United States v. Jeffrey P. Taylor

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-2916

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JEFFREY P. TAYLOR,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 2:11-cr-112-001 — Rudy Lozano, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 12, 2013 — DECIDED JANUARY 27, 2015

Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey Taylor engaged in sexual acts in

front of a webcam during online chats with a law-enforcement

officer posing as a 13-year-old girl. For this conduct he was

convicted of attempting to use the facilities of interstate

commerce to engage in criminal sexual activity with a minor.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). We reversed and ordered an acquittal,

holding that “sexual activity” under § 2422(b) requires evi-

dence of physical contact. United States v. Taylor, 640 F.3d 255,

2 No. 12-2916

260 (7th Cir. 2011). Taylor was recharged for the same conduct

but a different crime: attempting to transfer obscene material

to a minor using a means of interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 1470. A jury convicted him as charged.

In this new appeal, Taylor argues that the Double Jeopardy

Clause barred the second prosecution. He also challenges the

district court’s handling of strikes for cause during jury

selection and certain limitations on his cross-examination of

two law-enforcement officers. His final claim of error is a

challenge to the district court’s determination that his convic-

tion for violating § 1470 triggers the registration requirements

of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act

(“SORNA”). 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(ii), (7)(I) (2012) (defining

“sex offense” for purposes of the registration regime).

Taylor’s double-jeopardy claim is foreclosed by Supreme

Court precedent; he has preserved it for further review. The

challenge to the composition of the jury fails for two reasons:

(1) Taylor used peremptory strikes to remove two of the three

jurors about whom he now complains; and (2) he did not object

to the third, and the judge did not commit plain error in

seating that juror. The judge’s evidentiary rulings also were

sound; the relevance of the excluded cross-examination was

tenuous at best. Finally, a procedural impediment prevents us

from reviewing the judge’s SORNA ruling.

I. Background

On August 2, 2006, Taylor entered an online chat room and

began a conversation with “elliegirl1234.” “Ellie” identified

No. 12-2916 3

herself as a 13-year-old girl from Lafayette, Indiana. Taylor

responded that he was 37 and from Logansport. The conversa-

tion quickly became graphic as Taylor described his physique

and asked whether Ellie had engaged in sexual acts with her

boyfriend. Taylor wanted to see Ellie to masturbate in front of

a webcam; he asked her whether she had a webcam, but she

indicated that she did not. Taylor then turned on his webcam

and masturbated in front of it so that Ellie could see.

Taylor and Ellie conversed online on multiple occasions

over the next two weeks. The conversations were always

sexual in nature. On August 14 the conversation turned to

arranging a meeting in person, and Taylor asked Ellie to

fantasize about what would happen if the two met. Taylor

expressed some concern about meeting in person because he

“could go to jail.” (In an earlier conversation, he had referred

to Ellie as “jailbait.”) During this online chat, Taylor mastur-

bated a second time in front of his webcam so that Ellie could

see.

Ellie was not a 13-year-old girl but an online identity

assumed by law-enforcement personnel working on a joint

federal-state sting operation targeting child sex offenders. One

of the investigators used a picture of herself from when she

was 15 or 16 to help create the chat-room profile.

Taylor was eventually arrested and convicted of attempting

to use the facilities of interstate commerce to engage in criminal

sexual activity with a minor. See § 2422(b). We reversed that

conviction, holding that the statutory term “sexual activity”—

like its close cousin “sexual act”—requires evidence of physical

contact. Taylor, 640 F.3d at 257; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2), (3)

4 No. 12-2916

(2012) (defining “sexual act” and “sexual contact,” respec-

tively).1 Taylor had not attempted to commit a contact offense

with Ellie—his actions were limited to the online chat room—

so we directed entry of a judgment of acquittal. Taylor, 640 F.3d

at 260.

Taylor was again indicted for his August 2006 chat-room

conduct, this time on two counts of attempting to transfer

obscene material to a minor. See § 1470. He moved to dismiss

the new charges on double-jeopardy grounds. The district

judge denied the motion, noting that § 1470 and § 2422(b)

require proof of different elements. The case proceeded to trial

on the new charges.

