Board of County Commissioners Broward County Florida v. Lori Parrish, Broward County Property Appraiser

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS BROWARD COUNTY

FLORIDA, a political subdivision of the State of Florida,

Appellant,

v.

LORI PARRISH, Broward County Property Appraiser,

Appellee.

No. 4D14-101

[December 10, 2014]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

Broward County; Dale Ross, Judge; L.T. Case No. 13-023090 (08).

Joni Armstrong Coffey, Broward County Attorney, Andrew J. Meyers,

Chief Appellate Counsel, and Rocio Blanco Garcia, Assistant County

Attorney, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

William R. Scherer of Conrad & Scherer, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, and

Bruce S. Rogow and Tara A. Campion of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort

Lauderdale, for appellee.

GROSS, J.

This case is a tug of war between Broward County’s property appraiser,

a constitutional officer, and the Board of County Commissioners. The

Board wants to have as much control over its budget as possible; the

property appraiser believes that the Board’s discretion over her budget is

limited by the budget review process set by state law. The Florida

Constitution says that the Board’s “powers of local self-government” may

not be “inconsistent with general law.”1 Art. VIII, § 1(g), Fla. Const. Our

1As the Supreme Court has explained,

[a] general law operates universally throughout the state, or

uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or

uniformly within permissible classifications by population of

reading of applicable state statutes compels the conclusion that the

property appraiser’s view of her budgetary process is correct, so we affirm

the order granting a writ of mandamus.2

Factual Background

By way of background, section 195.087, Florida Statutes (2013),

requires the Florida Department of Revenue (“the FDOR”) to determine the

budget for each county’s property appraiser. Under this statute, on or

before June 1 of each year, property appraisers must submit to the FDOR

“a budget for the operation of the property appraiser’s office for the ensuing

fiscal year beginning October 1,” and furnish a copy of such budget to the

subject county’s commissioners. § 195.087(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013).

Following submission, the FDOR has until July 15 to notify the property

appraiser and the board of county commissioners of its tentative budget

amendments and changes. Id. Thereafter, “the property appraiser and

the board of county commissioners may submit additional information or

testimony to the [FDOR] respecting the budget” until—at the latest—

August 15, at which point the FDOR “shall make its final budget

amendments or changes to the budget and shall provide notice thereof to

the property appraiser and board of county commissioners.” Id.

Should the property appraiser or board of county commissioners take

exception with the FDOR’s final budget determination, either is entitled to

appeal the matter to the Administration Commission—comprised of the

Governor and Cabinet—no later than fifteen days after the county

concludes its section 200.065(2)(d),3 Florida Statutes (2013), public

counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function or

instrumentality.

Fla. Dep’t. of Business & Prof’l Regulation v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 967

So. 2d 802, 807 (Fla. 2007) (quoting State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So. 237,

240 (Fla. 1934)).

2At oral argument, the County suggested that the question presented in this case

was moot. Without deciding the issue of mootness, we consider the case on its

merits because it presents a controversy “capable of repetition, yet evading

review.” N.W. v. State, 767 So .2d 446, 447 n.2 (Fla. 2000); see also B.G. v. State,

137 So. 3d 548, 548 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

3Section 200.065(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2013), states in full:

Within 15 days after the meeting adopting the tentative budget, the

taxing authority shall advertise in a newspaper of general

circulation in the county as provided in subsection (3), its intent to

finally adopt a millage rate and budget. A public hearing to finalize

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hearing to finalize the county’s budget and set its millage rate.

§ 195.087(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013).

