Opinion

Azure Networks, LLC v. Csr, Plc

  • 771 F.3d 1336
  • 112 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1817
  • 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21188
  • 2014 WL 5741337
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Nov 6, 2014
Status
Published
On the bench
Reyna, Mayer, Chen
Cited by
89 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.5%

Vacated on other grounds by PLC v. Azure Networks, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 1846 (2015)

stating that “[t]here is a heavy presumption that claim terms carry their accustomed meaning in the relevant community at the relevant time.” (internal quotation marks omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • stating that “[t]here is a heavy presumption that claim terms carry their accustomed meaning in the relevant community at the relevant time.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
  • applying a com- bined analysis and finding a patent owner lacked an exclu- sionary right because it transferred away all substantial rights
  • holding that there is a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning
  • “In determining the nature of a transfer of rights, we have repeatedly recognized that a ‘key factor has often been where the right to sue for infringement lies.’"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC AND

TRI-COUNTY EXCELSIOR FOUNDATION,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CSR PLC AND CAMBRIDGE SILICON RADIO

INTERNATIONAL, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees,

AND

ATHEROS COMMUNICATIONS, INC. AND

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,

Defendants-Appellees,

AND

BROADCOM CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee,

AND

MARVELL SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

RALINK TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION (Taiwan)

AND RALINK TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

(USA),

Defendants-Appellees.

______________________

2013-1459

______________________

2 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Texas in No. 11-CV-0139, Judge

Michael H. Schneider.

______________________

Decided: November 6, 2014

______________________

MICHAEL E. JOFFRE, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd,

Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C., of Washington, DC, argued for

plaintiffs-appellants. With him on the brief was ANNA D.

MAYERGOYZ. Of counsel on the brief were ERIC M.

ALBRITTON and MICHAEL BENEFIELD, Albritton Law Firm,

of Longview, Texas; and DANNY L. WILLIAMS and

CHRISTOPHER N. CRAVEY, Williams, Morgan & Amerson,

P.C., of Houston, Texas.

DOMINIC E. MASSA, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and

Dorr LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts, argued for all de-

fendants-appellees. With him on the brief for defendant-

appellee Broadcom Corporation were LOUIS W. TOMPROS,

JASON H. LISS and DANA O. BURWELL. On the brief for

defendants-appellees Atheros Communications, Inc., et

al., were TIMOTHY TETER, LORI R. MASON and MATTHEW J.

BRIGHAM, Cooley LLP, of Palo Alto, California. On the

brief for defendants-appellees CSR PLC, et al., were

JEFFREY E. OSTROW and JONATHAN C. SANDERS, Simpson

Thacher & Bartlett LLP, of Palo Alto, California; and

KERRY L. KONRAD, of New York, New York.

______________________

Before REYNA, MAYER, AND CHEN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Chen.

Dissenting-in-part opinion filed by Circuit Judge Mayer.

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 3

CHEN, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Azure Networks, LLC (Azure) and Tri-

County Excelsior Foundation (Tri-County) sued CSR PLC,

Cambridge Silicon Radio International, LLC, Atheros

Communications, Inc., Qualcomm Inc., Broadcom Corp.,

Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., Ralink Technology Corp.

(Taiwan), and Ralink Technology Corp. (USA) (collective-

ly, Appellees) for alleged infringement of U.S. Patent No.

7,756,129 (the ’129 patent). The district court granted the

Appellees’ motion to dismiss Tri-County for lack of stand-

ing, finding that Tri-County had effectively assigned

Azure the ’129 patent. Because we agree that the agree-

ment between Tri-County and Azure constituted an

effective assignment for purposes of standing, we affirm

the dismissal of Tri-County.

The district court also construed the term “MAC ad-

dress” in the ’129 patent as “a device identifier generated

by the hub device” and not, as Azure and Tri-County

suggested, “an address that uniquely identifies a device or

group of devices on a shared communication medium.”

Azure stipulated to a judgment of noninfringement under

the district court’s construction of “MAC address.” Be-

cause the district court improperly construed the term, we

vacate the judgment of noninfringement and remand.

BACKGROUND

A. The ’129 Patent

The ’129 patent, entitled “Personal Area Network

with Automatic Attachment and Detachment,” describes a

network for wireless communications between a central

hub device and a number of surrounding peripheral

devices in close proximity with the hub device. The

specification details the use of “a wireless personal area

network [PAN] that permits a host device to communicate

with a varying number of peripheral devices with mini-

mal interference from neighboring networks.” ’129 pa-

4 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

tent, 2:66–3:3. To do so, the hub device “orchestrates all

communication in the PAN,” including managing the

timing of the network, allocating available bandwidth

among the peripheral devices, and supporting the at-

tachment, detachment, and reattachment of peripheral

devices. Id. at 3:33–39. The hub and the peripheral

devices communicate with one another over a predefined

set of streams, or one-way communication links. Id. at

3:53–56.

Claim 14 is representative of the accused claims to a

hub device:

14. A hub device for use within a personal area

network, comprising:

circuitry, and

a transceiver in communication with the circuitry,

the hub device configured to cause the transceiver

to

i) send a message to indicate the availabil-

ity of the hub device for peripheral device

attachment,

ii) receive, from a first peripheral device, a

message indicating the availability of the

first peripheral device for communication

with the hub device,

iii) send, to the first peripheral device, a

signal including a first peripheral device

identifier,

iv) receive, from the first peripheral de-

vice, a response,

v) send a hub response to the first periph-

eral device, and

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 5

vi) receive, from the first peripheral de-

vice, a second peripheral response includ-

ing the first peripheral device identifier.

Id. at claim 14 (emphasis added).

The parties agree that “peripheral device identifier” in

the asserted claims means “an element that identifies the

peripheral device.” Joint Appendix (J.A.) 1446. Claim 43

depends from claim 14 and introduces the disputed “MAC

address” term:

43. The hub device according to claim 14, wherein

the hub device is configured such that a plurality

of MAC addresses is capable of being used for

identification in association with the first periph-

eral device.

’129 patent, claim 43.

At the time of invention, the conventional meaning of

“MAC address,” i.e., a Media or Medium Access Control

address, was that it operated to uniquely identify a wire-

less device and could be generated in two ways—by the

manufacturer of the device or by the local network. The

district court concluded that the patentee acted as his

own lexicographer by redefining the claimed “MAC ad-

dress.” In so doing, the district court relied on the specifi-

cation in two ways. First, a statement in the specification

allegedly coined a new “MAC address” term that differs

from the traditional MAC address as known to a person of

ordinary skill in the art. That statement provided: “Each

device is identified by a Media Access (MAC) address.”

