Opinion

State Of Washington, V Spencer Lawrence Oberg

Court
Court of Appeals of Washington
Filed
May 6, 2014
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.7%

a defendant may plead guilty while disputing the facts alleged by the prosecution

How later courts described this case

  • a defendant may plead guilty while disputing the facts alleged by the prosecution

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The opinion

HLED

COURT OF APPEALS

DIV[ S1M4 Ti

2014 MAY - 6 AM 8: 28

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF

Si 5 2 i0

DIVISION II BY

TY

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 43472 -5 -II

Respondent,

v.

Consolidated with No. 43479 -2 -II, 43482 -2 -II

SPENCER LAWRENCE OBERG, And

Appellant,

No. 44900 -5 -II

In re Personal Restraint Petition of

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SPENCER LAWRENCE OBERG,

Petitioner.

HUNT, J. — Spencer Lawrence Oberg appeals his sentences and a community custody

condition requiring him to undergo drug and alcohol evaluation and treatment related to three

guilty plea convictions. He argues that ( 1) the Pierce County Superior Court failed to make the

statutorily required finding that a chemical dependency contributed to his offenses and there was

no evidence that alcohol was a factor in the current offenses, prerequisites for the drug and

alcohol related community custody condition of his sentences; and ( 2) his total sentence for his

third degree assault conviction exceeds the 60 -month statutory maximum for that offense. In a

pro se Statement of Additional Grounds for Review' ( SAG), Oberg asserts that ( 1) the superior

court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence, in violation of a global plea agreement

1

RAP 10. 10.

No. 43472 -5 -II (consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -II, 43482 -2 -II and 44900 -5 -II)

encompassing both. Pierce County' s and King County' s charges; ( 2) the State breached this

agreement by failing to advise the superior court that it was bound by the global plea agreement,

suggesting that his King County convictions for charges that were part of the global plea

2

agreement were " separate " offenses, failing to list the King County convictions as " other current

3

offenses " on the plea statements and the judgment and sentences, and misrepresenting the jail -

time credit to which Oberg was entitled under the global plea agreement; ( 3) the superior court

erred in not awarding him full crediffor his time served; and ( 4) his plea statements incorrectly

4

stated that he was ineligible for a Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative ( DOSA) sentence.

Finally, in a personal restraint petition ( PRP), which we consolidated with this direct appeal,

Oberg essentially repeats the claims he makes in his SAG.

The State concedes that Oberg' s third degree assault sentence exceeds the statutory

maximum for that offense and that remand for resentencing on this conviction is required; we

accept this partial concession. Because the record contains no evidence that alcohol was a factor

in Oberg' s convictions, we also hold that the superior court erred in imposing alcohol related

community custody conditions. Accordingly; we remand to the- superior court- to resentence

Oberg on the third degree assault conviction and to strike the alcohol related community custody

conditions in the judgments and sentences for cause numbers 10 -1- 03778 -2 and 11 - 1- 02533 -2.

2SAGat2.

3 SAG at 2.

4

RCW 9. 94A.660( 1).

2

No. 43472 -5 -II (consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -II, 43482 -2 -II and 44900 -5 -II)

We otherwise affirm Oberg' s sentences and his drug -related community custody condition. And

we deny his personal restraint petition.

FACTS

I. PIERCE COUNTY AND KING COUNTY PLEA AGREEMENTS

In September 2010, the Pierce County prosecutor charged Spencer Lawrence Oberg with

unlawful possession of a controlled substance ( methadone) and unlawful possession of a

controlled substance ( oxycodone) under Pierce County cause number 10 -1- 03778 -2. In January

2011, the Pierce County prosecutor charged Oberg with residential burglary and third degree

malicious mischief under cause number 11 - 1- 00523 -4. And in June 2011, the Pierce County

prosecutor charged Oberg with obtaining or attempting to obtain a controlled substance

oxycodone) by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; unlawful possession of a controlled

substance ( oxycodone); third degree assault of a law enforcement officer; and possession of

anther' s identification under cause number 11 - 1- 02533 -2. During this same time period, Oberg

committed a series of offenses in King County, which resulted in several additional charges

under two separate King County cause numbers ( 11 =1- 06655 = and 11 - 1- 06585 -1):

6

Oberg entered into several plea agreements to resolve all charges in both counties. On

November 15, 2011, Oberg agreed to enter Alford Newtons pleas to the following amended

/

Pierce County charges and the State agreed to recommend the following sentences:

1) residential burglary - 84 months ( cause number 11 - 1- 00523 -4);

s

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 ( 1970) ( a defendant may

plead guilty while disputing the facts alleged by the prosecution); State v. Newton, 87 Wn.2d

363, 552 P. 2d 682 ( 1976).