Unlike a plenary appeal to this court,4 an appeal to the Administration

Commission is not a matter of right, as the statute dictates merely that

the Commission “may hear appeals” from the FDOR’s final action. Id. If

the Administration Commission considers the matter and finds “any

aspect of the budget [to be] unreasonable in light of the workload of the

office of the property appraiser in the county under review,” it may amend

the judgment as necessary. Id. Upon completion of this process, the

resulting budget request “as approved by the department and as amended

by the commission . . . become[s] the operating budget of the property

appraiser for the ensuing fiscal year beginning October 1, except that the

the budget and adopt a millage rate shall be held not less than 2

days nor more than 5 days after the day that the advertisement is

first published. During the hearing, the governing body of the

taxing authority shall amend the adopted tentative budget as it sees

fit, adopt a final budget, and adopt a resolution or ordinance stating

the millage rate to be levied. The resolution or ordinance shall state

the percent, if any, by which the millage rate to be levied exceeds

the rolled-back rate computed pursuant to subsection (1), which

shall be characterized as the percentage increase in property taxes

adopted by the governing body. The adoption of the budget and the

millage-levy resolution or ordinance shall be by separate votes. For

each taxing authority levying millage, the name of the taxing

authority, the rolled-back rate, the percentage increase, and the

millage rate to be levied shall be publicly announced prior to the

adoption of the millage-levy resolution or ordinance. In no event

may the millage rate adopted pursuant to this paragraph exceed the

millage rate tentatively adopted pursuant to paragraph (c). If the

rate tentatively adopted pursuant to paragraph (c) exceeds the

proposed rate provided to the property appraiser pursuant to

paragraph (b), or as subsequently adjusted pursuant to subsection

(11), each taxpayer within the jurisdiction of the taxing authority

shall be sent notice by first-class mail of his or her taxes under the

tentatively adopted millage rate and his or her taxes under the

previously proposed rate. The notice must be prepared by the

property appraiser, at the expense of the taxing authority, and must

generally conform to the requirements of s. 200.069. If such

additional notice is necessary, its mailing must precede the hearing

held pursuant to this paragraph by not less than 10 days and not

more than 15 days.

4See art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.

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budget so approved may subsequently be amended under the same

procedure.” Id.

In this case, the Board informed its constitutional officers—including

its property appraiser, Lori Parrish—that the county was expecting a 1.8%

appropriation increase, leaving the property appraiser with a target budget

of $14,600,200. On June 5, 2013, the Board revised its appropriation

figure to 3.8%, increasing the property appraiser’s projected budget to

$14,886,000.

Notwithstanding the Board’s position on her budget, on May 31, 2013,

the property appraiser submitted to the FDOR her office’s proposed 2014

fiscal year budget, requesting $18,819,000. Consistent with section

195.087(1), the FDOR reviewed the budget request, made certain

amendments and changes, and on July 11, 2013, notified both the

property appraiser and the Board that it reached a tentative budget for the

office of $18,712,207. Displeased with the determination, the Board

responded by submitting additional information to the FDOR, including

the aforementioned projected budget and its explanation for the

calculation. Nevertheless, when the statutory deadline of August 15

arrived, the FDOR informed both sides no further changes would be

forthcoming, leaving the county responsible for $16,563,527 of the bill.

Unwilling to bind itself by the FDOR’s decision, the Board convened

during a September 24, 2013 public hearing to discuss adopting a 2014

fiscal budget that appropriated less funds to the property appraiser than

the amount approved by the FDOR. During the hearing, Commissioner

Martin David Kiar moved to approve the property appraiser’s budget as set

by the FDOR, arguing that under section 195.087(1)’s statutory scheme,

a property appraiser “is entitled and should receive the Department of

Revenue approved budget.” In a sentiment joined by several

commissioners and the mayor, Commissioner Kiar explained:

[W]e owe the Property Appraiser the money that the

Department of Revenue approved. We technically owe that

money to her. That’s money that we’re supposed to

appropriate to.

If we’re upset with that, we can appeal to the Cabinet but we

have to appropriate that money. That is technically her

money. It’s been approved by the Department of Revenue. It’s

been set up by that.

Despite these concerns, the Board’s majority approved a final 2014

fiscal year budget appropriating only $15,855,000 for the property

appraiser, a significant drop from the FDOR’s approved amount. In

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conjunction with this decision, the Board chose to appeal the FDOR’s final

budgetary decision to the Administration Commission. Since

supplemental authority was never submitted, and the 2014 fiscal year has

come to a close, it appears no decision from the Administration

Commission’s will issue.

