Opinion

Ann Marie Duncan v. Department of Homeland Security

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Aug 18, 2014
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.1%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANN MARIE DUNCAN, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DC-752S-14-0506-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: August 18, 2014

SECURITY,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Ann Marie Duncan, Riverdale, Maryland, pro se.

Lorna J. Jerome, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed her appeal of a 5-day suspension for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we

grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to

the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or

the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an

abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or

new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the

petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5

of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).

After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following

points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any

basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we

DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the

Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

¶2 The appellant occupied a competitive service position of program analyst,

GS-0343-13, with the United States Coast Guard. Initial Appeal File (IAF),

Tab 1 at 1, 8. On March 6, 2014, the agency notified the appellant of its decision

to suspend her for 5 calendar days, effective March 10, 2014, for failure to follow

instructions. Id. at 8-9.

¶3 On March 11, 2014, the appellant timely filed her appeal, arguing that the

agency failed to follow agency policy and the master labor agreement. Id. at 6.

The appellant also indicated that she was serving a probationary period. Id. at 1.

In his acknowledgment order, the administrative judge stated that the Board may

not have jurisdiction over suspensions of 14 days or less and he ordered the

appellant to file evidence and argument to prove that the action was within the

Board’s jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 2 at 2-3. The administrative judge also stated that

the Board may lack jurisdiction over an appeal by a probationary employee absent

certain circumstances. Id. at 3-5. The administrative judge afforded the appellant

an opportunity to file evidence or argument showing that her appeal should not be

dismissed for failure to make a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction, id. at 5,

but the appellant’s only subsequent submission filed below did not address the

3

jurisdictional questions, IAF, Tab 3. The agency moved to dismiss the appeal for

lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the appellant elected to appeal her

suspension through the agency’s grievance process pursuant to the collective

bargaining agreement before she filed her Board appeal. IAF, Tab 5 at 7.

¶4 The administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,

without holding the requested hearing. IAF, Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID). In his

initial decision, the administrative judge discussed the jurisdictional issues

presented by both the appellant’s status as a probationary employee and the

length of the suspension. ID at 2-3.

¶5 In her timely filed petition for review, 2 the appellant explains for the first

time that her appeal was based on a Uniformed Services Employment and

Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) filing, number DC-2014-0006-30-V. PFR

File, Tab 1 at 1. She states that she received the suspension 2 days after the

Department of Labor issued some sort of notice regarding the USERRA matter. 3

Id. The appellant did not address the administrative judge’s finding that the

Board lacked jurisdiction over her appeal because she was a probationary

employee and because she was suspended for less than 14 days. Id. The agency

did not respond to the petition for review. See PFR File.

¶6 The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary; it is limited to those matters over

which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit

Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Suspensions of more

than 14 days are within the Board’s jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512(2) and

2

On May 3, 2014, the appellant filed a pleading titled “Appellant Response to Initial

Order.” Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The Clerk of the Board properly

docketed the pleading as the appellant’s petition for review. See 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.114(a)(1) (a petition for review is a pleading in which a party contends that an

initial decision was incorrectly decided in whole or in part); PFR File, Tab 2, at 1.

3

In her initial appeal, the appellant did not mention USERRA, and, in her response to

the acknowledgment order, she only stated that she received the suspension 2 days after

the Department of Labor issued some sort of notice regarding the USERRA matter.

IAF, Tabs 1, 3.

4

7513(d). However, a suspension of 14 days or less is not an appealable action.

Lefavor v. Department of the Navy, 115 M.S.P.R. 120, ¶ 5 (2010); Stewart v.

Department of Defense, 82 M.S.P.R. 649, ¶ 15 (1999).

¶7 In her petition for review, the appellant does not allege any error in the

administrative judge’s decision to dismiss the appellant’s appeal for lack of

jurisdiction based on the length of the suspension. See PFR File, Tab 1. Based

on our review of the record, we discern no error in the administrative judge’s

decision. ID at 3; see Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997)

(finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings where the

administrative judge considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate

inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health

& Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).

¶8 Regarding the appellant’s status as a probationary employee, as the

administrative judge correctly explained, an individual serving in her

probationary period may appeal a termination for reasons arising prior to the

employee’s appointment if it was not effected in accordance with 5 C.F.R.

§ 315.805, or a termination for post-appointment reasons if it is based on partisan

political reasons or marital status. ID at 2; 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(b)-(c); Merian v.

Department of the Navy, 107 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 4 (2007). The appellant indicated

on her appeal form that she was serving a probationary period, IAF, Tab 1 at 1,

and, despite being informed of the jurisdictional issue and being afforded the

opportunity to file evidence and argument sufficient to meet her burden to

nonfrivolously allege that she had Board appeal rights, IAF, Tab 2 at 3-5, the

appellant failed to respond. The appellant does not raise this matter in her

petition for review.

¶9 The appellant also indicated on her appeal form that she had 4 years of

government service, IAF, Tab 1 at 1, which could suggest that she was not a

5

probationary employee. We need not resolve this issue, however, because it is

clear that the Board lacks jurisdiction over an appeal of a 5-day suspension. 4

¶10 In sum, we find that the administrative judge properly dismissed the

appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As discussed above, in her petition for

review, the appellant states, for the first time, her apparent desire to file an appeal

under USERRA. PFR File, Tab 1. Accordingly, we forward this matter to the

Washington Regional Office for the docketing of a new USERRA appeal. See

Maibaum v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶ 20 (2011)

(forwarding a USERRA claim to the regional office for docketing).

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to

the court at the following address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.

27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has

held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline

and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See

Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

4

Because the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on other

grounds, it was within his discretion not to address the agency’s alternative argument

raised below that the appeal should be dismissed based on the appellant’s election of

remedies. See Wagner v. Environmental Protection Agency, 51 M.S.P.R. 337, 352

(1991), aff’d, 972 F.2d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Table) (an administrative judge need not

cite every possible alternative basis for the disposition of an appeal, when the basis that

he does cite suffices as legal support for his decision).

6

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.

Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.

Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and

Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5,

6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court

appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of

attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for

Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems

Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor

warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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