3

No. 43472 -5 -II (consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -II, 43482 -2 -II and 44900 -5 -II)

2) obtaining or attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation - 24 months, and third degree assault - 51 months ( cause

number 11 - 1- 02533 -2); and

3) second degree identity theft- 57 months, and unlawful possession of a controlled

substance ( oxycodone) - 24 months ( cause number 10 -1- 03778 -2).

The State further agreed to recommend that ( 1) these sentences run concurrently with

each other and with the King County sentences; ( 2) Oberg receive credit for time served; and ( 3)

the superior court impose " drug /alcohol treatment per [ community corrections officer] CCO" for

cause numbers 10 -1- 03778 -2 and 11 - 1- 02533 -2. Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 39, 98. Each

Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty" advised Oberg, " The judge does not have to follow

anyone' s recommendation as to sentence." CP at 39, 98 ( emphasis omitted). Each of the

attached offender score stipulations listed the King County offenses as " convictions" rather than

other current offenses." CP at 16, 46, 107.

II. GUILTY PLEAS AND SENTENCING

On November 15, 2011, Oberg pled guilty to the amended Pierce County charges.

Oberg' s counsel advised the superior court that the pleas were all AlfordlNewton pleas and that

they represented a " global resolution" that also included the two King County cases noted in the

Oberg' s guilty plea statements. Report of Proceedings ( RP) at 3. The State also told the superior

court that " Mr. Oberg has already pled guilty and been sentenced on two separate felony cause

4

No. 43472 -5 -II (consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -II, 43482 -2 -II and 44900 -5 -II)

numbers up in King County. "6 RP at 4.

The superior court then engaged in an extensive colloquy, during which Oberg confirmed

that he had reviewed the Statements of Defendant on Plea of Guilty with his counsel, that he had

read the documents himself, and that he had no questions about these documents. The superior

court then reviewed with Oberg each of the charges under each cause number, the standard

sentencing ranges for each charge, and the State' s sentencing recommendations ( 1) to run the

Pierce County sentences concurrently with all other Pierce County sentences and with the

previously imposed King County sentences, and ( 2) that Oberg " get a drug and alcohol

evaluation and treatment according to the community corrections officer." RP at 8. Oberg

acknowledged that he understood the State' s recommendations. RP at 8. For each charge, the

superior court advised Oberg .that it was not bound by the State' s sentencing recommendations

and that it (the court) could impose consecutive sentences; Oberg also stated that he understood

this. Oberg then pled guilty to each of the charges. The superior court accepted his pleas and

proceeded to sentencing.

During sentencing, the State ( 1) noted Oberg' s numerous previous offenses; ( 2) advised

the superior court that Oberg had unsuccessfully participated in both the Pierce County Drug

Court Program and a DOSA program through the Department of Corrections; ( 3) stated, " Not

6 On November 4, 2011, the King County Superior Court sentenced Oberg to a total of 76

months of confinement for ( 1) two counts of forged prescriptions ( oxycodone) and one count of

unlawful possession of a controlled substance ( methamphetamine) under cause number 11 - 1-

06585- 1; and ( 2) two additional counts of forged prescriptions ( oxycodone), one count

possession of stolen firearm, and one count of second degree identity theft, under cause number

11 - 1- 06655 -6. The King County Superior ran all sentences concurrently and noted that these

sentences should also run concurrently with the Pierce County sentences.

5

No. 43472 -5 -II (consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -1I, 43482 -2 -II and 44900 -5 -II)

only is [ Oberg] young, but it is obvious that controlled substances have had a pretty significant

hold on him "; and ( 4) recommended a " high end," 84 -month sentence based on Oberg' s

extensive criminal history and " that he was basically on a crime spree happening over two

different counties." RP at 18, 19. When the superior court asked what Oberg' s King County

sentences were, the State responded that King County had given Oberg 76 months.