’129 patent, 3:31–32. And second, various statements in

the specification discussed the generation and assignment

of the MAC address by the hub device. See Azure Net-

works, LLC v. CSR PLC, No. 6:11CV139 LED-JDL, 2013

WL 173788, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2013). Based on

these passages, it construed “MAC address” as “a device

identifier generated by the hub device.” Id. at *5.

6 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

B. Tri-County’s License to Azure

The ’129 patent has passed through many hands of

ownership, but it was eventually acquired by Azure, a

Texas limited liability company located in the Eastern

District of Texas. Azure then sought local charities to join

in its patent enforcement activities. Ultimately, it part-

nered with Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) of

Harrison County, 1 which formed Tri-County, a Texas non-

profit corporation with its principal place of business in

the Eastern District of Texas. In 2010, Azure donated

multiple patents and patent applications, including the

application that would issue as the ’129 patent, to Tri-

County. 2

A few weeks after the donation, Tri-County and Azure

entered into an “Exclusive Patent License Agreement”

(hereinafter, Agreement), which transferred back to Azure

a number of rights in the ’129 patent. In particular, the

Agreement granted Azure the exclusive, worldwide,

transferable right to (i) make, have made, use, sell, offer

to sell, import, and lease any products, (ii) use and per-

form any method, process, and/or services, and (iii) other-

wise practice any invention in any manner under the ’129

patent. It also granted Azure the “full right to enforce or

and/or sublicense” the ’129 patent, J.A. 1201 § 1.2, includ-

1 CASA of Harrison County is a member of the Na-

tional Court Appointed Special Advocate Association and

provides court-appointed advocacy for neglected and

abused children in Harrison County. J.A. 454.

2 The Appellees allege that Azure was motivated to

donate the patents and patent applications to Tri-County

in order in order to further establish venue in the Eastern

District of Texas and to deduct from Azure’s tax liability

the value of its donation and portions of litigation pro-

ceeds owed to Tri-County. Appellees’ Br. 8, 19; see also 26

U.S.C. § 170(m).

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 7

ing the authority to reach settlements without Tri-

County’s consent. Specifically, the Agreement provided

that “Azure will have the exclusive right, but not the

obligation, to maintain, enforce, or defend” the ’129 pa-

tent, but has the “obligation to exercise good faith busi-

ness judgment to monetize” the ’129 patent, “including

but not limited to licensing [it] to third parties.” J.A. 1204

§ 4.4. Azure also received the right to assign the entire

Agreement or any of Azure’s rights under the Agreement,

without Tri-County’s consent, to any Azure affiliate in

connection with the sale of a material portion of any

Azure business unit. And, finally, the Agreement gave

Azure, not Tri-County, the exclusive right, but not the

obligation, to control future prosecution or pay mainte-

nance fees related to the ’129 patent family.

In exchange, Tri-County retained the right to receive

33% of the proceeds from Azure’s litigation or licensing

activities for the first five years and 5% thereafter. Azure

must pay Tri-County the respective percentages within

thirty days after each calendar quarter in which Azure

receives the proceeds. Tri-County also reserved “a royal-

ty-free, personal, non-transferable, non-exclusive right” to

practice the ’129 patent and make Tri-County branded

products. J.A. 1201–02 § 2.3. Additionally, Tri-County

retained a right to terminate the Agreement if Azure

breached its obligations or if Tri-County’s obligations

under the Agreement placed Tri-County’s tax-exempt

status at risk. Tri-County also reserved reversionary

rights in the ’129 patent once the Agreement expires. In

particular, the Agreement automatically expires on March

27, 2018, with two years remaining on the patent term,

but Tri-County has the option to renew in one-year in-

crements if it notifies Azure at least thirty days in ad-

vance. In addition, Tri-County is obligated not to

encumber the ’129 patent in any way and to participate in

litigation at Azure’s request and in Azure’s sole discretion.

8 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

Tri-County and Azure filed suit together against the

Appellees, who thereafter sought to dismiss Tri-County

from the case. They argued that the significant rights

transferred to Azure under the Agreement constituted an

effective assignment for purposes of standing, leaving Tri-

County with no rights to sue as co-plaintiff. The district

court agreed, finding that Tri-County’s title in the patent

and financial and reversionary interests therein were not

sufficient to confer standing upon Tri-County. J.A. 34–35.

On the district court’s dismissal of Tri-County, Azure and

Tri-County appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Standing

Standing is a matter of law that we review de novo.

Evident Corp. v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc., 399 F.3d

1310, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Patent Act governs

standing to sue for infringement, and it provides that only

the patentee and his successors in title are entitled to

bring a civil action for infringement. Propat Int’l Corp. v.

RPost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 35

U.S.C. § 281); Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d

1245, 1249–50 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-

Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A party

is a patentee if it holds legal title to the patent, either by

issuance or assignment. Propat, 473 F.3d at 1189;

Speedplay, 211 F.3d at 1249–50.

Even if a patentee does not transfer legal title, it may

transfer significant rights to the patent. When the pa-

tentee transfers rights, the “party that has been granted

all substantial rights under the patent is considered the

owner regardless of how the parties characterize the

transaction that conveyed those rights.” Speedplay, 211

F.3d at 1250. “In that event, the transferee is treated as

the patentee and has standing to sue in its own name.”

Propat, 473 F.3d at 1189. And whichever party has all, or

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 9

substantially all, rights in the patent “alone has standing

to sue for infringement.” Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499

F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Alfred E. Mann

Found. for Scientific Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d

1354, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A patent owner may

transfer all substantial rights in the patents-in-suit, in

which case the transfer is tantamount to an assignment of

those patents to the exclusive licensee, conferring stand-

ing to sue solely on the licensee.”). Therefore, when all

rights or all substantial rights have been transferred, the

transferee—and not the transferor—is the effective owner

for purposes of standing. See Speedplay, 211 F.3d at

1250.

In patent licensor-licensee standing cases, we are typ-

ically confronted with one of two scenarios: (1) cases in

which the exclusive licensee brings suit alone, requiring

us to decide whether the license agreement conferred

sufficient rights on the licensee for standing; or (2) cases

in which the licensor brings suit alone, and we decide

whether the licensor has transferred away enough rights

to divest it of the right to sue. This is not the typical case.

