Opinion

Earnest D. Shields v. Illinois Department of Correct

  • 746 F.3d 782
  • 88 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 231
  • 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4833
  • 2014 WL 949950
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
Mar 12, 2014
Status
Published
On the bench
Posner, Tinder, Hamilton
Nature of suit
prisoner
Cited by
712 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.6%

Questioned by Estate of Alvarez v. Johns Hopkins University, 275 F. Supp. 3d 670 (2017)

holding that prison doctors who followed an outside specialist’s recommendation for physical therapy—as opposed to surgery recommended by other physicians—were not deliberately indifferent, even though the patient ultimately needed surgery to fix his shoulder injury

How later courts described this case

  • holding that prison doctors who followed an outside specialist’s recommendation for physical therapy—as opposed to surgery recommended by other physicians—were not deliberately indifferent, even though the patient ultimately needed surgery to fix his shoulder injury
  • holding that medical providers who have ‘only an incidental or transitory relationship’ with the penal system generally are not considered state actors.”
  • holding that private companies and their employees who act under color of state law can also be sued under Section 1983
  • finding that no reasonable jury could find that Wexford physicians “personally realized there was a risk that [plaintiff’s] injury was not being treated properly, and so could not find that either consciously disregarded that risk”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Questioned by Estate of Alvarez v. Johns Hopkins University, 275 F. Supp. 3d 670 (2017)

    Additionally, the application of Monell to private corporations, even in § 1983 suits, has been called into doubt.26 In Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit pointed out the practical difficulties of applying Monell to private entities, asking, “How does a court identify the relevant ‘final policymaker’ in a corporation?
    District Court, D. MarylandAug 30, 2017Read it

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

EARNEST SHIELDS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10-cv-3746 — Ronald A. Guzman, Judge.

SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 24, 2013 — DECIDED MARCH 12, 2014

Before POSNER, TINDER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Earnest Shields was an Illinois

prisoner in 2008 when he was lifting weights and ruptured the

pectoralis tendon in his left shoulder. Although he received

some medical attention for the injury, he did not receive the

prompt surgery needed for effective treatment. Instead,

through a series of oversights and delays by various people

responsible for his medical care, too much time passed for

surgery to do any good. Shields now suffers from a serious and

2 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

permanent impairment that could have been avoided. So we

must assume, in any event, as we review the grant of summary

judgment against Shields on his claims arising from the official

response to his injury.

After his release from prison, Shields filed suit against

numerous defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that

all defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs and thus violated his rights under the Eighth

Amendment to the Constitution. On appeal, Shields is

pursuing claims against two groups of defendants.

The first group consists of Wexford Health Sources, Inc., a

private company that provides medical care to Illinois

prisoners under contract with the Illinois Department of

Corrections, and four doctors who worked for Wexford and

were directly involved in treating or failing to treat Shields.

The second group consists of two doctors employed by the

Southern Illinois University School of Medicine who examined

Shields and recommended physical therapy rather than

surgery. Shields contends these SIU defendants violated the

Eighth Amendment and committed medical malpractice under

state law.

The district court granted summary judgment for

defendants on all of Shields’ constitutional claims and then

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the medical

malpractice claims against the SIU doctors. After judgment

was entered, Shields filed a motion for relief under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 60 asking to amend his complaint to

include state-law medical malpractice claims against Wexford

and the doctors it employed. The district court denied the

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 3

motion. Shields appeals both the grant of summary judgment

on his constitutional claims and the denial of his post-

judgment motion to amend.1

This case illustrates the often arbitrary gaps in the legal

remedies under § 1983 for violations of federal constitutional

rights. Viewing the evidence through the lens of summary

judgment, we can and must assume that Shields is the victim

of serious institutional neglect of, and perhaps deliberate

indifference to, his serious medical needs. The problem he

faces is that the remedial system that has been built upon

§ 1983 by case law focuses primarily on individual

responsibility. Under controlling law, as a practical matter,

Shields must come forward with evidence that one or more

specific human beings acted with deliberate indifference

toward his medical needs.

Shields has not been able to do so. The Illinois Department

of Corrections and its medical services contractor, Wexford,

diffused responsibility for Shields’ medical care so widely that

Shields has been unable to identify a particular person who

was responsible for seeing that he was treated in a timely and

appropriate way. Several of the individual defendants

employed by Wexford were aware of portions of Shields’

1

Shields also sued the Illinois Department of Corrections and two wardens

of prisons where he was housed. The state agency itself is not subject to a

suit for damages under § 1983, see Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491

U.S. 58 (1989), and the wardens did not have direct responsibility for

Shields’ medical care. The district court dismissed the claims against these

non-medical defendants, and Shields does not challenge those dismissals

on appeal.

4 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

course of treatment, but no one person was responsible for

ensuring that Shields received the medical attention he needed.

No one doctor knew enough that a jury could find that he both

appreciated and consciously disregarded Shields’ need for

prompt surgery.

The problem Shields faces also raises a serious question

about how we should evaluate the responsibility of a private

corporation like Wexford for violations of constitutional rights.

The question is whether a private corporation should be able

to take advantage of the holding of Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which requires a plaintiff

suing a local government under § 1983 to show that the

violation of his constitutional rights was caused by a

government policy, practice, or custom. Our prior cases hold,

but without persuasive explanations, that the Monell standard

extends from local governments to private corporations. As we

explain below, however, that conclusion is not self-evident. We

may need to reconsider it if and when we are asked to do so.

As state and local governments expand the privatization of

government functions, the importance of the question is

growing.

Given the state of the controlling law, though, we must

ultimately affirm the summary judgment for all defendants on

the constitutional claims. Shields is also barred from appealing

the denial of his post-judgment motion to amend his complaint

because his appeal from that denial was untimely.

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 5

I. Facts for Purposes of Summary Judgment

We review de novo the grant of summary judgment,

construing all facts in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2005).

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no dispute of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Id. Because we are reviewing a grant of

summary judgment, we must give Shields as the non-moving

party the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and any

reasonable inferences from the evidence. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–51 (1986); Williams v. City of

Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 755 (7th Cir. 2013). Our account of the

facts therefore is not necessarily accurate in an objective sense

but reflects the evidence through the lens of summary

judgment.

