State of Tennessee v. Joshua Lee Steele

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs November 18, 2014

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOSHUA LEE STEELE

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Monroe County

No. 12-137 Amy A. Reedy, Judge

No. E2014-00321-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 4, 2014

The Defendant, Joshua Lee Steele, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, agreeing to allow

the trial court to determine his sentence. The trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-five

years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that

the trial court erred when it sentenced him because it did not properly consider the mitigating

factor that the Defendant assisted authorities in detecting or apprehending other persons who

had committed the offenses. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable

authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

R OBERT W. W EDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VERETT

W ILLIAMS and T IMOTHY L. E ASTER, JJ., joined.

Jeanne L. Wiggins, Madisonville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Joshua Lee Steele.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Senior Counsel;

Steven Bebb, District Attorney General; and A. Wayne Carter, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

This case arises from the Defendant and three co-defendants, Lorenz Freeman, Coty

Smith, and Jessica Payne, robbing, binding, and beating the victim, Mr. Vineyard. The

victim died from his injuries. For these offenses, a Monroe County grand jury indicted the

Defendant for one count of aggravated robbery, one count of conspiracy to commit

aggravated robbery, and one count of first degree felony murder.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder and agreed that the trial court

would determine his sentence.1 At the guilty plea submission hearing, the State offered the

following recitation of the facts in support of the trial court’s acceptance of the guilty plea:

[The State] would prove that on March the 4, 2012, that Mr. Freeman

and Mr. Smith and Ms. Payne had an attempt to go and rob the victim in this

case . . . . That they went to [the victim’s] place of residence, that [] Ms. Payne

stayed in the vehicle and [Mr. Freeman and Mr. Smith] get out. That they

approached [the victim’s] residence when another vehicle shows up and they

get spooked and leave and so there’s no event that happens at that point. They

go to a residence where they get hold of [the Defendant]. At that point,

sometime later on, and Ms. Payne does not return with them, but Mr. Freeman,

Mr. Smith and [the Defendant] go back to [the victim’s] residence, and at that

point they go in and it is Mr. Freeman and [the Defendant] who are the ones

that hold on to the victim [] and he’s hit in the head with a piece of iron, a

piece of wrought iron, and he eventually dies . . . .

. . . Mr. Smith was present, Mr. Smith was involved in the planning, Mr.

Smith goes through the house, the house is ransacked looking for what we

expect [was] cash, there were some rumors going around that the victim [] had

large amount of cash that was there. After this happens, they leave, go back,

and there’s some other conversations that goes on. . . . . [T]he defendants that

went into [the victim’s] residence all put on masks . . . . [T]he detectives and

the agents advised me that at least, [the Defendant] and Mr. Freeman were

very cooperative in their statements and forthcoming . . . .

At the sentencing hearing, the parties presented the following evidence: The State

offered the presentence report, which the trial court admitted into evidence. Doug Brannon,

chief detective for the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department, testified that he was the lead

investigator for this homicide case. He stated that in March of 2012, law enforcement

responded to a call from the victim’s neighbor. The neighbor reported that he had found the

victim dead in the victim’s home. Detective Brannon stated that law enforcement

investigated the crime scene, a “log cabin type home[.]” He stated that the victim’s home

had been “ransacked” and that the interior walls were “ripped apart, furniture overturned,

mattresses shredded, sheetrock busted through.” Detective Brannon testified that it was clear

“someone had been searching for something.”

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The three co-defendants also entered guilty pleas to various charges, none of which are the

subject of this appeal.

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Detective Brannon testified that investigators found the victim on the floor with his

wrists bound by “flexible handcuffs.” The victim had a visible injury to his head. Detective

Brannon stated that he later learned the victim had died from a head wound and that the

victim had been struck on the head and body with a hard object. Detective Brannon stated

that investigators interviewed neighbors and witnesses who provided “direct information”

that led to the Defendant and the co-defendants.

Detective Brannon stated that he located the Defendant first and that, initially, the

Defendant denied any role in the crime. The Defendant later acknowledged his involvement.

The Defendant “expressed remorse” about the victim’s death. The Defendant explained to

the investigators that he was not part of the original plan devised by Mr. Freeman, Mr. Smith,

and Ms. Payne but that he “agreed to participate” in their plan. The Defendant stated that he,

Mr. Freeman, and Mr. Smith went to the victim’s residence and gained entry by kicking open

the door. The Defendant stated that the three men held down the victim and assaulted him

with a piece of “rebar” about two feet long. Detective Brannon explained that “rebar” is a

piece of steel “normally used to reinforce concrete” and is very sturdy. The Defendant

described the events “step by step,” including the assault, tearing apart the walls, and stated

that the three men were looking for narcotics and money because they believed the victim

had a lot of cash. The Defendant identified the co-participants, which led to investigators

locating them.

Detective Brannon stated that, “[i]n total from what we learned from speaking to all

the parties, . . . it seemed that Mr. Smith [] had directed, initiated, was the man behind the

idea. . . .”

