STATE v. IVEN

OSCN Found Document:STATE v. IVEN

OSCN navigation

Home

Courts

Court Dockets

Legal Research

Calendar

Help

Previous Case

Top Of Index

This Point in Index

Citationize

Next Case

Print Only

STATE v. IVEN

2014 OK CR 8

Case Number: S-2013-824

Decided: 07/25/2014

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellant, v. WADE MATTHEW IVEN, Appellee.

Cite as: 2014 OK CR 8 , __ __

S U M M A R Y O P I N I O N

SMITH, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:

¶1 Wade Matthew Iven is charged with one count of Kidnapping in violation of

21 O.S.2011, § 741 (Count 1), one count of

Endeavoring to Commit an Act of Violence in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1378 (Count 2), Assault with a

Dangerous Weapon in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 645 (Count 3), and Domestic

Abuse in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 644(C) (Count 4), in the

District Court of Blaine County, Case No. CF-2012-84. Iven was bound over at

preliminary hearing. Thereafter, Iven filed a Motion to Suppress, and to Quash

and/or Set Aside Information. After a hearing, the Honorable Paul K. Woodward

granted the defendant's motion to suppress. The State appeals raising three

propositions.

I. A police officer may rely on the instructions of another officer in

stopping a vehicle, and effectuating an arrest, even though the officer

conducting the stop and arrest is not privy to all of the facts amounting to

probable cause for the arrest.

II. The "collective knowledge doctrine" applies to misdemeanor arrests,

including arrests for domestic abuse-assault & battery, as equally as felony

arrests.

III. Where a motion to suppress evidence is interposed by the appellee, the

burden of proof is on the proponent of the motion.

¶2 The charges against Iven stem from his arrest for a single misdemeanor

count of domestic abuse. Although the record is sparse, it is sufficient to

address the very narrow question presented. Deputy Craig Smith of the Blaine

County Sheriff's department was dispatched to a call of an on-going domestic

dispute. O.R. 34-35. Also responding to the call were Deputy Lonnie Spiva and

Officer Buddy King from the Okeene Police Department. O.R. 38, 84. Within ten

minutes of receiving the call, Deputy Smith and Officer King arrived in the area

and located the alleged victim, B.H., hiding in a trash trailer near the

airport.

¶3 Still visibly shaken and crying, B.H. described being involved in an

altercation with Iven as they were driving down the road. They had been in a

dating relationship. During the altercation, she managed to jump from the moving

vehicle and run into a field. Deputy Smith personally observed recent physical

injuries to B.H. including blood on her nose and under her eye, swelling to the

left side of her mouth, and bruises and abrasions on her arms and legs. Deputy

Spiva did not respond to the victim's location and, instead, attempted to locate

Iven. Iven was found near a car wash in Okeene and was arrested for domestic

abuse approximately one hour after the initial call was received by police. The

arrest was made at the request of Deputy Smith and based on information known to

him. Further investigation after the arrest led to additional charges.

¶4 Iven filed a motion to suppress arguing, inter alia , that because

Deputy Spiva neither personally observed the recent injuries to the alleged

victim nor was he aware of the existence of such injuries through information

communicated by another officer, Iven's arrest for domestic abuse was invalid

under Section 196(6) of Title 22. The State urged that the collective knowledge

doctrine could be applied to justify Iven's warrantless arrest for domestic

abuse. In response, Iven did not dispute the general applicability of the

doctrine, but argued that because information known to Deputy Smith was not

actually communicated to Deputy Spiva, the arrest was unlawful.

¶5 The court found that Deputy Smith did personally observe recent physical

injury to the alleged victim. Although there was some dispute as to whether

Deputy Smith actually relayed information concerning the injury to Deputy Spiva,

the trial court made a factual finding that Deputy Smith did not do so. Because

this information was not communicated, the trial court found the collective

knowledge doctrine could not operate to justify the arrest under Section 196(6).

Concluding that Iven's arrest was unlawful, the court suppressed evidence

derived therefrom.

¶6 The State appeals under the authority of

22 O.S.2011, § 1053(5) and asserts that the

suppressed evidence forms a substantial part of the State's evidence and the

State's ability to prosecute Iven is substantially impaired absent the

suppressed evidence. Appellate review is, therefore, in the best interests of

justice. State v. Sayerwinnie , 2007 OK CR 11, ¶ 6 , 157 P.3d 137, 139 . This Court reviews the trial court's

ruling on Iven's motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Ramos , 2013 OK CR

3,

¶ 14 , 297 P.3d

1251, 1254 . An abuse of discretion is any unreasonable or arbitrary action

taken without proper consideration of the facts and law pertaining to the issue;

a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, clearly against the logic and

effect of the facts. Neloms v. State , 2012 OK CR 7, ¶ 35 , 274 P.3d 161, 170 . Here, the trial court abused its

discretion and the State's request for relief should be granted.