Procedural Posture

Believing the Board’s action to be unauthorized, the property appraiser

filed a request with Broward County for a quarterly draw of $4,140,881.75,

conforming to the FDOR’s budgetary determination. After the county

countered with an offer of $3,963,750.00, the property appraiser filed a

petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court against the Board,

requesting that the Board be compelled “to fully fund the [FDOR] approved

Fiscal Year-2014 operation budget, as required per Florida Statutes, §§

192.091 and 195.087.” Aside from the irreparable harm caused by her

inability to carry out her statutory duty, the property appraiser argued

that “[b]ecause the county commission’s duty to adhere to the [FDOR’s]

final budget is wholly ministerial, its refusal to fully fund the [p]roperty

[a]ppraiser [wa]s the . . . type of agency inaction that mandamus is

designed to redress.”

After the trial court entered an alternative writ of mandamus,5 the

Board responded by characterizing the petition as an “improper attempt

to circumvent the exclusive appellate procedures established by the

Florida Legislature” in section 195.087(1)(b), involving an appeal to the

Administration Commission. In addition, the Board asserted the petition

failed to satisfy the elements justifying a writ of mandamus.

Following a non-evidentiary hearing, in December 2013, the trial court

entered a final order granting the property appraiser’s mandamus petition,

compelling the Board to “immediately fund [the property appraiser’s]

budget in accordance” with the FDOR’s final budget determination. In so

ruling, the trial court noted that while section 195.087(1)(b) provides either

the property appraiser or board of county commissioners the ability to

appeal the FDOR’s final budget determination to the Administration

5“If a petition for writ of mandamus shows a prima facie case for relief, the [trial]

court shall issue an alternative writ in mandamus to which the defendant in the

mandamus proceeding shall respond as provided in Florida Rule of Civil

Procedure 1.140.” Brown v. State, 93 So. 3d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)

(citing Parish v. State, 59 So. 3d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Fla. R. Civ. P.

1.630(d)(3)).

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Commission, the budget approved by the FDOR is “final” such that the

property appraiser maintained “an immediate right to be funded so as to

discharge [her] constitutional duties.” The trial court cautioned, however,

that its order was “not intended to usurp the budgetary authority of [the

Board, the FDOR,] or the Administration Commission”; rather, its purpose

was to direct the Board to “comply and discharge their ministerial act of

funding the budget for [the property appraiser] as approved or

subsequently amended by the” FDOR.

The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Granting a Writ of

Mandamus Requiring the Board to Fund the Property Appraiser in Accord

with the FDOR’s Approved Budget, Even Though the Board Sought Review

with the Governor and Cabinet

The question before us concerns whether the FDOR’s final

determination of the property appraiser’s budget entitled her to recover

from the Board a quarterly draw in that amount at the start of the fiscal

year, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal with the Administration

Commission. Close analysis of the applicable statutory framework

supports the property appraiser’s position.

While the granting of a writ of mandamus petition is typically reviewed

for an abuse of discretion, see Ilkhani v. Lamberti, 50 So. 3d 1180, 1181

(Fla. 4th DCA 2010), “to the extent our decision turns on statutory

interpretation, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Harvard ex rel. J.H.

v. Village of Palm Springs, 98 So. 3d 645, 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing

Anthony v. Gary J. Rotella & Assocs., P.A., 906 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th DCA

2005)).

As its primary issue on appeal, the Board asserts the property appraiser

lacks a clear legal right sufficient to warrant mandamus relief since neither

section 195.087’s “statutory scheme nor case law expressly addresses a

duty to provide interim funding” in the amount approved by the FDOR,

where an appeal is pending with the Administration Commission. The

property appraiser counters that, in accordance with section 192.091,

Florida Statutes (2013), “unless and until the Governor and Cabinet,

sitting as the Administration Commission, amend the [FDOR’s budgetary

determination,] the budget stands as approved and must be proportionally

funded by the” Board.

“Mandamus is a common law remedy used to enforce an established

legal right by compelling a person in an official capacity to perform an

indisputable ministerial duty required by law.” Poole v. City of Port Orange,

33 So. 3d 739, 741 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing Puckett v. Gentry, 577 So.

2d 965, 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)). “‘To be entitled to mandamus relief, the

petitioner must have a clear legal right to the requested relief, the

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respondent must have an indisputable legal duty to perform the requested

action, and the petitioner must have no other adequate remedy available.’”