7; (

Defense counsel ( 1) presented the " agreed recommendation of 84 months" 2)

acknowledged that over time, as the charges had increased in number, "[ i]t became really

8; (

apparent in this case that drug addiction was pushing this thing " 3) commented that "[ e] very

drugs9;

time [ Oberg] got arrested" he was carrying and ( 4) stated:

What I' m asking the Court to impose,

don' t go beyond any sort of

consecutive sentences, keep it at 84 months, the maximum concurrent as the

global offer thing. Anything the Court can do to make sure that Mr. Oberg gets

some additional treatment, whatever resources are available for him to do that.

RP at 25. Oberg' s wife asked the superior court to allow Oberg to have treatment and to

sentence him to 76 months, like the King County court had done, " because of the drug problems

that he has." RP at 22. Oberg similarly acknowledged his substance abuse issues.

The superior court commented extensively on Oberg' s young age ( 23), criminal history

24 or 25 felonies), family support, drug use ( including failed drug court), and the following

sentencing considerations:

7RPat20.

8

RP at 23.

9RPat24.

No. 43472 -5 -II (consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -II, 43482 -2 -II and 44900 -5 -II)

I am also troubled by the sheer volume of the crimes here, and in this

particular case what is an ongoing pattern of you being under the supervision of

the court and being out committing crimes on multiple occasions, not only here in

Pierce County, but also in King County. ... Basically what I' m being asked to

do is to wrap up what would be 12 felonies into one sentence, 76 months, which is

about six months a felony, on top of somebody who has already maxed out, even

before you consider those.

I understand the work that has gone into this by your attorney, by the

prosecutors in Pierce County and King County. Some judge has to put the first

number up, and apparently the judge in King County has with 76 months. The

second judge then has the option of going along with the concurrent sentence or

doing a consecutive sentence. That' s my decision here today.

I guess the bottom line is I don' t think 76 months is enough for everything

that has gone on here. What I' m going to do is on the cause number that ends in

78 -2, Count I, the range is 43 to 57 months. I' m going to impose 43 months. I

am going to run that consecutive to the King County cause numbers. The other

counts, the other sentences, would be as recommended, to be concurrent, so the

bottom line would be that it would be an additional 43 months for these five

felonies that were committed here in Pierce County.

RP at 31 -33 ( emphasis added).

The superior court sentenced Oberg to ( 1) 84 months of confinement for residential

burglary; ( 2) 24 months for obtaining or attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud,

deceit, or misrepresentation; ( 3) 5 -

1 months for third degree assault; ( 4) 43 months for second

degree identity theft; and ( 5) 24 months for unlawful possession of a controlled substance. The

superior court ran the 43 -month sentence on the second degree identity theft consecutively to

Oberg' s 76 -month King County sentences; it ran the remaining sentences concurrently with each

other and with the King County sentences.

In addition to the 51 -month sentence for third degree assault ( cause number 11- 1- 02533-

2), the superior court imposed 12 months of community custody, noting that the total term of

confinement for this conviction should not exceed the 60 -month statutory maximum. The

No. 43472 -5 -II (consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -II, 43482 -2 -II and 44900 -5 -II)

superior court also ordered Oberg to submit to " Drug /Alcohol evaluation and treatment per

CCO" under cause numbers 10 -1- 03778 -2 ( second degree identity theft and unlawful possession

of a controlled substance ( oxycodone)) and 11 - 1- 02533 -2 ( obtaining or attempting to obtain a

controlled substance by fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and third degree assault), and gave

him 8 days credit for time served under each cause number. CP at 60, 116.

Oberg appeals his consecutive sentences for second degree identity theft, his third degree

assault sentence, the drug and alcohol evaluation and treatment community custody

requirements, and the credit he received for time served.

ANALYSIS

I. SENTENCE IN EXCESS OF STATUTORY MAXIMUM

Oberg argues that the superior court erred when it sentenced him to 51 months plus 12

months of community custody for third degree assault because the total sentence exceeded the

60 -month statutory maximum for this offense and the court' s notation limiting his total

confinement to 60 months was not sufficient to cure this error. The State concedes that under

our Supreme Court' s decision in State v.. Boyd, 1-74 Wn.2d 470, 472 -

73, 275 P.3d 321 ( 2012), -

10

this " Brooks notation " no longer operates to ensure the sentence' s validity. We agree with

to

A " Brooks notation" is a hand -

written addition to the judgment and sentence stating that the

total combined term of confinement and community custody actually served may not exceed the

statutory maximum. In re Pers. Restraint ofBrooks, 166 Wn.2d 664, 674, 211 P. 3d 1023 ( 2009),

superseded by Boyd, 174 Wn.2d at 472 -73.

