John Vanderkam v. Melissa Vanderkam

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 17, 2014 Decided January 20, 2015

No. 13-5163

JOHN VANDERKAM AND GAYLYN DIERINGER,

APPELLANTS

v.

MELISSA VANDERKAM,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-01907)

Joseph R. Jeffery argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants.

Charles F. Fuller argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellee.

Before: TATEL and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge

GINSBURG.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge: The Employee Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) entitles certain spouses of

pension plan participants to a survivor annuity unless waived

pursuant to clearly defined procedures. In this case, the pension

plan participant concedes that ERISA vested an annuity in his

ex-wife, but nonetheless argues that Texas law, including his

Texas divorce decree, requires entry now of a declaratory

judgment that, after his death, she place her annuity payments

into a constructive trust for his benefit. The district court

rejected this claim, holding that ERISA preempts any state law

or state-court decree that would otherwise defeat the spouse’s

vested annuity. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we

affirm.

I.

ERISA protects retirement benefits for millions of pension

plan participants and their beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).

Finding that the stability of retirement benefits directly affects

the national economy, id. § 1001(a), Congress acted to ensure

that accrued benefits remain unaltered by individuals and states

alike. It accomplished this by prohibiting participants from

assigning or alienating their own benefits, id. § 1056(d)(1),

and, with limited exceptions, superseding state laws that

“relate to any employee benefit plan,” id. § 1144(a). One

exception rests on the fact that plan benefits are often

considered marital community property, a domain traditionally

reserved exclusively for state law. As a result, Congress

exempted a narrow category of state-court orders, known as

qualified domestic relations orders, from ERISA’s

anti-alienation and preemption provisions. Id.

§ 1056(d)(3)(A); § 1144(b)(7). A qualified domestic relations

order is a state-court decree regarding marital property that

creates or recognizes an alternate payee’s right to

ERISA-governed benefits—for instance, changing the plan

beneficiary from a soon-to-be ex-spouse to a child. Id.

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§ 1056(d)(3)(B)(i). In order to qualify for the exemption, the

state-court order may neither change the type or form of

benefits nor increase the actuarial value of the plan. Id.

§ 1056(d)(3)(D).

Despite this narrow exception, the protection of

beneficiaries—especially spouses—remains a paramount

ERISA objective. The crown jewel of ERISA’s spousal

protection, the qualified joint and survivor annuity, provides

monthly support for surviving spouses in the event of a

participant’s death, whether occurring before or after

retirement. Id. § 1055(a). Survivor annuity payments, equal to

at least 50 percent of the participant’s benefits, continue for the

remainder of the surviving spouse’s life. Id. § 1055(d)(1)(A).

Although for most ERISA benefits, like life insurance and

401(k) plans, participants may unilaterally waive benefits or

designate beneficiaries, participants are powerless to “defeat

a . . . surviving spouse’s statutory entitlement to an annuity.”

Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 843 (1997). Without the

spouse’s written consent expressly acknowledging the effect of

the waiver or new beneficiary designation, a participant can

neither waive nor alter the survivor annuity in any way. 29

U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2). Under the version of the statute governing

this case, moreover, the written consent must not only be

witnessed by a plan representative or notary public, but also

completed no more than 90 days before the annuity start date,

i.e., the date the participant either dies or retires. Retirement

Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984)

(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1055(c)(2), (c)(7)

(1984)). If a participant fails to obtain this written and

witnessed waiver within the 90-day time limit, the survivor

annuity vests in the spouse upon the participant’s retirement or

death. Taken together, “[t]he surviving spouse annuity and

[qualified domestic relations order] provisions, which

acknowledge and protect specific pension plan community

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property interests, give rise to the strong implication that other

community property claims are not consistent with the

statutory scheme.” Boggs, 520 U.S. at 847.

This case presents a conflict between state community

property law and ERISA. Specifically, we must determine

whether, after a survivor annuity has vested and absent a

qualified domestic relations order, the plan participant may use

state law to obtain legal control over his former spouse’s

survivor benefit.