Barnett v. Antonacci, 122 So. 3d 400, 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting

Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 941, 945 (Fla. 2009)). Mandamus, therefore,

cannot be used “‘to compel a public agency to exercise its discretionary

powers in a given manner,’” Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. Burton,

802 So. 2d 467, 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (quoting Williams v. James, 684

So. 2d 868, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)), or in “cases of doubtful right.” State

ex rel. Haft v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 843, 844 (Fla. 1970) (quoting State ex rel.

Perkins v. Lee, 194 So. 315, 317 (Fla. 1940)).

Central to mandamus relief is the ministerial character of the compelled

action—a situation arising where there “is no room for the exercise of [the

respondent’s] discretion, and the performance being required is directed

by law.’” Wright v. Frankel, 965 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)

(quoting Shulmister v. City of Pompano Beach, 798 So. 2d 799, 802 (Fla.

4th DCA 2001)). In the agency context, “official action is considered

ministerial when it is arrived at as the result of the performance of a

specific duty arising from legislatively designated facts.” Solomon v.

Sanitarians’ Registration Bd., 155 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 1963). “It is the

nature of the particular thing to be done that determines whether its

character is ministerial for mandamus purposes.” W. Flagler Assocs., Ltd.

v. Bd. of Bus. Regulation, 241 So. 2d 369, 378 (Fla. 1970).

To place this issue in its proper context, it is essential to grasp the

FDOR’s role in establishing a county property appraiser’s budget, as

established by the Legislature. Thus, we begin our analysis by discussing

why the Legislature, through section 195.087(1)6, interjected the FDOR—

6S ection 195.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), provides in full as follows:

On or before June 1 of each year, every property appraiser,

regardless of the form of county government, shall submit to the

Department of Revenue a budget for the operation of the property

appraiser’s office for the ensuing fiscal year beginning October 1.

The property appraiser shall submit his or her budget in the

manner and form required by the department. A copy of such

budget shall be furnished at the same time to the board of county

commissioners. The department shall, upon proper notice to the

county commission and property appraiser, review the budget

request and may amend or change the budget request as it deems

necessary, in order that the budget be neither inadequate nor

excessive. On or before July 15, the department shall notify the

property appraiser and the board of county commissioners of its

tentative budget amendments and changes. Prior to August 15, the

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a state agency—into a dispute between a county property appraiser and a

board of county commissioners.

In enacting Chapter 195, the Legislature’s stated purpose was “to

recognize and fulfull the state’s responsibility to secure a just valuation for

ad valorem tax purposes of all property and to provide for a uniform

assessment as between property within each county and property in every

other county or taxing district.” § 195.0012, Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis

added). In effectuating this goal, the Legislature charged the FDOR “with

implementing [this] intention” by, among other things,7 “supervising

Florida property appraisers and other local taxation officials and ensuring

that they comply with the laws which govern the assessment, collection

and administration of ad valorem taxes.” Dep’t of Revenue v. Ford, 438 So.

2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1983) (citation omitted). As our supreme court cautioned

in Burns v. Butscher, 187 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1966), absent this stable

statewide presence, the “[e]xercise of unbridled discretion by 67 Tax

Assessors without their being anchored to any master plan would result

in . . . imbalance.”

The FDOR’s role in setting the budget for each county’s property

appraiser serves the goal of a “uniform assessment as between property

within each county.” § 195.0012, Fla. Stat. (2013). Prior to 1973, section

195.011, Florida Statutes, broadly tasked the FDOR8 with reviewing

budgets submitted by assessors and tax collectors to determine whether

the requested amount was sufficient “to carry on [the assessor or tax

collector’s] work”; if the budget was inadequate or excessive, the FDOR

was required to return the budget to the assessor or tax collector, together

with its ruling, to allow the entity to make the required budgetary revisions

prior to resubmission.9 § 195.011, Fla. Stat. (1971).

property appraiser and the board of county commissioners may

submit additional information or testimony to the department

respecting the budget. On or before August 15, the department

shall make its final budget amendments or changes to the budget

and shall provide notice thereof to the property appraiser and board

of county commissioners.