8

No. 43472 -5 -II (consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -II, 43482 -2 -II and 44900 -5 -II)

11

Oberg, accept the State' s concession, and remand for resentencing.

II. COMMUNITY CUSTODY CONDITIONS

Oberg further argues that the superior court erred by requiring him to undergo drug and

alcohol evaluations and treatment as a community custody condition related to his convictions

under cause numbers 10 -1- 03778 -2 ( second degree identity theft and unlawful possession of

oxycodone) and 11 - 1- 02533 -2 ( obtaining or attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud,

deceit, or misrepresentation and third degree assault) because the superior court failed to make

an express finding, under RCW 9. 94A. 607( 1), that he had a chemical dependency that

contributed to these offenses. 12 The State counters that ( 1) a finding that drug use contributed to

13; (

Oberg' s crimes " was implicit in the court' s statements to defendant " 2) the plain language of

RCW 9. 94A.607( 1) does not require the court to use any specific language; thus ( 3) the court' s

11 The superior court' s total sentence of 63 months for Oberg' s third degree assault conviction

exceeded the 60 -month statutory maximum by 3 months. RCW 9A.20. 021; RCW 9A.36. 031( 2).

Applying Boyd here, the sentencing court must reduce the term of community custody so that the

confinement combined with the community custody term does not exceed the statutory

maximum. Boyd, 174 Wn.2d at 472.

12 The superior court did not impose community custody under the remaining cause number.

13

Br. of Resp' t at 5. We agree with the State that Oberg misinterprets our decision in State v.

Jones, 118 Wn. App. 199, 204, 76 P. 3d 258 ( 2003), as requiring the superior court to make an

explicitfinding. In Jones, we addressed only whether the trial court had authority to order the

defendant to participate in mental health treatment and counseling, which involved statutory

procedures specific to mental health evaluation and treatment that do not apply here. Jones, 118

Wn. App. at 208, 209 ( citing former RCW 9. 94A. 505( 9) ( 2001)). Contrary to Oberg' s argument,

Jones does not require that the superior court' s findings be " express "; nor does it discredit the

factors on which we rely above to satisfy RCW 9. 94A.607( 1).

9

No. 43472 -5 -II (consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -II, 43482 -2 -II and 44900 -5 -II)

14

implicit finding is sufficient to support the community custody condition. We agree with the

State that the superior court' s findings were sufficient to support the drug evaluation and

treatment community custody condition imposed under RCW 9. 94A. 607( 1). But we agree with

Oberg that the superior court did not make findings sufficient to support the alcohol -

related

condition.

A. Standard of Review

A defendant may challenge an illegal or erroneous sentence for the first time on appeal.

State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 744, 193 P. 3d 678 ( 2008); Jones, 118 Wn. App. at 204. We

review de novo whether the trial court had statutory authority to impose community custody

conditions. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P. 3d 201 ( 2007). If the condition was

statutorily authorized, we review the imposition of crime -related prohibitions for abuse of

discretion. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d at 110 ( citing State v. Ancira, 107 Wn. App. 650, 653, 27

P. 3d 1246 ( 2001)). We apply these standards separately to the drug and alcohol related

conditions imposed here.

B. Drug Evaluation and /or Treatment

RCW 9. 94A.607( 1) provides:

Where the court finds that the offender has a chemical dependency that

has contributed to his or her offense, the court may, as a condition of the sentence

and subject to available resources, order the offender to participate in

rehabilitative programs or otherwise to perform affirmative conduct reasonably

related to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been

14

The State does not discuss the drug and alcohol related conditions separately. Nor does it

acknowledge that the superior court made an express written finding supporting drug evaluation

and treatment in cause number 11 - 1- 02533 -2' s judgment and sentence ( obtaining or attempting

to obtain a controlled substance by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and third degree assault).

10

No. 43472 -5 -II (consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -II, 43482 -2 -II and 44900 -5 -II)

convicted and reasonably necessary or beneficial to the offender and the

community in rehabilitating the offender.

Emphasis added.)

