Opinion

Lake County Grading Co. v. Village of Antioch

385 Ill. Dec. 683
19 N.E.3d 615
2014 IL 115805
2014 Ill. LEXIS 1310

Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Filed: Oct 17, 2014
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 10 cases
Authority: More cited than 59.6%

The opinion

2014 IL 115805

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 115805)

LAKE COUNTY GRADING COMPANY, LLC, Appellee, v. THE VILLAGE

OF ANTIOCH, Appellant.

Opinion filed October 17, 2014.

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Garman and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, and Karmeier concurred in

the judgment and opinion.

Justice Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Burke.

OPINION

¶1 The circuit court of Lake County granted summary judgment to plaintiff, Lake

County Grading Company, LLC on its third-party beneficiary breach of contract

claims against defendant, Village of Antioch (Village). The appellate court affirmed,

holding that the Village breached the subject contracts by violating section 1 of the

Public Construction Bond Act (Bond Act) (30 ILCS 550/1 (West 2008)). 2013 IL App

(2d) 120474, ¶¶ 39-40. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Village did not

violate section 1 of the Bond Act, and, therefore, reverse the judgments of the appellate

and circuit courts.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 This cause of action arises from construction work performed in two residential

subdivisions located in Antioch, Illinois, known as the NeuHaven subdivision

(formerly the Deercrest subdivision), and the Clublands subdivision. Neumann Homes,

Inc. (Neumann) was the developer of both subdivisions. 1

¶4 The Village entered into two infrastructure agreements (the contracts) with

Neumann to make certain public improvements in the subdivisions for the benefit of

the Village. Pursuant to the contracts, and based upon section 1 of the Bond Act,

Neumann was required to provide surety bonds, the amount of which was based on the

total cost of the improvements.

¶5 Section 1 of the Bond Act provides, inter alia, that a political subdivision of the

State, such as the Village, contracting for public works above a specific dollar amount

shall require the contractor, as part of the agreement, to supply and deliver a bond. 30

ILCS 550/1 (West 2008). Each such bond is “deemed” to contain certain provisions,

even if they are not expressly included in the bond, and must provide for the

completion of the contract, the payment of materials used in the work, and all labor

performed in the work, including work completed by subcontractors. Id.

¶6 Neumann provided four surety bonds issued by Fidelity and Deposit Company of

Maryland (Fidelity) that were substantively identical. Each bond provided, in pertinent

part:

“[The P]rincipal [Neumann] shall perform and complete ***

improvement(s) to *** development in accordance with either the

plan(s)/specification(s)/agreement [prepared by Pearson Brown & Associates,

Inc. or Manhard Consulting], then this obligation shall be void ***. This bond

will terminate upon written acceptance of the improvements by the obligee

[Village] to the principal [Neumann] and/or surety [Fidelity].”

The four surety bonds totalled $18,128,827.

¶7 It is undisputed the bonds provided by Neumann did not contain specific “payment

bond” language that expressly guaranteed payment to subcontractors for labor or

materials. A payment bond generally provides that if the contractor does not pay its

subcontractors and material suppliers, the surety will pay them. See Western

Neumann is not a party to this appeal.

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Waterproofing Co. v. Springfield Housing Authority, 669 F. Supp. 901, 903 (C.D. Ill.

1987). In contrast, a “completion bond” (also known as a “performance bond”)

provides that if the contractor does not complete a project, the surety will pay for its

completion. Id.

¶8 Plaintiff and Neumann also entered into agreements for plaintiff to provide certain

labor and materials for the public improvements required under the contracts. Plaintiff

completed the work, but was not paid in full. Neumann later defaulted on its contract

with the Village and declared bankruptcy on November 1, 2007. Plaintiff last

performed work on the Clublands subdivision on December 23, 2006. Plaintiff last

performed work on the NeuHaven subdivision on April 16, 2007. On February 18,

2008, plaintiff served Neumann and the Village with notices of a lien claim for the

work it had completed on the project.

