Spone, K. v. Spone, R.

J-A02030-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

KJETIL SPONE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

RAFFAELLA SPONE

Appellee No. 1143 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Order Entered March 20, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Domestic Relations at No(s): 2007-31635 Pacses No. 792109797

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J. FILED OCTOBER 01, 2014

K.S. (“Father”) appeals from the support order and supplemental

support order, both entered March 20, 2013, which awarded child support to

R.S. (“Mother”). Father raises a plethora of issues concerning his obligation

with respect to summer camp costs, parochial school tuition, medical costs,

and child care costs for the parties’ two minor children. After careful review,

we affirm on all but one issue as indicated below; in relation to the claim

involving Father’s health insurance contribution, we vacate and remand.

The underlying facts of the case are fully set forth in the court’s three-

part support order dated March 20, 2013, its findings and conclusions, and

____________________________________________

*

Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

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accompanying supplemental order also dated March 20, 2013, and its

opinion filed June 12, 2013. Therefore, we will provide only a brief

summary: Father and Mother were married on January 16, 1999. The

parties have two minor children:1 (1) H.S., born in January of 2000, now

age 14; and (2) A.S., born in April of 2004, now age 10 (collectively, “the

Children”). On December 20, 2007, Father filed a complaint in divorce.

Prior to the parties’ divorce, Father moved to Anchorage, Alaska with his

girlfriend in April of 2008. On November 16, 2009, the divorce decree was

entered.

The trial court set forth the extensive procedural history as follows:

On May 14, 2010, the parties appeared with their

respective counsel at a Support hearing before the Honorable

Emanuel A. Bertin. The parties stipulated to the total support for

the calendar year 2008 and the basic support order for the

calendar year 2009, but had oral argument regarding Father’s

contribution to child care, private school and/or summer camp

for 2009. On June 25, 2010, there was additional testimony and

argument with respect to child care, private school and/or

summer camp for 2009 and the amount of support for the year

2010. On July 14, 2010, Judge Bertin issued a Supplemental

Support Memorandum and Order, addressing child care, private

school and summer camp for 2009 and the amount of support

from January 1, 2010 – Forward. Judge Bertin ordered Father to

pay the following for 2009: (1) 60% of $7,500.00 for child care,

totaling $4,500.00; (2) 60% of $6,525.00 for private school

tuition, totaling $3,915.00; and (3) 60% of $1,600.00 for

summer camp, totaling $960.00. From January 1, 2010 –

Forward, Father’s net monthly income was $1,325.24 based on

his Alaskan unemployment compensation. From January 1,

____________________________________________

1

As minor children are involved in this case, we identify them by their

initials.

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2010 – Forward, Father was ordered to pay $440.00 per month

for two children plus contribute $73.25 per month to Mother for

health insurance, which totaled $513.25 per month for child

support. As a result of Father receiving unemployment

compensation, Father was not required to pay for child care,

private school and/or summer camp.

On July 27, 2010, Father filed a Motion for Reconsideration

of the Supplemental Support Memorandum and Order of July 14,

2010. In response, Judge Bertin granted several of Father’s

requests and reduced Father’s total private school contribution of

$2,628.00 for 2009. On September 23, 2010, Father appealed

[the trial court]’s August 24, 2010 Order, addressing Father’s

Motion for Reconsideration. On August 5, 2011, the Superior

Court dismissed Father’s Appeal.[2]

On October 12, 2011, Mother and Father (via telephone)

appeared before Master Arthur Klein, Esquire (“Master Klein”) at

a Master’s Conference on Mother’s Petition to Modify Support

filed on or about June 21, 2011. On November 22, 2011, Master

Klein recommended the following: (1) Mother’s net income after

legal deductions was $2,483.00 per month; and (2) Father’s net

earning capacity considering, background, education and

experience was $5,600.00 per month based on the April 15th,

2011 Contempt hearing before the Honorable Carolyn T.

Carluccio and the parties’ stipulation dated February 10, 2009,

discussing Father’s earnings. Master Klein recommended Father

to pay $1,229.00 per month for two children, plus $218.00 per

month for medical insurance provided by Mother, and a monthly

arrears of $145.00 which totaled $1592.00 per month.

On December 5, 2011, Father filed Support Exceptions to

Master Klein’s Support recommendations, resulting in a hearing

before [the trial court] on April 12, 2012. At the hearing, Mother

appeared with counsel and Father appeared pro se. At the

conclusion of the hearing, [the trial court] issued an Order,

denying Father’s Support Exceptions.

____________________________________________

2

Spone v. Spone, 29 A.3d 842 [2726 EDA 2010] (Pa. Super. 2011)

(unpublished memorandum) (appeal dismissed because Father did not

request that certain transcripts be included in the certified record and

therefore, the panel could not conduct a meaningful review on appeal).

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Prior to the hearing on April 12, 2012, Mother filed a

Petition for Sanctions on April 9, 2012. On April 20, 2012,

Mother filed a Petition for Contempt, and Mother filed a Petition

for Child Care, Parochial School and Summer Camp on April 27,

2012.

On May 4, 2012, Father, through newly hired counsel, filed

a Motion for Reconsideration with Supplemental Brief, requesting

[the trial court] reconsider its Order dated April 12, 2012. On

May 14, 2012, Father appealed [the trial court]’s Order dated

April 12, 2012. On the same day, [the court] vacated its Order

of April 12, 2012 and granted Father’s Motion for

Reconsideration. On July 12, 2012, the Superior Court

dismissed Father’s appeal.

On June 22, 2012, [the trial court] issued an Order

regarding Father’s Motion for Reconsideration. Pursuant to the

Order of June 22, 2012, [the court] found that Mother’s net

income after legal deductions was $2,637.00 per month and

Father’s net income after legal deductions was $3,672.00 per

month. [The court] ordered Father to pay $888.00 per month

for two children plus $101.00 per month for medical insurance

provided by Mother, totaling $989.00 per month. Additionally,

Father was ordered to pay $99.00 per month on arrears and

58% of all unreimbursed medical expenses. On July 5, 2012,

Father filed a Motion for Reconsideration of [the court]’s June

22, 2012, Support Order, which [the court] granted by Order

dated July 13, 2012.

On July 16, 2012, [the trial court] held a hearing on

Mother’s Petition for Child Care, Parochial School and Summer

Camp due to the timely nature and gravity of impact upon the

children. At the hearing, both parties were represented by

counsel. A hearing never occurred because counsel reached an

agreement on behalf of the parties. The Order dated July 16,

2012, granted in part and continued in part Mother’s Petition for

Child Care, Parochial School and Summer Camp. Based on the

agreement, the Order directed Father to pay $1630.30 for the

children’s summer camp in accordance with his 60%

contribution.

