Opinion

Annette Davis v. Department of the Interior

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Aug 15, 2014
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANNETTE DAVIS, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, AT-0752-09-0860-E-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, DATE: August 15, 2014

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Adam J. Conti, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant.

Isaiah D. Delemar, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has referred this

appeal of the appellant’s removal to the Board for further consideration pursuant

to 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(5)(B) because the EEOC’s decision on the appellant’s

affirmative defense of retaliation for protected equal employment opportunity

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

(EEO) activity differs from the Board’s decision in this case. For the following

reasons, we CONCUR IN and ADOPT the EEOC’s decision, and FORWARD the

appeal to the regional office for adjudication of the appellant’s claim for

compensatory damages. The agency’s removal action is NOT SUSTAINED.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant was removed from her Fiscal Officer position, effective July

19, 2009, based on three specifications of failure to comply with proper

directives. In effecting the action, the agency considered the appellant’s past

disciplinary record for failure to comply with proper orders, including a 10-day

suspension and a 30-day suspension. On appeal, the appellant challenged the

action and alleged that it was based on race (African-American) and sex

discrimination and was taken in retaliation for her having filed an EEO

complaint. Her request for relief included, inter alia, a claim for compensatory

damages. Initial Appeal File, Tab 1 at 3. Following a hearing, the administrative

judge issued an initial decision in which he found that the agency had proven all

three specifications and therefore the charge of failure to comply with proper

directives. Initial Decision (ID) at 5-8. The administrative judge also found that

the appellant did not prove her affirmative defense of retaliation for protected

EEO activity. 2 ID at 8-12. Specifically he found that, because there had been a

hearing and the record was complete, the ultimate question was whether, upon

weighing all of the evidence, the appellant met her overall burden of proving

illegal retaliation. ID at 8-9. The administrative judge then found that, because

the appellant relied upon circumstantial evidence to prove her claim, she was

required to provide evidence showing a “convincing mosaic” of retaliation against

2

During adjudication, the administrative judge struck the appellant’s discrimination

claims on the basis that she had not alleged facts which, if proven, would establish a

prima facie case of either claim.

3

her, but failed to do so. ID at 9-12. Finding the penalty reasonable, the

administrative judge affirmed the agency’s action. ID at 13.

¶3 On petition for review, the full Board affirmed the administrative judge’s

findings regarding the three specifications and the charge. Davis v. Department

of the Interior, 114 M.S.P.R. 527, ¶ 5 (2010). The Board discerned no error in,

and affirmed, the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to

establish her claim of retaliation. The Board found, however, that the

administrative judge erred in handling the appellant’s affirmative defenses of race

and sex discrimination, id., and it remanded the case to allow her to submit

evidence and argument concerning those claims and to request a hearing, and for

the administrative judge to issue a supplemental initial decision on those claims.

Id., ¶ 14. On remand, the administrative judge accepted into the record a copy of

a decision by an EEOC administrative judge on the appellant’s complaint, finding

that the agency had subjected her to a hostile work environment because of her

race and sex, and in retaliation for her prior EEO activity, from late September

2006 to the end of 2007. 3 Davis v. Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No.

AT-0752-09-0860-B-1, Supplemental Initial Decision (SID) at 2 (July 11, 2011).

However, the administrative judge attached little significance to the EEOC

administrative judge’s findings, reasoning that the removal was unrelated and too

far removed from the 2006-2007 matters considered by the EEOC administrative

judge. SID at 9-10. The Board’s administrative judge found that the appellant

failed to prove that the agency’s decision to remove her was a pretext for

discrimination on the basis of race or sex, SID at 5-11, and that removal remained

3

The agency did not appeal the EEOC administrative judge’s decision to the Office of

Federal Operations. As part of his award, the EEOC administrative judge ordered the

agency to remove the 10-day suspension from the appellant’s personnel records. SID

at 3 n.1.

4

a reasonable penalty, 4 SID at 11-12. The supplemental initial decision became

the Board’s final decision on August 15, 2011, when neither party filed a petition

for review.

¶4 The appellant then filed a petition for review with the EEOC. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 7702(b)(1); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.157. She challenged the administrative judge’s

formulation of the “convincing mosaic” evidentiary standard for establishing

retaliation, arguing that it is greater than the “preponderance of the evidence”

burden required to prove Title VII claims, and she argued that the EEOC should

reject the administrative judge’s formulation of the standard.