¶9 Plaintiff ultimately filed a five-count second amended complaint seeking to recover

payment from the Village. In counts II and IV, the only counts at issue here, plaintiff

alleged breach of contract claims related to the work performed by plaintiff in the

NeuHaven and Clubland subdivisions. Specifically, plaintiff alleged the Village

breached the contracts because the surety bonds provided by Neumann did not contain

actual language guaranteeing payment to subcontractors as mandated by the first

paragraph of section 1 of the Bond Act. Plaintiff further alleged that by virtue of this

provision in section 1, it became a third-party beneficiary of the contracts between the

Village and Neumann because the requirements contained therein are read into every

public works contract for the benefit of subcontractors such as itself.

¶ 10 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Village in its motion

also relied upon section 1. It asserted that based upon the “deeming language”

contained in the statute, the bonds procured by Neumann were sufficient because they

contained both completion and payment provisions as a matter of law and covered all

of the site improvements which plaintiff constructed. The Village argued that

plaintiff’s only cause of action was against the bonds themselves, but because plaintiff

gave notice of its claims more than 180 days after last working on the project, the

claims were barred by the limitations period found in section 2 of the Bond Act (30

ILCS 550/2 (West 2008)).

¶ 11 In response to the Village’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff did not dispute

that it made its notices of claims more than 180 days after last performing work or

providing materials, but argued that the limitations period applied only to a suit on the

bond. Plaintiff claimed that the 180-day limitations period was inapplicable to its

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breach of contract claims because in a case such as this where no payment bond was

procured, a suit on the bond is impossible.

¶ 12 The issue before the trial court was therefore whether the surety bonds provided by

Neumann to the Village conformed with the relevant requirements of section 1 of the

Bond Act.

¶ 13 The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on counts II and

IV of the second amended complaint for the work it performed on the two subdivisions,

but granted the Village’s cross-motion for summary judgment as to counts I, III, and V,

dismissing those counts with prejudice. As to counts II and IV, the only counts at issue

here, the trial court concluded that the bonds provided by Neumann were completion

bonds, not payment bonds, and that it could not impute the “deeming language”

contained in section 1 into a completion bond that did not specifically contain a

payment bond provision. The trial court ultimately entered judgment in plaintiff’s

favor in the amount of $246,054.73.

¶ 14 The appellate court affirmed. 2013 IL App (2d) 120474, ¶ 40. In interpreting

section 1 of the Bond Act, the appellate court held that the Act mandates the public

entity require the general contractor to obtain a bond that contains language that

expressly provides payment for the benefit of subcontractors. Id. ¶ 36. It found the

Village breached its contractual obligation by not requiring Neumann to furnish a bond

with an express payment provision for subcontractors. Id. ¶ 33. The appellate court

held that the requirement to obtain such a bond became a term of the contract between

Neumann and the Village and that plaintiff, as a subcontractor, was a direct third-party

beneficiary with the right to sue on the contract. Id.

¶ 15 The appellate court further held that the language found in section 1, which

provides that payment provisions are deemed to be included in the bond, applies only

after the public entity satisfies the predicate condition of requiring the contractor to

procure a bond with a payment guarantee. Id. ¶ 36. The appellate court concluded that

the limitations period found in section 2 applied only to a suit on the bond and that

where no payment bond is procured, this section is inapplicable. Id. ¶ 39.

Consequently, the appellate court found that plaintiff’s breach of contract claims were

not time barred because the four-year statute of limitations for construction contracts

(see 735 ILCS 5/13-214 (West 2008)) applied rather than the 180-day limitations

period contained in the Bond Act. 2013 IL App (2d) 120474, ¶ 39.

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¶ 16 This court granted the Village’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a)

(eff. July 1, 2013)) and also allowed the Illinois Municipal League to file an amicus

curiae brief in support of the Village (Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010)).

¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 This case comes before us on the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735

ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2008). The interpretation of a statute, such as the Bond Act at

issue in this appeal, is a matter of law and thus presents a matter that is appropriate for

summary judgment. Village of Chatham, Illinois v. County of Sangamon, Illinois, 216

Ill. 2d 402, 433 (2005). We review summary judgment rulings and issues of statutory

interpretation de novo. Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 417 (2008).

