Opinion

Eric J. Chetlin v. United States Postal Service

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Dec 15, 2014
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ERIC J. CHETLIN, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DA-0752-14-0332-I-1

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: December 15, 2014

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL *

Exkano Phillipson, and Larry Guerrero, Houston, Texas, for the appellant.

Eric B. Fryda, Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

sustained the appellant’s removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one

only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the

*

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

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initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or

the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings

during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent

with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting

error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal

argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not

available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this

appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the

petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the

petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM

the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.113(b).

¶2 Effective December 7, 2012, the agency removed the appellant for inability

to perform the essential functions of his mail handler position. Initial Appeal File

(IAF), Tab 11 at 114-16. The appellant sustained a compensable back injury in

1999, and the agency provided a modified work assignment. Id. at 83. In

April 2010, the agency offered the appellant a new modified assignment, which

he did not accept. Id. at 83-84. A March 26, 2012 Work Capacity Evaluation

identified the appellant’s restrictions and indicated that they were permanent. Id.

at 139. The agency subsequently conducted an unsuccessful search for available

work within the appellant’s medical restrictions. Id. at 145-47. The appellant

failed to appear for an August 1, 2012 meeting with the District Reasonable

Accommodation Committee (DRAC) and, on October 12, 2012, DRAC informed

the appellant that no reasonable accommodation was available. Id. at 126, 145.

In the November 7, 2012 notice proposing to remove the appellant for inability to

perform the duties of his position, the agency stated, inter alia, that the appellant

had been continuously absent from duty since April 2010, and he was on the

periodic rolls of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) for

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more than 1 year. Id. at 120. The agency also informed the appellant of the

deadline for filing an application with the Office of Personnel Management for

disability or optional retirement. Id.

¶3 The appellant filed an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint

challenging his removal. See IAF, Tab 11 at 12, 21. After he received the final

agency decision on his EEO complaint, he filed a timely appeal with the Board.

IAF, Tab 1, Tab 29, Initial Decision (ID) at 2 n.1. After holding a hearing, the

administrative judge affirmed the agency’s removal decision finding that the

agency proved the charge by preponderant evidence. ID at 2, 15. The

administrative judge found that the appellant had medical restrictions that

prevented him from performing the essential functions of his position at the time

of his removal, and he had not demonstrated, clearly and unambiguously, that he

had recovered during the pendency of his appeal and he was able to perform the

essential functions of his position. ID at 12-15. The administrative judge further

found that the removal was reasonable and the appellant failed to prove his

affirmative defenses of disability discrimination, retaliation for protected EEO

and union activity, and harmful procedural error. ID at 15-21.

¶4 The appellant filed a petition for review of the initial decision, asking the

Board to vacate the initial decision pursuant to his proposed settlement

agreement. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The purpose of the settlement

agreement proposed by the appellant was to restore him to the rolls of his

employer, effective June 28, 2013, so that he could apply for disability

retirement. Id. at 2; Tab 6 at 8. The agency filed a response in opposition to the

appellant’s petition for review. PFR File, Tab 5. The appellant replied, arguing

in pertinent part that his petition met the Board’s review criteria because the

initial decision introduced new and material evidence that was not available when

the record closed despite his due diligence. PFR File, Tab 6 at 7. Specifically,

the appellant contends that the initial decision that affirmed his removal was new

and material evidence because it overruled “OWCP/DOL’s June 27 th , 2013

4

decision” stating that he had fully recovered and could return to full duty. PFR

File, Tab 6 at 7.

¶5 The Board will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent

a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that

of the initial decision. Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349

(1980). Although the appellant argues that, before the initial decision was issued,

he was unaware that his medical condition had no foreseeable end and required

long-term recovery and rehabilitation, he does not explain how this warrants an

outcome different from that of the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 6 at 7.

Moreover, the appellant has not shown that the administrative judge made

erroneous findings of fact, erroneously interpreted statute or regulation, or

misapplied the law to the facts. Thus, we discern no reason to disturb the

administrative judge’s finding that the agency proved the charge of inability to

perform. ID at 12-15; see Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106

(1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings where the

administrative judge considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate

inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); see also Broughton v. Department of

Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same). We therefore

DENY the appellant’s petition for review.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request further review of this final decision.

Discrimination Claims: Administrative Review

You may request review of this final decision on your discrimination

claims by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Title 5

of the United States Code, section 7702(b)(1) (5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1)). If you

submit your request by regular U.S. mail, the address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

5

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit your request via commercial delivery or by a method

requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, NE

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

You should send your request to EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after

your receipt of this order. If you have a representative in this case, and your

representative receives this order before you do, then you must file with EEOC no

later than 30 calendar days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to

file, be very careful to file on time.

Discrimination and Other Claims: Judicial Action

If you do not request EEOC to review this final decision on your

discrimination claims, you may file a civil action against the agency on both your

discrimination claims and your other claims in an appropriate United States

district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). You must file your civil action with

the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your receipt of this order. If

you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this order

before you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar

days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to file, be very careful to

file on time. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on race, color,

religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be entitled to

representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any requirement of

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prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and

29 U.S.C. § 794a.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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