holding proof of single violation is sufficient to support revocation
How later courts described this case
- holding proof of single violation is sufficient to support revocation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Opinion issued December 18, 2014
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-14-00238-CR
———————————
CHARLES EDWARD TUMLINSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 149th District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 50946
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Charles Edward Tumlinson, obtained deferred adjudication on
charges of aggravated sexual assault of a child1 and of indecency with a child by
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2014).
contact.2 The State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt on four grounds of violating
the terms of Appellant’s community supervision. Appellant pleaded not true to the
grounds. The trial court found three of the four grounds true, adjudicated
Appellant’s guilt, and assessed punishment at thirty years’ confinement and twenty
years’ confinement, respectively, to be served concurrently. In one issue,
Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by finding he violated the
named grounds of the terms of his community supervision.
We affirm.
Background
Appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of aggravated sexual assault of a child
and a charge of indecency with a child by contact. The trial court accepted
Appellant’s pleas and placed him on 10 year’s deferred adjudication in November
2007. One of the terms of Appellant’s community supervision concerned
participation in a sex offender treatment program. Specifically, Appellant was
required to
attend and participate in a sex offender treatment program . . . and
obey all rules, regulations and policies of the designated program until
successful completion and/or further orders of the court. Program
participation is defined as attendance at all meetings, prompt payment
of fees, acknowledgement of responsibility for the defendant’s
offenses, and progress toward responsible treatment goals.
2
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (Vernon 2011).
2
In its motion to adjudicate guilt, the State presented four grounds for determining
that Appellant had violated his community supervision requirements. In one of
those grounds, the State alleged that Appellant “failed to successfully participate in
sex offender treatment.”
At the hearing on the motion, H. John testified. John is a licensed sex
offender therapist. He works for O’Brien Counseling, which provides counseling
services to the Brazoria County Probation Department. John led the group therapy
session that Appellant first attended as part of his community supervision
requirements.
John testified that O’Brien Counseling’s sex offender therapy services are
based on four phases of treatment. Among other things, the first phase requires the
offender to acknowledge the specific acts committed. The second phase involves
the offender recognizing his thinking and behavior patterns and developing coping
responses. The third phase, known as the victim empathy phase, involves teaching
the offender to understand the perspective and feelings of the victim. In the last
phase, the offender develops mechanisms to prevent relapse and to function
independently of group counseling.
John informed the court that O’Brien Counseling typically expects offenders
to complete the first phase between six months to a year. Appellant took just under
two years. After that, Appellant completed the second phase in a shorter time
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span. Once, he was in the third phase, however, Appellant reported details related
to his underlying offenses that he had not previously disclosed in his therapy.
Because he had not disclosed these details and incorporated them into his therapy,
the counselors at O’Brien Counseling decided Appellant would need to return to
the first phase of treatment to cover those additional details.
After he was returned to the first phase of treatment, Appellant became less
invested in participating in his group therapy sessions. Over time, Appellant’s
accounts of the events of the offending acts became more inconsistent. His
answers to questions became more tangential, indirect, and vague. Ultimately, the
decision was made to terminate Appellant from the therapy sessions. The decision
to move Appellant back to the first level and the decision to terminate Appellant
from the therapy sessions were not made by one individual. Instead, the decisions
were made by the clinical staff with consultation from the probation department to
which Appellant reported.
Appellant’s group therapy sessions were terminated on July 24, 2013. The
State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt on August 2, 2013. A hearing on the
motion was not held until March 14, 2014. Six weeks before the hearing,
Appellant joined another sex offender therapy group. The group was led by Dr. J.
S. Hickey. Dr. Hickey has a PhD in clinical psychology and is a sex offender
treatment provider. Dr. Hickey testified for Appellant at the hearing on the motion
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to adjudicate guilt. As a condition for participating in group sex abuse therapy, Dr.
Hickey required Appellant to receive individual therapy for other disorders he felt
Appellant had.3 Dr. Hickey testified that Appellant had been cooperative in five
out of the six therapy sessions Appellant had attended.