¶ 19 It is well settled that our primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain

and give effect to the intent of the legislature. MidAmerica Bank, FSB v. Charter One

Bank, FSB, 232 Ill. 2d 560, 565 (2009). The plain language of a statute is the most

reliable indication of legislative intent. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006).

“[W]hen the language of the statute is clear, it must be applied as written without resort

to aids or tools of interpretation.” Id.

¶ 20 At issue is whether the surety bonds provided by Neumann to the Village

conformed with the relevant requirements of section 1. If the surety bonds were not

deficient under this provision of the Bond Act, the Village is entitled to judgment in its

favor as a matter of law on plaintiff’s breach of contract claims.

¶ 21 The following portion of section 1 is at issue and provides, in pertinent part:

“§ 1 Except as otherwise provided by this Act, all officials, boards,

commissions, or agents of this State in making contracts for public work of any

kind costing over $50,000 to be performed for the State, and all officials,

boards, commissions, or agents of any political subdivision of this State in

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making contracts for public work of any kind costing over $5,000 2 to be

performed for the political subdivision, shall require every contractor for the

work to furnish, supply and deliver a bond to the State, or to the political

subdivision thereof entering into the contract, as the case may be, with good and

sufficient sureties. The amount of the bond shall be fixed by the officials,

boards, commissions, commissioners or agents, and the bond, among other

conditions, shall be conditioned for the completion of the contract, for the

payment of material used in the work and for all labor performed in the work,

whether by subcontractor or otherwise.

If the contract is for emergency repairs as provided in the Illinois

Procurement Code, proof of payment for all labor, materials, apparatus,

fixtures, and machinery may be furnished in lieu of the bond required by this

Section.

Each such bond is deemed to contain the following provisions whether such

provisions are inserted in such bond or not:

‘The principal and sureties on this bond agree that all the undertakings,

covenants, terms, conditions and agreements of the contract or contracts

entered into between the principal and the State or any political subdivision

thereof will be performed and fulfilled and to pay all persons, firms and

corporations having contracts with the principal or with subcontractors, all just

claims due them under the provisions of such contracts for labor performed or

materials furnished in the performance of the contract on account of which this

bond is given, when such claims are not satisfied out of the contract price of the

contract on account of which this bond is given, after final settlement between

the officer, board, commission or agent of the State or of any political

subdivision thereof and the principal has been made.[’] ” (Emphases added.) 30

ILCS 550/1 (West 2008).

¶ 22 Thereafter, section 2 prescribes, in pertinent part, that any party seeking to enforce

a claim for labor or materials has no right of action under the Bond Act unless the party

files a verified notice of the claim with the officer, board, bureau, or department

Public Act 98-216, effective August 9, 2013, increased the threshold amount before a bond would

be required for projects by local governments to those costing over $50,000. Based upon the effective

date, this amendment is not applicable to this case.

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awarding the contract, within 180 days after the date of the last item of work or the

furnishing of the last item of materials. 30 ILCS 550/2 (West 2008).

¶ 23 The Village contends, as it did in the appellate court, that section 1 incorporates

completion and payment provisions in all surety bonds for public construction in

Illinois, even if the bonds themselves do not expressly include such provisions, due to

the “deemed to contain” language found in paragraph three. The Village asserts that the

bonds procured by Neumann would have satisfied all of plaintiff’s claims for payment

if plaintiff had made a claim against the bonds within the 180-day limitations period.

¶ 24 We agree. Based upon its plain language, the first paragraph of section 1 mandates

that a political subdivision of the State, such as the Village, whenever making a

contract for public works in excess of the specified dollar threshold, must have the

contractor deliver “a bond” with good and sufficient sureties. This paragraph further

provides that the amount of “the bond” shall be fixed by the public official and “the

bond” shall be conditioned, among other conditions, upon the completion of the

contract and for the payment of material and labor. Consequently, this paragraph does

not require, as plaintiff suggests, the furnishing of a “completion bond” and a “payment

bond” but, rather, the procurement of “a bond” for the public work.

¶ 25 Thereafter, the third paragraph stipulates that “Each such bond is deemed to contain

the following provisions whether such provisions are inserted in such bond or not.”