On August 15, 2012, Father appealed [the trial court]’s

Order of July 16, 2012, which was later dismissed by Superior

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Court on October 23, 2012. On August 28, 2012, Father filed a

Motion for Reconsideration of [the court]’s Order of July 16,

2012, which [the court] granted by Order dated August 30,

2012. On October 11, 2012, Mother filed an Emergency Motion

for an Evidentiary Hearing on Summer Camp Costs, Parochial

School, Medical Costs and Child Care Costs. On December 3,

2012, Mother filed another Emergency Motion for Father to

comply with the [c]ourt’s Order of November 22, 2011 and

contribute towards medical insurance.

On January 9, 2013, both parties appeared before [the

trial court] with their respective counsel for a one day hearing.

On the same day, Father filed a Reply to Mother’s Emergency

Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing on Summer Camp Costs,

Parochial School, Medical Costs and Child Care costs. [The trial

court] issued a Supplemental Support Order dated March 20,

2013 and a three-part Support Order dated March 20, 2013.

Thereafter, no post-trial motions were filed. On April 18, 2013,

Father filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Pennsylvania

Superior Court from [the court]’s Supplemental Support Order

dated March 20, 2013. On April 22, 2013, in accordance with

Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure,

[the court] ordered Father to file a Concise Statement of Matters

Complained of on Appeal within twenty-one days from the date

of the Order. Said statement was received on May 13, 2013.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2013, at 1-5.

Father now raises the following 12 issues on appeal:

A.

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produce adequate documentary evidence to substantiate her

testimony?

E.

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An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in

reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law,

or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either

manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice,

bias or ill will, discretion has been abused. In addition, we note

that the duty to support one’s child is absolute, and the purpose

of child support is to promote the child’s best interests.

Kimock v. Jones, 47 A.3d 850, 853-854 (Pa. Super. 2012), quoting

Brickus v. Dent, 5 A.3d 1281, 1284 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Based on our disposition, we begin with Father’s seventh claim, in

which he asserts the court erred in its determination of the portion of the

health insurance contribution attributed to Father because the calculation

was based on the total amount paid rather than the amount paid for the

Children only. Father’s Brief at 22.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.16-6(b) provides for the

payment of health insurance coverage, in relevant part, as follows:

(1) A party’s payment of a premium to provide health insurance

coverage on behalf of the other party and/or the children shall

be allocated between the parties in proportion to their net

incomes, including the portion of the premium attributable to the

party who is paying it, as long as a statutory duty of support is

owed to the party who is paying the premium. If there is no

statutory duty of support owed to the party who is paying the

premium, the portion attributable to that person must be

deducted from the premium as set forth in subdivision (2) below.

Premiums paid by a party to whom no duty of support is owed to

cover himself or herself only and that are not necessary to cover

the other party or a child as part of a support order shall not be

apportioned between the parties. If health insurance coverage

for a child who is the subject of the support proceeding is being

provided and paid for by a third party resident of either party’s

household, the cost shall be allocated between the parties in

proportion to their net incomes. If the obligor is paying the

premium, then the obligee’s share is deducted from the obligor’s

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basic support obligation. If the obligee is paying the premium,

then the obligor’s share is added to his or her basic support

obligation. Employer-paid premiums are not subject to

allocation.

(2) When the health insurance covers a party to whom no

statutory duty of support is owed, even if that person is paying

the premium as set forth in subdivision (1) above, or other

persons who are not parties to the support action or children

who are not the subjects of the support action, the portion of the

premium attributable to them must be excluded from allocation.

In the event that evidence as to this portion is not submitted by

either party, it shall be calculated as follows. First, determine

the cost per person by dividing the total cost of the premium by

the number of persons covered under the policy. Second,

multiply the cost per person by the number of persons who are

not owed a statutory duty of support, or are not parties to, or

the subject of the support action. The resulting amount is

excluded from allocation.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(b).

Here, the trial court concedes that it erred in determining the portion

of health insurance contribution attributed to Father:

Case law provides that a defendant should not be held

responsible for that portion of a health insurance which is

attributable to an ex-spouse. Mayer v. Gayer, 835 A.2d 1281,

1285 (Pa. 2003). However, it is submitted that this principal

applies only to those circumstances where insurance coverage

would be available for children only and where the premium

attributable to the ex-spouse can thereby be segregated from

that attributable to the children.

In this present case, it was difficult to determine the actual

cost of the medical coverage premium attributable to the

children only. Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(b)(2) mandates that when

the actual cost of the premium attributable to the children is not

known or cannot be verified, it shall be calculated as follows:

“First, determine the cost per person by dividing the total cost of

the premium by the [] number of persons covered [under] the

policy. Second, multiply the cost per person by the number of

persons who are not [owed a statutory duty of support, or are

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not] parties to, or the subject of the support action. The

resulting amount is excluded from allocation.” Id. This Court

concedes that it erred by not applying Rule 1910.16(b)(2) to

determine the health insurance premium attributed to the

children only. As such, this Court respectfully requests to be

allowed to recalculate the health insurance premium in

accordance with Rule 1910.16(b).

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2013, at 18-19.

Upon review, we agree with the trial court’s assessment and conclude

the court erred and abused its discretion in failing to properly allocate

Father’s medical insurance premium payments in accordance with Pa.R.C.P.

1910.16-6(b)(2), resulting in a manifestly unjust result. Accordingly, we

vacate that portion of the trial court’s order setting Father’s basic monthly

support obligation and remand for recalculation to include an appropriate

allocation of Father’s medical insurance payments in accordance with

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(b). The trial court is free to hold further hearings if it

deems them necessary to address this issue.

Turning to Father’s first argument, he asserts the court erred by

denying that Father properly objected to the Children’s attendance at

parochial school based on the high quality of the public schools in the vicinity

of their residence. Father’s Brief at 10. Specifically, Father proclaims there

was no evidence presented of a comparison between the public and

parochial schools because that was not the source of contention at the

January 9, 2013, hearing. Id. Rather, Father states the issue was the

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parties’ joint ability to pay for the children’s education and he claims he

raised this issue during closing arguments. Id.

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.16-6(d), the trial

court may direct the parent-obligor to contribute to private school tuition if it

is a “reasonable need:”

Private School Tuition. Summer Camp. Other Needs. The

support schedule does not take into consideration expenditures

for private school tuition or other needs of a child which are not

specifically addressed by the guidelines. If the court determines

that one or more such needs are reasonable, the expense

thereof shall be allocated between the parties in proportion to

their net incomes. The obligor’s share may be added to his or

her basic support obligation.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(d).