7See In re Polygraphex Sys., Inc., 275 B.R. 408, 415-16 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002)

(detailing the FDOR’s relationship with property appraisers).

8In the statute’s initial 1941 iteration, this responsibility fell upon the state’s

elected comptroller. See Ch. 41-20722, Laws of Fla.

9Section195.087(2), Florida Statutes (2013), still applies substantially the same

budget review system for tax collectors.

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In 1973, the Legislature “substantially reworded” this budget review

scheme by enacting section 195.087, which provided the FDOR with

appreciably more guidance and safeguards, particularly as applied to

property appraisers. See Ch. 73-172, Laws of Fla. The Attorney General

in 1973 explained that this change derived in part from the Legislature’s

desire to preserve uniformity within the property appraisal process:

The integrality of, and the procedural safeguards incorporated

in, the foregoing budget review system give rise to the

inference that the legislature . . . intended to establish a

comprehensive uniform expression of state policy regarding

the review of county assessors’ budgets to secure their

functional sufficiency to achieve uniform state-wide

assessment practice.

Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 73-389 (1973); see also In re Polygraphex Sys., Inc., 275

B.R. 408, 414 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (stating that the “main thrust” of

Chapter 195 “is to ensure uniformity in the collection and assessment of

property taxes”).

Viewing section 195.087 through this lens, with the insertion of the

FDOR as the arbitrator between property appraisers and county

commissioners in the budgetary process, the Legislature sought to shield

property appraisers from local political pressure to avoid compromising

the goal of statewide valuation uniformity.

In the budgetary process, the property appraiser is the yin to the board

of county commissioners’ yang. Each year the board of county

commissioners is required to prepare, summarize, and approve a balanced

county budget, meaning “the total of the estimated receipts available from

taxation and other sources” must “equal[ ] the total of appropriations for

expenditures and reserves.” § 129.01(2)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). Ad

valorem taxes—which comprise the majority of the county’s recoverable

taxes—derive from combining the property appraiser’s valuation of the

county’s property with the county commissioners’ approved millage rate—

the rate at which the county’s real property is taxed. See §§ 129.03(1),

200.001, 200.065, Fla. Stat. (2013). Given this relationship, the property

appraiser’s valuation heavily impacts a county’s ability to expand its

budget—if a county’s aggregate real property decreases in value, its

operating budget also decreases absent a millage rate increase.

Since raising taxes is politically unpopular, county commissioners have

a powerful incentive to pressure their property appraiser to arrive at higher

property valuations. If a county’s real property valuation increases, it is

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market forces and the property appraiser, not the county commissioners,

who shoulder the tax hike blame. For this reason, the property appraiser’s

budget is established by an unelected, independent entity—the FDOR—

instead of county commissioners. Free from political pressures, the FDOR

may hone in on the adequacy of the property appraiser’s proposed budget,

without the distraction of the next election.

These considerations underscore why condoning the Board’s course of

action in this case would not only be contrary to the Legislature’s intent

but problematic in practice. Under section 195.087’s budget review

system, the board of county commissioners assumes the role of advocate

rather than decision-maker. As articulated by the Attorney General in

1997 when discussing section 197.087(2), which applies to an analogous

review for tax collectors, while section 195.087 “requires that a copy of the

budget be furnished to the board of county commissioners, it does not

provide for, or otherwise require, approval by the county commission.” Op.

Att’y Gen. Fla. 97-02 (1997) (emphasis added). Rather, “it is the [FDOR]

that is charged under the statute with determining whether the budget is

adequate.” Id.

Consistent with the Attorney General’s viewpoint, section 192.091(1)(a),

Florida Statutes (2013), provides that “[t]he budget of the property

appraiser’s office, as approved by the Department of Revenue, shall be

the basis upon which the several tax authorities of each county, except

municipalities and the district school board, shall be billed by the

property appraiser for services rendered.” (Emphasis added). The

statute further directs that payments to the property appraiser “shall be

made quarterly by each such taxing authority.” § 192.091(1)(b), Fla.