During voir dire, a number of jurors indicated that either

they or an immediate family member had been the victim of a

crime or some form of sexual abuse. Prospective juror C.P.

disclosed that her daughter had been raped at age 15 by two

men, but she gave unequivocal assurances that she could be

impartial despite this incident. Taylor challenged C.P. based on

her daughter’s rape, but the judge declined to strike her for

cause, saying that Taylor had to take her at her word that she

would not let the incident affect her ability to be fair. Prospec-

tive juror P.W. indicated that she too had been raped. The

crime occurred about a year before trial, but P.W. uncondition-

ally assured the court that she could remain impartial and

1

The Fourth Circuit has subsequently disagreed with our analysis. See

United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248, 255–56 (4th Cir. 2012) (defining “sexual

activity” to include “conduct connected with the ‘active pursuit of libidinal

gratification’”).

No. 12-2916 5

would not let her own experience affect her decision in the

case. The judge twice denied Taylor’s motion to remove P.W.

for cause. Taylor responded to these rulings by using peremp-

tory challenges to strike both C.P and P.W. from the panel.

A third prospective juror, R.W., expressed reservations

about his ability to be impartial based on a crime against his

two daughters, who had been robbed while working at a

restaurant. The robber—a former employee of the restau-

rant—had locked them in a cooler during the robbery. When

questioned by the court about his ability to be impartial, R.W.

was initially unsure:

Q: Anything about that situation or what

occurred that would in any way cause you any

bias or prejudice in this case either for or against

the government or for or against the defendant?

A: I don’t think so, no.

Q: You say, I don’t believe so. Is there any

doubt?

A: I don’t think so. I don’t know.

Q: The reason I ask you that, … it’s important

that everybody in this case—

A: I know.

Q: —receive a completely fair and impartial trial.

A: I would hope not, yes.

Q: Okay. Do you have any doubt right now as

you [sit] here?

6 No. 12-2916

A: Maybe just a tinge, but I’ll say no. I’ll say no.

R.W.’s responses were sufficiently ambiguous that Taylor’s

counsel requested—and the government agreed—that the

judge should ask him again whether he could set the incident

aside and fairly evaluate the case based on the evidence and

the law. The judge did so, and this time R.W. unambiguously

said “yes,” he could be fair. Taylor raised no further objection

to R.W. and used his last peremptory challenge on a different

juror. R.W. was seated on the jury.

During trial, Taylor’s attorney tried several times to cross-

examine Special Agent Larry Brown and Investigator Cheri

Pruitt about their observations of other chat-room users, the

prevalence of minors in adult chat rooms, and whether people

in online chat rooms were generally truthful in their profiles.

The theory of relevance for this line of cross-examination was

not clearly articulated, but the apparent goal was to bolster an

argument that Taylor did not actually believe that Ellie was a

13-year-old girl. The judge sustained the government’s

objections to these questions.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. By the

time of sentencing, Taylor had already served more than four

years on the overturned conviction, which exceeded the 24 to

30 months that the Sentencing Guidelines recommended for

the new convictions. So the judge imposed a three-year term of

probation.

In an addendum to the presentence report, the probation

officer urged the court to find that Taylor’s convictions for

violating § 1470 require him to register as a sex offender under

SORNA. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) (requiring a “sex offender” to

No. 12-2916 7

register “in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where

the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a

student”); see also id. § 16913(b) (requiring initial registration

before the end of a sentence of imprisonment for the offense

giving rise to the registration requirement or within three

business days of sentencing, if the offender is not sentenced to

prison). In the addendum, the probation officer referred to a

letter from the Sheriff’s Office in Cass County, Indiana—

Taylor’s county of residence—advising the parties that

although state law did not independently require registration,

the convictions trigger SORNA duties and Taylor would be

required to register as a Tier I sex offender for a period of

15 years. See id. § 16915(a)(1) (establishing a minimum registra-

tion period of 15 years).