Here, both the licensor and the licensee have brought the

suit together, and the accused infringer seeks dismissal of

the licensor. Therefore, our inquiry in this case is two-

fold: (1) whether Tri-County transferred all substantial

rights under the ’129 patent to Azure, making Azure the

effective owner; and if so, (2) whether Tri-County may

nevertheless join in an infringement suit brought by the

licensee, but now effective owner, Azure.

A

“To determine whether an exclusive license is tanta-

mount to an assignment, we ‘must ascertain the intention

of the parties [to the license agreement] and examine the

substance of what was granted.’” Mann, 604 F.3d at 1359

(quoting Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc.,

240 F.3d 1016, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). The parties’ intent

10 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

alone is not dispositive. See Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG

v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 876 (Fed.

Cir. 1991) (finding agreement amounted to an assign-

ment, even though entitled “exclusive license,” because it

transferred substantial rights to licensee); see also

Speedplay, 211 F.3d at 1250.

We must also consider a non-exhaustive list of rights

for determining whether a licensor has transferred “all

substantial rights” to the licensee, including: (1) the

nature and scope of the right to bring suit; (2) the exclu-

sive right to make, use, and sell products or services

under the patent; (3) the scope of the licensee’s right to

sublicense; (4) the reversionary rights to the licensor

following termination or expiration of the license; (5) the

right of the licensor to receive a portion of the proceeds

from litigating or licensing the patent; (6) the duration of

the license rights; (7) the ability of the licensor to super-

vise and control the licensee’s activities; (8) the obligation

of the licensor to continue paying maintenance fees; and

(9) any limits on the licensee’s right to assign its interests

in the patent. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1360–61.

The parties do not dispute that the Agreement trans-

ferred to Azure an exclusive license to practice the ’129

patent. “[T]ransfer of the exclusive right to make, use,

and sell products or services under the patent is vitally

important to an assignment.” Id. at 1360. Also critical to

our inquiry is that the Agreement granted Azure the

exclusive right to enforce and defend the ’129 patent. In

determining the nature of a transfer of rights, we have

repeatedly recognized that a “key factor has often been

where the right to sue for infringement lies.” Aspex

Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1342

(Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Mann, 604 F.3d at 1361 (recog-

nizing that the “the most important consideration” in the

analysis is “the nature and scope of the exclusive licen-

see’s purported right to bring suit, together with the

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 11

nature and scope of any right to sue purportedly retained

by the licensor”).

It is not uncommon for a licensor to transfer to its li-

censee the exclusive right to enforce the patent. But

significant to this case, Tri-County reserved no right to

have control over, to veto, or to be notified of any of Az-

ure’s licensing or litigation activities. Retaining control of

these activities is also critical to demonstrating that the

patent has not been effectively assigned to the licensee.

See, e.g., Propat, 473 F.3d at 1192 (noting that retention

of right to veto, be consulted about, or give consent to

litigation decisions weighs in favor of finding agreement a

license, not an assignment); Mann, 604 F.3d at 1362–63

(noting that right to have joint control over litigation or

right to bring suit against alleged infringer if licensee

refuses to bring suit would also indicate that licensor

retained substantial rights); Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 875

(patentee retained only right to be informed about litiga-

tion and no right to control litigation decisions, suggesting

an assignment of the patent); Speedplay, 211 F.3d at 1251

(holding that licensor retained no veto rights over licen-

see’s litigation activities and licensee’s complete control

over litigation suggested that licensee obtained substan-

tial rights).

Rather than retaining any control over litigation ac-

tivities, Tri-County has a strict duty under the Agreement

to “join Azure as a party and cooperate with Azure in any

patent infringement suit, if, desirable to address a legal

issue,” such as standing. J.A. 1204 § 4.4. Tri-County

must join “at Azure’s request,” and after joinder, “Azure

would maintain full and absolute control over any such

patent infringement suit, including settlement of any

related claims or causes of action.” Id. Tri-County’s

joinder “would be limited solely to cooperation and that

which is necessary to address the legal issue.” Id. As the

district court recognized, nothing about this relationship

structure indicates that Tri-County has control over any

12 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

aspect of litigation involving the ’129 patent. Rather, it is

clear that Azure is holding all the strings. In sum, Az-

ure’s exclusive right to sue, exclusive license, and freedom

to sublicense are factors that strongly suggest that the

Agreement constitutes an effective assignment.

Tri-County argues that other factors demonstrate that

it retained enough rights such that whatever was trans-

ferred to Azure was something less than “all substantial

rights.” First, it points out that it has a right to receive a

portion of the proceeds from the enforcement of the ’129

patent. But that economic interest alone does not defeat a

transfer of substantial rights in the face of the factors

above that strongly indicate Azure’s ownership. See

Propat, 473 F.3d at 1191 (“To be sure, the fact that a

patent owner has retained a right to a portion of the

proceeds of the commercial exploitation of the pa-

tent . . . does not necessarily defeat what would otherwise

be a transfer of all substantial rights in the patent.”)

(citing Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 162–63 (1889)).

Second, it argues that it retained the right to practice

the ’129 patent, including the right to make, sell, and use

Tri-County-branded products covered by the patent. See

Fieldturf, Inc. v. Sw. Recreational Indus., Inc., 357 F.3d

1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[L]icensor’s retention of a

limited right to develop and market the patented inven-

tion indicates that the licensee failed to acquire all sub-

stantial rights.”). But in this case, this factor has little

force as Tri-County does not make or sell any products,

J.A. 8976–81, and the evidence on record suggests that

Tri-County will not make or sell any products in the

future. While Tri-County continues to retain this right

under the Agreement, its right is nonexclusive. We have

held that a nonexclusive license confers no standing on

the licensee because the licensee does not have a legally

protected interest conferred by the Patent Act. See

Propat, 473 F.3d at 1193–94 (holding that party has

standing to sue if it “has a legally protected interest in the

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 13

patent created by the Patent Act,” and that bare licensee

has no standing). That same logic applies even if it is the

patent owner holding the nonexclusive right and the

licensee holds the exclusionary rights. It is the licensee,

Azure, who may freely sublicense other parties or, in-

stead, tolerate infringement. So while infringement may

cause Tri-County pecuniary loss, the Patent Act confers

Azure, not Tri-County, with standing to bring suit for the

infringement. See Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst.,

Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that

“[p]ractice of the invention by others may indeed cause

[the nonexclusive licensee] pecuniary loss,” but “economic

injury alone does not provide standing to sue under the

patent statute”) (internal citations omitted).