Thus, the Support Guidelines allow the court to include private

school tuition in the support amount if the court determines that

the need for private school is a reasonable one. In determining

whether a need is reasonable, this Court has stated:

A private school education may be a reasonable need for a

child if it is demonstrated that the child will benefit from

such and if private schooling is consistent with the family’s

standard of living and station in life before the separation.

If these factors are proved, a court may order a parent to

provide financial support for the private schooling of a

minor child.

Murphy v. McDermott, 979 A.2d 373, 377 (Pa. Super. 2009), quoting

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(d). Accordingly, we “are to uphold the trial court’s

decision to order private school contributions so long as the court did not

abuse its discretion in determining that: (1) the child will ‘benefit,’ and (2)

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private schooling is consistent with the family’s prior standard of living and

station in life.” Id.

Here, the court found the following:

Father asserts that [the court] erred in requiring Father to

contribute to parochial school education for the parties’ two

children as the public schools where the children reside are of

high quality. The law is well-established in Pennsylvania that in

order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must

make a timely and specific objection at the appropriate stage of

the proceedings before the trial court. Hong v. Pelagatti, 765

A.2d 1117, 1123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). [“]An appellate court

will not ordinarily reverse the court below for not doing what it

was not asked to do, but will treat matter not objected to in the

court below as waived.” Whistler Sportswear, Inc. v. Rullo,

433 A.2d 40, 45 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981), citing Logan v. Cherrie,

282 A.2d 236 (Pa. 1971). During the parties’ closing argument,

Father argued that Mother resides in a very good school district

where the children’s attendance would alleviate some of the

financial contributions. However, Father never explicitly raised

an objection to the children attending parochial school based on

the exemplary public schools near the children’s residence.

There was no evidence presented that the public schools located

within the children’s residence are of high quality and the

children would benefit from public education. Likewise, there

was no submitted evidence showing the children are not

benefiting from a parochial school education. Accordingly, [the

court] cannot consider something it was not asked to do.

Therefore, this issue is waived.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2013, at 7-8.

We agree with the court’s conclusion. Father never specifically

objected to the Children attending parochial school based on the public

schools in the area nor did he present evidence that the Children would

benefit more from the public schools. Rather, during closing argument,

Father’s counsel alleged that Mother could not make Father pay $5,000.00

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because the children lived with her and she was making unilateral decisions.

N.T., 1/9/2013, at 129. Moreover, counsel stated:

[Father]’s not a bank. And, at some point, there has to be,

looking at a situation and making a decision, that some of these

things can’t be afforded. And because we want things doesn’t

mean that we have to have them. She has a very, very, very

good school district. That would take away some of the financial

obligations that she’s speaking about, take her stress away. And

she’s clearly stressed by her financial situation. It’s got to come

out in the household. I don’t know how that’s in the best

interests of the children – and, also, not ask [Father] to be a

bank.

Id. Counsel’s statements during closing argument merely amounted to a

contention that the Children’s attendance at a public school would alleviate

some of the financial contributions for Mother. Father never objected that

the private schooling was not reasonable based on the fact that it did not

benefit the Children or was not consistent with the family’s prior standard of

living and station in life.

Furthermore, to the extent Father argues the court erred because the

actual issue was the parties’ joint ability to pay for the children’s education,

we find this argument unavailing. In reaching the conclusion that private

school was reasonable, the trial court considered the incomes of both

parties, as well as other relevant factors, including that both Children had

attended the parochial school since they were in kindergarten, stating:

This Court finds from the totality of the evidence [the] cost of

the school to be reasonable, that the children will benefit from

the same and the schooling is consistent with the family’s

standard of living and station in life prior to the separation of the

parties. Moreover, this Court finds that parochial school

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expenses are reasonable based on Father’s own testimony of his

gross annual income of $55,000.00 per year.

Supplemental Order, 3/20/2013, at 14-15. Additionally, in its Rule 1925(a)

opinion, the court expounded upon its finding:

The total tuition amount for both children to attend Mary

Mother of the Redeemer Catholic Parochial School (“MMR”) is

$6,470.00 per year, which includes Mother’s parishioner rate of

$780.00 and a tuition fee of $5,690.00. The Court concluded

that the tuition amount for both children to attend MMR is

reasonable. The record establishes that children have known

only private school. Prior to the parties’ separation, [H.S.]

attended Gwynedd Friends preschool and enrolled at MMR for

kindergarten. At the time of the hearing, [H.S.] was 12 years

old, in seventh grade and attended MMR for the past eight years.

[A.S.] naturally followed in the footsteps of her big sister. Prior

to the parties’ separation, [A.S.] attended Gwynedd Friends, a

private school, starting at age 2. Like [H.S.], [A.S.] enrolled at

MMR for kindergarten. At the time of the hearing [A.S.] was 8

years old, in third grade and attended [] MMR for the past four

years. The entire record shows that the children have and are

benefiting from their private school education, commenced by

agreement1 and encouragement of both parents. As a result,

Father was court-ordered to contribute to the children’s parochial

school education in 2009. In 2010, Father was relinquished from

his obligation towards private school tuition when Father’s

income was based on his unemployment compensation.

1

The previous Court determined that Father actually

searched out and investigated MMR and initiated steps to

select the school for [H.S.], to which [M]other agreed in

the ultimate mutual decision of the parents. Both parents

loved the small classrooms, the teachers, the warm and

friendly environment and thought it so perfect for [H.S.]’s

development that they looked at no other schools. See

Trial Court Opinion, 10/5/10, at 6.

On January 9, 2012, Father resumed full-time

employment, earning an annual income of $55,000.00 per year.

Although Father’s annual income is $30,000.00 less than what

he made in 2008 at Draeger Medical, this Court determined that

Father still has a stringent obligation to support his children even

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if it causes him some hardship or requires sacrifice. Moreover,

Father’s resumption of his prior obligation to pay parochial

school tuition serves the best interest of the children.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2013, at 11 (some citations omitted). We agree

with the court’s sound reasoning and emphasize the following:

The principal goal in child support matters is to serve the best

interests of the child through provision of reasonable expenses.

The duty of child support, as every other duty encompassed in

the role of parenthood, is the equal responsibility of both mother

and father. As this duty is absolute, it must be discharged by

the parents even if it causes them some hardship.

Kimock, 47 A.3d at 855, quoting Yerkes v. Yerkes, 824 A.2d 1169, 1171

(Pa. 2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, Father

failed to present any evidence at the January 9, 2013, hearing that the

Children’s parochial school obligation was unreasonable or that Father even

suffers some kind of hardship. Accordingly, Father’s first argument fails.