¶7 Before reaching the merits of the legality of Iven's arrest, we must first

address two preliminary questions; the first being which party bears the burden

of establishing the legality of a misdemeanor arrest challenged, not on

constitutional grounds, but under Section 196 of Title 22. In Proposition III,

the State contends that the trial court erroneously placed the burden on the

State to demonstrate legality of the warrantless arrest.

¶8 In the context of a constitutional challenge to the legality of a

warrantless search or seizure, we have recognized that the State bears the

burden to establish that the search or seizure was lawful. Delgarza-Alzaga v.

State ,

2001 OK CR

30, ¶ 4 , 36 P.3d

454, 455 ; State v. McLemore , 1977 OK CR 24 , ¶ 8, 561 P.2d 1367, 1369 . The burden lies with the State at a

suppression hearing because warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively

unreasonable under the State and Federal Constitutions. Delgarza-Alzaga ,

2001 OK CR 30, ¶ 4 , 36 P.3d at 455 ;

Blackburn v. State , 1978 OK CR 24, ¶¶ 21, 23 ; 575 P.2d 638, 642 .

¶9 Our decisions in the area of constitutional challenges do not necessarily

answer the question in the present case. Here we must determine who bears the

burden when the lawfulness of a warrantless misdemeanor arrest is challenged

under statute. This is a question we have not squarely addressed. Section 196 of

Title 22 governs warrantless arrests and strictly limits the circumstances under

which a warrantless misdemeanor arrest is permitted.

22 O.S.2011, § 196. Absent one of the

enumerated exceptions, a warrant must be obtained to arrest a person for a

misdemeanor offense. In this manner, Section 196 operates much like

constitutional guarantees which create a preference for a judicial determination

of probable cause. Because Section 196, provides only limited exceptions

authorizing a warrantless misdemeanor arrest, the burden should be on the State

to prove that a challenged arrest falls within a statutory exception.

C.f. , Davis v. State , 1979 OK CR 40, ¶ 4 , 594 P.2d 1229, 1231 (noting that it was the State's

burden to prove compliance with statutorily mandated maintenance requirements

for a breathalyzer). We therefore conclude that the trial court properly placed

the burden on the State to justify the warrantless misdemeanor arrest.

¶10 As a second preliminary matter, we must determine whether the "collective

knowledge" doctrine can be applied in the present case. The rule for imputing

knowledge from one officer to another is known variously as the

"collective-knowledge" doctrine or the "fellow-officer" rule. United States

v. Chavez , 534 F.3d 1338, 1345 (10th Cir. 2008). Generally stated, the

doctrine allows an officer to stop, arrest, or search a suspect in limited

circumstances, even if the officer does not have firsthand knowledge of all of

the facts that amount to reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify the

action. This principle derives from the recognition that law enforcement

officers must be permitted to work collectively in the performance of their

duties and act on directions and information given by one officer to another.

United States v. Duval , 742 F.3d 246, 253 (6th Cir. 2014).

¶11 In the proceedings below, the parties and the trial court implicitly

believed that, as a general principle, the collective knowledge doctrine could

apply in determining the validity of an arrest claimed to be unlawful under

statute. In this appeal, the State notes that the Tenth Circuit in United

States v. Wilkinson , 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2011) extended the application

of the doctrine to stops for misdemeanor offenses and argues that the trial

court incorrectly applied the doctrine in the case at bar. However, as an

alternative basis to uphold the court's suppression of evidence, Iven argues for

the first time on appeal, that the doctrine cannot apply to the statutory

challenge at issue here. He asserts that the collective knowledge doctrine is a

product of constitutional challenges brought under the Fourth Amendment and

states are free to impose greater restrictions on police conduct. He argues that

the Legislature elected to impose such a greater restriction by the plain

language of Section 196(6). Although not previously raised, we must consider

this question as a preliminary matter.

¶12 In relevant part, Section 196 provides that a peace officer may, without

a warrant, arrest a person "[a]nywhere, including a place of residence of the

person, if the peace officer has probable cause to believe the person within the

preceding seventy-two (72) hours has committed an act of domestic abuse as

defined by Section 60.1 of this title, although the assault did not take place

in the presence of the peace officer. A peace officer may not arrest a person

pursuant to this section without first observing a recent physical injury to, or

an impairment of the physical condition of, the alleged victim ."

22 O.S.2011, § 196(6) (emphasis added);

see also 22 O.S.2011, §

60.16(B)(1). He claims the plain language of the statute requires the

arresting officer to personally observe the injury or impairment and, thus,

excludes the possibility that the collective knowledge doctrine might apply.