Stat. (2013). (Emphasis added). These provisions, when read in pari

materia with section 195.087, express the legislative desire that the

FDOR’s final budgetary decision serve as the property appraiser’s

definitive budget for billing purposes. By placing the cards in the FDOR’s

hands, the Legislature precluded a board of county commissioners from

strong-arming a property appraiser during budgetary disputes by

withholding funds pending a discretionary appeal. Rather, as section

192.091(1)(a) dictates, the FDOR’s budgetary determination must be

honored until a budget amendment or a decision by the Administration

Commission replaces it.

This notion is strengthened by the discretionary nature of the

Administration Commission’s appellate review. Pursuant to section

195.087(1)(b),10 the Administration Commission is neither compelled to

Section 195.087(1)(b) provides in full:

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hear budgetary appeals from the property appraiser or the board of county

commissioners, nor required to provide a timetable for making its decision.

Rather, the statute provides that the Administration Commission “may

hear appeals,” suggesting that the decision to hear an appeal is a purely

discretionary one, leaving open the possibility—as occurred in this case—

that the commission may never rule upon the appeal at all.

Given this indeterminate structure, had the Legislature intended the

FDOR’s final budgetary determination to receive an automatic stay

pending appeal to the Administration Commission, it would have provided

such remedy, as it has done in similar situations, or at the very least set

a timeline for the Administration Commission’s action. See, e.g., §

380.07(4), Fla. Stat. (2013) (stating, within the context of appeals to the

Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, that “[t]he filing of [a]

petition stays the effectiveness of the order until after the completion of

the appeal process”). By failing to do so, and crafting an appellate process

predicated on discretion, it is clear—and logical given the disruption such

a stay would bring—that the absence of a stay within the statute was a

significant omission, nullifying the Board’s argument that it may impose a

de facto stay by withholding funds from the property appraiser.

The Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Administration

Commission, may hear appeals from the final action of the

department upon a written request being filed by the property

appraiser or the presiding officer of the county commission no later

than 15 days after the conclusion of the hearing held pursuant to

s. 200.065(2)(d). The Administration Commission may amend the

budget if it finds that any aspect of the budget is unreasonable in

light of the workload of the office of the property appraiser in the

county under review. The budget request as approved by the

department and as amended by the commission shall become the

operating budget of the property appraiser for the ensuing fiscal

year beginning October 1, except that the budget so approved may

subsequently be amended under the same procedure. After final

approval, the property appraiser shall make no transfer of funds

between accounts without the written approval of the department.

However, all moneys received by property appraisers in complying

with chapter 119 shall be accounted for in the same manner as

provided for in s. 218.36, for moneys received as county fees and

commissions, and any such moneys may be used and expended in

the same manner and to the same extent as funds budgeted for the

office and no budget amendment shall be required.

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To combat this conclusion, the Board contends section 195.087(1)(b)’s

linking of the deadline to file an appeal with the Administration

Commission to fifteen days after the conclusion of a section 200.065(2)(d)

hearing evidences the Legislature’s intent that county commissioners be

permitted to set an interim budget pending appeal. The section

200.065(2)(d) hearing is the culmination of the budget creation process,

during which the county commissioners conduct a public hearing before

finalizing the county’s budget and millage rate for the fiscal year. While it

is true that section 200.065(2)(d) allows the board of county

commissioners to “amend [its] adopted tentative budget as it sees fit” and

“adopt a final budget” at this hearing, such a broad, general conferment of

power does not contravene section 192.091’s specific mandate requiring

the board to honor the FDOR’s decision—otherwise, the FDOR’s decision

would be superfluous.

Furthermore, the Legislature’s tying of the appellate deadline to the

conclusion of the section 200.065(2)(d) hearing does little to support the

Board’s position. It makes sense that appeals be filed after the county’s

budget is finalized so the Administration Commission can fully appreciate,

within the context of the county’s total budget, the impact of a potentially

excessive or inadequate property appraiser budget.

We have considered the other arguments raised by the Board and find

them to be unpreserved or without merit.

Affirmed.

DAMOORGIAN, C.J., and MAY, J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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