Opinion

Lillian D. Gaddy v. Department of Labor

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Oct 8, 2014
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.3%

“[W]e think it clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[W]e think it clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LILLIAN D. GADDY, DOCKET NUMBERS

Appellant, AT-0432-12-0550-I-1

AT-0752-14-0313-R-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Agency. DATE: October 8, 2014

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Donald Marshall, Jacksonville, Florida, and Chungsoo J. Lee, Feasterville

Trevose, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

Carmen L. Alexander and Amy Walker, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the September 21, 2012

initial decision, which dismissed her removal appeal as settled pursuant to a last

chance settlement agreement (LCA). See MSPB Docket No. AT-0432-12-0550-I-

1 (0550-I-1). For the reasons set forth below, the appellant’s petition for review

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

is DISMISSED as untimely filed without good cause shown. 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.114(e), (g).

¶2 In a September 15, 2014 nonprecedential final order, the Board affirmed the

April 10, 2014 initial decision, which dismissed the appellant’s appeal of the

agency’s removal action, taken pursuant to the LCA, for lack of jurisdiction. See

MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-14-0313-I-1 (0313-I-1). For the reasons set forth

below, we REOPEN the appellant’s removal appeal under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.118,

JOIN these appeals under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36(b), and, to the extent expressly set

forth below, MODIFY the September 15, 2014 final order. 2

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

MSPB Docket No. AT-0432-12-0550-I-1

¶3 The agency removed the appellant from her position as a GS-11 Claims

Examiner effective May 5, 2012, for unacceptable performance. 0550-I-1, Initial

Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 20-21. The appellant appealed her removal to the

Board, which the parties resolved through a LCA. Id., Tabs 1, 10. Pursuant to

the LCA, the appellant agreed that if she failed to achieve a performance rating of

at least “minimally successful” by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2013, her removal

would be reinstated immediately and she would not be entitled to an advanced

notice period or the opportunity to respond. Id., Tab 10 at 6-7. The LCA further

provided that the appellant waived her right to appeal the reinstated removal to

the Board. Id. at 7. The administrative judge found that the LCA was lawful on

its face and that the appellant represented that she understood the agreement and

entered into it voluntarily. 0550-I-1, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2. The

administrative judge entered the LCA into the record for purposes of enforcement

by the Board in a September 21, 2012 initial decision dismissing the case as

settled. 0550-I-1, ID at 1-2.

2

The reopened appeal has been assigned MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-14-0313-R-1.

3

¶4 The agency later reinstated the removal action effective November 21,

2013, based on the appellant’s failure to meet the minimum level of acceptable

performance for FY 2013 as stipulated in the LCA. 0550-I-1, Petition for Review

(PFR) File, Tab 4 at 4-5. The appellant filed a new appeal of her reinstated

removal on December 11, 2013, which was docketed as MSPB Docket No.

AT-0752-14-0313-I-1. 0313-I-1, IAF, Tab 1.

¶5 On August 7, 2014, the appellant filed a petition for review of the

September 21, 2012 initial decision dismissing the case as settled in MSPB

Docket No. AT-0432-12-0550-I-1. 0550-I-1, PFR File, Tab 1. On review, the

appellant challenges the validity of the LCA, arguing that it was unlawful, the

result of fraud and misrepresentation, and a violation of her civil rights. Id. at 6.

¶6 The Clerk of the Board issued an acknowledgment order advising the

appellant that her petition was untimely filed because it was not received on or

before October 26, 2012, the 35 th day following the issuance of the initial

decision. 0550-I-1, PFR File, Tab 3 at 1. The order further advised that the

Board’s regulations require a filing that appears to be untimely to be accompanied

by a motion to either accept the filing as timely, and/or to waive the time limit for

good cause. Id. The appellant responded that good cause exists to excuse her

untimely petition for review because: (1) the individual who signed the LCA as

the regional director was not the regional director when he signed it; and (2) she

believed that the LCA precluded her from filing a new complaint until

November 21, 2013, when she read articles about a federal court case finding

unlawful retaliation where a company terminated an employee after he revoked

his consent to an LCA containing a waiver of his right to file future

discrimination complaints. 0550-I-1, PFR File, Tab 5 at 4-8; see id., Tab 1 at 6-7.

¶7 The Board’s regulations provide that a petition for review must be filed

within 35 days after the date of issuance of the initial decision or, if the party

shows she received the initial decision more than 5 days after it was issued,

4

within 30 days of receipt. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). Here, because the appellant

has not alleged that she received the initial decision more than 5 days after it was

issued, the last day on which the appellant could timely file her petition for

review was October 26, 2012. 0550-I-1, ID at 2; see 0550-I-1, PFR File, Tabs 1,

5. Assuming the earliest possible filing date—December 11, 2013 3—the filing

was untimely by over 13 months, which is significant. See, e.g., Bennett v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 97 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 7 (2004) (finding a more than

3–month delay significant); Summers v. U.S. Postal Service, 87 M.S.P.R. 403,

¶¶ 6, 12 (2000) (finding delays of nearly 1 month and of 15 days significant),

aff’d, 25 F. App’x 827 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

¶8 The Board will waive the filing deadline for a petition for review only upon

a showing of good cause for the delay. Via v. Office of Personnel Management,

114 M.S.P.R. 632, ¶ 5 (2010). To establish good cause for an untimely filing, a

party must show that she exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the

particular circumstances of the case. Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force,

4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980). Factors that are considered in the determination of

good cause include the length of the delay, the reasonableness of the excuse and

showing of due diligence, whether the appellant is proceeding pro se, and whether

she has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond her control

that affected her ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty

or misfortune that similarly shows a causal relationship to her inability to file a

timely petition for review. Moorman v. Department of Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60,

62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table).