The government agreed with the probation officer and

asked the judge “to make a finding under SORNA that [Taylor]

is a Tier I sex offender, and therefore, [is] subject to the

registration requirement of 15 years.” Taylor objected, arguing

that his § 1470 convictions are not sex offenses as defined by

SORNA. The judge disagreed, adopted the position taken by

the government and the probation officer, and held that

“SORNA’s registration requirement applies to the defendant.”

When pronouncing sentence, however, the judge ordered

Taylor to register as a condition of probation and made no

mention of SORNA. Nor does the judgment refer to SORNA.

Instead, the judgment states that as a condition of three years’

probation, Taylor “shall register with the state sex offender

registration agency in the state where the defendant resides,

works, or is a student, as directed by the probation officer.”

8 No. 12-2916

II. Analysis

A. Double Jeopardy

Taylor first argues that his second prosecution on charges

of violating § 1470, based on the same conduct for which he

was acquitted under § 2422(b), violates the Double Jeopardy

Clause.2 He acknowledges that this argument is foreclosed by

Supreme Court precedent. The Double Jeopardy Clause

prohibits a second prosecution for the same offense following

an acquittal and the imposition of multiple punishments for the

same crime. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980). The

dispositive question for this type of double-jeopardy claim is

whether the two offenses—§ 2422(b) and § 1470—have

different elements. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,

304 (1932). They clearly do.

Section 1470 requires proof that the defendant transferred

obscene material to a child under the age of 16 using a means

of interstate commerce. Section 2422(b), in contrast, requires

proof that the defendant used a means of interstate commerce

to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a person

under the age of 18 to engage in sexual activity and that the

sexual activity constitutes a criminal offense. That Taylor’s

offenses were attempts—Ellie was a fictitious 13-year-old—

does not affect the Blockburger analysis here. Because each

crime requires proof of at least one fact not required by the

other, § 1470 and § 2422(b) are not the same offense and

2

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “[N]or

shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy

of life or limb.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.

No. 12-2916 9

principles of double jeopardy are not implicated. See United

States v. Loniello, 610 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When

different indictments charge crimes with different elements,

successive trials do not violate the double jeopardy clause.”).

No further analysis is required. Taylor indicates that he

raises the double-jeopardy argument simply to preserve it for

Supreme Court review; he advocates a return to the approach

of Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), which was overruled in

United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993). He has pre-

served that argument.

B. Jury Selection

Taylor next raises several claims of error relating to the

district court’s handling of strikes for cause during jury

selection. Our review is for abuse of discretion, which in this

context is highly deferential. United States v. Allen, 605 F.3d 461,

464 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that we give “great deference”

to the trial judge’s rulings on challenges to jurors for cause).

We have only a paper record before us; the district judge had

the “unique opportunity to assess the credibility of the jurors

during voir dire examination, as well as their demeanor

throughout the course of the trial.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Griffin v. Bell, 694 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir.

2012).

Taylor challenged juror C.P. for cause after she reported

that her daughter was raped when she was 15 years old. He

also challenged juror P.W. because she herself was a rape

victim. Both jurors maintained that they could be impartial

10 No. 12-2916

notwithstanding these experiences, and the district court

declined to remove them for cause. Taylor thereafter used

peremptory challenges to strike both women from the jury

pool.

In Ross v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that the

defendant’s right to an impartial jury is not violated when he

uses a peremptory challenge to strike a juror who should have

been removed for cause. 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). The loss of a

peremptory challenge is neither a constitutional violation nor

violates any rule-based right. See id. at 86; see also United

States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307 (2000) (denying any

constitutional right to peremptory challenges); United States v.

Brodnicki, 516 F.3d 570, 575 (7th Cir. 2008). The defendant’s

Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is vindicated so

long as the jury that actually sits is impartial. Ross, 487 U.S. at

88.