In 2008, plaintiff Earnest Shields was a prisoner at Hill

Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois. He was transferred

to the Stateville Correctional Center in Romeoville, Illinois, in

January 2009. Inmates at both Hill and Stateville receive their

medical care from Wexford, a company that contracted with

the Illinois Department of Corrections to provide medical care

to inmates. Defendants Arthur Funk, Robert Migliorino,

Richard Shute, and Ronald Schaefer are all physicians who

were employed by Wexford and had some involvement in

treating Shields. Dr. Funk was the regional medical director in

charge of overseeing medical care at Hill. Dr. Migliorino was

the medical director for Hill until October 7, 2008. After Dr.

Migliorino left Hill, the medical director position rotated

among several doctors, including Dr. Schaefer. Dr. Shute was

6 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

employed by Wexford as a traveling physician serving several

prisons.

Southern Illinois University School of Medicine (“SIU”) is

part of a state university with main campuses in Carbondale

and Springfield. SIU employed defendant Dr. David Olysav.

Dr. John Froelich also worked at SIU as a resident.

On June 16, 2008, Shields injured his shoulder while lifting

weights at Hill. Dr. Migliorino examined Shields that same

day, diagnosed a possible dislocated shoulder, and had him

sent to a hospital emergency room where an MRI was taken.

The MRI seemed to show a partial tear of the supraspinatus

tendon in Shields’ left shoulder. Dr. Migliorino recommended

that Shields be seen by an orthopaedic surgeon. As required by

Wexford procedure, Dr. Migliorino conducted a “collegial

review” with Dr. Funk to obtain approval for his

recommendation. Collegial reviews frequently took place over

the telephone, and Dr. Funk did not review patients’ charts as

part of the collegial review.

Dr. Funk approved Dr. Migliorino’s referral

recommendation, and Shields was seen by Dr. Schierer, an

orthopaedic surgeon who is not a defendant. Dr. Schierer

diagnosed a different problem, a ruptured left pectoralis

tendon. He recommended that Shields see a shoulder specialist

for surgery. Dr. Migliorino then secured Dr. Funk’s approval

through collegial review to have Shields see Dr. Clark, a

shoulder specialist who is also not a defendant. Dr. Clark

confirmed Dr. Schierer’s diagnosis but said he did not feel

comfortable performing the surgery himself. Dr. Clark

recommended that Shields see Dr. Gibbons, another shoulder

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 7

specialist who is not a defendant, for the surgery. Dr.

Migliorino seconded Dr. Clark’s recommendation and

obtained Dr. Funk’s approval via collegial review. Shields was

scheduled to visit Dr. Gibbons, but before the visit took place,

Dr. Gibbons notified Hill that he, too, would not feel

comfortable performing the necessary surgery. Dr. Clark

recommended finding another shoulder specialist to perform

it. By this time, almost two months had passed since Shields’

injury.

At this point, a critical error occurred. The regional director

responsible for Hill (Dr. Funk) and Hill’s medical director (Dr.

Migliorino) did not select specific doctors for referrals. When

a referral was authorized, staff in Hill’s Medical Records

department selected the specific doctor for the referral from a

list of local specialists that they maintained. When Dr.

Migliorino and Dr. Funk referred Shields to a shoulder

specialist for the third time, Hill’s list did not contain any more

shoulder specialists. Hill staff therefore contacted Wexford

staff to find an out-of-area shoulder specialist to examine

Shields. Wexford staff consulted their list of out-of-area

shoulder specialists, drew the name of SIU’s Dr. Olysav from

the list, and provided it to Hill. Dr. Olysav is a board-certified

orthopaedic surgeon, but he is not a shoulder specialist. For the

present we must assume he was included on Wexford’s list by

mistake. No one detected the error, and Shields was sent to SIU

for evaluation by Dr. Olysav and Dr. Froelich.

After Dr. Froelich conducted a physical examination and

took Shields’ medical history, Dr. Olysav examined Shields.

Dr. Olysav’s treatment recommendation differed dramatically.

All the specialists who had examined Shields up to that point

8 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

had recommended surgery to repair the torn tendon. Dr.

Olysav, however, recommended only physical therapy. He did

not recommend that a follow-up visit take place, nor did he

indicate whether or under what conditions any further

treatment might be needed. Dr. Funk and Dr. Migliorino

approved Dr. Olysav’s recommendation. They also did not

double-check Dr. Olysav’s credentials before approving his

recommendation, missing an opportunity to discover that

Olysav was not in fact a shoulder specialist.

On August 27, 2008, the day after being prescribed physical

therapy, Shields filed a formal grievance because he was not

receiving the surgery that several doctors had told him he

needed. The Hill employee who reviewed Shields’ grievance

spoke with a health care unit administrator, learned that the

last “specialist” to examine Shields had prescribed physical

therapy rather than surgery, and denied the grievance on that

basis. She, too, did not double-check Dr. Olysav’s credentials.

A designee of Hill’s warden approved the denial based solely

on the grievance and the response. He did not examine any

other documents or conduct any independent investigation

into the counselor’s conclusions.

Shields did not begin physical therapy at Hill until October

2008. He was not able to complete the therapy. The physical

therapist wrote on Shields’ chart that he was in too much pain

to continue. The therapist suggested evaluation by an

orthopaedist if such an evaluation had not already taken place.

Despite the therapist’s notes, no follow-up examination was

conducted and no further treatment was scheduled. (Dr.

Migliorino left Hill while Shields’ therapy was in progress.) In

fact, there is no indication that anyone checked whether

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 9

Shields’ therapy had resolved his injury, or even read the

therapist’s note indicating that the physical therapy had not

been successful.

A couple of months later, Dr. Schaefer, a Wexford traveling

physician filling in for the departed Dr. Migliorino, was asked

to lift the medical hold that had been placed on Shields. (A

medical hold prevents a prisoner from being moved to a

different prison during medical treatment, to ensure continuity

of care.) Dr. Schaefer reviewed Shields’ chart, asked Wexford

staff if further treatment was planned, was told no, and

accordingly lifted the medical hold on December 17, 2008. He

made this decision without examining Shields.