In Father’s second argument, he claims the court’s examination of the

family’s station in life and standard of living in comparison to that under

which the court initially ordered payment for parochial school was in error.

He asserts the court misconstrued his issue, stating:

The Trial Court states that Father raises an argument that the

Court’s deviation from the Child Support Guidelines was

inappropriate. While the Trial Court understood this to mean

that Father believes there was a deviation, as that term of art is

applied pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5, Father meant that the

inclusion of the parochial school expense pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.

1910.16-6(d) was an inappropriate adjustment, not that the

Court deviated from the Child Support Guidelines in the sense

explicated in Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5.

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Father’s Brief at 12 (citations omitted). Moreover, Father states, “[T]he

current financial reality of Mother and Father must be a part of the analysis.”

Id. at 13. He argues that because the Children “are not immune from the

stresses of their parents, one must wonder if the best interests of the

[C]hildren are served by continuing them in parochial school.” Id. at 15.

Further, he states “Mother has never demonstrated the benefit of educating

the [C]hildren in parochial school and if any such benefit would not be

offered in a public school.” Id.

Contrary to Father’s argument, the “burden of demonstrating a

material and substantial change rests with the moving party, and the

determination of whether such change has occurred in the circumstances of

the moving party rests within the trial court’s discretion.” Summers v.

Summers, 35 A.3d 786, 789 (Pa. Super. 2012). Here, Father is the moving

party. Other than mere allegations, Father has not presented any evidence,

as indicated above, that the Children’s parochial school was unreasonable

and furthermore, he has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that a

material and substantial change has occurred, in which he can no longer

meet his obligation regarding the Children’s schooling. We rely on the

court’s analysis as set forth in the prior issue and need not address this

issue further. Accordingly, Father’s second argument fails.

In his third issue, Father argues the court erred in finding that the

child care expenses were reasonable. While he admits that both parties will

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incur child care expenses, “he believes that it is in the best interests of the

children for Mother to explore different employment opportunities so that the

significant cost of child care may be reduced or eliminated.” Father’s Brief at

16. Specifically, he suggests that Mother “[sh]ould instead maintain

employment during the day and be home with the children during the hours

they sleep” so that the parties can reduce the amount of child care

payments. Id. at 17.

The allocation of childcare expenses is governed by Pennsylvania Rule

of Civil Procedure 1910.16-6(a), which provides, in pertinent part:

Reasonable child care expenses paid by either parent, if

necessary to maintain employment or appropriate education in

pursuit of income, shall be allocated between the parties in

proportion to their net incomes and added to his and her basic

support obligation.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(a).

We initially note that Father, in his Rule 1925(b) concise statement,

did not include the issue that Mother should maintain daytime employment

in order to reduce the childcare expenses.3 Consequently, the trial court did

not address that claim in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Therefore, Father has

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3

Rather, in his concise statement, Father states: “The Trial court erred in

determining that childcare expenses of $1,560.00 a month (for children ages

9 and 13) incurred by the mother were reasonable when said childcare

expenses represented more than half of the gross monthly salary of mother

(gross biweekly salary of mother determined to be $1,430.86).” Statement

of Matters Complained of Pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b),

5/13/2013, at unnumbered 2.

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waived this issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iv) (dictating “that

any issue not properly included in the Statement … shall be deemed

waived”). Nevertheless, relative to the reasonableness of the childcare

expenses in general, we agree with the trial court’s rationale.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court found the following:

Although the cost of childcare in this case is costly there is

nothing in the record to indicate that it is not reasonable under

the circumstances. Here, Mother has physical custody of the

children year-long because Father relocated to Alaska. As a

single parent, solely providing for the children, it is crucial that

Mother maintains her employment. Childcare expenses are

incurred as a result of Mother working overnight shifts on

Sunday, Tuesday, and Thursday from 5:00 pm until 7:00 am.

Because Father lives in Alaska, Father cannot assume childcare

responsibilities. Th[e] Court noted that maternal grandmother

cannot adequately assist Mother with childcare because she is 86

years old and her heath is unfortunately declining.

The record shows that Mother has used the same

overnight childcare sitter since 2008 and has continued to pay

her $10.00 per hour for her services, which Father contributed to

as court-ordered from June 2008 until January 2010. Th[e]

court noted that Mother researched hiring a nanny to provide

childcare instead, but the costs were substantially greater,

requiring a finder’s fee, health insurance for the nanny, and use

of a car. Additionally Father presented no evidence of

alternative childcare services or that the cost of the overnight

childcare used is exorbitant when compared with other child care

services available.

Th[e] Court concluded that the overnight childcare sitter is

beneficial in cases of emergency. In addition, the sitter helps

the children with their homework, provides meals and assists

with bedtime and early morning school preparation. Although

[H.S.] is now 13 years old (she was 12 at the hearing on

January 9, 2013), th[e] Court reasoned that it is unfair for a 13

year old, who is faced with her own adolescent issues, to be

required to produce a safe and productive environment for her

younger sister and herself. Accordingly, an overnight childcare

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sitter is in the best interests of the children. Based on the

record of this case, the childcare incurred by Mother is

reasonable and necessary for her to maintain employment.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2013, at 13-14.

The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, with respect to child

support actions, are explicit that reasonable child care expenses are the

responsibility of both parents if necessary to maintain employment. Kersey

v. Jefferson, 791 A.2d 419, 425 (Pa. Super. 2002). The record supports

the trial court’s conclusions regarding the reasonableness and necessity of

Mother’s child care expenses with regard to maintaining her employment.

Therefore, Father’s third argument is without merit.

In Father’s fourth argument, he contends the trial court erred in

accepting Mother’s testimony regarding the child care expenses when Mother

did not produce adequate documentary evidence to substantiate her

testimony. He states the court “failed to take into consideration vacation or

personal time Mother used during which a babysitter was not necessary.”

Father’s Brief at 18. Moreover, he argues the court “accepted Mother’s

representations of the children’s expenses without substantiation of their full

amount. Mother did offer some cancelled checks for a small fraction of the

total amount claimed, but because she did not issue the babysitter a 1099 or

W-2, it cannot be determined what the true amount expended was.” Id. at

19. Therefore, Father concludes he should not be “obligated to pay a portion

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of an expense for which the [t]rial [c]ourt had scant documentation to even

establish the actual expended amount.” Id.

The record reflects that Mother incurs a child care expense of

$1.560.00 per month or $390.00 per week. N.T., 1/9/2013, at 14-15.