On cross-examination, Detective Brannon stated that the Defendant was in possession

of the “rebar” inside the victim’s home and that the Defendant acknowledged using it to

strike the victim. Detective Brannon recalled that the autopsy showed that contributing to

the victim’s death were his injuries as well as “positional asphyxiation,” which Detective

Brannon stated he interpreted as the victim “drown[ing] in his own blood.” He stated that

the autopsy showed that the victim did not die immediately and remained alive for “some

time” after he was beaten.

Detective Brannon agreed that the Defendant cooperated with the authorities and

acknowledged his participation in the crime. Detective Brannon recalled that the

Defendant’s remorse was sincere. He reiterated his statement that it was the Defendant who

struck the victim in the head.

On redirect-examination, Detective Brannon recalled that the victim’s hands were

“cuffed” behind his back, and this restricted his movement and may have led to him not

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being able to breathe.

Larry Vineyard testified that he was the victim’s brother. He testified that the victim

was a non-violent person who did not own a gun. He described arriving at the crime scene

and walking inside the victim’s house. He recalled that there was a “foot or foot and a half”

deep puddle of blood where the victim’s face had been. Mr. Vineyard testified that he and

his two sons cleaned up the victim’s house and boarded it up. He described the victim’s

generous and kind personality. Mr. Vineyard testified that he had spoken with the District

Attorney and agreed that the Defendant and his co-defendants should be offered a deal to

plead guilty to second degree murder.

On behalf of the Defendant, Candy Clark, the Defendant’s sister, testified that the

Defendant did not know his father until he was eight years old and that the Defendant’s

mother was killed in a car wreck when he was eleven years old. Ms. Clark said the

Defendant had a wonderful relationship with his mother and that her death was very hard on

him. Ms. Clark testified that the Defendant was in the car wreck with his mother. Ms. Clark

and her sister “raised” the Defendant after his mother’s death. She described the Defendant

as angry and stated that he would get mad easily.

Ms. Clark testified that, as an adult, the Defendant had a “big heart” but made a lot

of bad decisions. She described him as a “follower,” and she said he could be dared by

someone to do anything. She stated that she had never known him to be violent toward

anyone, but she reiterated that he had a temper. She stated that the Defendant was “very

remorseful” for the victim’s death.

On cross-examination, Ms. Clark agreed that the Defendant had a prior criminal

history and that he had been convicted of multiple drug offenses and other crimes. She

agreed that he was on probation when this crime was committed.

Amber Ratledge testified that she was the Defendant’s older sister and that life had

“been really hard” on the Defendant, Ms. Clark, and herself because they had lost their

mother. She stated that the Defendant had a drug problem but had never been a violent

person.

After considering this evidence, the trial court stated that it had considered the

sentencing guidelines enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-102. The trial

court stated that the Defendant was a Range I offender and had a prior criminal record

spanning from 2007 to 2011. The trial court acknowledged that the Defendant had a “very

sad background” and had suffered during his life. The trial court went on to say:

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This is a case where considering enhancement factors we have two

leaders. . . . . There are four people and two leaders and I find that [the

Defendant] was a leader. He did strike the victim. Maybe he didn’t go there

to kill, but you don’t hit a man in the head with a piece of rebar without

advancing that quality of leadership in a criminal enterprise. When you take

that step you have taken a leadership role and he did that. So I do find in this

case that [the Defendant] was a leader in the commission of an offense

involving two or more criminal actors. . . . . I also find that the [D]efendant

treated or allowed a victim to be treated with exceptional cruelty during the

commission of the offense, and in his case I also find that tying him up with

those one time handcuffs, striking him and allowing him to lay there in a

helpless position, and the proof is that he didn’t die immediately but that he

bled what sounds like rather profusely based on the [] horrific cleanup efforts

of the victim’s brother and his two sons . . . . So I find all that proof taken

together is proof of that enhancement factor, that the [D]efendant treated or

allowed a victim to be treated with exceptional cruelty during the commission

of the offense. I do not find that the personal injuries inflicted upon or the

amount of damage to property sustained by or taken from the victim was

particularly great. That doesn’t mean it wasn’t great, that just means the Court

is finding it’s part of second degree murder. . . . . So in this case I also do not

find that any mitigation has been proven. There’s just not enough proof here

that fits in with those mitigating factors. Sympathetic issues, sad stories, but

not proof of mitigation in this crime. . . . . Having found those enhancement

factors, having consider[ed] what the law requires that I consider, and that is

that [the Defendant] shall be punished in relation to the seriousness of the

offense, . . . to prevent crime based on the testimony we have had in the record

today, and promote respect for the law which provides an effective general

deterrent, and in that case I sentence [the Defendant] to 25 years in the

Tennessee Department of Corrections.

It is from this judgment that the Defendant now appeals.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him

because it failed to consider the mitigating factor that the Defendant “assisted the authorities”

in investigating this crime. See T.C.A. § 40-35-113(9) (2014). The Defendant argues that

the trial court erred when it found that no evidence was presented to establish this mitigating

factor. The State counters that the record supports the trial court’s sentencing

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determinations. We agree with the State.

