Opinion

Ddr Holdings, LLC v. hotels.com, L.P.

  • 773 F.3d 1245
  • 113 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1097
  • 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22902
  • 2014 WL 6845152
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Dec 5, 2014
Status
Published
On the bench
Wallach, Mayer, Chen
Cited by
341 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.7%

finding eligible under Section 101 a patent claiming a method for retaining visitors on a website through the creation of a digital “store within a store,” both because “the claims recite an invention that is not merely the routine or conventional use of the Internet,” and also because the claims “do not attempt to preempt every application of the idea of increasing sales by making two web pages look the same,” but rather claim an “inventive concept for resolving [a] particular internet-centric problem”

How later courts described this case

  • finding eligible under Section 101 a patent claiming a method for retaining visitors on a website through the creation of a digital “store within a store,” both because “the claims recite an invention that is not merely the routine or conventional use of the Internet,” and also because the claims “do not attempt to preempt every application of the idea of increasing sales by making two web pages look the same,” but rather claim an “inventive concept for resolving [a] particular internet-centric problem”
  • finding the asserted claims patent-eligible in part because they “specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result—a result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink,” and in part because the “claimed solution amounts to an inventive concept for resolving [a] particular Internet-centric problem”
  • holding that claims that “do not merely recite the performance of some business practice known from the pre-Internet world along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet” and instead were “rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks” were not directed to an abstract idea
  • finding that the use of computer components in a claim transformed such claim because “[ijnstead of the computer network operating in its normal, expected manner by sending the website visitor to the third-party website ... the claimed system generates and directs the visitor to the above-described hybrid web page.... ”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Crypto Research, LLC v. Assay Abloy, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 671 (2017)

    Id. Thus, the subject matter of the patent was distinguishable from those held patent ineligible in Ultramercial and buySAFE, among others.
    District Court, E.D. New YorkFeb 17, 2017Read it

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

HOTELS.COM, L.P., CENDANT TRAVEL

DISTRIBUTION SERVICES GROUP, INC.,

EXPEDIA, INC., TRAVELOCITY.COM, L.P.,

SITE59.COM, LLC, INTERNATIONAL CRUISE &

EXCURSION GALLERY, INC.,

OURVACATIONSTORE, INC., INTERNETWORK

PUBLISHING CORPORATION, AND ORBITZ

WORLDWIDE, LLC,

Defendants,

AND

NATIONAL LEISURE GROUP, INC. AND

WORLD TRAVEL HOLDINGS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants,

AND

DIGITAL RIVER, INC.,

Defendant.

______________________

2013-1505

______________________

2 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Texas in No. 06-CV-0042, Judge J.

Rodney Gilstrap.

______________________

Decided: December 5, 2014

______________________

LOUIS J. HOFFMAN, Hoffman Patent Firm, of Scotts-

dale, Arizona, argued for plaintiff-appellee. On the brief

was IAN B. CROSBY, Susman Godfrey LLP, of Seattle,

Washington.

NORMAN H. ZIVIN, Cooper & Dunham LLP, of New

York, New York, argued for defendants-appellants, Na-

tional Leisure Group, Inc., et al. With him on the brief

was TONIA A. SAYOUR.

______________________

Before WALLACH, MAYER, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge CHEN.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge MAYER.

CHEN, Circuit Judge.

Defendants-Appellants National Leisure Group, Inc.

and World Travel Holdings, Inc. (collectively, NLG) ap-

peal from a final judgment of the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Texas entered in favor of

Plaintiff-Appellee DDR Holdings, LLC (DDR). Following

trial, a jury found that NLG infringes the asserted claims

of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,993,572 (the ’572 patent) and

7,818,399 (the ’399 patent). The jury also found the

asserted claims of the ’572 and ’399 patents are not inva-

lid. The district court denied NLG’s renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on, inter alia, nonin-

fringement and invalidity of the asserted patents. The

district court subsequently entered a final judgment

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 3

consistent with the jury’s findings on infringement, validi-

ty, and damages, and awarded DDR pre- and post-

judgment interest and costs. We affirm the district

court’s denial of NLG’s motions for JMOL of noninfringe-

ment and invalidity of the ’399 patent. Because we con-

clude that the ’572 patent is anticipated as a matter of

law, we reverse the district court’s denial of JMOL on the

validity of the ’572 patent, and remand to the district

court for further proceedings consistent with our decision.

I. BACKGROUND

DDR is the assignee of the ’572 and ’399 patents. The

’572 and ’399 patents are both continuations of U.S.

Patent No. 6,629,135 (the ’135 patent), which has a priori-

ty date of September 17, 1998. Each of these patents is

directed to systems and methods of generating a compo-

site web page that combines certain visual elements of a

“host” website with content of a third-party merchant.

For example, the generated composite web page may

combine the logo, background color, and fonts of the host

website with product information from the merchant.

’135 patent, 12:46–50.

The common specification of the patents-in-suit ex-

plains that prior art systems allowed third-party mer-

chants to “lure the [host website’s] visitor traffic away”

from the host website because visitors would be taken to

the third-party merchant’s website when they clicked on

the merchant’s advertisement on the host site. Id. at

2:26–30. The patents-in-suit disclose a system that

provides a solution to this problem (for the host) by creat-

ing a new web page that permits a website visitor, in a

sense, to be in two places at the same time. On activation

of a hyperlink on a host website—such as an advertise-

ment for a third-party merchant—instead of taking the

visitor to the merchant’s website, the system generates

and directs the visitor to a composite web page that

displays product information from the third-party mer-

4 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

chant, but retains the host website’s “look and feel.” Id.

at 3:9–21. Thus, the host website can display a third-

party merchant’s products, but retain its visitor traffic by

displaying this product information from within a gener-

ated web page that “gives the viewer of the page the

impression that she is viewing pages served by the host”

website. Id. at 2:56–63, 3:20–22.

Representative claim 13 of the ’572 patent recites:

13. An e-commerce outsourcing system compris-

ing:

a) a data store including a look and feel descrip-

tion associated with a host web page having a

link correlated with a commerce object; and

b) a computer processor coupled to the data store

and in communication through the Internet

with the host web page and programmed, upon

receiving an indication that the link has been

activated by a visitor computer in Internet

communication with the host web page, to serve

a composite web page to the visitor computer

wit[h] a look and feel based on the look and feel

description in the data store and with content

based on the commerce object associated wit[h]

the link.

System claim 13 requires that the recited system pro-

vide the host website with a “link” that “correlate[s]” the

host website with a “commerce object.” The “commerce

object” is the product or product catalog of the merchant.

’135 patent, 3:7–13. After recognizing that a website

visitor has activated the link, the system retrieves data

from a “data store” that describes the “look and feel” of

the host web page, which can include visual elements

such as logos, colors, fonts, and page frames. Id. at 12:46–

50. The claimed system then constructs a composite web

page comprising a “look and feel” based on the look and

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 5

feel description in the data store along with content based

on product information from the associated merchant’s

product catalog.

