and the family restored.”
Mother’s Brief at 10. Specifically, Mother asserts that she has had stable
housing for the last year, and with the assistance of her husband,4 she
“would be able to remedy the parenting issues in this case.” Id. Further,
Mother relies on the testimony of the Court Appointed Special Advocate,
Rhonda Dean, who stated that she observed one supervised visit of Mother
with T.J.S. and T.B.S. during which Mother “multi-tasked well” in caring and
interacting with each child. N.T., 5/15/14, at 142. Upon careful review, we
reject Mother’s arguments.
The testimonial evidence reveals that WCCB first became involved with
this family in 2010, when Mother self-referred due to her frustration in
parenting T.J.S., who was then approximately three years old. N.T.,
4
Mother testified that she married R.B. on May 31, 2013. N.T., 5/15/14, at
146. R.B. is not the biological father of T.J.S. or T.B.S.
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5/15/14, at 7. Lisa Wood, a clinical social worker at Wesley Spectrum
Services, testified that she began working with Mother in September 2010
with respect to her parenting skills, budgeting issues, and housing concerns.
Id. Wood testified regarding Mother’s parenting deficits as follows.
Q. What were the deficits in parenting that you were
working on with [M]other?
A. [ ] There were issues in terms of what [T.J.S.]
was eating, how much he was eating, when he was
eating, how much he was sleeping, the diaper
changes. And with mom there were a lot of
incidents where, when we would talk about things,
she would blame dad or she would say dad needs to
do that….
Id. at 14. In addition, Wood testified, “there was concern during that time
in general in regards to [Mother’s and Father’s] decision making and
judgment.” Id. at 14-15.
On March 15, 2011, T.J.S. was placed in custody due, in part, to
housing instability, domestic violence between Mother and Father, and an
allegation that the child had a physical injury caused by Father that was
subsequently deemed unfounded. Id. at 15-17, 127. T.J.S. was returned
home to Mother on May 16, 2011, with services ordered. Id. at 18, 127-
128. In addition, a safety plan was developed precluding Mother from being
alone with T.J.S. for more than two hours at a time. Id. at 18.
Wood continued to work with the family through the time of T.B.S.’s
birth in November 2011, during which concerns remained involving housing
instability and parenting deficits that risked the safety and welfare of T.J.S.
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Id. at 18-26. On December 5, 2011, less than one month after T.B.S.’s
birth, T.J.S. and T.B.S. were placed in custody after Mother called WCCB to
report that Father had left the home. Id. at 26. Wood visited the home on
the day of placement and found T.B.S. bright red, lethargic, and with his
eyes rolling backwards. Id. at 26-27. Further, Wood found that T.B.S. was
dressed too warmly, and that Mother “had not noticed how hot [T.B.S.] was
or what his needs were during that time.” Id. at 27.
After the placement, Wood supervised Mother’s visits, which increased
from twice to three times per week.5 Id. at 31-32. Wood testified that
Mother consistently failed to display age-appropriate parenting skills during
the visits, including, but not limited to, showing a minimal reaction to T.B.S.
falling and hitting his head, and T.J.S. having a plastic bag over his head.
Id. at 32-35, 40-44. Further, Wood testified that Mother was unable to
focus on T.J.S. and T.B.S. at the same time during visits. Id. at 38. In
January 2013, Mother’s husband, R.B., began attending supervised visits
with her. Id. at 44. Wood testified that Mother “wanted him to be like the
main caretaker for T.B.S[.]”6 Id.
5
Wood testified that, following the voluntary termination orders in July of
2013, supervised visits decreased, with the last one occurring on September
12, 2013. N.T., 5/15/14, at 49, 51. However, upon the reversal of the
voluntary termination orders and the remand of the case by this Court,
Mother participated in an additional five visits with T.J.S. and T.B.S. Id. at
51.
6
Wood testified that R.B. appeared uncomfortable and somewhat afraid
around T.J.S and T.B.S. during visits. N.T., 5/15/14, at 54-55.
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Wood testified that Mother does not understand age-appropriate
behaviors and the proper development of T.J.S. and T.B.S. Id. at 46-49.
Indeed, Carol Hughes, M.A., a licensed psychologist, observed three visits
between Mother and T.J.S. and T.B.S. and testified that Mother “struggle[d]
to utilize the direction and the instruction provided by the supervisor in
these visits. [T]here was lack of monitoring for safety. You see instances of
the inappropriate developmental expectations. There’s lack of empathetic
responding [by Mother to T.J.S. and T.B.S.]” Id. at 89.
Wood stated that Mother has made no progress in her parenting skills.
Id. at 49-51, 57. Wood testified on cross-examination by the Guardian Ad
Litem (GAL) as follows.