Taylor contends that by using peremptory challenges on

these two jurors, he was unable to strike juror R.W., who had

reservations about his impartiality. As we’ve explained, R.W.

initially expressed some uncertainty about his ability to be

impartial after disclosing that his daughters had been the

victims of a robbery. His ambiguous answers prompted follow-

up questioning by the judge, and R.W. ultimately assured the

court—unequivocally and without reservation—that he could

fairly judge the case. Taylor raised no further objection to R.W.

and indeed exercised his last peremptory challenge on a

different juror.

Taylor’s current objection to R.W. is therefore new on

appeal, and he bears the heavy burden of satisfying plain-error

No. 12-2916 11

review. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(B); United States v. Sloan,

492 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2007). The requirement of an

impartial jury is met when “the prospective juror has given

final, unequivocal assurances, deemed credible by the judge,

that for purposes of deciding the case, she can set aside any

opinion [she] might hold, relinquish her prior beliefs, or lay

aside her biases or her prejudicial personal experiences.” Allen,

605 F.3d at 464–65 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

A prospective juror does not come to the courtroom as a

tabula rasa. The important question is whether the juror can put

aside the experiences and beliefs that may prejudice his view

of the case and render a verdict based on the evidence and the

law. Id.; see also Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621,

625–26 (7th Cir. 2001). Although R.W. was initially equivocal

about whether the robbery of his daughters would affect his

judgment in the case, the judge’s follow-up examination

cleared up the ambiguity. The judge asked him if he “could be

fair and impartial to both sides and decide this case only on the

evidence introduced during this trial and the law that I am

giving you.” To this question R.W. answered “yes” without

qualification. This unequivocal assurance—deemed credible by

the trial judge—is sufficient. Allen, 605 F.3d at 464–65.

We note for good measure that R.W.’s initial uncertainty

was extremely mild; he said that he had “[m]aybe just a tinge”

of doubt about his ability to be perfectly neutral given his

daughters’ victimization. But he immediately withdrew that

statement and answered “no” to the judge’s question about

whether he harbored any doubt about his ability to be impar-

12 No. 12-2916

tial. And that was before the judge pursued a clean follow-up

question at Taylor’s request, to which R.W. responded un-

equivocally that he could be fair to both sides and decide the

case based only on the evidence and the law.

Finally, we note that R.W. never expressed any bias toward

either party and gave no indication that he would prejudicially

evaluate witness testimony or evidence. In his initial examina-

tion, he unambiguously assured the court that he understood

the presumption of innocence and the government’s burden to

prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge did not

err in accepting R.W.’s final, unequivocal assurance of impar-

tiality and seating him on the jury.

C. Limits on Cross-Examination

Taylor also objects that he was not allowed to cross-

examine Agent Brown and Investigator Pruitt about their

observations of other chat-room users, the presence of minors

in adult chat rooms, and the frequency of lying by chat-room

users. His theory of relevance for this line of questioning is that

the officers’ testimony about the general veracity of chat-room

users would have undermined the government’s case that he

actually believed he was conversing with a 13-year-old girl.

Limitations on cross-examination are reviewed for abuse of

discretion unless the limitation implicates a core component of

the Sixth Amendment confrontation right, in which case we

review the issue de novo. See United States v. Beck, 625 F.3d 410,

417 (7th Cir. 2010). The deferential standard applies here.

Taylor’s counsel had ample opportunity to cross-examine the

No. 12-2916 13

officers on core confrontation issues, including the key facts of

Taylor’s interactions with Ellie. The excluded cross-examina-

tion lies at the outer periphery of relevance, if it was relevant

at all.

Some of the excluded questions were flatly irrelevant. Early

in his cross-examination of Agent Brown, Taylor’s counsel

asked whether the agents had violated Yahoo! policies by

pretending to be a minor. When the prosecutor objected on

relevance grounds, counsel had difficulty explaining how

Agent Brown’s understanding of the Yahoo! terms of use made

it less likely that Taylor believed that he was talking to a minor.

Indeed, Taylor still has not plausibly explained the relevance

of this line of questioning.