The ’399 patent is directed to a similar system with a

greater emphasis on a “scalable [computer] architecture”

to serve “dynamically constructed [web] pages” associated

with multiple host website and merchant pairs. ’135

patent, 3:32–36. Representative claim 19 of the ’399

patent recites:

19. A system useful in an outsource provider serv-

ing web pages offering commercial opportuni-

ties, the system comprising:

(a) a computer store containing data, for each of a

plurality of first web pages, defining a plurality

of visually perceptible elements, which visually

perceptible elements correspond to the plurality

of first web pages;

(i) wherein each of the first web pages belongs

to one of a plurality of web page owners;

(ii) wherein each of the first web pages displays

at least one active link associated with a

commerce object associated with a buying

opportunity of a selected one of a plurality of

merchants; and

(iii) wherein the selected merchant, the out-

source provider, and the owner of the first

web page displaying the associated link are

each third parties with respect to one other;

(b) a computer server at the outsource provider,

which computer server is coupled to the com-

puter store and programmed to:

(i) receive from the web browser of a computer

user a signal indicating activation of one of

6 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

the links displayed by one of the first web

pages;

(ii) automatically identify as the source page

the one of the first web pages on which the

link has been activated;

(iii) in response to identification of the source

page, automatically retrieve the stored data

corresponding to the source page; and

(iv) using the data retrieved, automatically

generate and transmit to the web browser a

second web page that displays: (A) infor-

mation associated with the commerce object

associated with the link that has been acti-

vated, and (B) the plurality of visually per-

ceptible elements visually corresponding to

the source page.

Similar to claim 13 of the ’572 patent, system claim 19

of the ’399 patent requires that a “data store” hold “visu-

ally perceptible elements” (or “‘look and feel’ elements”)

that “visually . . . correspond” to a host web page. The

host web page must include a link associated with a

“buying opportunity” with a merchant. Once a visitor

activates this link, the claimed system generates and

transmits to the website visitor’s web browser a composite

web page that includes product information of the mer-

chant and the “look and feel” of the host website (i.e., “the

plurality of visually perceptible elements visually corre-

sponding to the [host web] page”).

Claim 19 further requires that the data store must

store “look and feel” descriptions for multiple hosts and

that each link must be associated with a particular mer-

chant’s product catalog. Claim 19 also requires that the

merchant, system operator, and host website be “third

parties with respect to one another.” When a website

visitor activates a link associated with a merchant’s

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 7

product catalog, the claimed system identifies the host

web page and then transmits a composite web page using

the proper “look and feel” elements of the host website in

the data store and the product information from the

associated merchant.

The ’572 patent issued on January 31, 2006. On the

same day, DDR filed suit against NLG, Digital River, Inc.

(Digital River), and nine other defendants, asserting

infringement of various claims of the ’135 and ’572 pa-

tents. NLG is a travel agency that sells cruises in part-

nership with travel-oriented websites and major cruise

lines through the Internet. DDR’s suit accused NLG of

infringing the ’135 and ’572 patents by providing a system

for cruise-oriented (host) websites that allows visitors to

book cruises on major cruise lines (merchants). Joint

Appendix (J.A.) 261. In particular, when a visitor on one

of these cruise-oriented (host) websites clicks on an adver-

tisement for a cruise, NLG’s system generates and directs

the visitor to a composite web page that incorporates “look

and feel” elements from the host website and product

information from the cruise line (merchant).

DDR’s suit was stayed during the pendency of an ex

parte reexamination of the ’135 and ’572 patents request-

ed by DDR that was based on prior art identified by the

defendants. Shortly after the U.S. Patent and Trademark

Office confirmed the validity of the ’135 and ’572 patents

and the stay was lifted, the ’399 patent issued on October

19, 2010. DDR subsequently amended its complaint to

assert infringement of this patent by several of the de-

fendants, including NLG.

During Markman proceedings, the parties stipulated

to a construction of several terms, including “look and

feel,” which appears in each of the asserted claims of the

’572 patent, and “visually perceptible elements,” which

appears in each of the asserted claims of the ’399 patent.

J.A. 542. For “look and feel,” the parties agreed to a

8 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

construction of: “A set of elements related to visual ap-

pearance and user interface conveying an overall appear-

ance identifying a website; such elements include logos,

colors, page layout, navigation systems, frames, ‘mouse-

over’ effects, or others elements consistent through some

or all of the website.” Id. For “visually perceptible ele-

ments,” the parties agreed to a construction of: “look and

feel elements that can be seen.” Id. The defendants,

however, expressly reserved their rights to argue that

both the “look and feel” and “visually perceptible ele-

ments” terms are indefinite, but offered the stipulated

constructions “in the alternative.” Id.

Between June 2012 and January 2013, DDR settled

with all defendants except for NLG and Digital River.

The case eventually proceeded to a jury trial in October

2012. At trial, DDR accused NLG and Digital River of

direct and willful infringement of claims 13, 17, and 20 of

the ’572 patent, and accused NLG—but not Digital Riv-

er—of direct and willful infringement of claims 1, 3, and

19 of the ’399 patent. DDR also accused NLG and Digital

River of inducing infringement of claim 17 of the ’572

patent.

The jury found that NLG and Digital River directly

infringed the asserted claims of the ’572 patent and that

NLG directly infringed the asserted claims of the ’399

patent, but that NLG and Digital River’s infringement

was not willful. The jury found that NLG and Digital

River did not induce infringement of claim 17 of the ’572

patent. The jury also found that the asserted claims were

not invalid. The jury determined DDR was entitled to

$750,000 in damages from both NLG and Digital River for

infringing DDR’s patents.

At the conclusion of trial, NLG and Digital River re-

newed motions for JMOL pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) on several

grounds. NLG contended the asserted claims of the ’572

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 9

and ’399 patents are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 be-

cause the claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject

matter and invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 1 because the

terms “look and feel” and “visually perceptible elements”

are indefinite. NLG also contended that neither the jury’s

finding of infringement nor its award of damages was

supported by substantial evidence. NLG also alleged the

district court made several unfair and prejudicial eviden-

tiary rulings.

Digital River contended that the asserted claims of

the ’572 patent are invalid as either anticipated under 35

U.S.C. § 102, obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, or indefinite

under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2. Digital River also contended

that the jury’s finding of infringement was not supported

by substantial evidence. Digital River moved for a new

trial pursuant to FRCP 59.

The district court denied NLG and Digital River’s mo-

tions for JMOL and Digital River’s FRCP 59 motion for a

new trial. Over the defendants’ objections, the district

court awarded DDR an additional $284,404 in prejudg-

ment interest pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284. The district

court entered a final judgment in favor of DDR, and NLG

and Digital River timely appealed. NLG and Digital

River’s appeals were consolidated and fully briefed. Prior

to oral argument, DDR and Digital River settled, and we

granted Digital River’s motion to terminate its appeal.

D.I. 65, 68. NLG’s appeal continued. We have jurisdic-

tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

1 Paragraph 2 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was replaced with

newly designated § 112(b) when § 4(c) of the America

Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, took effect on

September 16, 2012. Because the applications resulting

in the patents at issue in this case were filed before that

date, we will refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112.

10 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

II. DISCUSSION

Since the denial of a motion for JMOL is not patent

law-specific, regional circuit law applies. The Fifth Cir-

cuit reviews the denial of a JMOL motion de novo. See,

e.g., Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1248

(Fed. Cir. 2005). In the Fifth Circuit, JMOL is appropri-

ate if “the facts and inferences point so strongly and

overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court con-

cludes that reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contra-

ry verdict.” Id. The Court “must presume that the jury

resolved all factual disputes in the [prevailing party’s]

favor.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v.

Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir.

2012) (applying Fifth Circuit law to the review of a dis-

trict court’s grant of JMOL).

A. Anticipation

We turn first to the district court’s denial of Digital

River’s motion for JMOL of invalidity of the ’572 patent

based on 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). A patent claim is anticipated

if a single prior art reference expressly or inherently

discloses every limitation of the claim. See, e.g., Orion IP,

LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 605 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir.

2010). Anticipation challenges under § 102 must focus

only on the limitations actually recited in the claims. See

Constant v. Adv. Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560,

1570–71 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding “limitations [] not found

anywhere in the claims” to be irrelevant to an anticipa-

tion challenge). Whether a reference discloses a limita-

tion is a question of fact, and a jury’s findings on

questions of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence.

See, e.g., Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d

1009, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Invalidity by anticipation

must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i L.P., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).

On appeal, the parties only dispute whether Digital

River’s prior art Secure Sales System (SSS) satisfies the

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 11

“look and feel” limitation; DDR does not dispute that the

SSS satisfies every other limitation of the ’572 patent’s

asserted claims. NLG, which adopted Digital River’s

anticipation challenge to the ’572 patent, 2 argues that no

evidence supports the jury’s finding that the SSS does not

disclose the “look and feel” limitation, since it showed the

jury multiple examples of composite web pages generated

by the SSS with a “look and feel” based on a set of “look

and feel” elements from the corresponding host website.

DDR contends that, as the district court determined,

“it is up to the trier of fact to determine whether the

combination of elements making up the overall appear-

2 Even though Digital River terminated its appeal

prior to oral argument, it did not do so until after the

parties had fully completed their briefing. In its own

briefs, although only in footnotes, NLG incorporated by

reference Digital River’s arguments on anticipation.

Appellant’s Br. 43 n.23; Appellant’s Reply Br. 9 n.5. In a

consolidated case such as here, Rule 28(i) of the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) permits “any party

[to] adopt by reference a part of another’s brief.” See, e.g.,

Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm. Inc., 696 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3

(Fed. Cir. 2012); Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v.

Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1294 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Compare Microsoft Corp. v. DataTern, Inc., 755 F.3d 899,

910 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (co-parties in non-consolidated ap-

peals cannot use incorporation pursuant to FRAP 28(i) to

exceed word count limits prescribed by FRAP 32(a)(7)).

DDR implicitly concedes that NLG has adequately adopt-

ed Digital River’s anticipation defense as to the ’572

patent, acknowledging that “[NLG] did not adopt Digital

River’s anticipation defense or seek to extend it to prove

anticipation of the ’399 patent, which has claims contain-

ing extra elements not found in the asserted claims of the

’572 patent.” Appellee’s Br. 44 n.10 (emphasis added).

12 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

ance of a website has a similar ‘look and feel’ as compared

to another website.” DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com,

L.P., 954 F. Supp. 2d 509, 517 (E.D. Tex. 2013). DDR

contends that the jury reviewed substantial evidence that

Digital River’s SSS did not replicate the host website’s

“look and feel” in terms of “overall appearance” and that

the web pages generated by the SSS did not show “corre-

spondence of overall appearance.” In particular, DDR

argues that the SSS did not satisfy this limitation since it

did not replicate a sufficient number of “look and feel”

elements from the host web page. Appellee’s Br. 45–46.

We find that the record allows only one reasonable

finding: clear and convincing evidence establishes that

Digital River’s prior art SSS anticipates the asserted

claims of the ’572 patent. The record lacks substantial

evidence to support the jury’s finding that the asserted

claims of the ’572 patent are not anticipated. Therefore,

the district court erred by denying the defendants’ motion

for JMOL of invalidity of the ’572 patent under 35 U.S.C.

§ 102(a).

Digital River’s prior art SSS was operational and sold

to its first customer by August 12, 1996. J.A. 6618–23.

By August 1997, more than a year before the filing date of

the provisional application for the ’135 patent, Digital

River’s SSS had attracted its 500th customer. J.A. 6257.

Digital River advertised its SSS as a system for generat-

ing web pages that allowed website visitors to “purchase

and download the digital products of their choice,” but

still “retain[ed] the look and feel of [the host’s] site.” J.A.

6202 (emphasis added). The SSS was activated when

visitors on a host’s website clicked a “web site ‘buy’ but-

ton” hyperlink. J.A. 6320. Digital River’s advertisements

explained that “[w]hen [website visitor] customers want to

purchase, they push the ‘buy’ button and are transferred

immediately and transparently to the Digital River Cen-

tral Commerce Server.” J.A. 6202. This component of the

SSS then generated and served composite web pages to

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 13

website visitors that incorporated “look and feel” elements

of the host website and product information associated

with the host website’s “web store” in a manner that

“replicate[d] the look and feel of the [host’s] Web site.”

J.A. 6320 (emphasis added). These “look and feel” ele-

ments and this product information content were stored

by Digital River in a data warehouse and retrieved for

incorporation into the generated composite web page

based on a correlation with the “buy” button hyperlink on

the host website. See id. In this way, Digital River’s SSS

would allow “transaction[s to] take[] place in the selling

environment [the host website had] created, surrounded

by the look and feel of [the host website’s] identity. . . .

There [would be] no sensation [for a website visitor] of

being suddenly hustled off to another location.” J.A. 6123

(emphasis added).

During trial, a Digital River witness testified at

length on how the SSS generated composite web pages

with “look and feel” elements from host websites, and

operated the SSS for the jury. Digital River also showed

the jury several composite web pages generated by the

SSS for host websites before the earliest priority date of

the ’572 patent, including a composite web page that

incorporated several elements identified in DDR’s patents

or by DDR’s expert at trial as “look and feel elements”: the

host website’s logo, background color, and prominent

circular icons. J.A. 8856–57 (composite web page), 7502

(host website); see also J.A. 8858–61 (composite web page

incorporating host website logo, colors, fonts), 6122 (ex-

ample web page from host website).

The parties’ stipulated construction of “look and feel”

requires the generated composite web page to include a

set of elements from the host website, each of these ele-

ments being a “look and feel element” described in the

specification that “convey[s] an overall appearance identi-

fying a website.” J.A. 542. Consistent with the specifica-

tion, the stipulated construction defines these “look and

14 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

feel elements” that “convey an overall appearance identi-

fying a website” to “include logos, colors, page layout,

navigation systems, frames, ‘mouse-over’ effects, or other

elements that are consistent through some or all of a

Host’s website.” Id.; see also ’572 patent, 14:11–14.

Digital River’s SSS clearly satisfies this limitation. For

example, Digital River showed the jury a host website

that included a stylized logo, a particular background

color, and prominent circular icons. J.A. 7502. The SSS

generated a prior art composite web page that incorpo-

rated each of these “look and feel” elements. J.A. 8856–

57; see also J.A. 6172 (host website) and 6171 (SSS-

generated prior art composite web page incorporating

logo, navigational menu, and color “look and feel” ele-

ments). And as explained above, the SSS was consistent-

ly promoted and advertised as creating a composite web

page that retained the “look and feel” of the host website.

E.g., J.A. 6123, 6202, 6320.