(Emphasis added.) 30 ILCS 550/1 (West 2008). This paragraph continues by providing

language that ensures payment to all persons who have performed labor or provided

materials “in the performance of the contract on account of which this bond is given.”

Therefore, regardless of the actual language contained in a public construction bond

procured in accordance with section 1, the legislature has unambiguously provided that

all such bonds are deemed to contain both completion and payment provisions as a

matter of law. Simply put, we cannot envision a clearer indication of legislative intent

concerning the question before us than the language contained in paragraph three that

“[e]ach such bond is deemed to contain the following [payment and completion]

provisions whether such provisions are inserted in such bond or not.”

¶ 26 Plaintiff’s suggested interpretation is also inconsistent with the well established

two-fold purpose of section 1 of the Bond Act. First, the language at issue in this appeal

protects subcontractors for whom no right of mechanics’ lien exists against a public

body by guaranteeing payment for their labor and materials furnished to the contractor.

See, e.g., Carroll Seating Co. v. Verdico, 369 Ill. App. 3d 724, 727 (2006); Aluma

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Systems, Inc. v. Frederick Quinn Corp., 206 Ill. App. 3d 828, 853-54 (1990); Housing

Authority v. Holtzman, 120 Ill. App. 2d 226, 241 (1970). This provision assures

payment to subcontractors who make a timely demand on the bond, pursuant to section

2, who might otherwise have to depend solely on the responsibility of the contractor to

make payment for the labor and material provided. Id. Second, this provision of the

Bond Act guards the tax money allotted for public works by assuring that the terms,

conditions and agreements of the contract will be fulfilled and paid by the surety if the

contractor does not complete the project. Id. Consistent with this dual purpose, and

contrary to plaintiff’s suggested construction, the language in paragraph three of

section 1 guarantees completion and payment provisions are deemed in every bond

procured for a public project to assure that sufficient funds are available to pay both

subcontractors and material suppliers and to complete the project if the contractor does

not.

¶ 27 Plaintiff attempts to circumvent the plain language of section 1 of our Bond Act by

suggesting the phrase “each such bond” in the third paragraph applies only to bonds

which already have payment bond provisions contained therein. Plaintiff asserts that

“the import of section 1 of the Bond Act is to deem the stated language added only after

it has been established that payment bonds were obtained pursuant to that section.” It is

self-evident, however, that if a bond already has a provision for payment to

subcontractors it would be unnecessary to deem the payment language contained in

paragraph three into that bond. Plaintiff’s suggested interpretation would render the

language contained in paragraph three that “[e]ach such bond is deemed to contain the

following provisions whether such [payment or completion] provisions are inserted in

such bond or not” meaningless or redundant. See People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 594

(2006) (this court has an obligation to avoid a construction of a statute which would

render a part of it redundant or superfluous and instead must presume that each part of

the statute has meaning).

¶ 28 We note for purposes of comparison that the language found in section 1 of our

Bond Act contrasts significantly with the statutory language found in the comparable

federal bond statute. Under the federal statute, a contractor is required to furnish to the

government both a “[p]erformance bond” and a “[p]ayment bond.” See 40 U.S.C.

§ 3131(b)(1), (2) (2012) (“Type of bonds required.—Before any contract of more than

$100,000 is awarded for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or

public work of the Federal Government, a person must furnish to the Government the

following bonds, which become binding when the contract is awarded: (1)

Performance bond. *** (2) Payment Bond ***.”).

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¶ 29 Our research further reveals that, unlike our Bond Act, certain other state statutes

contain similar language to the federal bond statute which specifically requires the

procurement of a payment bond and a completion bond for public works. See, e.g.,

Tex. Gov’t Code § 2253.021(a) (West 2012) (“A government entity that makes a

public work contract with a prime contractor shall require the contractor, before

beginning the work, to execute to the governmental entity: (1) a performance bond if

the contract is in excess of $100,000; and (2) a payment bond if *** the contract is in

excess of $50,000, and the governmental entity is a municipality ***.”); N.Y. State Fin.