John and Melissa VanderKam married in 1984. An

employee of the Huffy Corporation, John enrolled in the

company’s retirement plan and designated Melissa as the

beneficiary of a 100-percent qualified joint and survivor

annuity. John retired in 1994, at which time the survivor

annuity irrevocably vested in Melissa, and John began

receiving monthly benefits. Eight years later, in March 2002,

John and Melissa divorced, agreeing to a decree awarding John

all “benefits existing by reason of [John’s] past, present, or

future employment.” Final Divorce Decree 19, J.A. 290.

One year later, John remarried and sought to designate his

new wife as the survivor annuity beneficiary. Counsel for

Huffy’s pension plan advised John that this designation would

be permissible if done pursuant to a qualified domestic

relations order that, in accordance with ERISA, did not require

the plan to increase benefits beyond actuarial estimates of

John’s and Melissa’s life expectancies. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 1056(d)(3)(D). In order to meet this requirement, John

motioned the Texas court to modify the divorce decree by

including an order naming his new wife as the annuity

beneficiary and calculating annuity benefits based upon

Melissa’s life expectancy. Melissa opposed John’s motion,

arguing that she had consented to the divorce decree only

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because she believed that the survivor annuity belonged to her

and was therefore entirely separate from John’s retirement

benefits. Her agreement to the decree, Melissa explained,

resulted from a “trade-off between the parties” whereby “if

[Melissa] kept the survivor benefit, . . . she would not touch the

rest of [John’s] retirement, which is quite a large sum.” Hr’g on

Mot. to Modify Tr. 7, J.A. 208. Also, pointing out that she was

not a beneficiary of John’s life insurance policy, Melissa

emphasized that the survivor annuity would represent her

primary means of providing for the couple’s son in the event of

John’s death. Rejecting Melissa’s arguments, the Texas court

entered a purported qualified domestic relations order

divesting Melissa of all ownership interests in John’s

retirement benefits, including the survivor annuity.

In 2005, Huffy terminated its pension plan, and because

the plan had insufficient assets to provide the benefits

promised to its employees, the Pension Benefit Guaranty

Corporation (PBGC) became the plan’s statutory trustee.

Established by ERISA to provide pension benefit insurance

and to “ensure that employees and their beneficiaries would

not be deprived of anticipated retirement benefits by the

termination of pension plans,” Connolly v. Pension Benefit

Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 214 (1986) (citation omitted),

PBGC independently determines the benefits it will pay under

ERISA and the terms of the terminated plan. After reviewing

John’s file, PBGC determined that the supposed qualified

domestic relations order was invalid and that Melissa remained

the proper beneficiary of the survivor annuity. This ruling

rested on two basic propositions. First, the Texas court order

was not a valid qualified domestic relations order because it

would require the plan to “provide a form of benefit, or [an]

option, not otherwise provided under the plan.” Letter from

Deborah Martin, PBGC Coordinator, to John VanderKam

(Dec. 18, 2009) (“PGBC Letter”) at 3, J.A. 257. Should John’s

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new wife survive him, PBGC explained, she would receive

survivor benefits for the remainder of her life, rather than the

remainder of Melissa’s life, which “would create a bizarre,

hybrid form of benefit” unavailable under the plan. PBGC

Letter 5, J.A. 259. Second, relying on ERISA’s text and

relevant federal court decisions, PBGC determined that unless

waived in accordance with the procedure set forth in the statute

and within the 90-day period, a spouse’s right to the survivor

annuity irrevocably vests on the annuity start date—here, the

day John retired. Accordingly, “the order could not transfer

Melissa’s right to the survivor benefit to [the new wife].”

PBGC Letter 6, J.A. 260.

After PBGC’s Appeals Board affirmed the agency’s initial

determination, John filed suit in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia, challenging PBGC’s

decision as both contrary to ERISA and arbitrary and

capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.