Third, Tri-County contends that it has termination

rights that limit whatever rights Azure has received

under the Agreement. In particular, each party has the

right to terminate the Agreement if the other party “sub-

stantially fails to perform or otherwise materially breach-

es any of the material terms, covenants or provisions of

[the] Agreement.” J.A. 1207 § 7.8. Tri-County maintains

that Azure must exercise good-faith judgment in monetiz-

ing the patents and report its efforts to Tri-County annu-

ally. Appellants’ Br. 27. Tri-County argues that it can

then exercise its right to terminate the Agreement, and

regain all rights conferred to Azure, if it determines that

Azure’s performance under this “good faith” provision is

unsatisfactory. Because Azure must enforce and license

the ’129 patent and share any proceeds with Tri-County,

Tri-County contends that its termination right enables it

to monitor—and, thus, control—Azure’s fulfillment of its

obligations. Reply Br. 6–7. According to Tri-County, this

termination right indicates that it retained significant

ownership interests in the ’129 patent. We do not agree.

We have held that termination rights conditioned up-

on the licensee’s “failure to perform up to the specified

benchmarks” provide some indication that the licensor

14 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

retained ownership in the patent. See Propat, 473 F.3d at

1191–92. But the discussion of the termination right in

Propat must be read in context. We explained that the

Propat termination right, by itself, was not sufficient to

show ownership; rather, we were persuaded by the show-

ing of additional rights retained by the licensor, including

one of the most crucial ones—the right to control the

litigation and licensing decisions:

In addition, [the licensor] retains an economic in-

terest in the patent and a substantial measure of

control over decisions affecting the patent rights.

It enjoys an equity interest in the proceeds of li-

censing and litigation activities, a right to notice

of licensing and litigation decisions and the right

to veto such decisions as long as the veto power

was not exercised unreasonably, and the unre-

stricted power to bar [the licensee] from transfer-

ring its interest in the patent to a third party. In

no case has this court held that a patentee who re-

tains such broad and wide-ranging powers with

respect to a patent has nonetheless transferred

“all substantial rights” in the patent.

Id. at 1191. In Propat, the licensor retained the responsi-

bility to maintain the patent, the right to notice of the

licensee’s decision-making, the right to veto licensing and

litigation decisions, the right to veto any transfer of the

licensee’s rights, in addition to the right to terminate the

license if the licensee failed to meet certain benchmarks.

Id. at 1190–91. That is not the case here.

Tri-County’s right to monitor whether Azure breaches

any of its obligations does not amount to the type of

control that we have found indicative of ownership in

prior cases. Tri-County does not have the right to veto

any of Azure’s decisions, and Azure is not obligated to

obtain Tri-County’s consent before acting. In fact, Tri-

County does not even have the right to receive notice

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 15

before Azure acts. Nor does Tri-County have the obliga-

tion to maintain the patent; maintenance lies with Azure,

at Azure’s option. It is true that Tri-County may termi-

nate the Agreement if Azure breaches its obligations, but

Tri-County does not explain—nor can we envision—how a

general good-faith requirement that inures to the finan-

cial benefit of both parties, with nothing more, would

allow Tri-County to trump Azure’s express and unilateral

rights and exert control over Azure’s licensing or litigation

decisions.

As an additional argument, Tri-County points to its

right to terminate the Agreement if it incurs unwanted

tax liabilities as a basis for demonstrating that it retained

ownership. But if Tri-County terminates the Agreement

for this reason, Azure has the option to re-acquire the ’129

patent for $305,000. J.A. 1207–08. Therefore, Tri-

County’s termination under this provision does not out-

right deprive Azure of controlling the patent. Tri-

County’s termination right under this provision loses

force as a factor suggesting it has substantial rights over

the ’129 patent.

Fourth, Tri-County contends that, in addition to its

termination rights, the Agreement automatically termi-

nates on March 27, 2018—two years before the patent

expires—leaving Tri-County a two-year reversionary

interest in the patent. Although Tri-County may option-

ally extend the Agreement in one-year increments, it

argues that, in general, agreements that terminate before

patent expiration leave the licensor with a substantial

interest in the patent.

In Aspex Eyewear, we addressed the effect of a hard

termination date, i.e., a date beyond which the license

cannot be renewed and all rights revert back to the licen-

16 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

sor. 3 The termination clause in that case provided that

the license would expire in 2003, but it gave the licensee

one option to extend the term another three years. 434

F.3d at 1338 n.2. The license would finally terminate in

2006, still leaving eleven more years remaining on the

patent term, which was to expire in 2017. Id. at 1338 &

n.4.

The rights distributed between the licensee and licen-

sor in Aspex Eyewear were similar to the distribution of

rights between Tri-County and Azure. Like Azure, the

licensee in Aspex Eyewear held the exclusive right to

practice the invention, the right to bring suit for in-

fringement, and the unrestricted right to sublicense,

while the licensor, like Tri-County, retained no right to

make litigation or licensing decisions. We acknowledged

that this distribution strongly suggested the license was

an effective assignment for purposes of standing. Id. at

1342. Yet the hard termination date confirmed to us that

the licensor retained ownership of the patent because the

licensor would regain all the rights transferred to the

licensee with a majority of the patent term remaining:

It was not a situation in which [the licensee] had

an exclusive license with all substantial rights

that was only defeasible in the event of a default

3 Tri-County and the Appellees dispute whether the

discussion of a hard termination date in Prima Tek II

should guide the analysis. In that case, however, we

declined to express any opinion on the significance of hard

termination dates. See 222 F.3d at 1378 (“Significantly,

the agreement does not specify a ‘hard’ termination date

beyond which the license cannot be renewed, and we

express no opinion as to the effect of such a provision on a

licensee’s standing to sue.”) (emphasis added) (internal

citation omitted). Prima Tek II’s discussion of reversion-

ary rights therefore is inapplicable.

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 17

or bankruptcy, or some other condition subse-

quent. By having rights for only a limited portion

of the patent term, it simply did not own the pa-

tent. It was merely an exclusive licensee without

all substantial rights. The ‘747 patent was never

assigned; it was exclusively licensed for only a

fixed period of years, which does not meet the all

substantial rights standard. Thus, we hold that

the Contour/Chic agreement was a license, not an

assignment, and [the licensor] was the owner of

the patent when the complaint was filed and enti-

tled to sue.