¶5 In its decision, the EEOC first clarified its view about the role of the

“convincing mosaic” in federal sector retaliation cases. Davis v. Department of

the Interior, EEOC Petition No. 0320110050 at 11-12 (July 16, 2014). The

EEOC explained that the “convincing mosaic” is “a useful way to describe how

several facts may add up to sufficient evidence to discredit an employer’s

explanation and demonstrate a causal connection between the prior protected

activity and the challenged adverse action.” Id. at 12. The EEOC stated that it

did not intend to promulgate a new standard whereby circumstantial evidence in a

retaliation case must have a mosaic-like character, or to require appellants to

meet a more demanding evidentiary standard, and that it also did not intend to

state a preference for one evidentiary framework over another, but, rather to

indicate that, under certain evidentiary scenarios, the “convincing mosaic” can

serve as a useful option for establishing the causal connection in retaliation cases.

The EEOC found that the Board’s administrative judge erred in insisting that an

appellant “must” provide evidence showing a “convincing mosaic” of retaliation

in order to prove retaliation using circumstantial evidence. Id.

4

The administrative judge noted that, after the EEOC administrative judge invalidated

the 10-day suspension, the agency issued a new penalty determination, but concluded

that removal remained appropriate. SID at 11.

5

¶6 The EEOC then reviewed the evidentiary record and found that the agency’s

articulated reason for removing the appellant was not legitimate. Id. at 13. The

EEOC found that the agency explicitly relied on the supervisor’s preceding

harassing conduct of the appellant, including past disciplinary actions, to justify

removing her, but that at least one past action, a 10-day suspension, was

invalidated by an EEOC administrative judge as discriminatory, and that

supervisors may not use their past discriminatory actions as a basis for

“subjecting their victims to new adverse actions.” Id. The EEOC then found

significant evidence that the appellant’s first-line supervisor harassed her

beginning in 2006 and 2007 and continuing until the date of her removal. The

harassment included evidence that the supervisor belittled the appellant during

meetings, told her numerous times to find a new job, refused her requests to be

downgraded in position in an effort to escape the harassment, excessively and

unjustifiably disciplined her for failing to follow trivial and erratic “directives,”

and twice tried to use discriminatory disciplinary actions as a means to remove

her. Id. at 14. Further, the EEOC found no evidence that the supervisor

improved her conduct towards the appellant over the years or that the agency

undertook any corrective action or other remedial measures to stop the

supervisor’s harassment of the appellant and ensure that it would not recur. Id.

For these reasons, the EEOC concluded that the record evidence clearly

established a nexus between the supervisor’s preceding harassing conduct and her

subsequent removal of the appellant. Id. at 13-15.

¶7 The EEOC thus differed with the Board’s final decision, concluding that it

constitutes an incorrect interpretation of the laws, rules, regulations, and policies

governing the issue of retaliation for protected activity, and is not supported by

the evidence in the record as a whole. Id. at 15.

6

ANALYSIS

¶8 In Ignacio v. U.S. Postal Service, 30 M.S.P.R. 471, 486 (Spec. Pan. 1986),

the Special Panel held that the Board is permitted to disagree with the EEOC only

as to misinterpretation of civil service law. Thus, the Board may not force

Special Panel review of an EEOC decision merely because the Board disagrees on

discrimination law unless the EEOC decision depends on civil service law for its

support or is so unreasonable that it amounts to a violation of civil service law.

Id.; see Parks v. U.S. Postal Service, 110 M.S.P.R. 64, ¶ 6 (2008), aff’d as

modified by 113 M.S.P.R. 60 (2010); Randel v. Department of the Navy,

72 M.S.P.R. 288, 290 (1996); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.162(a).

¶9 Here, the EEOC decision rests upon an interpretation of discrimination law,

specifically, a clarification of the law pertaining to retaliation for protected EEO

activity and the application of that law to the facts of this case. Further, the

EEOC decision is not so unreasonable that it amounts to a violation of civil

service law. Thus, under Ignacio, the Board lacks the authority to disagree with

the EEOC’s decision. We therefore CONCUR IN and ADOPT the decision

finding that the agency retaliated against the appellant based on her prior EEO

activity.

ORDER

¶10 Accordingly, we FORWARD this appeal to the regional office for

adjudication of the appellant’s claim for compensatory damages. The

administrative judge shall permit the appellant to present evidence and argument

in support of her claim and shall issue a decision resolving the claims. See

Edwards v. Department of Transportation, 112 M.S.P.R. 82, ¶ 21 (2009).

¶11 We ORDER the agency to carry out the EEOC’s decision by canceling the

appellant’s removal and restoring her, effective July 18, 2009. See Kerr v.

National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency

must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision.

7

¶12 We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back

pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel

Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this

decision. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); Edwards, 112 M.S.P.R. 82, ¶ 17.

We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s efforts to

calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to provide all

necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order.