Both the district court and DDR introduced a limita-

tion found neither in the ’572 patent’s claims nor the

parties’ stipulated construction. In particular, the district

court introduced a requirement that the generated com-

posite web page have an “overall match” in appearance

with the host website, beyond what is expressly recited by

the claims. DDR Holdings, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 517; see

also Appellee’s Br. 47. There is nothing, however, in the

parties’ stipulated construction of “look and feel,” the

claim language, or the specification that requires the

generated composite web page to match the host website

or to incorporate a specific number, proportion, or selec-

tion of the identified “look and feel” elements on a host

website.

In order to satisfy this limitation, it is sufficient that

“look and feel” elements identifying the host website are

transferred to and displayed on the generated composite

webpage. For example, independent claim 13 of the ’572

patent merely requires that the generated composite web

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 15

page have a “look and feel based on the look and feel

description in the data store and content based on the

commerce object associated wit[h] the link.” Independent

claim 17 requires only that the generated composite web

page have a “look and feel corresponding to the stored

look and feel description” of the host website. There is no

claim language requiring an “overall match” or a specific

number of “look and feel” elements.

Further, the common specification explains that “[t]he

look and feel is captured by selecting an example page

[from] the host, retrieving the sample page from the host,

identifying the look and feel elements from the sample

page, and saving the identified look and feel elements.”

’572 patent, 14:7–10. Nothing in the common specifica-

tion suggests that satisfaction of the “look and feel” limi-

tation requires more than mechanically identifying “look

and feel elements” from a web page on the host website,

storing these elements in a data store, and using these

stored “look and feel elements” to create the “look and

feel” of the generated composite web page.

The jury’s determination that the SSS does not antic-

ipate claims 13, 17, and 20 of the ’572 patent is not sup-

ported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the district

court erred by denying the defendants’ motion for JMOL

of invalidity of the ’572 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 3

B. Patent-eligible subject matter

NLG also contends that the district court erred by

denying its motion for JMOL that the asserted claims of

3 Neither Digital River nor NLG ever argued that

the ’399 patent is invalid as anticipated by or obvious over

prior art. We decline to speculate whether Digital River’s

prior art SSS, either alone or in combination with other

prior art, invalidates the ’399 patent under 35 U.S.C.

§§ 102 or 103.

16 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

the ’572 and ’399 patents are invalid under 35 U.S.C.

§ 101. Since the ’572 patent is invalid as anticipated

under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), we focus on NLG’s § 101 chal-

lenge to claims 1, 3, and 19 of the ’399 patent. We con-

clude, as did the district court, that the asserted claims of

the ’399 patent clear the § 101 hurdle.

We review the district court’s determination of patent

eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 de novo. Dealertrack,

Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132

S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012), the Supreme Court set forth an

analytical framework under § 101 to distinguish patents

that claim patent-ineligible laws of nature, natural phe-

nomena, and abstract ideas—or add too little to such

underlying ineligible subject matter—from those that

claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First,

given the nature of the invention in this case, we deter-

mine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-

ineligible abstract idea. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,

134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). If so, we then consider the

elements of each claim—both individually and as an

ordered combination—to determine whether the addition-

al elements transform the nature of the claim into a

patent-eligible application of that abstract idea. Id. This

second step is the search for an “inventive concept,” or

some element or combination of elements sufficient to

ensure that the claim in practice amounts to “significantly

more” than a patent on an ineligible concept. Id.

Distinguishing between claims that recite a patent-

eligible invention and claims that add too little to a pa-

tent-ineligible abstract concept can be difficult, as the line

separating the two is not always clear. At one time, a

computer-implemented invention was considered patent-

eligible so long as it produced a “useful, concrete and

tangible result.” State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature

Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)

(finding a machine that transformed data by a series of

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 17

mathematical calculations to a final share price to be

patent-eligible); see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544

(Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). This understanding rested, in

large part, on the view that such inventions crossed the

eligibility threshold by virtue of being in the technological

realm, the historical arena for patented inventions. See,

e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952, 954–56 (Fed. Cir.

2008) (en banc) (concluding that a patent-eligible process

must either be “tied to a particular machine or apparatus”

or transformed into a different state or thing, i.e., the

“machine-or-transformation test”).

While the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos noted

that the machine-or-transformation test is a “useful and

important clue” for determining patent eligibility, 130 S.

Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010), it is clear today that not all ma-

chine implementations are created equal. For example, in

Mayo, the Supreme Court emphasized that satisfying the

machine-or-transformation test, by itself, is not sufficient

to render a claim patent-eligible, as not all transfor-

mations or machine implementations infuse an otherwise

ineligible claim with an “inventive concept.” See 132 S.

Ct. at 1301 (“[S]imply implementing a mathematical

principle on a physical machine, namely a computer, [i]s

not a patentable application of that principle.”) (describ-

ing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972)). And

after Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of gener-

ic computer limitations does not make an otherwise

ineligible claim patent-eligible. 134 S. Ct. at 2358. The

bare fact that a computer exists in the physical rather

than purely conceptual realm “is beside the point.” Id.

Although the Supreme Court did not “delimit the pre-

cise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category” in resolving

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356–57, over the course of several

cases the Court has provided some important principles.

We know that mathematical algorithms, including those

executed on a generic computer, are abstract ideas. See

Benson, 409 U.S. at 64. We know that some fundamental

18 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

economic and conventional business practices are also

abstract ideas. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (finding the

“fundamental economic practice” of hedging to be patent

ineligible); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (same for intermedi-

ated settlement).

In some instances, patent-ineligible abstract ideas are

plainly identifiable and divisible from the generic com-

puter limitations recited by the remainder of the claim.

For example, the Supreme Court in Alice determined that

the claims at issue “simply instruct[ed] the practitioner to

implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement

on a generic computer.” 134 S. Ct. at 2359. In Ultramer-

cial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 5904902, at

*5 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2014), the claims merely recited the

abstract idea of using advertising as a currency as applied

to the particular technological environment of the Inter-

net. In buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355

(Fed. Cir. 2014), the claims recited no more than using a

computer to send and receive information over a network

in order to implement the abstract idea of creating a

“transaction performance guaranty.” In Accenture Global

Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336,

1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2013), the claims merely recited “gen-

eralized software components arranged to implement an

abstract concept [of generating insurance-policy-related

tasks based on rules to be completed upon the occurrence

of an event] on a computer.” And in Bancorp Servs.,

L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d

1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the claims recited no more

than the use of a computer “employed only for its most

basic function, the performance of repetitive calculations,”

to implement the abstract idea of managing a stable-value

protected life insurance policy. Under Supreme Court

precedent, the above claims were recited too broadly and

generically to be considered sufficiently specific and

meaningful applications of their underlying abstract

ideas. Although many of the claims recited various com-

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 19

puter hardware elements, these claims in substance were

directed to nothing more than the performance of an

abstract business practice on the Internet or using a

conventional computer. Such claims are not patent-

eligible.

Against this background, we turn to the ’399 patent’s

asserted claims. We begin our § 101 analysis at

Mayo/Alice step one: determining whether the computer-

implemented claims at issue here are “directed to” a

patent-ineligible abstract idea. 4 Here, we note that the

’399 patent’s asserted claims do not recite a mathematical

algorithm. Nor do they recite a fundamental economic or

longstanding commercial practice. Although the claims

address a business challenge (retaining website visitors),

it is a challenge particular to the Internet.

