The opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LYNDA R. FARLEY
Appellant No. 316 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 29, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-SA-0000260-2013
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 07, 2014
Appellant, Lynda R. Farley, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered January 29, 2014, by the Honorable Bernard L. Coates, Jr., Court of
Common Pleas of Dauphin County. We affirm.
While on routine patrol on June 24, 2013, State Capitol Police Officer
Michael Schmidt observed Farley driving a minivan down a one-way street.
See N.T., Summary Appeal Hearing, 1/27/14 at 4. The windows of the
minivan were completely covered with signs and posters, so that the driver
of the vehicle could not see out of the side or rear windows. See id. at 4, 6.
observed a six to eight inch television screen mounted on the front
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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dashboard of the minivan. See id. at 6. The television screen displayed a
constant live video feed of a trailer connected to the rear of the van. See
id. Farley admitted to Officer Schmidt that she had the monitor installed
because she was not able to see out of the vehicle as the windows were
covered. See id. at 9.
Based on his experience and training, Officer Schmidt opined that the
camera and monitor system were not safe and charged Farley with violating
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4527, which regulates the use of television equipment in
motor vehicles, and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(b), restricting obstructions on a
January 27, 2014, Farley was convicted of both charges and fined $25.00 for
each summary offense. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Farley raises the following issues for our review.
1. Whether insufficient evidence was presented to support a
conviction of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4527, relating to the prohibition
against television type receiving equipment forward of the
2. Whether the evidence presented was insufficient to convict
Appellant of the offense of [75] Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(b) relating
to obstruction on side and rear windows?
3. §
4524(b), relating to obstruction on side and rear windows
violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions?
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as follows.
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The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial
in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the
above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts
and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or
none of the evidence. Furthermore, when reviewing a sufficiency
claim, our Court is required to give the prosecution the benefit of
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
However, the inferences must flow from facts and
circumstances proven in the record, and must be of such volume
and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence and
The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on conjecture and
speculation and a verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail
even under the limited scrutiny of appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 275-276 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted).
Farley first challenges her summary conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
4527, pertaining to the use of television equipment in motor vehicles.
Section 4527 provides as follows.
(a) General rule.--No motor vehicle operated on a highway
shall be equipped with television-type receiving equipment
forward of the back of the driver's seat or otherwise visible to
the driver.
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(b) Exception.--This section shall not apply to the following:
(1) Television-type receiving equipment in a vehicle used
exclusively for safety or law enforcement purposes as approved
by the Pennsylvania State Police.
(2) Electronic displays used in conjunction with in-vehicle
navigation systems.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4527.
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1
-type receiving
interpretation of the term to be too narrow. The statute contains no
requirement that the television-type equipment be capable of broadcasting
vehicle consisted of a six to eight inch television monitor that broadcast a
constant, live video feed from the rear of the van. We find this device is
sufficient to co -
Farley raises an additional argument regarding the interpretation of an
as used in that subsection is disjunctive and distinguishes what types of
television equipment must be approved by Pennsylvania State Police. Given
this meaning, an exception would lie for either television-type receiving
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1
Notably, Farley does not support this assertion with evidence of record.
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equipment in a vehicle used exclusively for safety or television-type
receiving equipment used for law enforcement purposes as approved by the
Pennsylvania State Police. Farley argues that because her rear view
television set was used for safety purposes, it qualifies as an exception
under section 4527(b)(1), regardless of whether it was approved by state
police.
the Commonwealth, such an interpretation would produce the absurd result
of allowing civilian drivers to install television-type equipment, no matter
how distracting or dangerous, merely under the guise of safety. When
Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or
Commonwealth v. Cahill, --- A.3d ---, ---, 2014 WL
2921806 at *3 (Pa. Super., filed June 24, 2014). We find it more reasonable
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exclusi
to obtain the requisite approval by the Pennsylvania State Police for the rear
camera and television monitor system in her vehicle, we find the exceptions
listed under section 4527(b)(1) to be inapplicable. We therefore find the
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Farley next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her
summary conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(b), relating to obstructions
[n]o person shall drive a motor vehicle with any sign, poster or
other nontransparent material, including ice or snow, upon the
side wings or side or rear windows of the vehicle which
materially obstructs, obscures or impairs the driver's clear view
of the highway or any intersecting highway. The placement of a
registration permit upon the side or rear window of a vehicle
shall not be considered a material obstruction.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(b). Farley essentially argues that because her vehicle
could be classified as a multipurpose vehicle pursuant to 67 Pa.Code § 41.3,
which are exempt from certain restrictions regarding obstruction of side or
rear windows, her conviction under section 4525(b) was improper. Such an
could
satisfy another classification of vehicle. Farley concedes that her vehicle is
not registered as a multipurpose vehicle. See N.T., Summary Appeal
Id. at 4. This evidence was more than sufficient to support
under 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(b).
Lastly, Farley contends that her conviction under section 4524(b)
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions.
protections to equal protection and/or due process, a court must first
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Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 89 A.3d 679, 685-686 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted).
In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const.,
Amdt. 14, § 1, we apply different levels of scrutiny to different
types of classifications. At a minimum, a statutory classification
must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Classifications based on race or national origin and classifications
affecting fundamental rights are given the most exacting
scrutiny. Between these extremes of rational basis review and
strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which
generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based
on sex or illegitimacy.
Id. at 686 (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)). Rational basis
review is applicable under the Pennsylvania Constitution for laws that restrict
Nixon v.
Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277, 287 (Pa. 2003).
Section 4524(b) does not implicate a protected class or a fundamental
right. As the purpose of the statue is clearly designed to protect and
promote public safety, our review must be rational basis. Given a rational
basis review, section 4524(b) clearly serves a legitimate state interest in
ensuring drivers of motor vehicles refrain from obscuring a clear view of the
highwa
vans do not have side or rear view windows, here the distinction lies in that
signage so that her view was completely obstructed in violation of section
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4524(b). Section 4524(b) rationally addresses this safety concern. This
argument fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/7/2014
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