¶13 It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that we must

ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. State v.

Stice ,

2012 OK CR

14, ¶ 11 , 288 P.3d

247, 250 . Legislative intent is to be determined first by the plain and

ordinary language of the statute. Johnson v. State , 2013 OK CR 12, ¶ 10 , 308 P.3d 1053, 1055 . "A statute should be given a

construction according to the fair import of its words taken in their usual

sense, in conjunction with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the

provision." Id . (citation omitted). In determining legislative intent, we

may also look to other statutes on the same or relative subjects as well as the

natural or absurd consequences of any particular interpretation. Stice ,

2012 OK CR 14, ¶ 11 , 288 P.3d at

250 .

¶14 Contrary to Iven's assertion, the plain language of Section 196(6)

contains no requirement that the arresting officer personally observe the recent

injury or impairment to the alleged victim. To be sure, we must presume that the

Legislature was aware of our decisions and contemplated them in amending the

statute. Rogers v. Bailey ,

2011 OK 69, ¶ 13 , 261 P.3d 1150, 1156 . Long before Section 196(6) was

adopted, in Holt v. State , 1973 OK CR 38 , 506 P.2d 561 , we acknowledged that the collective

knowledge doctrine was a firmly rooted principle of law. Holt ,

1973 OK CR 38, ¶ 14 , 506 P.2d at 566 .

Had the Legislature intended to reject the application of the doctrine, it could

have easily done so by imposing a requirement that the arresting officer

personally observe the injury or impairment to the alleged victim. It did not do

so and we will not read into a statute a requirement that is not there.

Dawkins v. State , 2011 OK CR 1, ¶ 10 , 252 P.3d 214, 218 . More significantly, Iven's position

ignores the language of Section 60.16 of Title 22.

¶15 In addition to restating the language contained in Section 196(6),

Section 60.16 requires that an arrest for domestic abuse be based on an

investigation by the officer "of the circumstances surrounding the incident,

past history of violence between the parties, statements of any children present

in the residence, and any other relevant factors."

22 O.S.2011, § 60.16(B)(2). A rule that

excluded the applicability of the collective knowledge doctrine would frustrate

the stated unequivocal intent of the Legislature in this regard. With the

possible exception of domestic abuse arising in a small community with an

arresting officer who has a long history of service - one who might then have

personal knowledge of the parties, their past history, and other relevant

information - it would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for one

officer to possess personal knowledge of all of the information required by

Section 60.16 prior to effectuating an arrest. With confidence we can say the

Legislature did not intend such a result.

¶16 Having determined that the doctrine applies to a purely statutory

challenge to the legality of an arrest, we now address the trial court's

application of the rule in the present case. The State argues that the trial

court's application of the collective knowledge doctrine was incorrect. The

State's arguments are well taken.

¶17 Over forty years ago in Holt we said: "It is well settled that an

agent may rely upon his fellow officers to supply the information which forms

the basis of the arresting officer's reasonable grounds for believing that the

law is being violated. Holt ,

1973 OK CR 38, ¶ 14 , 506 P.2d at 566 . Since that time,

the Tenth Circuit in Chavez succinctly summarized the manner in which the

collective knowledge doctrine can apply. Although not mutually exclusive, the

court generally classified collective knowledge relationships as either

"horizontal" or "vertical." Chavez , 534 F.3d at 1345 .

¶18 Horizontal collective knowledge applies in situations where a number of

individual law enforcement officers have pieces of information but no single

officer possesses all of the information necessary to establish reasonable

suspicion or probable cause to justify the action taken. Id . Because no

one officer has the requisite level of knowledge, the horizontal collective

knowledge doctrine requires a court to determine whether the individual officers

communicated the information that they possessed individually in order to

effectively pool their information and justify the action taken based thereon.

Id .

¶19 On the other hand, vertical collective knowledge applies where one

officer has knowledge of facts rising to the level of reasonable suspicion or

probable cause, as may be the case, and directs another officer to act without

communicating the facts known by him to the second officer. Chavez , 534

F.3d at 1345 . This rule allows the knowledge of the requesting officer to be

imputed to the acting officer, id . at 1347, and derives from the Supreme

Court decision in U.S. v. Hensley ,

469 U.S. 221 , 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83

L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). There the Court recognized that police officers are entitled

to assume another officer or law enforcement agency requesting aid in performing

a search or seizure has the information necessary to legally justify the action;

however, the fact that one officer may follow a directive from others does not

insulate the search or seizure if the directing officer or agency did not have

legally sufficient information. Hensley , 469 U.S. at

230-31 , 105 S.Ct. at 681 (citing Whitely v. Warden ,

401

U.S. 560, 568 , 91 S.Ct. 1031, 1037 , 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971)).