Mother submitted checks made to the babysitter, Laura Rehak, for her

services. Id. at 13. Mother pays Rehak $10.00 per hour from 5:15 p.m. to

7:15 a.m. the following morning. Id. at 13-14. She testified that up until

the date of the hearing, the sitter had provided care for the past six years

and has never asked for an increase in pay. Id. at 12, 15. Mother also

noted there is no outside facility that could care for her children overnight

while she is working. Id. at 12.

In its March 20, 2013, supplemental order, the court indicated “Father

failed to submit proof that the cost of securing competent child care is

exorbitant compared with other child care services available in the area.”

Supplemental Order, 3/20/2013, at 13. Moreover, in its Rule 1925(a)

opinion, the court found the following:

In this instant case, Mother incurs childcare expenses of

$1,560.00 per month to maintain employment. The record

evidences that Mother submitted photocopies of checks issued to

the children’s childcare sitter, Laura Rehak as Exhibit M-3. Th[e]

Court noted that Father did not object to the admission of Exhibit

M-3. These checks, along with Mother’s credible testimony

accurately evidence that she pays Laura Rehak $10.00 per hour

for her services. The record also shows that Mother has paid

Laura Rehak the same rate since 2008, when Father was ordered

to contribute to childcare. Th[e] Court accurately determined

that Mother incurs $1,560.00 per month for childcare based on

the photocopies of childcare payments and her credible

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testimony. Thus, there was sufficient evidence for th[e] Court to

order Father to contribute to childcare expenses.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2013, at 15.

We note it is well-settled that the trial court, sitting as the finder of

fact, is free to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the

witnesses. Green v. Green, 783 A.2d 788, 791 (Pa. Super. 2001). Here,

the court found Mother’s testimony regarding child care expenses credible.

Moreover, Father could have called Rehak as a witness at the January 9,

2013, hearing but he did not. Likewise, he did not submit any evidence that

the child care expense was unreasonable. Rather, Father makes

unsubstantiated assertions that Mother has not provided proof of her child

care expenses or that what she did provide was inadequate. Accordingly,

Father’s fourth argument fails.

Next, Father argues the trial court’s calculation of the federal child

care tax credit was in error. He states that when the court used

Pennsylvania Child Support Guideline Worksheets to calculate Father’s

obligation for 2012 and 2013, it erred in its computation because (1) Mother

could only get the child care tax credit for a “qualifying child”, who was an

individual under the age of 13, (2) their oldest daughter had turned 13 on

January 17, 2013, and (3) therefore, she was no longer considered a

“qualifying child.” Father’s Brief at 20. Moreover, he contends:

Because there is only one qualifying child for 2013, the

child care tax credit is up to $3,000 instead of up to $6,000 for

2012 when there were two qualifying children. Yet, according to

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the Family Law Software, the child care tax credit was reduced

by merely $60 between 2012 and 2013. Because of this

anomaly, the calculation for either or both 2012 and 2013 is

inaccurate based on the child care tax credit. Therefore, the

guidelines should be run again.

Id.

We note that Father fails to explain how this calculation alters or

affects his obligation pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(a)(1-2). Moreover,

like his third issue, Father also did not include this claim in his Rule 1925(b)

concise statement.4 As such, the trial court did not address the claim in its

Rule 1925(a) opinion. Accordingly, Father has waived this issue on appeal.

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iv) (dictating “that any issue not properly included

in the Statement … shall be deemed waived”).

In Father’s sixth claim, he argues the court erred in requiring him to

reimburse Mother for the Children’s summer camp because he was not

consulted about these expenses pursuant to the custody agreement.

Father’s Brief at 20, 22. He relies on Horowitz v. Horowitz, 600 A.2d 982

(Pa. Super. 1991) to support his argument. Id. at 21. Moreover, he states

he “is under no obligation to continue to pay for summer camp just because

____________________________________________

4

Rather, in his concise statement, Father states: “The Trial Court erred in

calculating father’s support order as it failed to reduce the total childcare

expenses twenty-five percent (25%) to reflect the federal childcare tax

credit available to the mother.” Statement of Matters Complained of

Pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), 5/13/2013, at unnumbered

2.

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he has paid so in the past.” Id. at 22. He contends he merely did so

because he was under court order. Id.

Like private school tuition, the court may direct the obligor to

contribute to summer camp costs if it is a “reasonable need.” See Pa.R.C.P.

1910.16–6(d).

Here, Mother testified that A.S. attends gymnastics summer camp in

addition to year-round gymnastics training. N.T., 1/9/2013, at 20. Mother

stated that the parties’ other daughter, H.S., attends volleyball camp, which

she “highly excels” at and “enjoys.” Id. at 21.

The court found the summer camp expenses were reasonable based

on the following:

Th[e] Court did order Father to pay a total of $278.00 for

both children’s summer camp expenses because th[e] Court

determined that the summer camp expenses were reasonable

and consistent with the family’s standard of living and station in

life. See Holland v. Holland, 663 A.2d 768, 769 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 1995) (holding daughter’s equestrian activities were

important to her well-being and constituted “other needs,” which

were not specifically addressed by guidelines); Marshall v.

Marshall, 591 A.2d 1060, 1063 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding

music lessons, dance lessons, and racquet and swim club

memberships were reasonable needs, which were not addressed

by guidelines). Here, [A.S.]’s gymnastics summer camp

expense for 2012, totaled to $336.00 and [H.S.]’s volleyball

summer camp expenses for 2012, totaled $150.00. Th[e] Court

noted that Haley attended summer camp prior to the parties’

separating. Additionally, Father contributed to summer camp

expenses for the calendar year of 2009. Th[e] Court also noted

that Father testified that he mailed Mother $252.00 for his

children’s summer camp. Although this is contested by Mother,

th[e] Court concluded that Father’s alleged summer camp

contribution evidences his consent to contribute to the children’s

summer camp expenses. Based on the record of this case, th[e]

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Court found that the summer camp expenses for both children

are reasonable based on the parties’ standard of living.

Moreover, the children are deserving of it, as it enhances their

socialization and is a cost both parents should happily incur.

Accordingly, the best interest of the children is served by

maintaining their standard of living and station in life.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2013, at 17-18.

We agree with the court’s determination that there was sufficient

testimony that summer camp was a reasonable need based on the best

interest of the Children and the parties’ prior contributions. We reiterate

that it is the function of the trial court as fact-finder to weigh the evidence

presented and to assess the credibility of witnesses. Green, 783 A.2d at

791. The court again found Mother’s testimony credible regarding summer

camps. On the other hand, Father did not present any evidence to show

that summer camp, which has been a consistent part of the Children’s lives,

was not beneficial to them.