Second Am. Compl. 2–11; Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. 12. In

response, and citing Melissa’s affidavit swearing that she

“never intended to waive the survivor benefit” and “wish[ed]

to claim [her] right to that benefit,” PBGC asked the district

court to join Melissa as a necessary party. Melissa VanderKam

Aff., J.A. 12. After the district court granted that motion, John

amended his complaint to allege unjust enrichment and breach

of contract claims against Melissa, and, invoking a Texas

statute, sought a declaration that given the divorce decree, John

“has equitable title to the . . . survivor benefit payments” and

that “upon actual receipt of the survivor benefit payments,

[Melissa] will owe fiduciary obligations to John and hold those

payments in constructive trust.” Second Am. Compl. 13. The

parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

Relying on cases from the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth

Circuits, the district court found PBGC’s two

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determinations—that Melissa’s claim to the survivor benefit

irrevocably vested upon John’s retirement and that the Texas

court order was not a valid qualified domestic relations

order—both reasonable and amply supported by the

administrative record. VanderKam v. Pension Benefit

Guaranty Corp., 943 F. Supp. 2d 130, 141–46 (D.D.C. 2013).

As to the state-law claims against Melissa, the district court

found them preempted by ERISA, emphasizing that the claims

“are nothing more than an effort to make an end-run around

ERISA’s statutory prescriptions” and would permit John “to

achieve what [he] otherwise cannot accomplish under the

statute itself—to divest Melissa of the survivor annuity benefit

paid to her by PBGC.” Id. at 150. The district court therefore

granted summary judgment in favor of PBGC and Melissa.

After John filed his appeal here, we granted his motion to

dismiss PBGC from the case, leaving only his appeal of the

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Melissa

on the state-law claims. Appellant’s Mot. to Dismiss PBGC

(Apr. 2, 2014). Before reaching those claims, however, we

must address the threshold issue of whether this case is ripe for

review. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission, 501 F.3d 204, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The

question of ripeness goes to our subject matter jurisdiction, and

thus we can raise the issue sua sponte at any time.”) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

II.

Article III of the Constitution limits federal court

jurisdiction to cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

Consistent with this limitation and “our theoretical role as the

governmental branch of last resort,” the ripeness doctrine

precludes premature adjudication of “abstract disagreements”

and instead reserves judicial power for resolution of concrete

and “fully crystalized” disputes. National Treasury Employees

8

Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Put simply, “Article III courts should not make decisions

unless they have to.” Id.

In this case, Melissa will receive no survivor benefits if

she predeceases John, which suggests that “[i]f we do not

decide [the case] now, we may never need to,” id. Given our

“independent obligation to assure ourselves of jurisdiction,”

Floyd v. District of Columbia, 129 F.3d 152, 155 (D.C. Cir.

1997), we ordered supplemental briefing regarding whether

this case is ripe for judicial review.

To determine whether a dispute is ripe for judicial

consideration, we must evaluate (1) “the fitness of the issues

for judicial decision” and (2) “the hardship to the parties of

withholding court consideration.” Abbott Laboratories v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).

Under the fitness element, “we look to see whether the

issue is purely legal” or instead “would benefit from a more

concrete setting.” National Association of Home Builders v.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 440 F.3d 459, 463–64 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). The facts of the present case are undisputed, as is

PBGC’s determination that ERISA vested the survivor annuity

in Melissa. The single question presented—whether ERISA

preempts John’s attempt to gain equitable title to Melissa’s

survivor annuity—is thus purely legal. The fitness element also

requires that we consider whether “deciding the issue now

would violate principles of judicial restraint and efficiency that

counsel against spending [our] scarce resources on what

amounts to shadow boxing.” Alcoa Power Generating, Inc. v.

FERC, 643 F.3d 963, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). Addressing this purely legal

question now raises no concern about inefficiency or waste of

judicial resources.

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As to the second element, we agree with John that denial

of judicial review would presently cause him significant

hardship, as it would “interfere[] with John’s ability to make

decisions about the organization of his estate and the

distribution of his property after his death.” Appellant’s

Supplemental Br. 2. The very purpose of ERISA benefits,

especially benefits accruing to dependents and spouses, is to

provide economic security and peace of mind. 29 U.S.C.

§ 1001(a) (noting ERISA’s objective to protect “the continued

well-being and security of millions of employees and their

dependents”). Indeed, ERISA expressly authorizes preemptive

litigation to “clarify . . . rights to future benefits under the

terms of [a] plan.” Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).