If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due, and/or other

benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed amount no

later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.

¶13 We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing

when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it

took to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask the

agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).

¶14 No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully

carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement

with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant

believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition

should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not

fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of

any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

¶15 For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance

Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and

Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation

necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision

are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all

documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the

Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be

made within the 60-day period set forth above.

8

¶16 This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board concurring

in and adopting the EEOC’s decision. Title 5 of the United States Code, section

7703(a)(1) (5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1)). It is not a final decision on the issue of the

appellant’s entitlement to compensatory damages because that issue has been

forwarded to the regional office for adjudication.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST

COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your compensatory

damages, including pecuniary losses, future pecuniary losses, and nonpecuniary

losses, such as emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss

of enjoyment of life. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at

42 U.S.C. § 1981a. The regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201,

1201.202, and 1201.204. If you believe you meet these requirements, you must

file a motion for compensatory damages WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF

THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. You must file your motion with the office that

issued the initial decision in your appeal.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney

fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at Title 5 of

the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The

regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If

you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees

WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. You

must file your attorney fees motion with the office that issued the initial decision

on your appeal.

9

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request further review of this final decision.

Discrimination Claims: Administrative Review

You may request review of this final decision on your discrimination

claims by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Title 5

of the United States Code, section 7702(b)(1) (5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1)). If you

submit your request by regular U.S. mail, the address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit your request via commercial delivery or by a method

requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, NE

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

You should send your request to EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after

your receipt of this order. If you have a representative in this case, and your

representative receives this order before you do, then you must file with EEOC no

later than 30 calendar days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to

file, be very careful to file on time.

Discrimination and Other Claims: Judicial Action

If you do not request EEOC to review this final decision on your

discrimination claims, you may file a civil action against the agency on both your

discrimination claims and your other claims in an appropriate United States

district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). You must file your civil action with

the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your receipt of this order. If

you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this order

10

before you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar

days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to file, be very careful to

file on time. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on race, color,

religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be entitled to

representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any requirement of

prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and

29 U.S.C. § 794a.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

DFAS CHECKLIST

INFORMATION REQUIRED BY DFAS IN

ORDER TO PROCESS PAYMENTS AGREED

UPON IN SETTLEMENT CASES OR AS

ORDERED BY THE MERIT SYSTEMS

PROTECTION BOARD

AS CHECKLIST: INFORMATION REQUIRED BY IN ORDER TO PROCESS PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN SETTLEMENT

CASES

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OFFICE MUST NOTIFY CIVILIAN PAYROLL

OFFICE VIA COMMAND LETTER WITH THE FOLLOWING:

1. Statement if Unemployment Benefits are to be deducted, with dollar amount, address

and POC to send.

2. Statement that employee was counseled concerning Health Benefits and TSP and the

election forms if necessary.

3. Statement concerning entitlement to overtime, night differential, shift premium,

Sunday Premium, etc, with number of hours and dates for each entitlement.

4. If Back Pay Settlement was prior to conversion to DCPS (Defense Civilian Pay

System), a statement certifying any lump sum payment with number of hours and

amount paid and/or any severance pay that was paid with dollar amount.

5. Statement if interest is payable with beginning date of accrual.

6. Corrected Time and Attendance if applicable.

ATTACHMENTS TO THE LETTER SHOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

1. Copy of Settlement Agreement and/or the MSPB Order.

2. Corrected or cancelled SF 50's.

3. Election forms for Health Benefits and/or TSP if applicable.

4. Statement certified to be accurate by the employee which includes:

a. Outside earnings with copies of W2's or statement from employer.

b. Statement that employee was ready, willing and able to work during the period.

c. Statement of erroneous payments employee received such as; lump sum leave, severance

pay, VERA/VSIP, retirement annuity payments (if applicable) and if employee withdrew

Retirement Funds.

5. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the

type of leave to be charged and number of hours.

NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES

Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process

payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as

ordered by the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.

1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise

information describing what to do in accordance with decision.

2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:

a. Employee name and social security number.

b. Detailed explanation of request.

c. Valid agency accounting.

d. Authorized signature (Table 63)

e. If interest is to be included.

f. Check mailing address.

g. Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.

h. Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to

be collected. (if applicable)

Attachments to AD-343

1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday

Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement. (if applicable)

2. Copies of SF-50's (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and

amounts.

3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.

4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address

to return monies.

5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)

6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of

the type of leave to be charged and number of hours.

7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual

Leave to be paid.

NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay

Period and required data in 1-7 above.

The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump

Sum Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)

a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.

b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.

c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.

If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s

Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.