Additionally, Father’s reliance on Horowitz, supra, is misplaced. In

Horowitz, the wife claimed the trial court erred in failing to require husband

to pay $3,100.00 for the daughter’s summer "teen tour" across the country,

as required in the separation agreement for summer camp tuition.

Horowitz, 600 A.2d at 986. On appeal, a panel of this Court found the

claim was without merit based on the following:

Although husband agreed in other years to pay for summer

camps and related programs, we agree with the trial court’s

finding that the cross-country “teen tour” was of a far different

nature than the other camps, and at a much greater cost. Thus,

even though husband paid for other programs which were not

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defined strictly as summer camps, he was not obligated to pay

for Jennifer's “teen tour,” and the trial court found correctly

husband was not required to reimburse wife for this expense.

Id. at 986-987. Here, the record does not reflect that the Children’s

summer camps were far different from the camps they had done in the past

or were at a much greater cost. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion on

the part of the trial court in determining that Father should pay a portion of

the Children’s summer camp expense. Accordingly, this argument is without

merit.

With respect to his eighth argument, Father claims the court erred in

determining he was obliged to pay part of the medical expenses because

there was no proof of payment. Father’s Brief at 22. He states the court

misconstrues his argument as solely challenging the Children’s orthodontia

expense. Father contends his issue is “that he is being required to

reimburse Mother when decisions that led to the medical bills were made

unilaterally by Mother, he has not been presented with the bills or the

insurance coverage, and the bills may not have been satisfied.” Id. at 22-

23.

Contrary to Father’s argument, he did specify the Children’s

orthodontia bills in his Rule 1925(b) concise statement: “The trial court

erred in its determination of Father’s obligation to pay part of the medical

expenses for children as the Court accepted documentation with no proof

that medical expenses were actually paid (that is the orthodontic

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payment plan).” Statement of Matters Complained of Pursuant to Rule of

Appellate Procedure 1925(b), 5/13/2013, at unnumbered 2 (emphasis

added).

As the trial court properly noted:

The law of the Commonwealth is well established that a party

complaining on appeal of the admission of evidence objected to

in the court below will be limited to the specific objection made

at trial. Aiello v. SEPTA, 687 A.2d 399, 403 (Pa. Commw.

1996). A failure to object to the admission of evidence ordinarily

constitutes a waiver of the right to object to the admissibility of

the evidence or to its use as legal evidence. Jones v.

Treegoob, 249 A.2d 352, 367 (Pa. 1969). A party must make a

timely and specific objection at the appropriate stage of the

proceedings before the trial court. Hong, 765 A.2d at 1123.

Furthermore, this Court is free to choose to believe all, part, or

none of the evidence presented. Stokes [v. Gary Barbera

Enterprises, Inc., 783 A.2d 296, 297 (Pa. Super. 2001)].

Here, Mother submitted evidence of unreimbursed medical

expenses for the children as Exhibit M-5 and Exhibit M-6.

Exhibit M-5 included the orthodontic payment plan bill for [H.S.].

Father’s failure to object to the admission of documentation

concerning the orthodontic payment plan constituted a waiver of

the right to object to the admissibility of the evidence or to its

use as legal evidence. As a result, th[e] Court was free to

consider all of the evidence concerning orthodontic medical

expenses and determine whether that evidence corroborated

with the parties’ testimony. Based on Exhibit M-5, th[e] Court

properly concluded that the orthodontia bill corroborated with

Mother’s testimony that she paid $4,800.00 for [H.S.]’s

orthodontia expenses and the bills marked “outstanding” meant

Father had not paid his portion of unreimbursed medical

expenses.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2013, at 19-20.

A review of the record confirms that Father failed to object to the

admission of outstanding medical bills with respect to the Children. See

N.T., 1/9/2013, at 22-27. Therefore, we see no abuse of discretion with the

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court imputing the outstanding unreimbursed orthodontia expenses to

Father. Accordingly, this argument fails.

Next, Father complains the court erred in determining his contribution

to the unreimbursed medical expenses because no documentation of those

expenses was presented. Father’s Brief at 23. Specifically, he states that

according to the March 20, 2013, supplemental order, the parties were

required to produce documentation of unreimbursed medical expenses to the

other party no later than March 31st of the following calendar year, in which

the final medical bill to be allocated was received. Id. Father alleges

Mother violated the order with respect to the expenses incurred in 2012

because she never personally supplied him with the bills and he was never

provided with concrete information about the orthodontia treatment. He

contends the bills only became known to him when the “petitions” were filed.

Id. Moreover, he states that because “these petitions were filed a

significant amount of time after some of the final medical bills were received,

he necessarily objects to the untimely production of them.” Id. at 24.

Further, he states he “could not have raised th[e] specific issue below

because it was only when the Supplemental Order explicated the timeliness

requirement that Father could object that the bills have not been received in

a timely fashion.” Id.

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By way of background, in the March 20, 2013, supplement order, with

respect to Father’s 2011 income, Father’s 2012 income, and Mother’s 2013

income, the court provided, in relevant part:

2. From June 21, 2011 – January 8, 2012

…

c. The monthly support obligation includes cash medical

support in the amount of $250 annually for unreimbursed

medical expenses incurred for each child. Unreimbursed

medical expenses of the children that exceed $250

annually shall be allocated between the parties. The party

seeking allocation of unreimbursed medical expenses must

provide documentation of expenses to the other party no

later than March 31st of the year following the calendar

year in which the final medical bill to be allocated was

received.

…

3. From January 9, 2012 – December 31, 2012

…

c. The monthly support obligation includes cash medical

support in the amount of $250 annually for unreimbursed

medical expenses incurred for each child. Unreimbursed

medical expenses of the children that exceed $250

annually shall be allocated between the parties. The party

seeking allocation of unreimbursed medical expenses must

provide documentation of expenses to the other party no

later than March 31st of the year following the calendar

year in which the final medical bill to be allocated was

received. The unreimbursed medical expenses are to be

paid as follows:

1) 57% by Father and 42% by Mother. Father is to

contribute 57% of unreimbursed medical expenses

incurred from January 9, 2012 – December 31,

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2012. Accordingly, Father shall pay 57% of

$5,190.10 and $666.23, which totals $3,338.11.

Thus Father is ORDERED to pay $3,338.11 directly to

Mother[.]