The judge also appropriately excluded questions about the

officers’ observations of other chat-room users. The link

between their observations of chat-room behavior and Taylor’s

state of mind regarding Ellie’s age is tenuous at best. To

connect their observations to Taylor’s knowledge requires a

series of unstated—and unfounded—assumptions: (1) that the

officers had a basis for knowing how often other chat-room

users were truthful in their profiles; (2) that the officers’

observations were sufficiently representative to draw infer-

ences about chat-room users more generally; and (3) that

Taylor was aware of the general propensity of chat-room users

to provide false information in their profiles (if there was such

a propensity). The judge was well within his discretion to

exclude this line of cross-examination; it was speculative and

potentially misleading.

14 No. 12-2916

The judge did allow Taylor to present evidence that Yahoo!

policies prohibited minors from being in the chat room, so the

limitations placed on his cross-examination of Agent Brown

and Investigator Pruitt did not prevent him from presenting

his theory of the case or otherwise interfere with his ability to

cross-examine the officers. We find no abuse of discretion.3

D. SORNA Sex-Offender Registration

Taylor’s final argument is that the district court erroneously

concluded that his convictions for violating § 1470 qualify as

“sex offenses” under SORNA, triggering the Act’s registration

regime.

SORNA requires the states to establish and maintain a

jurisdiction-wide sex-offender registry that meets certain

minimum standards, see generally 42 U.S.C. § 16912(a) (2012),

and states that fail to do so may lose some federal funding, see

id. § 16925. Although the states are charged with implementing

the registries, sex offenders have a federal duty to register with

the state irrespective of whether the state’s implementation

meets federal requirements.4 § 16913(a); see United States v.

3

Taylor argues that the cumulative-error doctrine mandates reversal. Since

we find no error, we have no occasion to consider that argument.

4

Some states have imposed registration duties more onerous than SORNA’s

requirements, and in these states those added registration requirements are

duties solely created by state law. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 301.45 (applying

registration requirements to all persons convicted of a Wisconsin sex

offense, regardless of where they live, work, or go to school). But see

(continued...)

No. 12-2916 15

Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds

sub nom., Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010); United States

v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Brown,

586 F.3d 1342, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gould,

568 F.3d 459, 468–69 (4th Cir. 2009). Thus, federal law imposes

a duty on sex offenders to register where they live, work, or go

to school—a duty that is also imposed by state law if the state’s

registration requirements track SORNA.

A “sex offender” for purposes of SORNA’s registration

duty is defined broadly as “an individual who was convicted

of a sex offense.” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1). The statute also defines

the term “sex offense” very broadly through a maze of

definitions and sub-definitions. See § 16911(5). SORNA

prescribes a minimum registration period of 15 years (applica-

ble to Tier I sex offenders), but the registration duty is longer

for some offenders (25 years for Tier II offenders and life for

Tier III offenders). See § 16915(a).

The parties and the probation officer asked the judge to

decide whether Taylor’s § 1470 convictions qualify as “sex

offenses” under SORNA. The Cass County Sheriff’s Office had

advised the court that although the convictions did not trigger

a registration duty under state law, Taylor would be required

to register as a Tier I sex offender under federal law. The

4

(...continued)

Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting, without

expressing any opinion on the merits, that Wisconsin’s universal

registration requirement may trigger a constitutional question about its

extraterritorial application when applied to nonresidents with no

connection to the state).

16 No. 12-2916

government agreed with the Sheriff and, on the recommenda-

tion of the probation officer, urged the judge to find that Taylor

is a Tier I sex offender under SORNA. Taylor objected, arguing

that his convictions are not sex offenses under the federal

definition. The judge sided with the government and held that

Taylor’s § 1470 convictions are sex offenses as defined by

SORNA.

