Opinion

Rita Joves v. United States Postal Service

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Sep 10, 2014
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.1%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

RITA JOVES, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, SF-0353-13-4238-I-1

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: September 10, 2014

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Guillermo Mojarro, Upland, California, for the appellant.

Catherine V. Meek, Long Beach, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed her restoration appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant

petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to

the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or

the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an

abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or

new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the

petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5

of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).

After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following

points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any

basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we

DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the

Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant is an employee who has partially recovered from

compensable injuries she suffered in 2003 and 2008. Initial Appeal File (IAF),

Tab 6 at 11. In April 2013, she was given a limited duty assignment in the Los

Angeles Customer Call Center. See IAF, Tab 3 at 5-6, Tab 5 at 6. 2 On July 22,

2013, that limited duty assignment was ended and the appellant was instructed to

report to a “stand by” position in the manager district office. See IAF, Tab 5 at 6.

She did so, without being given any actual duties until August 21, 2013, when the

appellant accepted the agency’s offer of a limited duty assignment as a Customer

Care Agent. See IAF, Tab 5 at 4-6, Tab 6 at 11-12. It was undisputed that the

appellant was in a pay status during the period from July 22, to August 21, 2013.

See IAF, Tab 6 at 14-28.

2

The April 2013 offer and acceptance of this limited duty assignment is documented in

Tab 24 (at 89) of the Initial Appeal File of MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-12-0654-B-1,

which concerns an alleged denial of restoration in June 2012.

3

¶3 The appellant alleged that, during the period from July 22, to August 21,

2013, she was directed to stay in a particular management office for 8 hours per

day, except to use the restroom, and was not allowed to use the phone to talk with

anyone or to be out on the floor. IAF, Tab 5 at 6. She alleged that the

“segregation which she was subjected to was abusive and akin to [being]

tortured” and that the circumstances of her treatment during this period were so

unreasonable as to amount to a denial of restoration. Id. at 4-5. The

administrative judge noted that the Board has found that a job offer may be

tantamount to a denial of restoration when the duties offered are outside an

employee’s medical restrictions but found that this case did not involve such an

offer. IAF, Tab 9, Initial Decision (ID) at 7. The administrative judge

acknowledged the appellant’s contention that placing her in the management

office without duties was “akin to [being] tortured” but concluded that the

appellant’s placement into a full-time paid stand-by status for an interim period

was not tantamount to a denial of restoration. ID at 7.

¶4 In a timely filed petition for review, the appellant makes the same

contentions she made below. Petition for Review File, Tab 1.

ANALYSIS

¶5 As the administrative judge indicated, one of the requirements in

establishing jurisdiction over an appeal under 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c) is that the

agency have denied an employee’s request for restoration. Latham v. U.S. Postal

Service, 117 M.S.P.R. 400, ¶ 10 (2012). The Board has ruled that a job offer may

be deemed tantamount to a denial of restoration if the offered duties are outside

the employee’s medical restrictions. Paszko v. U.S. Postal Service, 119 M.S.P.R.

207, ¶ 9 (2013). We are aware of no cases, and the appellant has identified none,

in which the Board has found a denial of restoration for a period in which the

appellant was in a full pay status. Accordingly, we affirm the administrative

judge’s determination that the Board lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.

4

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to

the court at the following address:

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec.

27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has

held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline

and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See

Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff.

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.

Additional information is available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov.

Of particular relevance is the court's "Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and

Appellants," which is contained within the court's Rules of Practice, and Forms 5,

6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your court

appeal, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of

attorneys who have expressed interest in providing pro bono representation for

Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the court. The Merit Systems

5

Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor

warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.