Opinion

Michelle Y. Chandler v. General Services Administration

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Jan 21, 2015
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MICHELLE Y. CHANDLER, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DC-0752-12-0736-C-1

v.

GENERAL SERVICES DATE: January 21, 2015

ADMINISTRATION,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL ∗

Michelle Y. Chandler, Woodbridge, Virginia, pro se.

Bianca Manns, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

denied her petition for enforcement of the parties’ settlement agreement.

Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision

contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

∗

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of

the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the

appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or

involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of

the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite

the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See

Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the

following points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,

which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

¶2 The appellant filed a petition for enforcement in which she alleged that the

agency failed to comply with the parties’ agreement settling her appeal of, among

other actions, a 30-day suspension. Compliance File (CF), Tab 1. On the parties’

request, the administrative judge had entered the settlement agreement into the

record for enforcement purposes. See MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-12-0736-I-1,

Initial Appeal File, Tab 32, Initial Decision. In her petition for enforcement, the

appellant alleged that the agency selected her for a GS-13 Contract Specialist

vacancy and then rejected her even though she was the top candidate. CF, Tab 1

at 5. She further alleged that the individual responsible for that rejection

subsequently told her that he was going to pull a new certificate for the position

at issue, but that she is unaware of any such certificate, and that the same

individual also told her that she should leave the agency. Id. The agency

responded with a motion to dismiss the petition in which it argued that selecting

the appellant for the position at issue was not one of the terms of the parties’

settlement agreement. CF, Tab 5. It alleged that the appellant was instead

attempting to appeal a nonselection, which is outside the Board’s jurisdiction. Id.

The appellant did not respond.

3

¶3 In her September 24, 2014 compliance initial decision, the administrative

judge denied the appellant’s petition for enforcement of the settlement agreement.

CF, Tab 6, Compliance Initial Decision (CID). Specifically, the administrative

judge found that the agency had fully complied with the only relevant term in the

agreement, which required it to substitute an official reprimand for the 30-day

suspension that was the subject of the appellant’s appeal, and that the agreement

did not require the agency to place the appellant into the position at issue, or into

any position at all. CID at 2-3. In her petition for review of the compliance

initial decision, the appellant again argues that the agency selected, then rejected

her for the position at issue, and that the agency had singled her out and harassed

her because of her disability or in retaliation. Petition for Review (PFR) File,

Tab 1 at 5. The agency responds in opposition. PFR File, Tab 3.

¶4 The party who is asserting a breach of a settlement agreement has the

burden of proving the breach. Hicks v. U.S. Postal Service, 52 M.S.P.R. 561, 564

(1992). Although the party seeking enforcement has the burden of proof, an

agency must also produce relevant, material, and credible evidence of its

compliance with an agreement upon the filing of a petition for enforcement by an

appellant. Eagleheart v. U.S. Postal Service, 110 M.S.P.R. 642, ¶ 9 (2009).

Settlement agreements brought to the Board for enforcement are enforced and

interpreted in accordance with contract law. Hicks, 52 M.S.P.R. at 564. A

party’s breach is material when it “relates to a matter of vital importance or goes

to the essence of the contract.” Caston v. Department of the Interior,

108 M.S.P.R. 190, ¶ 17 (2008). The Board has held that implicit in any

settlement agreement, as under other contracts, is a requirement that the parties

fulfill their respective contractual obligations in good faith. Kuykendall v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 68 M.S.P.R. 314, 323 (1995). To establish a

breach of a settlement agreement based on the implied covenant of good faith, the

appellant must show that the agency’s proven retaliatory or harassing actions,

4

under the totality of the circumstances, amounted to an unjustified and substantial

deprivation of the appellant’s rights. Id. at 323-25.

¶5 We agree with the administrative judge that the agency has demonstrated its

compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement. CID at 2-3. Moreover,

the appellant’s unsubstantiated allegations do not support an allegation that the

agency breached the covenant of good faith in its implementation of the

settlement agreement.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to

the court at the following address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.

27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has

held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline

and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See

Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.

Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.

Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and

5

Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5,

6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court

appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of

attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for

Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems

Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor

warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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