Shields was transferred to Stateville in January 2009. After

visiting the Stateville health care unit several times in April

and May complaining of shoulder pain, Shields was referred

to a shoulder specialist at the University of Illinois—Chicago.

That doctor confirmed in July 2009 that his left pectoralis

tendon had been ruptured. Unfortunately for Shields, though,

too much time had passed for surgery to be effective. The

result is that Shields’ left shoulder is permanently atrophied.

His chest has sunk in around the left pectoralis tear, and he

will never regain anything resembling full function in his left

arm. We must assume that these permanent injuries would

have been prevented by timely surgery. Surgery is the

standard treatment for a pectoralis tear and typically results in

a favorable outcome—but only if it is done promptly.

10 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

II. Analysis

A. Eighth Amendment

Shields alleges that Wexford and Drs. Funk, Migliorino,

Shute, and Schaefer (“the Wexford defendants”), and SIU and

Drs. Olysav and Froelich (“the SIU defendants”) were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in

violation of the Eighth Amendment and actionable under

§ 1983. We address each group of defendants in turn.

1. The Wexford Defendants

Shields argues that Wexford and the doctors it employed

were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, in violation

of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishment. He also argues that Drs. Funk, Migliorino, Shute,

and Schaefer, in their individual capacities and as Wexford

employees, were deliberately indifferent to those needs.

a. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

We consider first the claim against the Wexford corporation

itself. The question posed here is how § 1983 should be applied

to a private corporation that has contracted to provide essential

government services—in this case, health care for prisoners.

The answer under controlling precedents of this court is clear.

Such a private corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983

unless the constitutional violation was caused by an

unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself.

Respondeat superior liability does not apply to private

corporations under § 1983. E.g., Iskander v. Village of Forest Park,

690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). Because Shields has no

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 11

evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom of Wexford

itself, these precedents doom his claim against the corporation.

For reasons we explain below, however, Iskander and our

cases following it on this point deserve fresh consideration,

though it would take a decision by this court sitting en banc or

pursuant to Circuit Rule 40(e), or a decision by the Supreme

Court to overrule those decisions. We start with the

background of § 1983 and the Supreme Court cases relevant to

the issue, then turn to circuit court decisions, and finally

discuss reasons to question those circuit decisions and adopt

a different approach for private corporations.

The law now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted as

part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux

Klan Act, to provide a private right of action against persons

acting under color of state law who violated constitutional

rights. See 17 Stat. 13, § 1. The statute provides in relevant part:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress … .” The 42nd Congress

enacted the law as part of a series of steps to protect freed

slaves and their supporters from abuses of local and state

government power in the Reconstruction era.

The statute was not used often until the Supreme Court

held in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), that § 1983

12 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

could provide a federal remedy for constitutional violations

even if the defendant’s action also violated state law and even

if a state remedy was available. After Monroe, § 1983 became

the most important vehicle for enforcing federal constitutional

rights against state and local governments and their agents.

Monroe also held, however, that a local government was not a

“person” that could be sued under § 1983. 365 U.S. at 187–92.

Most defendants under § 1983 are public employees, but

private companies and their employees can also act under

color of state law and thus can be sued under § 1983. E.g.,

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161–62 (1992); Lugar v. Edmondson

Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). In a case involving a

private company, the Supreme Court took for granted that the

corporate defendant would be liable under § 1983 for a

constitutional tort committed by its employee. In Adickes v. S.H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), a woman sued both a police

officer and a private corporation under § 1983 for race

discrimination. The plaintiff was a white teacher who had

entered a restaurant in Mississippi with several African

American students. She had been refused service and was then

arrested when she left the restaurant.

The Supreme Court reversed summary judgment for the

restaurant and explained that the plaintiff could recover from

the restaurant if she could prove “that a Kress employee, in the

course of employment, and a Hattiesburg policeman somehow

reached an understanding to deny Miss Adickes service in the

Kress store, or to cause her subsequent arrest because she was

a white person in the company of Negroes.” 398 U.S. at 152. In

other words, the Court indicated that a private corporation

could be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 13

superior liability. Interestingly, Adickes was decided at a time

when a municipal government could not be held liable at all

under § 1983.

For present purposes, the next pivotal decision was Monell

v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell first

overruled Monroe in part and held that a local government

could be sued as a person under § 1983. Id. at 690. The Court

then considered the issue of respondeat superior liability under

§ 1983, and held that “respondeat superior is not a basis for

rendering municipalities liable under § 1983 for the

constitutional torts of their employees.” Id. at 663 n.7. The

Court held instead that a local government could be held liable

under § 1983 only if the government’s own policy or custom

had caused the violation. Id. at 694.

In a number of decisions since Monell, our court has applied

the Monell standard to private corporations. We said it first in

Iskander: “Moreover, just as a municipal corporation is not

vicariously liable upon a theory of respondeat superior for the

constitutional torts of its employees, [Monell, 436 U.S. at 694],

a private corporation is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for

its employees’ deprivations of others’ civil rights.” 690 F.2d at

128; see also Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 622 (7th Cir. 2010);

Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577 F.3d 816, 822 (7th

Cir. 2009); Woodward v. Correctional Medical Services of Illinois,

Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004). All other circuits that

14 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

have addressed the issue have reached the same conclusion,

extending the Monell standard to private corporations.2

Such a unified phalanx of decisions from our own and

other circuits is entitled to considerable respect. Upon closer

examination, however, there are substantial grounds to

question the extension of the Monell holding for municipalities

to private corporations.

A close look at the reasoning of Monell provides no

persuasive reason to extend its holding to private corporations.