Q. So, if you’re looking at the big picture and
[Mother’s] capacity to take care of these kids?
A. Yes. It’s been the ongoing theme of not being
able to retain information … and an ongoing theme
of repeatedly talking about the same things over and
over and over. And then just happening, like you
said, one time it’s the diaper, one time it’s a
medication bottle, one time it’s a fishing hook, one
time it’s a glass; just repeated things of the same
theme or nature of safety or of caretaking or
feeding. You know, there are themes in all of those
areas that speak back to not being able to meet the
basic needs of the [C]hildren.
Id. at 63-64. Likewise, the WCCB caseworker, Susan Storer, testified that
Mother has not made any progress in her parenting skills. Id. at 132-133.
Significantly, Mother testified that, in addition to services from Wood,
she currently receives services from Life Way Support Center, which teaches
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hands-on parenting. Id. at 148, 151. However, Mother testified with
respect to the difficulty she encounters during supervised visits as follows.
Q. What do you do during visits?
A. I … interact with the [C]hildren. I play with them
and try to keep [T.B.S.] occupied, but it’s kind of
hard to keep a two year old occupied because … he’s
like the Energizer Bunny, he doesn’t want to sit still.
It’s hard to play with the six year old while watching
after my two year old.
Id. at 150-151.
The foregoing testimonial evidence demonstrates that Mother’s
repeated and continued incapacity has caused T.J.S. and T.B.S. to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for their
physical or mental well-being, and that the causes of her incapacity will not
be remedied. As such, we discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans’
court in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2).7
Further, contrary to Mother’s assertion, we will not disturb the
termination orders based on the testimony of the Court Appointed Special
Advocate, Rhonda Dean. Dean wrote two reports in the underlying matter,
dated January 28, 2013, and March 27, 2014, which the orphans’ court
admitted into evidence during the termination hearing. Dean testified that
she observed three visits between Mother and T.J.S. and T.B.S. N.T.,
7
Based on this disposition, we need not address Mother’s issues with
respect to Sections 2511(a)(5) and (8).
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5/15/14, at 141. In the January 28, 2013 report, Dean stated that, during
the supervised visit on December 27, 2012, Mother “multi-tasked well with
caring for and interacting with both of her children.” Id. at 141-142, Exhibit
A at 4. Nevertheless, Dean testified that T.J.S. and T.B.S. share a bond with
the foster parents, and she did not recommend removing them from the
foster home. Id. at 143-145. In fact, upon inquiry by the orphans’ court,
Dean testified that she has the same recommendation as the agency, that is,
to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 145. Therefore, we conclude
the orphans’ court did not err in concluding there was clear and convincing
evidence to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(2).
Although Mother does not invoke Section 2511(b) in her issues on
appeal, in light of the requisite bifurcated analysis, we review the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. With
respect to the bond analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b), our Supreme
Court confirmed that, “the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child
to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition.”
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). The Court further stated that,
“[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination must also
consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they
have a bond with their foster parents.” Id. at 268 (citation omitted).
Moreover, the Court directed that, in weighing the bond considerations
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pursuant to section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of
childhood ever in mind.” The Court observed that, “[c]hildren are young for
a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy
development quickly. When courts fail … the result, all too often, is
catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id. at 269.
In this case, Hughes observed three visits between Mother and T.J.S.
and T.B.S. and performed two bonding evaluations. N.T., 5/15/14, at 102-
103. Hughes testified she observed T.J.S. engage in solitary play during the
visits, and she opined that T.J.S. displayed a relational pattern of avoidance
toward Mother. Id. at 71, 72, 79, 104. Hughes testified neither child
showed significant joy in seeing Mother during the visits. Id. at 114. With
respect to T.B.S., Hughes testified that, because Mother was his primary
caregiver for less than one month, he does not have an attachment to her.
Id. at 104.
In contrast, Hughes testified that T.J.S. and T.B.S. have a bond with
their foster parents, a pre-adoptive resource, with whom they have lived for
17 months. Id. at 89, 110, 134. Significantly, Hughes testified T.J.S. and
T.B.S. would suffer a “great negative impact” if they are removed from their
foster family. Id. at 100. With respect to terminating Mother’s parental
rights, Hughes agreed on direct examination that no harm would come to
either child and testified, “I don’t believe the children would have
adjustment problems if Mother’s rights were terminated.” Id. at 101.
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J-S67030-14
Based on the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, we
discern no abuse of discretion by the court in concluding that T.J.S. and
T.B.S.’s “primary emotional attachment is with the foster parents,” and
returning T.J.S. and T.B.S. to Mother would have a “significant negative
effect on the[ir] development[.]” Findings of Fact, 5/20/14, at 4.
Accordingly, we affirm the orders involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/2/2015
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