True, Melissa may predecease John, but John seeks

declaratory relief now—relief that would be independent of

any future events. John seeks not a constructive trust that will

spring into existence only if Melissa someday receives the

annuity payments, but rather a current declaration that he “has

equitable title to the . . . survivor benefit payments” and that

“upon actual receipt of the . . . payments, [Melissa] will owe

fiduciary obligations to John and hold those payments in

constructive trust.” Second Am. Compl. 13 (emphases added).

A final decision regarding John’s entitlement to such a

declaration would give him an immediate, concrete, and

valuable benefit: certainty regarding whether monthly annuity

payments will be paid to his ex-spouse and son’s mother, or

whether he can assign those payments to a different beneficiary

of his choosing. This case thus presents a fully crystalized

dispute ripe for our resolution.

III.

Having elected to dismiss his appeal against PBGC, John

makes three key concessions: (1) that the survivor annuity

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vested in Melissa upon his retirement, (2) that any supposed

waiver in the divorce agreement was invalid under ERISA, and

(3) that the Texas court order was not a valid qualified

domestic relations order. In other words, John concedes that

under ERISA, the survivor annuity belongs to Melissa. Given

this, we face a single question: May John use state law to seize

a benefit that federal law has vested in Melissa?

ERISA “supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they

may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29

U.S.C. § 1144(a). Despite the simplicity of the statutory text,

“ERISA pre-emption questions are recurrent,” reflecting “the

comprehensive nature of the statute, the centrality of pension

and welfare plans in the national economy, and their

importance to the financial security of the Nation’s work

force.” Boggs, 520 U.S. at 839. But in Boggs v. Boggs, a

decision central to our resolution of this case, the Supreme

Court helpfully narrowed the ERISA preemption inquiry.

Under Boggs, rather than examine conflicts between state law

and ERISA’s text, we may “simply ask[] if state law conflicts

with the provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate its

objects.” Id. at 841. And as instructed by the Court in Hillman

v. Maretta, in order to answer that question, “we must first

ascertain the nature of the federal interest.” 133 S. Ct. 1943,

1950 (2013).

In this case, the nature of the federal interest is obvious.

Congress designed ERISA “to promote the interests of

employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.”

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983). With

respect to qualified joint and survivor annuities specifically,

Congress displayed special “solicitude for the economic

security of surviving spouses” and legislated to “provide

detailed protections to spouses of plan participants which, in

some cases, exceed what their rights would be were [state]

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community property law the sole measure.” Boggs, 520 U.S. at

843, 841. Prior to ERISA, no law required that pension plans

support spouses beyond the life of the participant. H.R. Rep.

No. 93–807, at 4732 (1974). Recognizing that this void could

“result in a hardship where an individual primarily dependent

on his pension as a source of retirement income is unable to

make adequate provision for his spouse’s retirement years

should he predecease her,” Congress required that “if a plan

provides for a lifetime annuity” for participants, “the plan must

[also] provide for a joint and survivor annuity.” Id. Congress

strengthened these provisions in 1984 by enacting the

Retirement Equity Act (REA), which enlarged ERISA’s

protection for surviving spouses in three significant respects.

First, although the joint and survivor annuity was initially a

mere “option entirely within a participant’s discretion,” Boggs,

520 U.S. at 843 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1055(a), (e) (1982)), the

REA removed that discretion by prohibiting a participant from

waiving the survivor annuity without spousal consent, Boggs,

520 U.S. at 843 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)). Second, as

evidence of Congress’s concern not only for surviving spouses,

but also for “spouse[s] and dependent children in the event of

divorce or separation,” Boggs, 520 U.S. at 847, the REA made

annuities payable to surviving spouses so long as the spouse

was married to the participant at the time of

retirement—regardless of marital status at the time of the

participant’s death, Hopkins v. AT & T Global Information

Solutions Co., 105 F.3d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing 29

U.S.C. §§ 1055(a), (f)). Third, although ERISA initially had

nothing to say about whether and how beneficiaries could

waive survivor benefits, the REA established a clear and

defined procedure for waiving a survivor annuity, requiring an

express, witnessed waiver within 90 days of the annuity start

date. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1055(c)(2), (c)(7)(A). Through these three

amendments, Congress recognized “the status of marriage as

an economic partnership” and sought to protect “the substantial

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contribution to that partnership of spouses who work both in

and outside the home.” Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L.