Id. at 1342–43 (footnote omitted). We distinguished

clauses, like the one in Prima Tek II, that lacked a defi-

nite termination date because “the term of the agreement

existed potentially for the life of the respective patents,

and it was presumable that the transferred patent would

never return to the assignor.” Id. at 1343.

The termination clause in Tri-County’s Agreement

does not have the same kind of hard termination date as

in Aspex Eyewear. Instead, the Agreement states that it

“shall end . . . on the termination date of 03/27/2018 or at

the end of each year thereafter, unless [Tri-County]

notifies Azure at least 30 days in advance of its intent to

renew the agreement for an additional year.” J.A. 1207

§ 7.8. We expressly noted in Aspex Eyewear that this type

of renewal cycle presumes that the patent “would never

return to the assignor.” 434 F.3d at 1343. We also note

that eleven years remained on the patent’s term in Aspex

Eyewear following the expiration date of the agreement

with no indication of the likelihood of extending or renew-

ing the license after the first option to extend. In con-

trast, only two years remain on the ’129 patent term

following the March 27, 2018 termination date. Such

short patent term life following expiration, coupled with

the rolling renewal cycle that can extend to the end of the

patent’s term, provides another indicator that Tri-County

18 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

transferred all substantial rights to the patent. There-

fore, the district court was correct in concluding that the

reversionary right in the Agreement does not suggest, as

Tri-County contends, that Tri-County retained ownership

of the patent.

After weighing all the factors, we agree with the dis-

trict court that Azure acquired significant rights under

the ’129 patent, including the right to enforce, to license,

to control the licensing and litigation, to sublicense, to

practice exclusively, and to maintain the patent. Tri-

County’s economic interests, limited termination rights,

and unfixed reversionary interest with only a very limited

amount of time remaining on the patent do not demon-

strate that it retained ownership. As the district court

found, the balance of factors establishes that Tri-County

transferred all substantial rights in the ’129 patent to

Azure, making Azure the effective owner for purposes of

standing.

B

Azure and Tri-County argue that even if the Agree-

ment constitutes an assignment for purposes of standing,

Tri-County would still be able to join suit with Azure.

They maintain that Tri-County still has interests in the

’129 patent that are in jeopardy, including its reversion-

ary interest and its interest in receiving proceeds from

enforcing the patent. Appellants’ Br. 35–36. Having an

interest in the litigation, however, does not confer stand-

ing. To bring or join suit, Tri-County must have “exclu-

sionary rights and interests created by the patent

statutes.” Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1340 (emphasis added).

Parties who “hold less than all substantial rights to

the patent and lack exclusionary rights under the patent

statute” do not have standing. Id. at 1340–41 (emphasis

added). This lack of standing “cannot be cured by adding

the patent title owner to the suit.” Id. at 1341; Propat,

473 F.3d at 1193–94 (“By contrast, a bare licen-

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 19

see . . . lacks standing to sue third parties for infringe-

ment . . . . A bare licensee cannot cure its lack of standing

by joining the patentee as a party.”).

As discussed above, Tri-County transferred all sub-

stantial rights in the ’129 patent to Azure, including all

exclusionary rights. Tri-County serves effectively as a

nonexclusive licensee. The district court properly con-

cluded that Tri-County lacks standing to bring suit, but

more importantly, to even join the suit. Because Tri-

County does not have any exclusionary rights under the

’129 patent, it lacks standing to join the suit as a co-

plaintiff. Tri-County’s standing deficiency cannot be

cured by adding Azure to the suit. See Morrow, 499 F.3d

at 1343 (“To demonstrate entitlement to join as a co-

plaintiff [a party] must have the right to exclude others

from making, using or selling the invention in the United

States.”). We therefore affirm the district court’s dismis-

sal of Tri-County.

II. “MAC Address”

Claim construction is a matter of law that we review

de novo. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N.

Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc).

There is a “heavy presumption” that claim terms “carry

their accustomed meaning in the relevant community at

the relevant time.” Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan,

Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The district

court, however, construed “MAC address” narrowly as a

local address generated by the hub, even though the

ordinary and customary meaning included either local or

universal MAC addresses. Departure from the ordinary

and customary meaning is permissible only when the

patentee has acted as his own lexicographer or disavowed

claim scope in the specification or during the prosecution

history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed.

Cir. 2005) (en banc). The heavy presumption that “MAC

20 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

address” carries its well-established meaning in the

relevant industry has not been overcome here.

The parties do not meaningfully dispute the ordinary

and customary meaning of a “Media Access Control” or

“Medium Access Control” address (commonly referred to

as a MAC address) to the relevant community at the time

of invention. MAC addresses have long been used to

identify various wireless devices. Industry literature and

dictionaries at the time of invention, which are not dis-

puted, consistently define MAC addresses as unique

identifiers. For example, the dictionary of the Institute of

Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) defined “MAC

address” as “[a]n address that identifies a particular

medium access control (MAC) sublayer service access

point (SAP).” THE NEW IEEE STANDARD DICTIONARY OF

ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS TERMS 755 (5th ed. 1993);

STEVEN M. KAPLAN, WILEY ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS

ENGINEERING DICTIONARY 459 (John Wiley & Sons 2004)

(defining MAC address as “Media Access Control ad-

dress,” that is, “a hardware address which uniquely

identifies each physical connection”). The Appellees’ own

construction acknowledges that MAC addresses are

“device identifiers.”

The claims use “MAC address” consistently with the

well-understood industry meaning: to identify a unique

device. Claim 2 recites that the “first peripheral device

identifier is based at least in part on a MAC address of

the first peripheral device.” Claim 43 recites that the

“plurality of MAC addresses [are] capable of being used

for identification in association with the first peripheral

device.” Nothing in the claims displaces the customary

meaning of “MAC address.” The specification also refers

to the term as an identifier for a device. ’129 patent,

3:60–64 (“The Hub 110 uses MAC addresses to identify

itself and the PEAs [Personal Electronic Accessory] 120.

The Hub 110 uses its own MAC address to broadcast to

all PEAs 120. The Hub 110 might also use MAC address-

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 21

es to identify virtual PEAs within any one physical PEA

120.”).