Monell gave two reasons for barring respondeat superior liability

for municipalities under § 1983. First, the Court focused on the

language of § 1983, which imposes liability on a person who

“shall subject, or cause to be subjected,” any person to a

deprivation of Constitutional rights:

The italicized language [of causation] plainly

imposes liability on a government that, under

color of some official policy, “causes” an

employee to violate another’s constitutional

rights. At the same time, that language cannot be

easily read to impose liability vicariously on

2

See Iskander, 690 F.2d at 128; Rojas v. Alexander’s Dept. Store, Inc., 924 F.2d

406, 408–09 (2d Cir. 1990); Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504, 506 (4th

Cir. 1982); Street v. Corrections Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir.

1996); Lux v. Hansen, 886 F.2d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989); Tsao v. Desert Palace,

Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas

Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 723 (10th Cir. 1988); Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127,

1129–30 (11th Cir. 1992). See also Lyons v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc.,

30 F.3d 240, 246 (1st Cir. 1994); Defreitas v. Montgomery County Corr. Facility,

525 Fed. Appx. 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2013).

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 15

governing bodies solely on the basis of the

existence of an employer-employee relationship

with a tortfeasor. Indeed, the fact that Congress

did specifically provide that A’s tort became B’s

liability if B “caused” A to subject another to a

tort suggests that Congress did not intend § 1983

liability to attach where such causation was

absent.

436 U.S. at 692.

Second, the Court concluded that the legislative history of

the Civil Rights Act of 1871 showed that Congress did not

intend to impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities.

Id. at 693. The Court focused on a rejected proposal known as

the Sherman Amendment. Directed at Ku Klux Klan activity in

the Reconstruction-era South, the amendment would have held

a municipality liable for the torts of private citizens not under

the municipality’s control, and thus would have imposed in

essence a generalized duty to keep the peace. See 436 U.S. at

692–94 & n.57. The amendment was rejected largely due to

concerns about its constitutionality. See id. at 678–79. The

Monell Court seems to have concluded that if the 1871

Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment on constitutional

grounds, then it similarly would have thought that respondeat

superior liability for municipalities was unconstitutional, so

respondeat superior liability for municipalities must be implicitly

barred under § 1983. See id. at 693. While the Court’s

discussion is opaque, it was clearly focused on municipalities

and did not consider private corporations, such as in Adickes v.

Kress.

16 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

The rejection of respondeat superior liability for

municipalities in Monell has been the subject of extensive

analysis and criticism. See Board of County Com’rs v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397, 430–37 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (calling for

reconsideration of Monell rejection of respondeat superior

liability); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834–44

(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); see also, e.g., Jack M.

Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts,

48 DePaul L. Rev. 627 (1999); Peter H. Schuck, Municipal

Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons from Tort Law and

Organization Theory, 77 Geo. L.J. 1753 (1989); Larry Kramer

and Alan O. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: A

Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 S. Ct. Rev. 249 (1987);

Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The

Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 517

(1987); Karen M. Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the

Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 Temple L.Q.

409 (1978). (A reader of these critiques will find citations to

many more.) These commentators have pointed out many

critical problems with Monell’s conclusion that respondeat

superior claims against municipalities are not permitted under

§ 1983.

Perhaps the most important criticism to emerge from this

literature is that Monell failed to grapple with the fact that

respondeat superior liability for employers was a settled feature

of American law that was familiar to Congress in 1871, when

§ 1983 was enacted. Congress therefore enacted § 1983 against

the backdrop of respondeat superior liability, and presumably

assumed that courts would apply it in claims against

corporations under § 1983. Cf. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 38–45

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 17

(1983) (considering common law in 1871 to decide standard for

punitive damages under § 1983); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,

257–59 (1978) (considering common law in 1871 to decide that

actual injury is needed to recover compensatory damages

under § 1983); see generally Jack M. Beermann, A Critical

Approach to Section 1983 With Special Attention to Sources of

Law, 42 Stanford L. Rev. 51, 66–73 (1989).

The Court’s reliance on the Sherman Amendment is also

problematic. The rejection of the proposal to hold

municipalities liable for actions of private citizens it could not

control says little about whether a municipality should be held

liable for constitutional torts committed by its own employees

acting within the scope of their employment. (More about this

below, when we discuss reasons not to extend the Monell

holding to private corporations.) Finally, the Court gave only

cursory and tentative treatment to the strongest foundation for

respondeat superior liability: an employer should be held

responsible for the torts of employees whose actions it can

control and from whose actions it profits. See 436 U.S. at 694 &

n.58.

Given these flaws on the surface of its reasoning, Monell is

probably best understood as simply having crafted a

compromise rule that protected the budgets of local

governments from automatic liability for their employees’

wrongs, driven by a concern about public budgets and the

potential extent of taxpayer liability.

Of course, the critiques of Monell’s rejection of respondeat

superior liability for municipalities have not yet persuaded the

Supreme Court to reconsider that rule. Given our position in

18 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

the judicial hierarchy, then, we are bound to follow Monell as

far as municipal liability is concerned. We need not extend that

holding, however, to the quite different context of private

corporate defendants.

As noted, respondeat superior liability, which makes

employers liable for their employees’ actions within the scope

of their employment, is an old and well-settled feature of

American law. See, e.g., Restatement (3d) of Agency §2.04

(2006); Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Wis.

2004) (Sykes, J.) (respondeat superior “has been well-settled in

the law of agency for perhaps as long as 250 years.”); Sword v.

NKC Hospitals, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 147–48 (Ind. 1999); Adames

v. Sheahan, 909 N.E.2d 742, 754–55 (Ill. 2009). It is often justified

through a deterrence theory. E.g., Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at 336.

Employers are less likely than employees to be judgment-proof

and thus are more likely to be deterred by potential liability. Id.

Plus, while potential liability for a single tort may not be

enough to cause an employee to take more care, the specter of

massive aggregate liability might spur the employer to take

precautions. Employers are in the better position to take cost-

effective measures to avoid causing injury and can absorb the

costs of those precautions more easily than their individual

employees. Id. All of this suggests that making employers

liable for their employees’ torts may result in less tortious

behavior overall. We should not insulate employers from

respondeat superior liability under § 1983 without powerful

reasons to do so.