…

4. From January 1, 2013 – Forward

…

c. The monthly support obligation includes cash medical

support in the amount of $250 annually for unreimbursed

medical expenses incurred for each child. Unreimbursed

medical expenses of the children that exceed $250

annually shall be allocated between the parties. The party

seeking allocation of unreimbursed medical expenses must

provide documentation of expenses to the other party no

later than March 31st of the year following the calendar

year in which the final medical bill to be allocated was

received. The unreimbursed medical expenses are to be

paid as follows:

1) 56% by Father and 44% by Mother. Thus,

Mother is to provide Father with unreimbursed

medical expenses and Father is to contribute 56% of

any and all unreimbursed medical expenses incurred

from January 1, 2013 – Forward.

Supplemental Order, 3/20/2013, at 20-23.

With respect to unreimbursed medical expenses, Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-

6(c) provides, in pertinent part:

(c) Unreimbursed Medical Expenses. Unreimbursed medical

expenses of the obligee or the children shall be allocated

between the parties in proportion to their respective net

incomes. Notwithstanding the prior sentence, there shall be no

apportionment of unreimbursed medical expenses incurred by a

party who is not owed a statutory duty of support by the other

party. The court may direct that obligor's share be added to his

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or her basic support obligation, or paid directly to the obligee or

to the health care provider.

…

(3) Annual expenses pursuant to this subdivision (c), shall be

calculated on a calendar year basis. In the year in which the

initial support order is entered, the $ 250 threshold shall be pro-

rated. Documentation of unreimbursed medical expenses

that either party seeks to have allocated between the parties

shall be provided to the other party not later than March 31 of

the year following the calendar year in which the final bill

was received by the party seeking allocation. For purposes of

subsequent enforcement, unreimbursed medical bills need not

be submitted to the domestic relations section prior to March 31.

Allocation of unreimbursed medical expenses for which

documentation is not timely provided to the other party

shall be within the discretion of the court.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(c) (emphasis added).

We note that the only part of the supplemental order that Father

makes reference to is on page 20, which actually refers to the unreimbursed

medical expenses from June 21, 2011 to January 8, 2012,5 and not the 2012

medical expenses he complains of in his brief.6 Nevertheless, as the trial

court properly found:

Father never objected to the admission of unreimbursed

medical expenses on the basis that the unreimbursed medical

expenses were not presented to Father prior to March 31 st of the

____________________________________________

5

With respect to these expenses, the court stated no evidence was

presented and therefore, Father was not required to contribute.

Supplemental Order, 3/20/2013, at 20-21.

6

Father does not reference or present any evidence regarding the 2013

medical expenses and therefore, we limit our analysis to the 2012 medical

expenses.

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years in question. As stated previously objections must be

timely and specific. Hong, 765 A.2d at 1123. The record shows

that Father claimed that Mother never presented him with

unreimbursed medical expenses or communicated about the

medical bills, but Father never specifically raised the issue that

the bills were not presented to Father prior to March 31st of the

years in question. The law has long been settled in Pennsylvania

that issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal.

Truesdale ex rel. Truesdale v. Albert Einstein Medical

Center, 767 A.2d 1060, 1063 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).

Even if Father had raised the issue properly at the trial

Court level, th[e] Court’s decision is still correct because the law

provides that allocation of unreimbursed medical expenses for

which documentation is not timely provided to the other party

shall be within the discretion of the court. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910-

16-6(c)(3). As such, th[e] Court has discretion to allocate

unreimbursed medical expenses for which documentation is not

timely provided to the other party.

Furthermore, th[e] Court noted Father’s contradictions

regarding unreimbursed medical bills. Father initially testified

that he never received any medical bills, but later admitted that

Mother attached the medical bills to her court filings, which were

served to him for his review. Th[e] Court noted that on January

9, 2013, Father filed a Reply to Mother’s October 11, 2012

Emergency Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing, admitting Mother

provided him medical bills on April 27, 2012 or at the parties’

conference on July 16, 2012. In Father’s Reply, Father stated he

would forward a check for fifty-eight percent (58%) of the

unreimbursed medical expenses beyond $250.00, which is the

responsibility of Father with the exceptions of the bill for braces.

See Father’s Reply, 1/9/13, at 5. Father’s Reply is an admission

that he received the 2012 medical bills before March 31 st, of

2013, which is the following year. Therefore, th[e] Court did not

err in ordering Father to contribute to unreimbursed medical

expenses as they were presented to Father prior to March 31 of

the year following the calendar year.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2013, at 20-21. The record supports the court’s

determination. We emphasize while Father may not have received the

March 20th order until that time, the statute is clear that “documentation of

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unreimbursed medical expenses… shall be provided to the other party not

later than March 31 of the year following the calendar year.” Pa.R.C.P.

1910.16-6(c)(3). As such, Father would have been on notice that he was

required to object to the lack of documentation that Mother provided to him

for any year pursuant to the Rule. Moreover, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.

1910.16-6(c)(3), it was at the trial court’s discretion where documentation

was not timely provided. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not

abuse its discretion when charging Father with the unreimbursed medical

expenses.

Next, Father claims the court erred in failing to explicitly consider

Mother’s personal injury settlement in its child support calculation. He

states that the official note to Pa.R.C.P. 1910-16-2(a)(8), relied on by the

trial court, did not give the court “discretion to lower the amount of the

award or analyze how the award was used. It is clear that a settlement

amount is considered income available for purposes of child support.”

Father’s Brief at 25 (citation omitted). Moreover, he states the court erred

by including the settlement award by increasing the number of Mother’s

weekly work hours based on the following:

If the $7,000 personal injury settlement was truly considered for

2012, Mother’s income would be much greater, even considering

the slight increase in Mother’s hourly rate in 2013, than her

income in 2013. An additional 2.5 hours per week for one year

at Mother’s 2012 hourly rate of $17.03 per hour only accounts

for an increase of $2,213.90 when the entire $7,000 personal

injury settlement either should have been included fully by the

Trial Court in Mother’s 2012 income or the Trial Court should

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have explained how the remainder of the $7,000 will be treated

in future years.

Id. at 26.

Pursuant to the support guidelines, the “[m]onthly gross income is

ordinarily based upon at least a six-month average of all of a party's

income.” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(a). The statute sets forth the different types

of income, which are included. Id. Relevant to this issue is income from

“other entitlements to money or lump sum awards, without regard to source,

including lottery winnings, income tax refunds, insurance compensation or

settlements; awards and verdicts; and any form of payment due to and

collectible by an individual regardless of source.” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-

2(a)(8). The official note to Rule 1910.16-2(a)(8) provides, in pertinent

part:

The trial court has discretion to determine the most appropriate

method for imputing lump sum awards as income for purposes of

establishing or modifying the party's support obligation. These

awards may be annualized or they may be averaged over a

shorter or longer period of time depending on the circumstances

of the case. They may also be escrowed in an amount sufficient

to secure the support obligation during that period of time.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(a)(8), Official Note.