At the time of invention, MAC addresses could be as-

signed either universally, i.e., the manufacturer of the

device creates the unique identifier for the device, or

locally, i.e., a network device, like the hub device of the

’129 patent, creates the unique identifier for a given

device, like the peripheral devices in the ’129 patent. J.A.

1605, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area

Networks: Overview and Architecture 21 (IEEE Mar. 8,

2002) (within the 48-bit MAC address there is a “Univer-

sally or Locally administered (U/L) address bit . . . [which]

indicates whether the address has been assigned by a local

or universal administrator”) (emphasis added). 4 The

4 See, e.g., FRANK HARGRAVE, HARGRAVE’S

COMMC’NS DICTIONARY 313 (IEEE Press 2001) (defining

MAC as an “acronym for Medium Access Control” and

MAC address as a “48 bit number unique to each network

interface card (NIC). Generally, the number is pro-

grammed into the NIC at the time of manufacture; hence,

it is LAN and location independent. . . . Also called a

hardware address, MAC name, physical address, or

universal address.”) (emphasis added); NEWTON’S

TELECOM DICTIONARY 450 (CMP Books Feb. 2002) (equat-

ing MAC address with Medium Access Control Address

and defining as “a 48-bit number, formally known as an

EUI-48 (Extended Unique Identifier-48) . . . . The MAC

Address is programmed into the card, usually at the time

of manufacture”) (emphasis added). From these refer-

ences, the dissent gleans inconsistent definitions, which

do not exist. See Dissenting Op. 5–6. That MAC address-

es were usually programmed into a device at the time of

manufacture means that sometimes they were not. The

IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Net-

works specification simply buttresses that point. The

22 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

relevant dispute here is whether the claimed “MAC

address” should be read narrowly, as a device identifier

that can only be generated locally by the hub device,

thereby excluding the “universal” type MAC address

created by the manufacturer of the device. We see no

reason to limit this established term of art to only hub-

generated addresses. The claims of the ’129 patent do not

specify whether the “MAC address” is generated locally or

universally. The specification refers to the phrase “Media

Access (MAC) address,” and not “Media Access Control

(MAC) address.” Based on this single reference, the

district court concluded that the patentee “coin[ed] a new

term” distinct from a standard MAC address, which in

turn was limited to hub-generated addresses. Azure, 2013

WL 173788, at *4. We disagree. For a patentee to act as

his own lexicographer and give a term something other

than its well-established meaning, he must “clearly set

forth a definition of the disputed term.” CCS Fitness, Inc.

v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

The lexicography must appear with “reasonable clarity,

deliberateness, and precision sufficient to narrow the

definition of the claim term in the manner urged.” Abbott

Labs. v. Syntron Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d 1343, 1355

(Fed. Cir. 2003).

Through the single, cursory use of “Media Access

(MAC) address”—dropping the word “Control”—the

specification did not re-coin an established term of art by

redefining it to have a narrower definition than the tradi-

tional MAC address. Dropping the word “Control” was

prior art cited on the face of the ’129 patent uses MAC

addresses consistently with the IEEE specification, as

either universal or local addresses. See, e.g., PCT Appli-

cation WO 00/68811, 5:7–10 (published Nov. 16, 2000)

(describing a universal MAC address); U.S. Patent No.

6,570,857, 4:30–35 (describing a local MAC address).

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 23

not unknown to those of ordinary skill in the art, based on

other technical literature. See, e.g., J.A. 1970–71, SUSAN

YOUNG & DAVE AITEL, THE HACKER’S HANDBOOK, THE

STRATEGY BEHIND BREAKING INTO AND DEFENDING

NETWORKS (CRC Press 2004) (referring to “Media Access

(MAC) address” as a “unique address assigned to a net-

working device upon its creation by the manufacturer”);

J.A. 1978, Implementing QoS, available at

http://vonage.nmhoy.net/qos.html (last visited Oct. 7,

2014) (“MAC Address prioritizes network devices by their

Media ACcess Address (MAC Address).”). This one indi-

cium therefore is simply not a strong enough suggestion

that the inventor intended to displace a well-established

term of art. See Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 744

F.3d 732, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that specification

does not set out redefinition for “volatile memory” term

and its clear ordinary meaning cannot be overcome “by a

few passing references that do not amount to a redefini-

tion or disclaimer”). This is especially so because “MAC

address” has a “clear, settled, and objective” meaning to a

person of ordinary skill in the art. See id. at 737 (finding

that term “volatile memory” has a “clear, settled, and

objective” meaning that leaves relevant public with firm

understanding of scope “unless something exceptional

sufficiently supplants that understanding”). And when

read in context, it becomes clear that that “Media Access

(MAC) address” in the specification has the same meaning

as that of a traditional MAC address: it is a device identi-

fier. ’129 patent, 3:31–32 (“Each device is identified by a

Media Access (MAC) address.”) (emphasis added).

In reading the hub-generation-only limitation into the

claims, the district court also pointed to the parts of the

specification referring to the hub device generating and

assigning the newly coined “MAC address” to the periph-

eral devices. Azure, 2013 WL 173788, at *4–5; see, e.g.,

’129 patent, 11:2–3 (“The Hub 110 then assigns a MAC

address to the PEA . . . .”). Failing to find a reference in

24 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

the specification to manufacturer-generated MAC ad-

dresses, it concluded that the claimed “MAC address”

must be hub-generated.

Although there is no specific reference to universally

generated MAC addresses in the specification, using a

term the same way in all disclosed embodiments is not by

itself sufficient to redefine a term of art. See Aventis

Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed.

Cir. 2012); CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366. The specifica-

tion “must have sufficient clarity to put one reasonably

skilled in the art on notice that the inventor intended to

redefine the claim term.” Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms.

USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also

Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,

381 F.3d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[E]ven where a

patent describes only a single embodiment, claims will not

be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrat-

ed a clear intention to limit the claim scope.”) (internal

quotation omitted).

The statements in the specification relied upon by the

district court neither define “MAC address” nor exclude

universal addresses. The specification does not state that

a hub-generated MAC address is the actual invention

itself or that hub-generation is a critical feature. See

SunRace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298,

1305 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing cases limiting claim

language because feature “described as essential to the

invention” but declining to do so when the specification

“does not state that the cam is the actual invention it-

self”).