The text of § 1983 does not foreclose respondeat superior

liability for corporations. “Cause” has many legal meanings,

but it generally refers to proximate causation, which is

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 19

something broader than immediate, direct causation. See

National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC, 735 F.3d

539, 547 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983,

990 (7th Cir. 2012). The requirement of causation certainly does

not generally preclude respondeat superior liability for a given

tort. See Dobbs’ Law of Torts § 425 (2d ed); Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at

334; Sword, 714 N.E.2d at 147–48; Adames, 909 N.E.2d at 754–55.

The causation requirement affects whether an individual

employee can be found liable for a wrong in the first place, not

whether his or her wrong can be imputed to the employer

under respondeat superior. Courts routinely applying respondeat

superior liability to corporations do not ask whether the

corporation “caused” the wrong by its employee. They ask

instead only whether the employee was acting within the scope

of employment.

The Monell Court’s interpretation of the legislative history

of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 similarly does not indicate that

Congress rejected the idea of respondeat superior liability for

corporations. The rejected Sherman Amendment, which the

Monell Court relied on to reject respondeat superior liability for

municipalities, would have made a “county, city, or parish”

vicariously liable for acts of violence committed by private

citizens. Monell, 436 U.S. at 667. The amendment was designed

to make municipalities vicariously liable for violence and

property damage inflicted by the Ku Klux Klan, regardless of

whether the municipality knew of the Klan’s planned activity

in advance or had the power to stop it. Id. at 667–68. That

proposition simply is not analogous to imposing liability on

private corporations for the tortious behavior of their own

employees acting within the scope of employment. Nothing in

20 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

the Monell treatment of the legislative history bars respondeat

superior liability for corporations.

Other Supreme Court decisions also do not require the

extension of Monell to this new context. Monell itself said

nothing about whether its new “policy or custom” standard

would apply to private companies sued under § 1983. Nor did

Monell even mention Adickes’ almost reflexive application of

respondeat superior liability to a private company under § 1983.

Adickes remains good law, see Lugar, 457 U.S. at 930–31

(quoting Adickes’ discussion of private liability under § 1983 at

length and with approval), so current Supreme Court

precedent seems to support rather than reject respondeat

superior liability for private corporations under § 1983. Further,

since Monell, the Supreme Court has never held that a private

corporation may take advantage of the Monell standard that

applies to local governments. That suggests that we should

treat a private corporation like any other “person” who causes

a constitutional violation and that respondeat superior liability

should apply.

Moreover, in the related context of qualified immunity

under § 1983, the Court has distinguished between employees

of municipalities and employees of private corporations. In

both Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997), and Wyatt

v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167–68 (1992), the Supreme Court based

its conclusion on grounds of both history and policy, focusing

on differences between private actors and governments.

Despite a long history of private corporations performing state

functions, there is no tradition of providing immunity to their

employees. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 405. Further, unlike

municipalities, private corporations are subject to market

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 21

pressures, which provide a set of incentives entirely different

from those imposed by the democratic process. Id. at 409–11.

The conditions under which private corporations compete and

provide government services are thus materially different from

those affecting municipalities. Id. Due to these differences,

private prison employees are barred from asserting qualified

immunity from suit under § 1983. Id. at 412.

The Court’s reasoning in Richardson and Wyatt suggests that

we should not foreclose respondeat superior liability against

private corporations under § 1983. Private prison employees

and prison medical providers have frequent opportunities,

through their positions, to violate inmates’ constitutional

rights.3 It is also generally cheaper to provide sub-standard

care than it is to provide adequate care. Private prisons and

prison medical providers are subject to market pressures. Their

employees have financial incentives to save money at the

expense of inmates’ well-being and constitutional rights. The

unavailability of qualified immunity for these employees is a

deterrent against such conduct, but respondeat superior liability

for the employer itself is likely to be more effective at deterring

such actions. Insulating private corporations from respondeat

superior liability significantly reduces their incentives to control

their employees’ tortious behavior and to ensure respect for

3

Although Richardson involved a private prison, some circuits (including

our own) have applied Richardson to private medical providers, holding that

they are similarly barred from asserting immunity under § 1983. See, e.g.,

Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of

qualified immunity for private health care providers for jail); McCullum v.

Tepe, 693 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2012); Jensen v. Lane County, 222 F.3d 570 (9th Cir.

2000); Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999).

22 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

prisoners’ rights. The results of the current legal approach are

increased profits for the corporation and substandard services

both for prisoners and the public.

So the Supreme Court has not directly said whether Monell

applies to private corporations, and there are powerful reasons

to say no. Yet we and all other circuits that have considered the

question have said yes. Why? It’s not easy to say. Our opinion

in Iskander and virtually all of the circuit opinions after Monell

simply cite one or more prior cases that all seem to trace back

to the terse Fourth Circuit opinion in Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co.,

678 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1982). The relevant portion of that

opinion said in full:

In Monell v. New York City Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court

held that a municipal corporation cannot be

saddled with section 1983 liability via

respondeat superior alone. We see this holding

as equally applicable to the liability of private

corporations. Two aspects of Monell exact this

conclusion. The Court found section 1983

evincing a Congressional intention to exclude the

imposition of vicarious answerability. For a third

party to be liable the statute demands of the

plaintiff proof that the former “caused” the

deprivation of his Federal rights. 436 U.S. at

691–92. Continuing, the Court observed that the

policy considerations underpinning the doctrine

of respondeat superior insufficient to warrant

integration of that doctrine into the statute. Id. at

694. No element of the Court’s ratio decidendi

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 23

lends support for distinguishing the case of a

private corporation.

678 F.2d at 506.

There are good reasons to question the Powell conclusion.

It overlooked the fact that Monell was focused on the Sherman

Amendment, which would have imposed liability for mere

failure to prevent harm caused by private citizens, not

employees controlled by an employer. It also overlooked the

fact that respondeat superior liability was already a well

established part of the common law in 1871, so Congress could

reasonably have expected the courts to apply the doctrine

under § 1983. Perhaps most important, the Powell opinion

simply overlooked the Monell Court’s special solicitude for

municipalities and their budgets. These omissions counsel

against adopting the Powell court’s conclusion.