Law § 137 (West 2012) (“In addition to other bond or bonds, if any, required by law for

the completion of a work specified in a contract for the prosecution of a public

improvement *** the comptroller *** shall nevertheless require *** a bond

guaranteeing prompt payment of moneys due to all persons furnishing labor or

materials to the contractor ***.”); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 574.26 Subd. 2 (West 2012) (“[a]

contract with a public body for the doing of any public work is not valid unless the

contractor gives (1) a performance bond to the public body *** and (2) a payment bond

***.”).

¶ 30 In contrast to the language contained in the federal and state statutes above, our

Bond Act only requires the procurement of “a bond” in connection with a public work

and once the bond is obtained, it is deemed to include both a payment and performance

provision. This language is markedly different from that contained in the federal and

state statutes quoted above that plainly require the procurement of a performance and a

payment bond.

¶ 31 Plaintiff has not cited, and our research has not revealed, any case where a

contractor furnished a bond as required under section 1 and the court found that the

payment provisions contained therein were not deemed part of the bond. The cases

relied upon by plaintiff do not inform our decision because, in contrast to the instant

case, they either involved circumstances where the contractor failed to procure a bond

of any kind (see, e.g., A.E.I. Music Network, Inc v. Business Computers, Inc., 290 F.3d

952, 954 (7th Cir. 2002)), or where the case was based on the absence of a payment

bond and there was no discussion of whether the public entities had procured a

completion bond into which the payment provisions of section 1 could be read (see,

e.g., Ardon Electric Co. v. Winterset Construction, Inc., 354 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (2004)).

¶ 32 For these reasons, we conclude that based upon the deeming language contained in

paragraph three of section 1, the four surety bonds furnished by Neumann contained

both completion and payment provisions as a matter of law. In light of our

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determination, we need not consider, and we make no comment today, on the Village’s

additional claim that plaintiff did not qualify as a third-party beneficiary under the

contracts the Village entered into with Neumann.

¶ 33 Finally, plaintiff raises two alternative underdeveloped arguments that the lower

courts did not reach for affirming the award of summary judgment. As far as we can

discern, plaintiff initially claims the Village also violated section 1 of the Bond Act

because the four surety bonds issued by Fidelity did not cover all of the unpaid work it

performed. Plaintiff’s argument appears to be based on a claim that the Village did not

obtain any bond related to the work performed during “phase two” and “phase four” in

the Clublands subdivision. The record establishes that the four surety bonds covered

different phases of the project in the two subdivisions. One of the four surety bonds

specifically covered “phase one” at Clublands while a second surety bond covered

“phase three” there.

¶ 34 Count IV of the second amended complaint contained plaintiff’s breach of contract

claim concerning the work it performed at Clublands. This count included an attached

exhibit with a description and specific cost of all the work and materials provided by

plaintiff. Our review of this exhibit, however, indicates that it only concerns

improvements provided by plaintiff during phase one and phase three at Clublands.

Therefore, any claim by plaintiff regarding lack of a surety bond for work performed

during phases two and four at Clublands was not properly pled by plaintiff and is

irrelevant to our determination here.

¶ 35 Plaintiff’s second alternative argument is even more underdeveloped and occupies

less than one page of its brief. Plaintiff simply claims that the Village also violated

section 1 of the Bond Act because a clause in the contracts “show[s] that [the Village]

never intended to have any Payment Bonds for the protection of the subcontractors, but

that the subcontractors were to be paid solely from SSA bond proceeds.” This

argument is apparently related to the fact that the Village paid for a portion of the site

improvement costs by issuing two “Special Service Area” bonds for each of the

subdivisions. Plaintiff, however, does not provide any elaboration or real argument of

how this payment scheme involving the SSA bonds impacted it or could constitute a

repudiation of the requirements of section 1. Furthermore, plaintiff does not cite to any

authority.

¶ 36 As we have previously instructed, “a reviewing court is not simply a depository

into which a party may dump the burden of argument and research.” People ex rel.