Moreover, nothing in the specification or the prosecu-

tion history shows an attempt to distinguish over prior art

for lacking a hub-generated MAC address. See SciMed

Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 25

F.3d 1337, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l

Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 5

For these reasons, we adopt Azure’s proposed con-

struction of “MAC address” as “an address that uniquely

identifies a device or group of devices on a shared com-

munication medium.” Accordingly, we vacate the judg-

ment of noninfringement and remand for further

proceedings, consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND

REMANDED

COSTS

Each party shall bear their own costs.

5 The district court’s construction would also result

in the hub device generating its own MAC address, in

addition to generating the MAC addresses for the periph-

eral devices. Although the specification discusses embod-

iments where the hub generates the MAC address for

each peripheral device, it is entirely silent on the source of

the hub device’s own MAC address.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC AND

TRI-COUNTY EXCELSIOR FOUNDATION,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CSR PLC AND CAMBRIDGE SILICON RADIO

INTERNATIONAL, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees,

AND

ATHEROS COMMUNICATIONS, INC. AND

QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,

Defendants-Appellees,

AND

BROADCOM CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee,

AND

MARVELL SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

RALINK TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION (Taiwan)

AND RALINK TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

(USA),

Defendants-Appellees.

_____________________

2013-1459

______________________

2 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

MAYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting-in-part.

I agree with the court’s thorough and well-reasoned

analysis of the standing question, but respectfully dissent

from Section II of the court’s opinion. The specification of

U.S. Patent No. 7,756,129 (the “’129 patent”) repeatedly

and unambiguously indicates that the term “Media Access

(MAC) address” refers to an address that is assigned to a

peripheral device by a hub device. The patent neither

contemplates nor enables any other method of network

communication. The court offers no plausible justification

for disregarding the unequivocal disclosure in the specifi-

cation and dramatically expanding the definition of

“Media Access address” to cover any address that unique-

ly identifies a device on a shared communication system.

The decision to jettison the trial court’s claim construction

is predicated almost exclusively on a purported industry

definition of the term “Media Access Control address,” but

that term is found nowhere in the ’129 patent.

I.

Over and over again, the ’129 patent makes clear that

a “Media Access (MAC) address” is an address assigned to

a peripheral device by a hub device. The patent explains

that “a single [h]ub device” communicates with multiple

peripheral devices, id. col.3 l.28, and “orchestrates all

communication in the [Personal Area Network],” id. col.3

l.33. Each peripheral device is assigned a “Media Access

(MAC) address,” id. col.3 l.32, by the hub device when it

becomes part of the communications network, id. col.11

ll.50-52. The Summary of the Invention describes a single

method by which peripheral devices are attached to the

network, a method that requires that the hub device

assign a Media Access address to each peripheral device.

Id. col.1 ll.57-61 (explaining that “[t]he unattached pe-

ripheral device . . . receives a new address from the hub

device . . . and communicates with the hub device using

the new address”); id. col.2 ll.8-14 (explaining that the

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 3

unattached peripheral device “receiv[es] a new address

from the hub device” and is “attach[ed] to the network

using the new address”). The specification goes on to

repeatedly describe a system in which the hub device

assigns an address to each peripheral device. Id. col.11

ll.2-4 (“[T]he [h]ub . . . assigns a MAC address to the

[peripheral device].”); id. col.11 ll.50-54 (“When the [h]ub

successfully receives the attach-request from the [periph-

eral device], it assigns a MAC address to the [peripheral

device].”); id. col.11 ll.55-60 (“The [h]ub sends the new

MAC address in an attach-assignment message to the

now-identified [peripheral device].” (diagram reference

numbers omitted)); id. col.12 ll.31-34 (“The [peripheral

device] waits for an attach confirmation from the [h]ub

using the new MAC address . . . and, upon receiving it,

sends a final acknowledgement to the [h]ub.” (diagram

reference numbers omitted)). Without exception, the ’129

patent uses the term “MAC address” to refer to an ad-

dress that is generated by the hub device. Nothing in the

specification contemplates that a Media Access address

will be assigned to a peripheral device at the time it is

manufactured. Instead, as the district court correctly

concluded, “what is defined and consistently disclosed” in

the ’129 patent “is a MAC address that originates with

the hub device.” Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, No.

11-CV-0139, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Tex. May 17, 2013).

The specification typically provides “the primary

guide to claim interpretation.” ArcelorMittal France v. AK

Steel Corp., 700 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also

Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653

F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“It is axiomatic that the

claim construction process entails more than viewing the

claim language in isolation. Claim language must always

be read in view of the written description.”). Here, be-

cause the specification repeatedly makes clear that the

term “Media Access (MAC) address” refers to an address

assigned by a hub device—and discloses no other method

4 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

for network communication—the court has no warrant to

vastly expand the term to cover any address that uniquely

identifies a device on a network. See Saffran v. Johnson

& Johnson, 712 F.3d 549, 560 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (explaining

that a claim term should be construed in accordance with

its “[e]xtensive, consistent usage in the specification”);

Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554

F.3d 1010, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (refusing to construe the

term “wound” to cover fistulae because such a construc-

tion would “expand the scope of the claims far beyond

anything described in the specification”). “Although the

specification need not present every embodiment or

permutation of the invention and the claims are not

limited to the preferred embodiment of the invention,

neither do the claims enlarge what is patented beyond

what the inventor has described as the invention.” Net-

word, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed.

Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

II.

Three fundamental errors infect the court’s decision to

expand the ’129 patent to cover an invention that the

patentees neither claimed nor described. First, the court

states that “[t]he parties do not meaningfully dispute the

ordinary and customary meaning of a ‘Media Access

Control’ or ‘Medium Access Control’ address (commonly

referred to as a MAC address) to the relevant community

at the time of the invention.” Ante at 20. This is incor-

rect. The Defendants-Appellees vigorously—and persua-

sively—contend that Azure Networks, LLC (“Azure”)

never established that, at the time of the claimed inven-

tion, there was a standard industry definition of the term

“MAC address” which necessarily encompassed both

addresses assigned locally and at the time of manufac-

ture. To the contrary, Azure, in its opening claim con-

struction brief, “cited and quoted two references that

make clear that one of ordinary skill would understand

MAC addresses as pre-programmed identifiers, not locally

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 5

assigned addresses.” Br. of Defendants-Appellees at 39-

40.