For all of these reasons, a new approach may be needed for

whether corporations should be insulated from respondeat

superior liability under § 1983. Since prisons and prison medical

services are increasingly being contracted out to private

parties, reducing private employers’ incentives to prevent their

employees from violating inmates’ constitutional rights raises

serious concerns. Nothing in the Supreme Court’s

jurisprudence or the relevant circuit court decisions provides

a sufficiently compelling reason to disregard the important

policy considerations underpinning the doctrine of respondeat

superior. And in a world of increasingly privatized state

24 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

services, the doctrine could help to protect people from

tortious deprivations of their constitutional rights.4

If the Monell policy/custom standard did not apply here, we

would reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment

for Wexford. Shields has offered evidence showing that the

corporation was responsible for his health care. As an entity,

the company knew of his injury, its severity, the need for

surgery, and the complete failure of physical therapy. (Recall

the therapist’s note that Shields had to stop the therapy

because of pain.) Wexford nevertheless failed to ensure that

Shields received the surgery he needed to avoid permanent

impairment of his shoulder. These facts would support

respondeat superior liability for Wexford and would lead us to

reverse summary judgment for Wexford on that ground.

The facts in this case are also an excellent example of the

problems generated by barring respondeat superior liability for

corporations under § 1983. On the facts before us, it appears

that Wexford structured its affairs so that no one person was

4

For more detailed critiques of the extension of Monell to private corpora-

tions, and for more detailed reviews of the policy considerations and the

nuances in the case law, see Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized

Government Through § 1983, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449 (2009), and Barbara

Kritchevsky, Civil Rights Liability of Private Entities, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 35

(2004); see also Jack M. Beermann, Why Do Plaintiffs Sue Private Parties

Under Section 1983?, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 9, 27 (2004). As just one example

of additional problems, the Monell policy/custom rule is difficult to apply

to a private corporation. How does a court identify the relevant "final

policymaker" in a corporation? Is it the CEO, the board of directors, the

shareholders? What if the corporation is a subsidiary of another? See

Kritchevsky, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. at 56–60.

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 25

responsible for Shields’ care, making it impossible for him to

pin responsibility on an individual. If respondeat superior

liability were available, Wexford could not escape liability by

diffusing responsibility across its employees, and prisoners

would be better protected from violations of their

constitutional rights.

In view of these considerations, we have considered the

possibility of circulating an opinion overruling Iskander and its

progeny on this point for consideration by the entire court

under Circuit Rule 40(e). Since Shields has not asked us to

overrule those cases and Wexford has not had occasion to brief

the issue, we have decided not to take that approach. A

petition for rehearing en banc would provide an opportunity

for both sides to be heard on this issue, and our decision is of

course subject to review on certiorari. For now, this circuit’s

case law still extends Monell from municipalities to private

corporations. Iskander, 690 F.2d at 128; Gayton, 593 F.3d at 622;

Rodriguez, 577 F.3d at 822. To recover against Wexford under

our current precedent, Shields must offer evidence that his

injury was caused by a Wexford policy, custom, or practice of

deliberate indifference to medical needs, or a series of bad acts

that together raise the inference of such a policy. Woodward, 368

F.3d at 927.

Shields attempts to proceed by showing a series of bad acts.

He argues that mistakenly referring him to the wrong doctor

(and failing to detect or correct that mistake), combined with

failing to promptly discipline and eventually replace Dr.

Migliorino, shows that Wexford was deliberately indifferent to

his medical needs.

26 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

Such isolated incidents do not add up to a pattern of

behavior that would support an inference of a custom or

policy, as required to find that Wexford as an institution/

corporation was deliberately indifferent to Shields’ needs. See

Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 2003)

(“proof of isolated acts of misconduct will not suffice; a series

of violations must be presented to lay the premise of deliberate

indifference”); Cornfeld v. Consolidated High School Dist. No. 230,

991 F.2d 1316, 1326 (7th Cir. 1993) (requiring “a pattern or

series of incidents of unconstitutional conduct” in the absence

of an explicit policy). Under our existing case law, summary

judgment was properly granted for Wexford on this claim.

b. Drs. Funk, Migliorino, Shute, and Schaefer

Shields contends that Drs. Funk, Migliorino, Shute, and

Schaefer were all deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.

However, he has not come forward with evidence that would

allow a reasonable jury to find that any one of the Wexford

doctors both knew there was a risk of harm to Shields and

consciously disregarded that risk. See Mathis v. Fairman, 120

F.3d 88, 91 (7th Cir. 1997).

The initial response to Shields’ injury was not deliberately

indifferent. Dr. Migliorino saw Shields the day he was injured

and sent him to an outside hospital emergency room. When an

MRI revealed an injury, Dr. Migliorino referred Shields to an

orthopaedic surgeon, and Dr. Funk approved the referral.

There is no indication that this response was inadequate, let

alone deliberately indifferent. Rather, Drs. Funk and

Migliorino seem to have taken prompt action to diagnose

Shields’ injury and to seek treatment for it.

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 27

Shields argues that Drs. Funk and Migliorino deliberately

delayed the surgery he needed, referring him to endless

doctors in search of a different, cheaper treatment

recommendation. However, Drs. Funk and Migliorino referred

Shields to the type of doctor who seemed well qualified to

perform his surgery: an orthopaedic surgeon specializing in

the shoulder. Given that Drs. Funk and Migliorino did not

select specific doctors for referrals, referring Shields to the type

of doctor who would be able to treat his injury competently,

with surgery or otherwise, was adequate. Each time a

particular doctor said he was unwilling to try the surgery

himself, Drs. Funk and Migliorino scheduled another referral

promptly. We see no basis for holding Drs. Funk and

Migliorino responsible for the specialists’ reluctance to do the

surgery themselves. Under these circumstances, the multiple

referrals do not permit an inference of deliberate indifference.

We must assume the referral to Dr. Olysav was a mistake

since he was not the proper sort of specialist. The problem for

Shields is that § 1983 requires proof of individual

responsibility. There is no indication that Dr. Funk or Dr.