Indeed, identifying the precise nature of the abstract

idea is not as straightforward as in Alice or some of our

other recent abstract idea cases. NLG’s own varying

formulations of the underlying abstract idea illustrate

this difficulty. NLG characterizes the allegedly abstract

idea in numerous ways, including “making two web pages

look the same,” “syndicated commerce on the computer

using the Internet,” and “making two e-commerce web

pages look alike by using licensed trademarks, logos, color

schemes and layouts.” See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 18–20.

The dissent characterizes DDR’s patents as describing the

entrepreneurial goal “that an online merchant’s sales can

be increased if two web pages have the same ‘look and

feel.’” Dissenting Op. 2. But as discussed below, under

4 The parties do not dispute that the asserted sys-

tem and method claims of the ’399 patent, for the purpos-

es of § 101, are no different in substance. See Appellee Br.

63; Appellant Br. 24. Thus, the form of the asserted

claims (system or method) does not affect our analysis of

their patent eligibility. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360.

20 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

any of these characterizations of the abstract idea, the

’399 patent’s claims satisfy Mayo/Alice step two.

As an initial matter, it is true that the claims here are

similar to the claims in the cases discussed above in the

sense that the claims involve both a computer and the

Internet. But these claims stand apart because they do

not merely recite the performance of some business prac-

tice known from the pre-Internet world along with the

requirement to perform it on the Internet. Instead, the

claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer tech-

nology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising

in the realm of computer networks.

In particular, the ’399 patent’s claims address the

problem of retaining website visitors that, if adhering to

the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyper-

link protocol, would be instantly transported away from a

host’s website after “clicking” on an advertisement and

activating a hyperlink. For example, asserted claim 19

recites a system that, among other things, 1) stores “visu-

ally perceptible elements” corresponding to numerous

host websites in a database, with each of the host web-

sites displaying at least one link associated with a product

or service of a third-party merchant, 2) on activation of

this link by a website visitor, automatically identifies the

host, and 3) instructs an Internet web server of an “out-

source provider” to construct and serve to the visitor a

new, hybrid web page that merges content associated

with the products of the third-party merchant with the

stored “visually perceptible elements” from the identified

host website. See supra 5.

In more plain language, upon the click of an adver-

tisement for a third-party product displayed on a host’s

website, the visitor is no longer transported to the third

party’s website. Instead, the patent claims call for an

“outsource provider” having a web server which directs

the visitor to an automatically-generated hybrid web page

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 21

that combines visual “look and feel” elements from the

host website and product information from the third-party

merchant’s website related to the clicked advertisement. 5

In this way, rather than instantly losing visitors to the

third-party’s website, the host website can instead send

its visitors to a web page on the outsource provider’s

server that 1) incorporates “look and feel” elements from

the host website, and 2) provides visitors with the oppor-

tunity to purchase products from the third-party mer-

chant without actually entering that merchant’s website.

The dissent suggests that the “store within a store”

concept, such as a warehouse store that contains a kiosk

for selling a third-party partner’s cruise vacation packag-

es, is the pre-Internet analog of the ’399 patent’s asserted

claims. Dissenting Op. 4. While that concept may have

been well-known by the relevant timeframe, that practice

did not have to account for the ephemeral nature of an

Internet “location” or the near-instantaneous transport

between these locations made possible by standard Inter-

net communication protocols, which introduces a problem

that does not arise in the “brick and mortar” context. In

particular, once a customer enters a physical warehouse

store, that customer may encounter a kiosk selling third-

5 On a fundamental level, the creation of new com-

positions and products based on combining elements from

different sources has long been a basis for patentable

inventions. See, e.g., Parks v. Booth, 102 U.S. 96, 102

(1880) (“Modern inventions very often consist merely of a

new combination of old elements or devices, where noth-

ing is or can be claimed except the new combination.”);

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–19 (2007)

(“[I]nventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon

building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discov-

eries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in

some sense, is already known.”).

22 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

party cruise vacation packages. There is, however, no

possibility that by walking up to this kiosk, the customer

will be suddenly and completely transported outside the

warehouse store and relocated to a separate physical

venue associated with the third-party—the analog of what

ordinarily occurs in “cyberspace” after the simple click of

a hyperlink—where that customer could purchase a cruise

package without any indication that they were previously

browsing the aisles of the warehouse store, and without

any need to “return” to the aisles of the store after com-

pleting the purchase. It is this challenge of retaining

control over the attention of the customer in the context of

the Internet that the ’399 patent’s claims address.

We caution, however, that not all claims purporting to

address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.

For example, in our recently-decided Ultramercial opin-

ion, the patentee argued that its claims were “directed to

a specific method of advertising and content distribution

that was previously unknown and never employed on the

Internet before.” 2014 WL 5904902, at *3. But this alone

could not render its claims patent-eligible. In particular,

we found the claims to merely recite the abstract idea of

“offering media content in exchange for viewing an adver-

tisement,” along with “routine additional steps such as

updating an activity log, requiring a request from the

consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public access, and

use of the Internet.” Id. at *5.

The ’399 patent’s claims are different enough in sub-

stance from those in Ultramercial because they do not

broadly and generically claim “use of the Internet” to

perform an abstract business practice (with insignificant

added activity). Unlike the claims in Ultramercial, the

claims at issue here specify how interactions with the

Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result—a

result that overrides the routine and conventional se-

quence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a

hyperlink. Instead of the computer network operating in

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 23

its normal, expected manner by sending the website

visitor to the third-party website that appears to be

connected with the clicked advertisement, the claimed

system generates and directs the visitor to the above-

described hybrid web page that presents product infor-

mation from the third-party and visual “look and feel”

elements from the host website. When the limitations of

the ’399 patent’s asserted claims are taken together as an

ordered combination, the claims recite an invention that

is not merely the routine or conventional use of the Inter-

net.

It is also clear that the claims at issue do not attempt

to preempt every application of the idea of increasing

sales by making two web pages look the same, or of any

other variant suggested by NLG. Rather, they recite a

specific way to automate the creation of a composite web

page by an “outsource provider” that incorporates ele-

ments from multiple sources in order to solve a problem

faced by websites on the Internet. As a result, the ’399

patent’s claims include “additional features” that ensure

the claims are “more than a drafting effort designed to

monopolize the [abstract idea].” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357.

In short, the claimed solution amounts to an inventive

concept for resolving this particular Internet-centric

problem, rendering the claims patent-eligible.

In sum, the ’399 patent’s claims are unlike the claims

in Alice, Ultramercial, buySAFE, Accenture, and Bancorp

that were found to be “directed to” little more than an

abstract concept. To be sure, the ’399 patent’s claims do

not recite an invention as technologically complex as an

improved, particularized method of digital data compres-

sion. But nor do they recite a commonplace business

method aimed at processing business information, apply-

ing a known business process to the particular technologi-

cal environment of the Internet, or creating or altering

contractual relations using generic computer functions

and conventional network operations, such as the claims

24 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

in Alice, Ultramercial, buySAFE, Accenture, and Bancorp.

The claimed system, though used by businesses, is patent-

eligible under § 101. 6 The district court did not err in

denying NLG’s motion for JMOL of invalidity under 35

U.S.C. § 101 as to these claims.