Azure’s problem is one of proof. If it wanted to en-

large its claims far beyond anything described in the

specification, it had the burden of coming forward with

evidence demonstrating not only that there was a com-

mon industry definition of the term “MAC address,” but

that that definition necessarily encompassed both ad-

dresses assigned at the time of manufacture and by a

local network. The simple fact, however, is that Azure

failed to adduce any such evidence. Indeed, its references

provide divergent definitions of the term. Azure relies

heavily on an Institute of Electrical and Electronics

Engineers (“IEEE”) specification which indicates that

MAC addresses can be assigned either locally or at the

time of manufacture. See J.A. 1604-07. Other references

Azure provided to the trial court, however, indicate that a

MAC address is typically a 48-bit number assigned to a

network interface card at the time of manufacture, not an

address assigned to a peripheral device by a local hub

device as described in the ’129 patent. See HARGRAVE’S

COMMC’NS DICTIONARY 313 (2001) (A “MAC address” is

“[a] 48-bit number unique to each network interface card

(NIC). Generally, the number is programmed into the

NIC at the time of manufacture; hence, it is LAN and

location independent.” (emphasis added)); NEWTON’S

TELECOM DICTIONARY 450 (2002) (A “MAC address” is a

“Medium Access Control Address” or a “MAC name” that

“traditionally is in the form of a 48-bit number, formerly

known as an EUI-48 (Extended Unique Indentifier-48),

which is unique to each LAN (Local Area Network) NIC

(Network Interface Card). The MAC address is pro-

grammed into the card, usually at the time of manufac-

ture.” (emphasis added)). The fact that Azure’s own

references provide inconsistent definitions of the term

“MAC address” belies its contention that there was a

“standard industry definition,” Br. of Plaintiffs-Appellants

6 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

at 43, of the term sufficient to overcome its “[e]xtensive,

consistent usage,” Saffran, 712 F.3d at 560, in the specifi-

cation. See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni,

158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasizing that “a

common meaning, such as one expressed in a relevant

dictionary, that flies in the face of the patent disclosure is

undeserving of fealty”).

Apparently recognizing that Azure’s claim construc-

tion argument rests on a very feeble evidentiary founda-

tion, the court creates out of whole cloth its own definition

of “Media Access address.” In the court’s view, a Media

Access address is anything that identifies a device on a

network, and it has ferreted out two dictionary definitions

that it believes support its definition of the term. See ante

at 20. These dictionary definitions are not part of the

record, however, and the Defendants-Appellees have had

no opportunity to challenge them. Even more fundamen-

tally, the one cited definition that could even arguably

support this court’s exceedingly broad claim construc-

tion—the one stating that a “Media Access Control ad-

dress” is “a hardware address which uniquely identifies

each physical connection,” ante at 20—pertains to a term

found nowhere in the ’129 patent.

Language matters. The definition upon which the

court’s claim construction is predicated is a definition of a

“Media Access Control address,” not a “Media Access

address,” the term used in the ’129 patent. See ’129

patent col.3 ll.31-32 (“Each device is identified by a Media

Access (MAC) address.”). The fact that the patentees

dropped the word “control” from their definition of the

acronym “MAC” is highly significant. It indicates that

they were not relying on any purported industry defini-

tion of the acronym, but were instead using the term

“Media Access (MAC) address” consistently with the

disclosure in the specification to refer to an address

assigned to a peripheral device by a hub device.

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 7

Indeed, any doubt as to whether the meaning of the

term “MAC address” as used in the ’129 patent was

intended to be different from any purported industry

understanding of the term is resolved by reference to

documents the inventors themselves provided. The ’129

patent was developed in the course of the inventors’ work

on a project known as “BodyLAN.” On six separate occa-

sions, the BodyLAN specification uses the phrase “Media

ACcess,” capitalizing both the “A” and the first “C” in

“Access.” See J.A. 1664, 1686, 1691, 1701. The fact that

the inventors capitalized the “M,” the “A,” and the “C,” in

the term “Media ACcess” indicates that the letter “C” in

the acronym “MAC” refers to the second letter in the word

“access” and not to the word “control” in a media access

control address. See Computer Docking Station Corp. v.

Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasiz-

ing that “repeated and definitive remarks in the written

description” can restrict a particular claim term); Ren-

ishaw, 158 F.3d at 1250 (“[W]here there are several

common meanings for a claim term, the patent disclosure

serves to point away from the improper meanings and

toward the proper meaning.”). Significantly, the

BodyLAN specification, just like the specification of the

’129 patent, makes clear that a “Media ACcess” address

originates with the hub device. See J.A. 1701.

Finally, even assuming arguendo that the term “MAC

address” is ambiguous and could potentially be construed

to cover addresses assigned to a device at the time of

manufacture, such a construction would render the as-

serted claims invalid. See Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v.

Cybex Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 1343, 1349 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(explaining that a court can “construe claims to preserve

their validity when after applying all the available tools of

claim construction . . . the claim is still ambiguous” (cita-

tions and internal quotation marks omitted)). The ’129

patent describes a system in which a hub “orchestrates all

communication” in the network, ’129 patent col.3 l.33, by

8 AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC

creating MAC addresses and assigning them to peripheral

devices, id. col.11 ll.2-4. The patent does not describe any

other way for the hub device to perform the attachment

and communication steps required by the asserted claims.

It contains no disclosure of how the claimed network

would function if the hub had to communicate with pe-

ripheral devices using unspecified and potentially propri-

etary addresses which had been assigned to those devices

at the time of manufacture. To expand the definition of

MAC address to include addresses assigned at the time of

manufacture would permit the ’129 patent to encompass a

network that the inventors neither contemplated nor

adequately described. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig In-

struments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (“[A] patent

is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of

the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecu-

tion history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty,

those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.”);

MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687

F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The specification must

contain sufficient disclosure to enable an ordinarily

skilled artisan to make and use the entire scope of the

claimed invention at the time of filing.”).

Azure cannot have it both ways. If the term “MAC

address” is properly construed to refer only to addresses

assigned to peripheral devices by a hub device, then the

accused products do not infringe. If, on the other hand,

the term is broadly and unreasonably expanded to cover

addresses assigned at the time of manufacture, then the

asserted claims are invalid. See MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1381

(“[A] patentee chooses broad claim language at the peril of

losing any claim that cannot be enabled across its full

scope of coverage.”); Liebel–Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,

481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The irony of this

situation is that [the patentee] successfully pressed to

have its claims include a jacketless system, but, having

AZURE NETWORKS, LLC v. CSR PLC 9

won that battle, it then had to show that such a claim was

fully enabled, a challenge it could not meet.”).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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