Opinion

Travis L. Warren v. Department of the Navy

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Sep 29, 2014
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.2%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

TRAVIS L. WARREN, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DC-0752-14-0515-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: September 29, 2014

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Neil C. Bonney, Esquire, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for the appellant.

Omari O. Jackson, Esquire, Portsmouth, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed his appeal as untimely filed. Generally, we grant petitions such as this

one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings

during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent

with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting

error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal

argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not

available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this

appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the

petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the

petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM

the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.113(b).

¶2 On March 14, 2014, the appellant, a WG-10 pipefitter at the agency’s

Norfolk Naval Shipyard, filed this appeal of the agency’s December 18, 2013

action, which placed him on an indefinite suspension for failure to meet a

condition of his employment, i.e., his ineligibility to occupy a sensitive position.

Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1, Tab 4 at 8-19. Because the appellant filed his

Board appeal more than 2 months after the effective date of his suspension, the

agency moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed, id. at 5, and the appellant

moved to consolidate the appeal with another he had filed with the Board on

April 1, 2014, 2 IAF, Tab 6. In his initial decision, the administrative judge found

2

The administrative judge denied the appellant’s motion to consolidate the instant

appeal with Warren v. Department of the Navy, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-0565-I-1,

because the imposition of an indefinite suspension, the subject of this appeal, and an

agency’s failure to terminate such a suspension after the condition subsequent has

occurred, the subject of the appellant’s other appeal, are separately reviewable agency

actions. IAF, Tab 17, Initial Decision (ID) at 4 n.2 (citing Rhodes v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 487 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The administrative judge

also denied the appellant’s motion to serve as a class representative. IAF, Tab 10; ID

at 4 n.2. We find no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s rulings on these

motions.

3

that the appeal was untimely filed without good cause shown for the delay. See

ID.

¶3 In his timely-filed petition for review, the appellant reiterates his argument

that the agency misrepresented the basis for his indefinite suspension, which

improperly influenced him to not file a Board appeal of the agency’s action

because he thought it would be futile. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1; see

IAF, Tab 9 at 6-7. Specifically, the appellant argues that, contrary to the

agency’s assertions in the notice proposing his indefinite suspension, he had not

yet been determined ineligible to occupy a sensitive position, and he

“detrimentally relied on the agency’s false statement that he had lost his security

clearance and did not appeal the indefinite suspension to the Board.” PFR File,

Tab 1 at 5. The agency responds in opposition. PFR File, Tab 3.

¶4 Due to the appellant’s choice to use annual leave, his suspension was made

effective December 18, 2013. IAF, Tab 4 at 19, 22. With exceptions not

applicable here, an appeal must be filed no later than 30 days after the effective

date of the action being appealed. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(b)(1). Thus, when the

appellant filed this appeal on March 14, 2014, IAF, Tab 1, it was 56 days late. To

establish good cause for the untimely filing of an appeal, a party must show that

he exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular

circumstances of the case. E.g., Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force,

4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980). To determine if an appellant has shown good cause,

the Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of his excuse

and his showing of due diligence, whether he is proceeding pro se, and whether

he has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond his control

that affected his ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty

or misfortune which similarly shows a causal relationship to his inability to

timely file his petition. E.g., Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R.

60, 62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table).

4

¶5 In his initial decision, the administrative judge analyzed the appellant’s

assertions of good cause for his untimely filing in the context of the factors set

forth above. ID at 6-10. He also explicitly disposed of the appellant’s sole

argument on review. ID at 9-10 (citing Damaso v. Office of Personnel

Management, 86 M.S.P.R. 371, ¶ 5 (2000)); see also Duff v. Department of the

Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 146, 149 (1995) (an employee’s claim that he did not realize

that he had good grounds for an appeal does not establish good cause for an

untimely filing). If the appellant thought that the agency’s basis for his indefinite

suspension was not correct, then he could have filed an appeal, but we do not

agree with his claim that the agency misled him into not filing one.

¶6 We instead agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the agency

“properly and expressly notified the appellant that he could file a Board appeal

from the suspension and the appellant chose not to file.” ID at 10. The

appellant’s discovery of new precedent after the expiration of the filing deadline,

his discouragement about what he perceived as the likely outcome of an appeal,

or the fact that others successfully advanced an argument that he chose not to

pursue, does not establish good cause for his untimely filing. See, e.g., Olson v.

Department of Agriculture, 91 M.S.P.R. 525, ¶ 6 (2002).

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to

the court at the following address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.

5

27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has

held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline

and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See

Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.

Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.

Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and

Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5,

6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court

appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of

attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for

Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems

Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor

warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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