Here, the court found the following:

This court incorporated the sound policy of this Commonwealth

that in child support cases a court must “consider the value and

extent of their … other financial resources.” Dugery v. Dugery,

276 Pa. Super. 51, 54, 419 A.2d 90, 91 (1980).

…

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Unlike Father, Mother was not terminated from her employment

and has year-long physical custody of the children without any

type of assistance from Father unless court-ordered. Mother

testified that she received $7,000 from a personal injury

settlement in 2012. Mother stated that she used the award to

pay bills and the outstanding mortgage on the house, which

benefited the children. Mother’s testimony indicates that she

used the funds to provide continued stability and continuity for

her and the children instead of using the funds to maintain a

higher standard of living for herself. Th[e] Court took Mother’s

testimony into consideration. To be fair, th[e] Court included

Mother’s settlement award to her income by increasing the

number of her weekly work hours from 37.5 to 40. Th[e] Court

concedes that it failed to explain how it allocated Mother’s

settlement award for 2012. Despite such harmless error, this

Court properly used its discretion to determine the appropriate

method for imputing Mother’s settlement award in setting forth

its Support Order.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2013, at 21-22.

Based on the trial court’s explanation in its opinion, and in accordance

with the official note to Rule 1910.16-2(a)(8), we do not find that the trial

court has abused its discretion in determining the most appropriate method

for imputing Mother’s settlement awards as income for purposes of

establishing her support obligation. Furthermore, other than bald

assertions, Father has not presented any case law or evidence

demonstrating that its methodology was an abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, his tenth claim is without merit.

In Father’s penultimate issue, he contends the court erred in issuing a

support order in which the aggregate obligation was in excess of the federal

statute that caps an obligor’s child support obligation at no more than 65%

of his net income. Father’s Brief at 26. First, he states the court erred in

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dismissing this claim for failing to cite authority because he raised it in his

concise statement and therefore, he did not have to cite to authority. Id.

Additionally, he argues his garnishments will exceed 65% of his disposable

income, even before his obligation for unreimbursed medical expenses over

$250.00 is considered, and therefore the court’s order exceeded the

maximum for which he can be responsible under the Federal Consumer

Credit Protection Law, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677. Id. at 27.

Here, the trial court found the issue was waived for failure to “cite

even one case in support of his position.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2013, at

23. We are compelled to disagree. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of

Appellate Procedure, a concise statement “shall concisely identify each ruling

or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to

identify all pertinent issues for the judge. The judge shall not require the

citation to authorities; however, appellant may choose to include pertinent

authorities in the Statement.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). Therefore, while it

would have been advantageous to identify the federal guideline Father was

relying on, Father was not required to cite authorities.

Turning to the merits of the claim, the Federal Consumer Credit

Protection Law provides, in pertinent part:

(2) The maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of

an individual for any workweek which is subject to garnishment

to enforce any order for the support of any person shall not

exceed--

…

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(B) where such individual is not supporting such a spouse or

dependent child described in clause (A), 60 per centum of such

individual’s disposable earnings for that week;

except that, with respect to the disposable earnings of any

individual for any workweek, the 50 per centum specified in

clause (A) shall be deemed to be 55 per centum and the 60 per

centum specified in clause (B) shall be deemed to be 65 per

centum, if and to the extent that such earnings are subject to

garnishment to enforce a support order with respect to a period

which is prior to the twelve-week period which ends with the

beginning of such workweek.

15 U.S.C § 1673(b)(2).

In conjunction with the federal statute, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil

Procedure 1910.21 addresses the withholding of an obligor’s income, in

relevant part, as follows:

(a) Immediate Income Withholding. Every order of court shall

contain an immediate order for the withholding of income unless

(1) there is no overdue support owing under the order and (2)

either the court finds there is good cause not to require

immediate income withholding or the parties agree in writing to

an alternative arrangement.

(b) Initiated Income Withholding. If there is no immediate

income withholding pursuant to subdivision (a), and nonpayment

of the support order causes overdue support to accrue, the court

shall enter an order for the immediate withholding of income.

…

(e) Notice to Obligor. Objections. A notice of entry of an order

for income withholding shall be served on the obligor. The

obligor may object to the order in writing or by personal

appearance before the county domestic relations section

within ten days after issuance of the notice. The grounds

for an objection are limited to the following mistakes of

fact: … (iii) the amount being withheld exceeds the

maximum amount which may be withheld under the

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federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673.

If a mistake of fact has occurred, the order shall be modified

accordingly.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.21(a), (b), (e) (emphasis added).

Here, Father did not file objections to the March 20, 2013 support

order, to which he takes issue in a timely manner, within ten days following

notice of the order. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.21(e). Therefore, the court did not

err in denying his claim.7 Accordingly, we need not address it further.

Lastly, Father argues the court erred by failing to explore undisclosed

financial contributions to Mother. Father’s Brief at 29. Specifically, he

states:

Assuming for argument that it was appropriate for Father to pay

a portion of the cost of parochial school, Father implored the

court to evaluate the portion of the fee for which the Mother was

responsible. Father questioned the true income of Mother’s

household given that her net pay after babysitting expenses

leaves her with very little to cover shelter, food, and clothing

expenses for the entire year.

Id.

Regarding this argument, the trial court found the following:

With regard to this allegation, Mother testified that she was not

receiving financial contributions from other sources. Father

offered no evidence or testimony to contradict her testimony and

support this allegation. As such, th[e] Court was forced to make

a credibility determination and decide this issue accordingly.

Such credibility determinations are within the sole province of

th[e] Court and there exists no evidence which would hint at an

____________________________________________

7

See Craley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 895 A.2d 530, 532-33 (Pa.

2006) (holding that this Court may affirm on any basis).

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abuse of discretion. Therefore, this error asserted by Father is

without evidentiary or factual support.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/2013, at 24.

We agree with the court’s conclusion. As stated above, the trial court

was in the position to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the

witnesses. Green, 783 A.2d at 791. Here, the court found Mother’s

testimony credible. Moreover, Father makes unsubstantiated claims that

Mother was receiving income from other sources. Accordingly, Father’s final

argument fails.

In conclusion, we affirm in part, and vacate in part, specifically with

respect to Father’s seventh claim regarding his health insurance

contribution. With respect to this issue, the trial court acknowledged its

error and requested a remand for recalculation to include an appropriate

allocation of Father’s medical insurance payments in accordance with

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(b).

Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded with

instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished

President Judge Emeritus Ford Elliott joins the memorandum. Judge

Strassburger files a concurring/dissenting memorandum.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/1/2014

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