C. Indefiniteness

In its motion for JMOL of invalidity, NLG also sought

to invalidate the asserted claims of the ’572 and ’399

patents on the ground that the terms “look and feel” and

“visually perceptible elements” render the claims indefi-

nite because they are impermissibly subjective and fail to

notify the public of the bounds of the claimed invention. 7

On appeal, NLG contends that the district court erred by

denying its motion. We disagree.

Since the ’572 patent’s asserted claims are invalid un-

der 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), we need not decide NLG’s indefi-

niteness challenge to the patent based on the term “look

and feel.” We thus focus our analysis on the term “visual-

ly perceptible elements” in the ’399 patent’s asserted

claims. The parties stipulated to a construction of the

6 Of course, patent-eligible does not mean patenta-

ble under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. As discussed in

footnote 3 supra, the patentability of the ’399 patent’s

asserted claims is not before us.

7 Though NLG contended that the term “look and

feel” is indefinite before the district court, on appeal NLG

shifts its focus to “look and feel description.” “Look and

feel” and “look and feel description,” while related, are

recited as separate terms within the asserted claims.

E.g., ’572 patent, claim 13 (“. . . a look and feel based on

the look and feel description in the data store . . .”). NLG

provides no explanation or justification for its shift in

focus. As does DDR in its briefing, we focus our analysis

on the term “look and feel.”

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 25

term as “‘look and feel’ elements that can be seen.” J.A.

542. NLG argues that the term “is effectively the same as

‘look and feel description,’” and therefore lacks definite-

ness for the same reasons. Appellant’s Br. 30 n.12.

Indefiniteness is a question of law we review de novo.

Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355,

1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The definiteness requirement is

set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2, which states that “[t]he

specification shall conclude with one or more claims

particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the

subject matter which the applicant regards as his inven-

tion.” The definiteness requirement focuses on whether

“a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and

prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about

the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”

Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120,

2129 (2014). The inquiry “trains on the understanding of

a skilled artisan at the time of the patent application.”

Id. at 2130.

When a claim term “depend[s] solely on the unre-

strained, subjective opinion of a particular individual

purportedly practicing the invention,” without sufficient

guidance in the specification to provide objective direction

to one of skill in the art, the term is indefinite. Datamize,

LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed.

Cir. 2005) (finding “aesthetically pleasing” to be indefinite

because the specification lacked any objective definition of

the term). For some facially subjective terms, the defi-

niteness requirement is not satisfied by merely offering

examples that satisfy the term within the specification.

See Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 764 F.3d 1364,

1371–73 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding a single example of the

term “unobtrusive manner” in the specification did not

outline the claims to a skilled artisan with reasonable

certainty). For other terms like, for example, terms of

degree, specific and unequivocal examples may be suffi-

cient to provide a skilled artisan with clear notice of what

26 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

is claimed. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599

F.3d 1325, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding the phrase

“not interfering substantially” to be definite where intrin-

sic evidence provided multiple examples that would allow

a skilled artisan to determine whether a particular chem-

ical bond linkage group would “interfer[e] substantially”

with hybridization).

Here, though NLG attempts to characterize “look and

feel” as purely subjective, the evidence demonstrates that

“look and feel” had an established, sufficiently objective

meaning in the art, and that the ’399 patent used the

term consistent with that meaning. The specification

explains that “the look and feel is captured by selecting an

example page [from] the host, retrieving the sample page

from the host, identifying the look and feel elements from

the sample page and saving the identified look and feel

elements.” ’399 patent, 13:5–9. “Look and feel elements”

are described as “includ[ing] logos, colors, page layout,

navigation systems, frames, ‘mouse-over’ effects, or other

elements that are consistent through some or all of a

Host’s website.” Id. at 13:9–12. DDR’s expert on in-

fringement testified that a skilled artisan would interpret

these “other elements” as elements such as headers,

footers, fonts, and images. J.A. 3584.

These examples are consistent with the established

meaning of the term “look and feel” in the art, as demon-

strated by Digital River’s own evidence at trial. For

example, as discussed in Section II. A., Digital River

advertised its prior art SSS as generating composite web

pages that displayed third-party merchandise but also

replicated the “‘look and feel’ of the [host website’s] identi-

ty.” J.A. 6123. Digital River also explained that the

composite web pages generated by its SSS “retain[ed] the

look and feel of the [host’s web]site.” J.A. 6202. At trial,

Digital River conceded that it understood the meaning of

“look and feel.” J.A. 4146–47 (“Q. And Digital River

understood what it meant when it said: we’ll match your

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 27

look and feel, right? A. Yes, sir.”). Digital River also

admitted that its customers understood the meaning of

“look and feel.” J.A. 4199 (“Q. . . . [S]omebody who is

reading Digital River’s [advertising] document should

understand what Digital River means when it says

matching look and feel, right? . . . A. Yes, sir.”).

In sum, “look and feel” is not a facially subjective term

like “unobtrusive manner” in Interval or “aesthetically

pleasing” in Datamize. Rather, as demonstrated by

Digital River’s own advertisements for its prior art SSS

and its admissions at trial, the term had an established

meaning in the art by the relevant timeframe. The exam-

ples of “look and feel” elements disclosed in the specifica-

tion are consistent with the term’s established meaning.

In short, the term “visually perceptible elements,” or

“‘look and feel’ elements that can be seen,” viewed in light

of the specification and prosecution history, informed

those skilled in the art about the scope of the ’399 patent’s

claims with reasonable certainty. The district court did

not err by denying NLG’s motion for JMOL of invalidity of

the ’399 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2.

D. Infringement

NLG also contends that the district court erred by

denying its motion for JMOL of noninfringement as to

both the ’572 and ’399 patents. Since the ’572 patent is

invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), we address only NLG’s

noninfringement appeal of the ’399 patent. We find, as

did the district court, that the jury was presented with

substantial evidence on which to base its finding that

NLG infringes the asserted claims of the ’399 patent.

NLG argues that the jury’s finding that NLG’s ac-

cused websites satisfy the “visually perceptible elements”

limitation of the asserted claims is unsupported. NLG

further argues that DDR failed to introduce evidence that

NLG’s accused system automatically identifies or recog-

nizes the source web page as required by claims 1 and 19

28 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

of the ’399 patent. NLG also argues that DDR only

showed the jury screenshot images of the accused web-

sites running NLG’s e-commerce system on a single day,

and thus did not provide evidence of NLG’s alleged in-

fringement throughout the entire damages period.

The record tells a different tale. For the “visually per-

ceptible elements” limitation, the jury viewed screenshot

images from nine NLG-partner host websites and their

corresponding accused NLG-operated composite web

pages. DDR’s expert on infringement also presented the

jury with lists of the “look and feel elements” from each

host website allegedly incorporated in a corresponding

NLG-generated composite web page and opined that the

accused composite web pages satisfied the limitation. The

jury was free to use this proffered evidence and testimony

to form its own conclusions as to whether NLG’s accused

composite web pages satisfied the “visually perceptible

elements” limitation of the asserted claims.