When pronouncing sentence, however, the judge ordered

Taylor to register with the state sex-offender registration

agency as a condition of three years’ probation; the judge did

not refer to SORNA at all. The judgment conforms to the

judge’s oral pronouncement of sentence and does not mention

registration under § 16913, the registration period prescribed

by § 16915, or SORNA more generally. Instead, in the section

listing special conditions of probation, the judgment states that

Taylor “shall register with the state sex offender registration

agency in the state where the defendant resides, works, or is a

student, as directed by the probation officer.” Like other

conditions of probation, this condition ends when probation

ends.

The registration duty under § 16913, in contrast, lasts for a

minimum of 15 years. See § 16915(a)(1) (setting a 15-year

minimum registration period for Tier I sex offenders). Yet as

we’ve noted, the judgment is silent about SORNA and its

duration rule. The district court can require Taylor to register

with the state sex-offender registration agency as a condition

of probation regardless of whether the definition of “sex

offense” in § 16911 includes his crimes. Although the judge

orally ruled on that question, the court’s judgment rests not on

No. 12-2916 17

SORNA but on the court’s authority to set conditions of

probation. In other words, the judgment does not implement

the court’s SORNA ruling but instead imposes a more modest

registration duty limited to the three-year duration of Taylor’s

probation.

This procedural quirk prevents us from reviewing the

judge’s SORNA ruling. As the Supreme Court has recently

reminded us, we review the district court’s judgments, not its

opinions. See Jennings v. Stephens, No. 13–7211, 2015 WL

159277, at *5 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2015) (“This Court, like all federal

appellate courts, does not review lower courts’ opinions, but

their judgments.”); see also, e.g., California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307,

311 (1987); Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297–98 (1956);

Seymour v. Hug, 485 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2007). “Courts

reduce their opinions and verdicts to judgments precisely to

define the rights and liabilities of the parties.” Jennings,

2015 WL 159277, at *5. Here, the judgment simply tells Taylor

to register with the state sex-offender registration agency as a

condition of three years’ probation.

Taylor has not challenged the condition of probation.

Instead, he asks us to reverse the judge’s oral SORNA ruling,

but that ruling was not reduced to judgment. To the contrary,

the judgment imposes a much more limited registration

obligation. The government, for its part, defends the judge’s

SORNA ruling and asks us to affirm it. But the government did

not file a cross-appeal challenging the district court’s failure to

embody that ruling in the judgment. Without a cross-appeal,

we cannot review the judge’s SORNA ruling, which if correct

could be thought to increase Taylor’s registration obligation to

18 No. 12-2916

15 years, well beyond the three-year period prescribed by the

judgment. “[A]n appellee who does not cross-appeal may not

‘attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own

rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary.’”

Jennings, 2015 WL 159277, at *5 (quoting United States v. Am.

Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924)); see also Greenlaw v.

United States, 554 U.S. 237, 245 (2008). That the judge’s oral

statements about SORNA might conceivably affect some future

proceeding does not entitle us to treat them as appealable

subjects. Jennings, 2015 WL 159277, at *5–6.

We appreciate that Taylor needs to know what his legal

obligations are after his probation ends. Perhaps for this

reason, SORNA requires that “[a]n appropriate official” notify

sex offenders of the duty to register “shortly before” their

release from custody, or if the offender is not in custody,

“immediately after the sentencing of the sex offender[] for the

offense giving rise to the duty to register.” 42 U.S.C. § 16917(a).

The statutory language contemplates notice from the Executive

Branch, not the judiciary. The Department of Justice takes the

position that Taylor must register under SORNA; that much is

clear from the government’s argument at sentencing and on

appeal. Taylor disputes the government’s position, of course,

which is why he joined the prosecutor in asking the district

court to decide the question. The federal courts can issue

declaratory judgments to resolve concrete disputes, of which

this is one. But the district court did not issue a declaratory

judgment resolving the parties’ dispute about whether SORNA

applies.

No. 12-2916 19

In short, because the judgment does not incorporate the

judge’s SORNA ruling and the government has not filed a

cross-appeal contesting that omission, there is nothing for us

to review. See Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1297 (7th Cir.

1986).

AFFIRMED.