Migliorino had any involvement in that mistaken referral, let

alone that either one acted with deliberate indifference to

Shields’ health in allowing the referral to go forward.

Approving Dr. Olysav’s treatment recommendation of

physical therapy also was not deliberately indifferent. Shields

points to the fact that all previous shoulder specialists who had

seen his records had recommended surgery. However,

choosing one treatment recommendation over another does

not amount to deliberate indifference where both

recommendations are made by qualified medical professionals,

28 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

as Drs. Funk and Migliorino believed to be the case here. See

Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 261 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Mere

differences of opinion among medical personnel regarding a

patient’s appropriate treatment do not give rise to deliberate

indifference.”).

Neither Dr. Funk nor Dr. Migliorino was deliberately

indifferent to Shields’ medical needs after approving him for

physical therapy as recommended by Dr. Olysav. Dr.

Migliorino left Hill before Shields’ physical therapy was

stopped because of pain, and there is simply no evidence that

Dr. Funk knew of any continuing injury after he approved Dr.

Migliorino’s recommendation that Shields undergo physical

therapy. In particular, there is no evidence that Dr. Funk saw

the physical therapist’s report that Shields could not complete

the prescribed physical therapy because of the pain it caused.

On these undisputed facts, a reasonable jury could not find

that either Dr. Funk or Dr. Migliorino personally realized there

was a risk that Shields’ injury was not being treated properly,

and so could not find that either consciously disregarded that

risk.

Finally, there is no evidence that would support a finding

that Dr. Shute or Dr. Schaefer was deliberately indifferent to

Shields’ medical needs. Dr. Schaefer’s job was limited to

determining whether further treatment was planned. After

determining it was not, he lifted the medical hold on Shields.

He did not personally examine Shields, so he did not know

that his injury had not been adequately addressed. Shields

makes no arguments about Dr. Shute on appeal, so any claim

against him is waived. Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709,

718.

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 29

2. The SIU Defendants

Summary judgment was also properly granted on Shields’

§ 1983 claims against SIU, Dr. Olysav, and Dr. Froelich. Shields

makes no arguments regarding SIU itself on appeal, so any

claim against SIU is waived. Puffer, 675 F.3d at 718. Shields also

has not shown that either Dr. Olysav or Dr. Froelich acted

under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983. Whether

a medical provider is a state actor is a functional inquiry,

focusing on the relationship between the state, the medical

provider, and the prisoner. Rodriguez, 577 F.3d at 826. A

business like Wexford that contracts to provide medical care to

prisoners undertakes “freely, and for consideration,

responsibility for a specific portion of the state’s overall

[constitutional] obligation to provide medical care for

incarcerated persons,” id. at 827, and thus acts under color of

state law for purposes of § 1983. On the other hand, we have

held that medical providers who have “only an incidental or

transitory relationship” with the penal system generally are not

considered state actors. Id. at 827.

The undisputed facts show here that Dr. Olysav and Dr.

Froelich each had only an incidental and transitory relationship

with the penal system. Neither was not acting under color of

state law for purposes of § 1983. Wexford referred Shields to

Dr. Olysav for a one-time examination, which he performed

with the help of Dr. Froelich. Dr. Olysav recommended

physical therapy and had nothing more to do with the patient.

Neither Dr. Olysav nor Dr. Froelich scheduled follow-up

appointments with Shields or retained responsibility for his

course of treatment, so they did not have a sufficiently direct

relationship with him to find that they were acting under color

30 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

of state law. See Rodriguez, 577 F.3d at 828. Their relationship

with Wexford was similarly too attenuated to support the

conclusion that they were acting under color of state law.

Shields correctly points out that Drs. Olysav and Froelich

both indicated that they had treated inmates before and that

Wexford had made the arrangements for those treatments.

However, there is no evidence that Drs. Olysav and Froelich

had a contract with Wexford or the prison, that their practices

focused on treating inmates, or even that they regularly treated

inmates as part of their practices. Standing alone, merely

having treated inmates before does not establish the kind of

close relationship between the doctors and Wexford required

to find that they were state actors. In other words, the

undisputed facts show that Dr. Olysav and Dr. Froelich had

only incidental and transitory relationships with both Wexford

and Shields. The undisputed facts do not allow a reasonable

inference that these doctors acted under color of state law

when they took the referral from Wexford. Summary judgment

was properly granted for them on Shields’ § 1983 claims.

Accordingly, the district court also did not abuse its discretion

by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

state law claims for medical malpractice against these

defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

B. Rule 60 Motion for Relief

Finally, Shields appeals the district court’s denial of his

Rule 60 motion for relief. After the district court issued its

opinion and final judgment, Shields filed a motion to amend

his complaint to add state medical malpractice claims against

Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 31

the Wexford defendants.5 The court found that the motion to

amend his complaint was brought under Rule 15(b), which

directs courts to grant leave to amend freely where the

opposing party will not be prejudiced by the amendment. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(b)(1). The court then denied the motion, holding

that Shields’ operative complaint (the second amended

complaint) did not give the Wexford defendants fair notice of

a medical malpractice claim against them. The court also held

that allowing such a late amendment would prejudice the

Wexford defendants by requiring them to devote resources to

investigating and defending the claim after having already

taken discovery and moved successfully for summary

judgment on the claims actually asserted against them. On

appeal, Shields argues that the Wexford defendants were on

sufficient notice that medical malpractice claims were being

asserted against them, so that having to defend those claims

would not have prejudiced them.

Shields’ appeal of the district court’s denial of his motion to

amend came too late. In civil cases where the federal

government is not a party, a party ordinarily must file a notice

of appeal within 30 days of the district court’s entry of

judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Filing a Rule 60 motion

will toll the commencement of that time limit until the motion

is resolved, as long as the Rule 60 motion is filed within 28

days of the district court’s entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(4)(A)(vi). Filing a post-judgment Rule 15(b) motion does

5

Shields also asked the district court to amend its judgment, a request

properly brought under Rule 60. The court declined, and Shields does not

appeal that denial, so we do not discuss these claims further.

32 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143

not similarly toll the time to file an appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(4)(A).