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Illinois Department of Labor v. E.R.H. Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 56. “A

court of review is entitled to have the issues clearly defined and to be cited pertinent

authority.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. “A point not argued or supported by citation to

relevant authority fails to satisfy the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7), (i)

(see Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7), (i) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) [citation]).” Both argument and

citation to relevant authority are required. Id. Where, as here, the issue “ ‘is merely

listed or included in a vague allegation of error [it] is not ‘argued’ and will not satisfy

the requirements of the rule.’ ” Id. (quoting Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 370

(2010)). Accordingly, plaintiff has forfeited review of this issue. Id.

¶ 37 CONCLUSION

¶ 38 We hold that under the plain language of the statute, the bonds furnished by

Neumann to the Village were sufficient and did not violate the pertinent provisions of

section 1 of the Bond Act. Therefore, the Village did not breach any contractual

obligation owed to plaintiff in obtaining the bonds for the public work performed by

Neumann.

¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are

reversed, and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to enter an order

granting summary judgment in the Village’s favor on counts II and IV of the second

amended complaint.

¶ 40 Appellate court judgment reversed.

¶ 41 Circuit court judgment reversed.

¶ 42 Cause remanded with directions.

¶ 43 JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:

¶ 44 In today’s decision, the majority takes the extraordinary step of declaring that a

surety bond that explicitly guarantees a single obligation must, by operation of law, be

interpreted as guaranteeing a second obligation that is not referenced in the bond at all.

As a result, the majority holds that the Village of Antioch (the Village) cannot be held

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liable for its failure to require a public construction bond that is expressly conditioned

for completion of the contract and payment for labor and materials furnished by

subcontractors, even though section 1 of the Public Construction Bond Act (Bond Act)

(30 ILCS 550/1 (West 2008)) obligates the Village to do exactly that. For the following

reasons, I disagree and respectfully dissent.

¶ 45 The Village entered into two contracts with a general contractor, Neumann Homes,

Inc., (Neumann) to make certain public improvements. Neumann, in turn, entered into

subcontracts with Lake County Grading Company, LLC, (Lake County Grading) to

provide labor and materials for certain portions of the public improvements benefitting

the Village.

¶ 46 Section 1 of the Bond Act provides that where the State or a political subdivision

thereof enters into a public construction contract that exceeds the statutory threshold

amount, the public body must require the contractor to provide a bond that “shall be

conditioned for the completion of the contract, for the payment of material used in the

work and for all labor performed in the work, whether by subcontractor or otherwise.”

30 ILCS 550/1 (West 2008). As the majority explains, a payment bond secures the

obligation of the general contractor to pay its subcontractors for labor and materials,

while a completion bond (sometimes referred to as a performance bond) guarantees the

general contractor’s obligation to complete the construction project. See supra ¶ 7

(citing Western Waterproofing Co. v. Springfield Housing Authority, 669 F. Supp. 901,

903 (C.D. Ill. 1987)).

¶ 47 In this case, Neumann provided four surety bonds that, on their faces, secured its

obligations to “perform and complete” various aspects of the public improvements for

the Village. As the majority acknowledges, it is undisputed that the bonds provided by

Neumann did not contain any language that guaranteed payment to subcontractors for

labor or materials.

¶ 48 Although Lake County Grading completed the work specified in the subcontracts,

it was not paid in full. Neumann subsequently defaulted on its contract with the Village

and declared bankruptcy. Lake County Grading subsequently brought suit, as a

third-party beneficiary, seeking recovery against the Village for breach of its contract

with Neumann. Those claims were premised on the Village’s violation of its statutory

duty to require that Neumann procure an appropriate construction bond that secured

payment to subcontractors for labor and materials.

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¶ 49 At the time the contracts were entered into, section 1 of the Bond Act provided, in

relevant part, as follows:

“§ 1. Except as otherwise provided by this Act, all officials, boards,

commissions or agents of this State, or of any political subdivision thereof in

making contracts for public work of any kind costing over $5,000 to be

performed for the State, or a political subdivision thereof shall require every

contractor for the work to furnish, supply and deliver a bond to the State, or to

the political subdivision thereof entering into the contract, as the case may be,

with good and sufficient sureties. The amount of the bond shall be fixed by the

officials, boards, commissions, commissioners or agents, and the bond, among

other conditions, shall be conditioned for the completion of the contract, for the