Cause number 11 - 1- 02533 -2' s judgment and sentence for Oberg' s obtaining or

attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and third

degree assault convictions includes an express written finding supporting the drug evaluation and

treatment condition: " The court finds that the offender has a chemical dependency that has

contributed to the offense( s)." CP at 51. Thus, the court clearly complied with RCW

9. 94A.607( 1) as to this cause number.

In contrast, the judgment and sentence for cause number 10 -1- 03778 -2 ( second degree

identity theft and unlawful possession of oxycodone) contains no finding about whether Oberg

has a chemical dependency that contributed to these offenses. Accordingly, we must determine

whether the superior court satisfied this finding requirement some other way. Although RCW

9. 94A. 607( 1) requires the superior court to " find" that Oberg had a chemical dependency that

contributed to his offenses, the State is correct that the statute does not specify what type of

Here, ( 1) Oberg to having a substance abuse problem; ( 2)

finding the court must make. admitted

the parties and the court discussed at length how Oberg' s drug use contributed to his offenses;

3) the record clearly establishes that the court found that Oberg had a chemical dependency and

that this chemical dependency was a, if not the, driving force behind his offenses; and ( 4) the

nature of the charges clearly reflect that drug use contributed to Oberg' s offenses because the

charges were all related to drug offenses. We hold that in this context it is clear that the superior

court made the required finding.

11

No. 43472 -5 -II (consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -II, 43482 -2 -II and 44900 -5 -II)

Accordingly, we affirm the community custody condition requiring Oberg to undergo

drug evaluations and treatment under cause numbers 11 - 1- 02533 -2 and 10 -1- 03778 -2.

C. Alcohol Evaluation and /or Treatment

Unlike the drug -related condition, nothing in the record suggests that the superior court

made any findings about whether Oberg' s alcohol use contributed to his offenses. Nor is there

any independent evidence of such a relationship. Because the record does not support the

alcohol evaluation and treatment condition, we remand to the superior court to strike this

alcohol -related portion of Oberg' s community custody conditions in cause numbers 10- 1- 03778-

15

2 and 11 - 1- 02533 -2. See Jones, 118 Wn. App. at 207 -08.

III. SAG AND PRP ISSUES

Most of Oberg' s PRP repeats the issues he raises in his SAG. Therefore, unless

otherwise noted, we address these issues together.

A. Consecutive Sentence

Oberg challenges his consecutive sentence under cause number 10 -1- 03778 -2. He asserts

that ( 1) the superior court violated the global- plea- agreement by imposing the consecutive

sentence; ( 2) the State breached the plea agreement by not reminding the court that it was bound

by the plea agreement and failing to state in his ( Oberg' s) criminal history that the King County

15 The State requests that we strike the superior court' s notation " Drug / lcohol eval. and follow

A

up treatment recommended" under section 4.4 " OTHER" of the judgment and sentence in cause

number 11 - 1- 02533 -2, because the treatment recommendation does not relate to property held in

evidence. Br. of Resp' t at 7 ( note 3) ( quoting CP at 54). Instead, as we discuss above, the

superior court need strike only the reference to alcohol in section 4.4, leaving the drug evaluation

and treatment recommendation intact.

12

No. 43472 -5 -II (consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -II, 43482 -2 -II and 44900 -5 -II)

convictions were other current offenses; and ( 3) if the superior court did not err, his guilty pleas

were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because he was advised that the superior court was

required to impose consecutive sentences under the global plea agreement. These assertions lack

merit.16

Every document related to Oberg' s pleas clearly states that the State would recommend

concurrent sentences. Nothing in the record shows otherwise. 17 Almost every plea document

states that the superior court was not bound by this agreed sentencing recommendation. And the

Superior Court' s plea colloquy with Oberg shows that concurrent sentencing was a mere

recommendation, which that the court was not required to follow.

Similarly, the record does not support Oberg' s contention that the State breached the plea

agreement. On the contrary, as agreed, the State clearly recommended that the superior court

impose concurrent sentences, and the superior court understood that this was the State' s

recommendation. Nor does the record supports Oberg' s assertion that he was not advised that

the superior court could ignore the State' s recommendation. Again, ( 1) all the relevant

documents that Oberg signed warned him that the sentencing court was notbound by the State' s

sentencing recommendation; ( 2) the Pierce County Superior Court specifically advised him

during the plea colloquy that it was not bound by any part of the agreed recommendation,

16 Because we consider the documents Oberg attached to his PRP, we need not address his PRP

reply request for an order to produce certified records.