In State v. Bise, the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed changes in sentencing law

and the impact on appellate review of sentencing decisions. The Tennessee Supreme Court

announced that “sentences imposed by the trial court within the appropriate statutory range

are to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of

reasonableness.’” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012). A finding of abuse of

discretion “‘reflects that the trial court’s logic and reasoning was improper when viewed in

light of the factual circumstances and relevant legal principles involved in a particular case.’”

State v. Shaffer, 45 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235,

242 (Tenn. 1999)). To find an abuse of discretion, the record must be void of any substantial

evidence that would support the trial court’s decision. Id. at 554-55; State v. Grear, 568

S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Delp, 614 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).

The reviewing court should uphold the sentence “so long as it is within the appropriate range

and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes

and principles listed by statute.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-10. So long as the trial court

sentences within the appropriate range and properly applies the purposes and principles of

the Sentencing Act, its decision will be granted a presumption of reasonableness. Id. at 707.

The defendant bears “[t]he burden of demonstrating that the sentence is improper.” State v.

Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991).

In determining a specific sentence within a range of punishment, the trial court should

consider, but is not bound by, the following advisory guidelines:

(1) The minimum sentence within the range of punishment is the sentence that

should be imposed, because the general assembly set the minimum length of

sentence for each felony class to reflect the relative seriousness of each

criminal offense in the felony classifications; and

(2) The sentence length within the range should be adjusted, as appropriate, by

the presence or absence of mitigating and enhancement factors set out in §§

40-35-113 and 40-35-114.

T.C.A. § 40-35-210(c) (2014). The trial court must consider: (1) the evidence, if any,

received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles

of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics

of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on the

mitigating and enhancement factors set out in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-113

and -114; (6) any statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts

as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; and (7) any statement the

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defendant made in the defendant’s own behalf about sentencing. See T.C.A. § 40-35-210

(2014); State v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

Section 40-35-113 contains a non-exclusive list of mitigating factors that a trial court

may apply to a defendant’s sentence “if appropriate for the offense.” T.C.A. § 40-35-113

(2014). We, however, recognize that a trial court’s weighing of applicable mitigating factors

is “left to the trial court’s sound discretion.” State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 345 (Tenn.

2008). “[T]he trial court is free to select any sentence within the applicable range so long as

the length of the sentence is ‘consistent with the purposes and principles of [the Sentencing

Act].’” Id. at 343. The burden of proving applicable mitigating factors rests upon the

defendant. State v. Mark Moore, No. 03C01-9403-CR-00098, 1995 WL 548786, at *6

(Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 18, 1995), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 5, 1996).

Moreover, the trial court’s “misapplication of an enhancement or mitigating factor does not

invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as

amended in 2005.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. “[Appellate Courts are] bound by a trial court’s

decision as to the length of the sentence imposed so long as it is imposed in a manner

consistent with the purposes and principles set out in sections -102 and -103 of the

Sentencing Act.” Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 346.

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider the evidence

presented in support of mitigating factor (9), that the Defendant “assisted the authorities in

uncovering offenses committed by other persons or in detecting or apprehending other

persons who had committed the offenses[.]” T.C.A. § 40-35-113(9) (2014). The trial court

did consider whether there was any proof at the sentencing hearing of mitigating factors and

stated that it found that there was none. Our review of the record indicates that Detective

Brannon testified that the Defendant did give information to the authorities that aided them

in identifying other persons who had been involved in the crime.

We agree that this is proof of mitigating factor (9), that the Defendant “assisted the

authorities in uncovering offenses committed by other persons or in detecting or

apprehending other persons who had committed the offenses[.]” Id. However, as previously

stated, enhancing and mitigating factors are advisory only. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114 (2014);

see also Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 699 n.33, 704; Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 343. This Court is “bound

by [the] trial court’s decision as to the length of the sentence imposed so long as it is imposed

in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles set out in sections -102 and -103 of

the Sentencing Act.” Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 346. The trial court stated that it considered the

Defendant’s role in the crime, and the circumstances of the victim’s death, particularly that

the Defendant left the victim to die after beating him in the head with an iron pole.

Accordingly, the trial court applied two enhancement factors, that the Defendant was a leader

in the commission of an offense involving two or more criminal actors and that the

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Defendant treated the victim with exceptional cruelty during the commission of the offense.

T.C.A. § 40-35-114(2), (5) (2014). For these reasons, the trial court sentenced the Defendant

to a within range sentence of twenty-five years for second degree murder.

We conclude that the Defendant’s within range sentence is consistent with the

purposes set out in the Sentencing Act and that it was within the trial court’s broad discretion

not to apply mitigating factor (9) when sentencing him. See State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d

851, 861 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-10). The Defendant is not entitled to

relief on this issue.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the aforementioned reasoning and authorities, we affirm the trial

court’s judgments.

________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

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