Adjudication of Guilt
In his sole issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by
finding he violated the named grounds of the terms of his community supervision.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
A trial court’s determination on a motion to adjudicate is reviewable in the
same manner as a determination of a motion to revoke community supervision.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 2014). A
revocation proceeding is neither criminal nor civil in nature; rather, it is an
administrative proceeding. Canseco v. State, 199 S.W.3d 437, 438 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). At a revocation hearing, the State must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has violated a condition of
his community supervision. Id. at 438. The State satisfies its burden if the greater
weight of credible evidence creates a reasonable belief that the defendant violated a
condition of his probation as alleged by the State. Solis v. State, 589 S.W.2d 444,
3
John testified that he considered the possibility that Appellant had other
psychological disorders that were preventing him from progressing in his
treatment. John reviewed Appellant’s psychological examination results and
determined that Appellant did not indicate “any clinical psychopathology.”
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447 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Armstrong v. State, 82 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2002, pet. ref’d). Proof of a single violation is sufficient to support a
revocation. Canseco, 199 S.W.3d at 439.
Our review of an order adjudicating guilt and revoking community
supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that the defendant violated the terms of his community supervision.
Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Duncan v.
State, 321 S.W.3d 53, 56–57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d).
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order.
Canseco, 199 S.W.3d at 439; Duncan, 321 S.W.3d at 57. As the trier of fact at a
revocation proceeding, the trial court determines the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given to their testimony. Armstrong, 82 S.W.3d at 448.
B. Analysis
In its motion to adjudicate guilt, the State alleged that Appellant had violated
four terms of his requirements for community supervision. One of the claims that
the trial court found true was the claim that Appellant had failed to successfully
participate in sex offender treatment.
Under the terms of his community supervision, Appellant was required to
attend and participate in a sex offender treatment program . . . and
obey all rules, regulations and policies of the designated program until
successful completion and/or further orders of the court. Program
participation is defined as attendance at all meetings, prompt payment
6
of fees, acknowledgement of responsibility for the defendant’s
offenses, and progress toward responsible treatment goals.
Appellant claims that the terms of his community supervision did not define what
successful participation meant. This is contradicted by the second sentence of this
term, which explicitly defines “program participation.” Appellant then asserts that
we should define successful participation to mean that Appellant attended the
meetings, promptly paid his fees, and acknowledged responsibility for his offense.
This definition excludes the written requirement that program participation
includes “progress toward responsible treatment goals.”
John testified that the goals of the group sex offender therapy sessions
include completing four phases of treatment. At a certain point in his therapy,
Appellant had completed the first two phases. But while Appellant was in the third
phase, Appellant identified previously undisclosed details of the offense that had
not been part of his existing treatment. As a result, Appellant had to return to the
first phase of treatment. After Appellant returned to the first phase of treatment,
his active involvement in the therapy sessions declined. When he did participate,
his answers to questions became more tangential, indirect, and vague. Ultimately,
the decision was made to terminate Appellant from the therapy sessions. The
decision to move Appellant back to the first level and the decision to terminate
Appellant from the therapy sessions were not made by one individual. Instead, the
7
decisions were made by the clinical staff with consultation from the probation
department to which Appellant reported.
Appellant points out that Dr. Hickey testified that, at the time of the hearing,
Appellant was in a new group therapy program and had been cooperative in five
out of the six therapy sessions Appellant had attended. Appellant argues that this
shows that he did actively participate in a sex offender treatment program.
Appellant was removed from his original group therapy program in late July
2013. The State filed its motion to adjudicate guilt in early August 2013. At that
time, Appellant was not involved in any group therapy program, let alone
successfully participating in one. The simple fact that Appellant took steps to stop
violating this term of his community supervision six months after he began
violating it does not establish that no violation occurred. See Canseco, 199 S.W.3d
at 439 (holding proof of single violation is sufficient to support revocation).
The State’s burden of proof was by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at
438. We review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. Rickels, 202
S.W.3d at 763. We hold that Appellant has failed to establish that the trial court
abused its broad discretion by determining that Appellant violated this term of his
community supervision. Because this ground is sufficient to support the trial
court’s adjudication of guilt, we do not need to reach Appellant’s challenges to the
other grounds. See Canseco, 199 S.W.3d at 439; TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (requiring
8
appellate courts to address every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of
the appeal).
We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Laura Carter Higley
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Brown.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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