As for the other contested limitations of the ’399 pa-

tent’s asserted claims, DDR’s expert on infringement

testified that on activation of a link on an NLG-partner

host website corresponding to an NLG-generated compo-

site web page, a keyword identifier is sent to NLG’s e-

commerce web server (e.g., “OBWEB” for Orbitz’s host

website), and a processor therein determines the location

and identity of the host website (e.g., Orbitz). The jury

was free to credit this testimony as evidence that NLG’s

accused e-commerce system “automatically . . . recog-

niz[es]” or “automatically identif[ies]” the source page “on

which the link has been activated.”

NLG’s argument that DDR provided the jury with

screenshot images of NLG’s accused composite web pag-

es—and thus evidence of infringement—for only one day

appears to be more relevant to damages than to infringe-

ment. Regardless, NLG’s contention is without merit.

DDR’s expert testified that he had examined NLG’s

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 29

accused system throughout the entire period of alleged

infringement, including any changes in its software

source code, deposition testimony on its operation, and,

via the Internet Archive, prior versions of accused compo-

site web pages. Based on his review, DDR’s expert testi-

fied that nothing about NLG’s accused system “had

changed in any substantial way” during this period. J.A.

3751–52. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding

that NLG’s accused system infringes the ’399 patent, and

thus the district court did not err in denying NLG’s mo-

tion for JMOL of noninfringement.

E. Damages

DDR sought $6.04 million in damages for NLG’s in-

fringement of the ’572 and ’399 patents; NLG countered

with $375,000. The parties agreed on a verdict form that

instructed the jury to award a single sum to compensate

DDR for NLG’s infringement of the asserted claims found

to be infringed and not invalid. J.A. 3080. The jury

awarded DDR $750,000 in damages for NLG’s infringe-

ment, without specifying how this award was apportioned

between the ’572 and the ’399 patents.

Because we find the ’572 patent invalid as anticipat-

ed, we vacate the damages award. This could warrant a

new trial on damages. See Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage

Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

NLG did not, however, move for a new trial under FRCP

59 and may not have preserved its recourse to this option.

DDR Holdings, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 522 (“Interestingly

however, NLG does not move for a new trial pursuant to

Rule 59.”). We remand to the district court to determine

the effect—if any—of our invalidation of the ’572 patent

on the jury’s damages award. 8

8 We note that NLG’s contention that the jury’s

damages award was “grossly excessive” because its ac-

30 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

F. Prejudgment Interest

The district court also awarded DDR prejudgment in-

terest. NLG contends that DDR should not be entitled to

any prejudgment interest because it is a non-practicing

entity and at a minimum, DDR should not be entitled to

any prejudgment interest during a four-year stay in

litigation since the stay was the result of DDR’s request

for ex parte reexamination of the ’135 and ’572 patents.

We review the district court’s award of prejudgment

interest for an abuse of discretion. See Telcordia Techs.,

Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 612 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir.

2010); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S.

648, 657 (1983) (“[A] decision to award prejudgment

interest will only be set aside if it constitutes an abuse of

discretion.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, after a finding of

infringement, the court “shall award . . . damages . . .

together with interest and costs.” (emphases added).

Prejudgment interest should ordinarily be awarded

absent some justification for withholding such an award.

Gen. Motors, 461 U.S. at 657; see also Energy Transp.

Grp., Inc. v. William Demant Holding A/S, 697 F.3d

1342, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The award of pre-judgment

interest is the rule, not the exception.”) (quotation and

citation omitted).

NLG cites no case law suggesting that prevailing non-

practicing entities are not entitled to prejudgment inter-

est. We decline to create such a statutory exception. See

Energy Transp., 697 F.3d at 1358 (“The district court did

cused websites infringed for only one day is based on a

flawed premise and is without merit. As the district court

explained, NLG cannot attempt to “reverse engineer the

jury’s math . . . and use its substituted, and purely specu-

lative, analysis to call the award excessive.” DDR Hold-

ings, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 530.

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 31

not abuse its discretion in this case by following the

standard rule of awarding pre-judgment interest.”).

However, since the ’572 patent is invalid, the district

court must recalculate its award of prejudgment interest

so that it is tied solely to NLG’s infringement of the ’399

patent, which issued in 2010, more than four years after

issuance of the ’572 patent. Nickson Indus., Inc. v. Rol

Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Generally,

prejudgment interest should be awarded from the date of

infringement to the date of judgment.”). Since the ’399

patent did not issue until after the stay was lifted in 2010,

we need not determine whether DDR is entitled to pre-

judgment interest during the pendency of the contested

stay.

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments

and find them unpersuasive.

III. CONCLUSION

In large part, we affirm the district court. The assert-

ed claims of the ’572 patent, however, are anticipated by

Digital River’s prior art Secure Sales System under 35

U.S.C. § 102(a), and no substantial evidence supports the

jury’s contrary finding. As such, the district court erred

in denying defendants’ motion for JMOL of invalidity as

to the ’572 patent. We vacate the award of damages and

prejudgment interest to DDR based on NLG’s infringe-

ment of the ’572 and ’399 patents and remand to the

district court in order to determine the damages and

prejudgment interest attributable solely to NLG’s in-

fringement of the ’399 patent.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND

REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

HOTELS.COM, L.P., CENDANT TRAVEL

DISTRIBUTION SERVICES GROUP, INC.,

EXPEDIA, INC., TRAVELOCITY.COM, L.P.,

SITE59.COM, LLC, INTERNATIONAL CRUISE &

EXCURSION GALLERY, INC.,

OURVACATIONSTORE, INC., INTERNETWORK

PUBLISHING CORPORATION, AND ORBITZ

WORLDWIDE, LLC,

Defendants,

AND

NATIONAL LEISURE GROUP, INC. AND

WORLD TRAVEL HOLDINGS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants,

AND

DIGITAL RIVER, INC.,

Defendant.

______________________

2013-1505

______________________

2 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

MAYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The claims asserted by DDR

Holdings, LLC (“DDR”) fall outside 35 U.S.C. § 101 be-

cause they simply describe an abstract concept—that an

online merchant’s sales can be increased if two web pages

have the same “look and feel”—and apply that concept

using a generic computer.

I.

The common specification of DDR’s patents notes that

an online merchant will often lose customers when those

customers click on an advertisement from a third-party

vendor that has been displayed on the original merchant’s

web page. See U.S. Patent No. 6,993,572 (the “’572 pa-

tent”) col.2 ll.30–33. The specification explains, however,

that the original merchant could potentially avoid “the

loss of hard-won visitor traffic,” id. col.2 ll.64–65, if he

were able to dupe customers into believing that they were

still on the merchant’s web page even when they were

actually viewing goods from a third-party vendor, id. col.2

ll.26–65. Notably, though, DDR’s patents are very vague

as to how this duping is to occur, indicating only that the

web page of the original merchant and that of the third-

party vendor should be made to look alike using “visually

perceptible elements.” See U.S. Patent No. 7,818,399 (the

“’399 patent”) col.28 ll.31–32 (requiring the use of a “plu-

rality of visually perceptible elements visually corre-

sponding to the [original merchant’s web] page”). DDR’s

patents fail to meet the demands of section 101 because

they describe a goal—confusing consumers by making two

web pages look alike—but disclose no new technology, or

“inventive concept,” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prome-

theus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012), for achiev-

ing that goal. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62,

120 (1854) (rejecting a claim which covered “an effect

produced by the use of electro-magnetism distinct from

the process or machinery necessary to produce it”); In re

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 3

Brooks, 90 F.2d 106, 107–08 (CCPA 1937) (“It is for the

discovery or invention of some practicable method or

means of producing a beneficial result or effect, that a

patent is granted, and not for the result or effect itself.”

(emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted)).

DDR’s patents are long on obfuscation but short on

substance. Indeed, much of what they disclose is so

rudimentary that it borders on the comical. For example,

the patents explain that two web pages are likely to look

alike if they are the same color, have the same page

layout, and display the same logos. See ’572 patent col.14

ll.5–18. The recited computer limitations, moreover, are

merely generic. The claims describe use of a “data store,”

a “web page having a link,” and a “computer processor,”

id. col.29 ll.1–13, all conventional elements long-used in e-

commerce. Because DDR’s claims, like those at issue in

Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International, “simply

instruct the practitioner to implement [an] abstract

idea . . . on a generic computer,” they do not meet section

101. 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014); see id. at 2360 (reject-

ing claims requiring a “data processing system’” with a

“communications controller” and a “data storage unit” as

“purely functional and generic” (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted)); Accenture Global Servs.,

GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344

(Fed. Cir. 2013) (rejecting claims requiring “a combination

of computer components including an insurance transac-

tion database, a task library database, a client compo-

nent, and a server component, which include[d] an event

processor, a task engine, and a task assistant”).

II.

The court concludes that the asserted claims of

DDR’s ’399 patent fall within section 101 because “they do

not merely recite the performance of some business prac-

tice known from the pre-Internet world along with the

4 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

requirement to perform it on the Internet.” Ante at 20.

This is incorrect. DDR’s claims do, in fact, simply take a

well-known and widely-applied business practice and

apply it using a generic computer and the Internet. The

idea of having a “store within a store” was in widespread

use well before the dawn of e-commerce. For example,

National Leisure Group, Inc. (“NLG”), one of the defend-

ants here, previously “sold vacations at . . . BJ’s Whole-

sale Clubs through point of purchase displays in the 45

BJ’s Clubs along the Eastern Seaboard.” Br. of Defend-

ants-Appellants National Leisure Group, Inc. and World

Travel Holdings, Inc. at 4. DDR’s patents are directed to

the same concept. Just as visitors to BJ’s Wholesale

Clubs could purchase travel products from NLG without

leaving the BJ’s warehouse, the claimed system permits a

person to purchase goods from a third-party vendor, but

still have the visual “impression that she is viewing pages

served by the [original host merchant].” ’399 patent col.3

ll.23–24; see ante at 3 (explaining that DDR’s claimed

system “permits a website visitor, in a sense, to be in two

places at the same time”). Indeed, any doubt as to wheth-

er the claimed system is merely an Internet iteration of

an established business practice is laid to rest by the fact

that one of the named inventors acknowledged that the

innovative aspect of his claimed invention was “[t]aking

something that worked in the real world and doing it on

the Internet.” J.A. 03208.

Alice articulated a technological arts test for patent

eligibility. 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (explaining that the claimed

method fell outside section 101 because it did not “im-

prove the functioning of the computer itself” or “effect an

improvement in any other technology or technical field”).

Here, the court correctly recognizes Alice’s technological

arts standard, but applies it in a deficient manner. Ac-

cording to the court, DDR’s claims fall within section 101

because the “solution” they offer “is necessarily rooted in

computer technology in order to overcome a problem

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 5

specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”

Ante at 20 (emphasis added). The solution offered by

DDR’s claims, however, is not rooted in any new computer

technology. Its patents address the problem of preventing

online merchants from losing “hard-won visitor traf-

fic,” ’572 patent col.2 ll.64–65, and the solution they offer

is an entrepreneurial, rather than a technological, one.

DDR has admitted that it did not invent any of the gener-

ic computer elements disclosed in its claims. J.A. 3311–

16. There is no dispute, moreover, that at the time of the

claimed invention the use of hyperlinks to divert consum-

ers to particular web pages was a well-understood and

widely-used technique. See ’399 patent col.1 ll.29–52.

While DDR’s patents describe the potential advantages of

making two web pages look alike, they do not disclose any

non-conventional technology for capturing the “look and

feel” of a host website or for giving two web pages a simi-

lar appearance. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (“[W]hat

petitioner characterizes as specific hardware . . . is purely

functional and generic.”); Accenture, 728 F.3d at 1345

(rejecting claims that contained no “detailed software

implementation guidelines”). DDR’s patents fall outside

section 101 because they simply “tak[e] existing infor-

mation”—the visual appearance of a host merchant’s

website—and use conventional technology to “organiz[e]

this information into a new form.” Digitech Image Techs.,

LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed.

Cir. 2014); see Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298 (emphasizing that

reciting “well-understood, routine, [or] conventional

activity” does not impart patent eligibility).

In concluding that DDR’s claims meet the demands of

section 101, the court focuses on the fact that “they recite

a specific way to automate the creation of a composite web

page . . . .” Ante at 23 (emphasis added). The Supreme

Court, however, has emphatically rejected the idea that

claims become patent eligible simply because they dis-

close a specific solution to a particular problem. See

6 DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P.

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599–601 (2010) (conclud-

ing that claims fell outside section 101 notwithstanding

the fact that they disclosed a very specific method of

hedging against price increases); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.

584, 593 (1978) (rejecting the argument “that if a process

application implements a principle in some specific fash-

ion, it automatically falls within the patentable subject

matter of § 101”). Indeed, although the claims at issue in

Alice described a very specific method for conducting

intermediated settlement, the Court nonetheless unani-

mously concluded that they fell outside section 101. 134

S. Ct. at 2358–60.

Nor is the fact that the claims address an “Inter-

netcentric problem,” ante at 23, sufficient to render them

patent eligible. The Supreme Court has repeatedly made

clear that “limiting the use of an abstract idea to a partic-

ular technological environment” is insufficient to confer

patent eligibility. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mayo, 132 S.

Ct. at 1294; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610. Accordingly, the fact

that DDR’s system operates “in the context of the Inter-

net,” ante at 22, does not bring it within patentable sub-

ject matter.

The potential scope of DDR’s patents is staggering,

arguably covering vast swaths of Internet commerce.

DDR has already brought infringement actions against

ten defendants, including Digital River, Inc., Expedia,

Inc., Travelocity.com, L.P., and Orbitz Worldwide, LLC.

See J.A. 255–63; ante at 7. DDR’s claims are patent

ineligible because their broad and sweeping reach is

vastly disproportionate to their minimal technological

disclosure. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (In assessing

patent eligibility, “the underlying functional concern . . . is

a relative one: how much future innovation is foreclosed

relative to the contribution of the inventor.”).

DDR HOLDINGS, LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. 7

Alice made clear that claims untethered to any ad-

vance in science or technology do not pass muster under

section 101. 134 S. Ct. at 2359. Viewed as a whole,

DDR’s claims contain no more than an abstract idea for

increasing sales implemented via “some unspecified,

generic computer,” id. at 2360. The inventive concept, if

any, embedded in DDR’s claims is an idea for “retaining

control over the attention of the customer,” ante at 22.

Because this purported inventive concept is an entrepre-

neurial rather than a technological one, DDR’s claims are

not patentable.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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