No. 98–397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).

Against this clear congressional objective—ensuring

ongoing financial support for divorced and surviving

spouses—John invokes a Texas statute providing that “[t]he

subsequent actual receipt by the non-owning party of property

awarded to the owner in a decree of divorce or annulment

creates a fiduciary obligation in favor of the owner and

imposes a constructive trust on the property for the benefit of

the owner.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.011(b). Despite

conceding that ERISA vested the survivor benefit in Melissa,

John argues that the divorce decree and this Texas statute

entitle him to a declaration that he “has equitable title” to

Melissa’s survivor benefit, and that upon receipt of her

annuity, Melissa is bound by Texas law to deliver it to John’s

designee. Second Am. Compl. 13.

The conflict between ERISA and Texas law could hardly

be starker—what ERISA gives to Melissa, John argues, Texas

takes away. But as the Supreme Court held in Boggs, “in the

face of this direct clash between state law and the provisions

and objectives of ERISA, the state law cannot stand.” Boggs,

520 U.S. at 844. Any other result would frustrate Congress’s

objective to provide “enhanced protection to the spouse and

dependent children in the event of divorce” by “ensur[ing] a

stream of income to surviving spouses.” Id. at 847, 843

(emphases added). Simply put, John may not use Texas law to

compel an outcome expressly barred by ERISA.

John nonetheless insists that his claims fall outside

ERISA’s preemption of state laws that “relate to any employee

benefit plan,” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added), because

he seeks title only to Melissa’s benefits. In Boggs, however, the

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Supreme Court expressly rejected this argument. There, a

participant’s first wife attempted to transfer her survivor

annuity benefits to the couple’s adult sons through her will.

Boggs, 520 U.S. at 833. After her death, the participant married

his second wife, in whom the survivor annuity vested after the

participant’s death and against whom the sons attempted to

enforce the testamentary transfer. Id. Holding the state law

permitting the transfer preempted, the Court rejected the

argument that the claims “affect[ed] only what a plan

participant may do with his or her benefits after they are

received and not the relationship between the pension plan

administrator and the plan beneficiary.” Id. at 838. Accepting

that argument, the Court declared, “would undermine the

purpose of ERISA’s mandated survivor’s annuity.” Id. at 844.

So too here.

John also contends that although the divorce agreement is

invalid as a waiver of Melissa’s right to receive her survivor

annuity under ERISA, the agreement remains a valid waiver of

Melissa’s right to retain her benefits under Texas law. In fact,

he argues, Melissa is collaterally estopped from arguing

otherwise. But this argument only highlights the conflict

between ERISA and the Texas statute: state law may not

resurrect an agreement invalidated by federal law. And, like

John’s plan vs. benefits argument, the distinction between the

right to receive benefits, as opposed to the right to retain them,

has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. In Hillman,

the Court invalidated a state law that imposed personal liability

on beneficiaries of life insurance under the Federal Employee

Group Life Insurance Act, holding that with a beneficiary’s

designation “comes the expectation that the . . . proceeds will

be paid . . . and that the beneficiary can use them.” 133 S. Ct.

at 1953 (emphasis added). Indeed, “the term ‘beneficiary’

itself . . . would be meaningless if the only effect of a

designation were to saddle the nominal beneficiary with

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liability under state law for the full value of the proceeds.” Id.

at 1956 (Thomas, J., concurring). For this reason, the Court

held, “where a beneficiary has been duly named,

the . . . proceeds she is owed under [federal law] cannot be

allocated to another person by operation of state law.” Id. at

1953. That reasoning applies with equal force to ERISA

beneficiaries.

Finally, John points to the Supreme Court’s decision in

Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings &

Investment Plan, which expressly left open the question

whether, after benefits are distributed, state courts can enforce

a beneficiary’s waiver of her interest in pension plan benefits.