¶9 First, the appellant’s contention that the individual who signed the LCA as

the regional director was not the regional director on that date does not establish

3

For the reasons discussed below, we will presume that the appellant filed the petition

for review of the initial decision dismissing the case as settled on the same date she

filed the appeal of her reinstated removal.

5

good cause for her untimely filing. See 0550-I-1, PFR File, Tab 5 at 4-5, 7,

10-13. Even if true, the appellant has not shown how this allegation relates to her

ability to timely file.

¶10 Second, the appellant’s contention that she thought she would be in breach

of the LCA if she filed a new complaint until she read the news articles about the

federal court case likewise fails to establish good cause for her delay in

challenging the validity of the LCA. 4 See 0550-I-1, PFR File, Tab 5 at 5-6. It is

well established that an appellant’s inexperience with legal matters and

unfamiliarity with Board procedures do not warrant waiver of the Board’s

deadlines. See Brady v. Department of Labor, 57 M.S.P.R. 341, 344 (1993). It is

further well settled that an appellant’s claimed misunderstanding of, and

dissatisfaction with, the terms of a settlement agreement do not constitute good

cause for her filing delay. Griffin v. Office of Personnel Management,

104 M.S.P.R. 540, ¶ 9 (2007), aff’d, 263 F. App’x 867 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

¶11 Although the appellant is now unhappy with the agreement and claims that

the agreement was involuntary, tainted by fraud, and unlawful insofar as it

allegedly violates her civil rights, she has not shown how the circumstances

surrounding the settlement agreement interfered with her ability to file a timely

petition for review. The appellant has not shown good cause for her significant

4

Although irrelevant to the disposition of the petition for review, we wish to clarify

that the LCA at issue in the articles referenced by the appellant is distinguishable from

the LCA in the instant case. In that case, the LCA contained a waiver of all civil rights

claims—past and future—against the employer company. Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission v. Cognis Corp., No. 10-CV-2182, 2011 WL 6149819, at *1-2

(C.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2011). Such prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title

VII is void as against public policy. Id. at *9-10; see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver

Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (“[W]e think it clear that there can be no prospective

waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII.”). On the other hand, a knowing and

voluntary waiver of Board appeal rights in an LCA is not void as a matter of public

policy. McCall v. U.S. Postal Service, 839 F.2d 664, 666-67 (Fed. Cir. 1988),

distinguished by Alexander v. U.S. Postal Service, 264 F.3d 1067, 1070 (Fed. Cir.

2001).

6

delay in filing a petition for review of the initial decision dismissing her appeal as

settled. Accordingly, the petition for review is dismissed as untimely filed.

MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-14-0313-R-1

¶12 On December 11, 2013, the appellant filed an appeal of the agency action

removing her for breaching the LCA, which the administrative judge dismissed on

April 10, 2014, for lack of jurisdiction based on the appeal rights waiver

contained in the LCA. 0313-I-1, IAF, Tab 1, Tab 9, ID. The appellant timely

filed a petition for review of the April 14, 2014 initial decision. 0313-I-1, PFR

File, Tab 1. Because that petition for review appeared to challenge the validity of

the LCA, the Clerk of the Board issued a show cause order instructing the

appellant to clarify the basis of her petition for review. Id., Tab 4. The show

cause order advised that an attack on the validity of a settlement agreement must

be made in the form of a petition for review of the initial decision dismissing the

case as settled. Id. As such, the order explained that, to the extent the appellant

was seeking to challenge the validity of the LCA, the Clerk of the Board would

docket her filing as a petition for review of the September 21, 2012 initial

decision dismissing the case as settled and allow her an opportunity to show good

cause for the untimely filing. Id. at 2. The order further provided that if the

appellant failed to respond within 15 days, i.e., by August 14, 2014, the Board

would conclusively determine that she had decided not to contest the validity of

the settlement agreement and, instead, would interpret the petition for review as a

request to review the April 14, 2014 initial decision finding a lack of jurisdiction

over the removal taken pursuant to the LCA. Id. at 2–3.

¶13 On September 15, 2014, the Board issued a final order affirming the

April 10, 2014 initial decision. 0313-I-1, Final Order (Sept. 15, 2014). The final

order indicated that no response to the show cause order had been received, and

that the LCA would be presumed valid and enforceable. Final Order, ¶ 9. Upon

further review, however, it appears that the appellant intended the August 7, 2014

7

petition for review filed in MSPB Docket No. AT-0432-12-0550-I-1 to constitute

a response to the show cause order issued in MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-14-

0313-I-1. As such, we modify ¶ 9 of the final order to reflect that the Board

received a timely response to the show cause order, which has been docketed as a

petition for review of the initial decision dismissing the case as settled in MSPB

Docket No. AT-0432-12-0550-I-1. As the response did not cast doubt upon the

correctness of any other aspect of the September 15, 2014 final order, no further

modification is warranted.

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the reasons set forth above, we dismiss the petition for review in MSPB

Docket No. AT-0432-12-0550-I-1 as untimely filed. This is the final decision of

the Merit Systems Protection Board regarding the timeliness of the petition for

review in this matter. The September 21, 2012 initial decision remains the final

decision of the Board regarding the lawfulness and voluntariness of the LCA.

¶15 Further, as set forth above, we MODIFY the September 15, 2014 final order

in MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-14-0313-I-1 to the extent it incorrectly stated that

the Board did not receive any response to the show cause order. Except as

expressly provided herein, the September 15, 2014 final order remains

unchanged, and the April 10, 2014 initial decision remains the final decision of

the Board.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your

request to the court at the following address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

8

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar days

after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,

2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has held

that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline and

that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See Pinat v.

Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the

United States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.

Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.

Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and

Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5,

6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court

appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of

attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for

Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems

Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor

warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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