17

In his PRP, Oberg specifically asserts that a September 2, 2011 King County memorandum

stated that the concurrent sentencing aspect of his plea agreement was not merely a sentencing

recommendation. Oberg is incorrect: This memorandum expressly stated that the concurrent

sentencing aspect of the plea was part of the " [ agreed sentencing recommendation." PRP

Attach. 1, Ex. A at 2.

13

No. 43472 -5 -I1 ( consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -1I, 43482 -2 -11 and 44900 -5 -I1)

including the concurrent sentence recommendation; and ( 3) Oberg assured the superior court that

he understood this.

B. No Exceptional Sentence'

Oberg also argues that the superior court erred by imposing the consecutive sentence

without finding any aggravating factors to support an exceptional sentence. We disagree. The

Pierce County Superior Court ran the sentences for all of the Pierce County convictions ( entered

on the same day) concurrently, in compliance with RCW 9. 94A.589( 1)( a). Because the

consecutive sentence was solely in relation to the King County convictions, which the King

County Superior Court had previously entered on a different day, the consecutive sentence was

18

not an exceptional one that required aggravating factors for support. Accordingly, the Pierce

County Superior Court did not violate RCW 9. 94A.589( 1)( a).

C. Credit for Time Served

Oberg next challenges the superior court' s award of only eight days of jail time credit,

claiming that the plea agreement required the superior court to give him credit for all time served

18

See, in contrast, In re Pers. Restraint ofFinstad, 177 Wn.2d 501, 507 -08, 301 P. 3d 450 ( 2013)

RCW 9. 94A.589( 1)( a) requires sentencing court to impose concurrent sentences for convictions

entered or sentenced on the same day unless imposing exceptional sentence under RCW

9. 94A. 535).

14

No. 43472 -5 -I1 ( consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -I1, 43482 -2 -1I and 44900 -5 -11)

19

since his arrest on July 13, 2011. This challenge also fails. As we have already explained, the

superior court was not bound by the plea agreement' s sentencing recommendation, and the

record shows that Oberg was aware of that fact.

Nor does Oberg show that the superior court failed to comply with RCW 9. 94A.505( 6),

which provides: " The sentencing court shall give the offender credit for all confinement time

served before the sentencing if that confinement was solely in regard to the offense for which the

offender is being sentenced." Under this statute, the Pierce County Superior Court had authority

to give Oberg credit for time he had served on only the Pierce County charges for which it was

sentencing him, not for time served in connection with other charges, including those in King

County.

D. DOSA ELIGIBILITY

Finally, Oberg argues that his " eligibility for DOSA is improperly stricken from the

Pierce County plea statements as he is eligible for a DOSA sentencing alternative." SAG at 3.

19

Oberg also asserts that the State breached the plea agreement by writing on the judgment and

sentence that he was to receive eight - days credit for time served. But whether the State entered

this notation on the judgment and sentence is outside the record before us. Accordingly, we do

not address this assertion. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P. 2d 1251 ( 1995).

In its response to Oberg' s PRP, the State argues that the court erred in awarding Oberg

credit for eight days of time served when he received credit for the King County convictions and

was serving those sentences in the Pierce County jail pending the November 15 hearing.

Because a personal restraint petition is intended to allow a petitioner, and not the State, to seek

relief from improper restraint, see RAP 16. 6( a), and the State does not raise this issue in a cross

appeal, we decline to address it.

15

No. 43472 -5 -II (consolidated with Nos. 43479 -2 -II, 43482 -2 -II and 44900 -5 -II)

20

Whether Oberg could qualify for a DOSA sentence is outside the record before us.

Accordingly, we need not address this assertion. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335.

We remand for resentencing on the third degree assault conviction ( cause number 11 - 1-

02533- 2) and to strike the alcohol related community custody conditions related to the second

degree identity theft and unlawful possession of oxycodone convictions ( cause number 10 -1-

03778- 2) and to the obtaining or attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation and third degree assault convictions ( cause number 11 - 1- 02533 -2). We

otherwise affirm Oberg' s sentences, including his drug -related community custody condition;

and we deny his personal restraint petition.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2. 06. 040, it is so ordered.

We concur:

20 Moreover, because the State did not recommend and Oberg did not request a DOSA, his

DOSA eligibility is irrelevant.

16

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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