555 U.S. 285, 299 n.10 (2009). Some courts, most recently the

Fourth Circuit in Andochick v. Byrd, have held that such suits

are not preempted by ERISA because there is “no conflict with

either ERISA’s objectives or relevant Supreme Court

precedent.” 709 F.3d 296, 298 (4th Cir. 2013). Unlike

Andochick, however, this is not a post-distribution case.

Rather, as explained above in our ripeness discussion, John

seeks a pre-distribution declaration that he currently “has

equitable title to the . . . survivor benefit payments.” Second

Am. Compl. 13. Moreover, none of the cases John cites,

including Kennedy, involves survivor annuity benefits.

Instead, they concern other ERISA benefits, such as life

insurance and 401(k) plans, that are not subject to the rigorous

waiver provisions that govern survivor annuities. With respect

to survivor annuities, absent an express and witnessed waiver,

“Congress has spoken with force and clarity in directing that

the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other.”

Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1951 (citation omitted).

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, the only circuit to have

considered the Kennedy question in the survivor annuity

context, concluded that permitting a “constructive trust on the

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proceeds of a pension plan . . . would allow for an end-run

around ERISA’s rules and Congress’s policy objective of

providing for certain beneficiaries, thereby greatly weakening,

if not entirely abrogating, ERISA’s broad preemption

provision.” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1061 (9th

Cir. 2008). We agree. The survivor annuity waiver provisions

are aimed at preventing precisely this type of situation, where a

participant seeks to enforce an invalid waiver of his spouse’s

primary means of supporting herself following a divorce.

In conclusion, we emphasize the narrowness of our

opinion. This case involves an effort by a plan participant to

obtain an interest in undistributed plan benefits, and we hold

only that absent a qualified domestic relations order and

compliance with ERISA’s strict waiver provisions for survivor

annuities, he may not use state law for that purpose. This

opinion has nothing to say about how ERISA might affect an

effort by a plan participant to use state law to obtain an interest

in benefits after distribution to the beneficiary. That question is

not presented in this case, and we express no opinion on it.

IV.

For the reasons given above, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

So ordered.

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring:

Although I agree John VanderKam may not use state law

to obtain an interest in Melissa VanderKam’s ERISA-

protected survivor annuity, I write separately to emphasize

that the Court has not today decided all state laws are

preempted insofar as they burden qualified joint and survivor

annuity (QJSA) benefits that have not yet been disbursed.

The Court’s holding is necessarily limited to the situation in

which the claimed source of authority for obtaining an interest

in QJSA benefits is an agreement in the divorce decree of a

plan participant and his beneficiary in which the beneficiary

purports to waive her right to the survivor annuity. Because

other ways of obtaining an interest in ERISA benefits,

specifically those to which the Congress spoke in the anti-

alienation provision of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), are not before us,

we have no occasion to decide whether the requirements for

assignment and alienation in § 1056(d) preempt a state law

that would transfer the annuity pursuant to an agreement to

assign rather than to waive the benefits.

John argues that although the divorce decree did not give

rise to a valid qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), the

requirements for a QDRO in § 1056(d) are intended only to

“creat[e] a path for participants and beneficiaries to enforce

their private agreements directly against a plan” and therefore

do not preempt a state law that is used to enforce directly

against a beneficiary her agreement to alienate her benefits.

John’s argument is beside the point because Melissa “did not

assign or alienate anything to [John] or to the Estate later

standing in his shoes.” Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont

Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 292-97 (2009) (holding a

nearly identical provision of a divorce decree was an

attempted waiver, not an assignment, and therefore should not

be analyzed for validity under the requirements for a QDRO).

It is therefore sufficient today for us to hold the QJSA

provision in ERISA preempts a state law that would give

2

effect to an otherwise invalid waiver of QJSA benefits; we

need not address whether the QDRO provision preempts a

state law that provides a different way of obtaining an interest

in QJSA benefits. An example might be a car dealer suing a

QJSA beneficiary who gave the dealer a security interest in

her future stream of benefits in exchange for a car.