¶20 In situations involving vertical collective knowledge, the legality of a

search or seizure stands or falls on the sufficiency of the information known to

the officer directing that the challenged action be taken. Chavez , 534

F.3d at 1346 ; see also Hensley ,

469 U.S. at 231 , 105 S.Ct. at 681

(concluding that police officer may effectuate an arrest and conduct a search

incident thereto on the basis of a flyer or bulletin issued by another agency,

even though the bulletin did not set forth facts necessary to establish probable

cause, but the legality of the arrest is determined by whether the agency

issuing the bulletin had sufficient information to establish probable cause for

the arrest). It is inconsequential whether the officer relying on the directive

had knowledge of the specific facts which led to the request for assistance.

Hensley , 469 U.S. at 231 , 105 S.Ct. at 681 . As explained by the

Supreme Court: "In an era when criminal suspects are increasingly mobile and

increasingly likely to flee across jurisdictional boundaries, this rule is a

matter of common sense: it minimizes the volume of information concerning

suspects that must be transmitted to other jurisdictions and enables police in

one jurisdiction to act promptly in reliance on information from another

jurisdiction." Id .

¶21 The matter sub judice presents us with an application of the

"vertical" collective knowledge doctrine and the principles announced in

Hensley . Under these circumstances, it is irrelevant whether Deputy Smith

actually conveyed his observations of the alleged victim's injuries to Deputy

Spiva. Spiva was entitled to assume the request to arrest Iven was based on

legally sufficient information known to a fellow officer directing the arrest be

made. The relevant inquiry is whether Deputy Smith had the requisite information

to support Iven's arrest at the time he made the request for action to be taken.

On this point there is no dispute. Because Deputy Smith observed recent injury

to the alleged victim, his knowledge is imputed to Deputy Spiva.

¶22 The trial court's determination that Iven's arrest was unlawful pursuant

to Section 196(6) was based upon its finding that Deputy Spiva lacked personal

knowledge of recent injury or physical impairment to the alleged victim and the

court's disputed finding that Deputy Smith failed to communicate his personal

knowledge when asking for assistance in arresting Iven for domestic abuse. This

conclusion was an unreasonable action taken without proper consideration of the

facts and law pertaining to the issue and, therefore, the trial court abused its

discretion in granting Iven's motion to suppress.

DECISION

¶23 The decision of the District Court of Blaine County granting Defendant's

motion to suppress evidence is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED

to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ,

Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2014), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon

the delivery and filing of this decision.

AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BLAINE COUNTY

THE

HONORABLE PAUL K. WOODWARD, DISTRICT JUDGE

ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL

ERIC N. EDWARDS

114 EAST BROADWAY, STE. 810

P.O. BOX

5188

ENID, OK 73701

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

BARRY RETHERFORD

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

BLAINE

COUNTY

DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

BLAINE COUNTY COURTHOUSE

THIRD

FLOOR

212 NORTH WEIGLE

WATONGA, OK 73772

COUNSEL FOR

STATE

ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL

BARRY RETHERFORD

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

BLAINE

COUNTY

DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

BLAINE COUNTY COURTHOUSE

THIRD

FLOOR

212 NORTH WEIGLE

WATONGA, OK 73772

COUNSEL FOR

APPELLANT/STATE

JAMES L. HANKINS

TIMBERBROOKE BUSINESS CENTER

929 N.W. 164TH ST.

EDMOND, OK 73013

COUNSEL FOR

APPELLEE

OPINION BY: Smith, V.P.J.

Lewis, P.J.: concur

Lumpkin, J.: concur

in results

C. Johnson, J.: concur

A. Johnson, J.: concur

LUMPKIN, JUDGE: CONCUR IN RESULTS

¶1 I concur in the decision to reverse the District Court's order granting

the motion to suppress and remand the case for further proceedings. However, I

find that the defendant's claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that the

collective knowledge doctrine cannot apply to the statutory challenge at issue,

should be reviewed for plain error only.

¶2 To be entitled to relief under the plain error doctrine, Appellant must

prove: 1) the existence of an actual error (i.e., deviation from a legal rule);

2) that the error is plain or obvious; and 3) that the error affected his

substantial rights, meaning the error affected the outcome of the proceeding.

Hogan v. State ,

2006 OK CR 19, ¶ 38 , 139 P.3d 907, 923 ; 20 O.S.2011, § 3001.1. If these elements are

met, this Court will correct plain error only if the error "seriously affect[s]

the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings" or

otherwise represents a "miscarriage of justice." Hogan , 2006 OK CR 19, ¶ 38 , 139 P.3d at 923 . Applying this

analysis, I find no error and thus no plain error.

Citationizer © Summary of Documents Citing This Document Cite

Name

Level

None Found.

Citationizer: Table of Authority Cite

Name

Level

None Found.