Shields filed his Rule 60 motion thirty days after the district

court entered its final judgment. If we consider his motion to

amend as having been brought under Rule 60, he is not entitled

to the tolling provided for in Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) because he did not file his motion

within 28 days of the district court’s final judgment, as

required by the rule. If we consider Shields’ motion under Rule

15(b), then he did not file an appeal of the resolution of that

motion within 30 days of the court’s entry of judgment in his

case, as required by Rule 4(a)(1)(A). Either way, Shields’

appeal is untimely, and his claims regarding the motion are

barred.

Conclusion

There is ample evidence here that plaintiff Shields was the

victim of delayed medical care that has left him with a serious

and permanent injury that could have been avoided. The

evidence suggests that he is the victim not of any one human

being’s deliberate indifference but of a system of medical care

that diffused responsibility for his care to the point that no

single individual was responsible for seeing that he received

the care he needed in a timely way. As a result, no one person

can be held liable for any constitutional violation. Finally,

Shields’ efforts to rely on state medical malpractice law against

the Wexford defendants appear to have run afoul of

procedures courts must follow for the timely and fair

resolution of cases. As the case is presented to us, the judgment

of the district court must be and is AFFIRMED.

Nos. 12‐2746 and 13‐1143  33

TINDER,  Circuit  Judge,  concurring.  I  concur  in  the  result

reached  in  the  majority  opinion,  that  is,  affirming  the  judg‐

ment of the district court. I also join in the majority opinion

except  for  the  discussion  of  whether  the  Monell  standards

should apply to private corporations like Wexford, at pp 10‐

25  of  the  majority  opinion.  I  may  not  ultimately  disagree

with  the  thorough  and  thoughtful  points  made  in  that  dis‐

cussion. However, I would prefer to undertake that analysis

in a case in which the issue is raised and briefed by the par‐

ties. With regard to the majority opinion’s invitation to have

a petition for rehearing filed on the question, I am doubtful

that this is a proper case in which to do so.

My  understanding  of  the  record  below  is  that  this  issue

was certainly forfeited, if not waived, by Plaintiff‐Appellant

Ernest Shields. In his amended complaints before the district

court, Shields alleged the existence of “policies, regulations,

or decisions officially adopted” by Wexford. The Defendants

repeatedly  challenged  the  existence  of  such  policies  or  pro‐

cedures  in  the  district  court,  including  in  their  motion  to

dismiss and their summary judgment briefing. Instead of ar‐

guing that the Monell paradigm did not apply for the reasons

articulated  in  the  majority opinion, Shields stood on  the ar‐

gument that Wexford had policies and practices that directly

led  to  Shields’  suffering  a  deprivation  of  his  constitutional

rights;  he  stuck  to  that  theory  throughout  the  summary

judgment  briefing  and  even  in  post‐opinion  briefing.  He

never breathed a word about Monell’s relationship to corpo‐

rate liability. I would suggest that the majority opinion’s ar‐

guments in this regard were waived by Shields’ failure to ar‐

gue them before the district court. Frey Corp. v. City of Peoria,

34  Nos. 12‐2746 and 13‐1143

Ill.,  735  F.3d  505,  509  (7th  Cir.  2013)  (“When  a  party  fails  to

develop  an  argument  in  the  district  court,  the  argument  is

waived and we cannot consider it on appeal”). And so, too,

in  his  briefing  before  our  court  Shields  renewed  his  Monell

arguments  against  Wexford,  arguing  about  the  existence  of

policies or procedures that led to his constitutional depriva‐

tion.  He  did  not  assert  that  the  Monell  paradigm  should

change  in  the  context  of  a  corporate  contractor  providing

governmental services.

In  other  words,  if  Shields  accepts  the  majority  opinion’s

invitation  to  brief  this  issue  in  a  petition  for  rehearing,  he

would then be raising it for the very first time. Some cases in

our circuit state that  a  party is barred  from raising an issue

for the first time in a petition for rehearing. See, e.g., Hebron v.

Touhy, 18 F.3d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1994) (an argument raised for

the first time in a petition for rehearing “comes too late and

has been waived”). It is true that other cases suggest that an

argument raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing

may be considered forfeited, and only on a plain error basis.

See, e.g., United States v. Rosas, 410 F.3d 332, 337 n.1 (7th Cir.

2004) (“raising a claim [for the first time] in a petition for re‐

hearing  is  the  functional  equivalent  of”  raising  the  claim

while an appeal is pending, and the claim is “considered for‐

feited  and  the  review  is  exclusively  for  plain  error”)  (citing

United States v. Macedo, 406 F.3d 778, 789 (7th Cir. 2005)); In‐

diana Gas Co., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 321 (7th Cir.

1998) (“An argument made for the first time in a petition for

rehearing has been forfeited … .”). What plain error review

Nos. 12‐2746 and 13‐1143  35

would  entail  in  this  context  is  unclear.1  But  there  exists  no

law in our circuit that would allow us to review, de novo and

on the merits, brand new arguments raised in a petition for

rehearing.

Our  sister  circuits  that  have  spoken  on  this  question

agree with our determination on this matter: in general, new

issues raised in petitions for rehearing are not eligible for re‐

view.  Numerous  circuits  hold  that  an  issue  raised  for  the

first  time  in  a  petition  for  rehearing  has  been  waived  and

cannot be reviewed.2 Some hold that this practice constitutes

1 In my view, such review ought to be exceedingly rare because it could

encourage litigants to ignore issues in the district court and before panels

of  this  court,  only  to  spring  them  for  the  first  time  in  a  petition  for  re‐

hearing. That is inefficient and could turn the steady stream of rehearing

petitions that we now experience into a flood.

2 See, e.g., United States v. Bongiorno, 110 F.3d 132, 133 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[A]

party  may  not  raise  new  and  additional  matters  for  the  first  time  in  a

petition for rehearing.”); United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir.

2002) (an issue raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing en banc

cannot  be  considered  because  it  was  not  raised  on direct  appeal);  High‐

tower v. Texas Hosp. Assʹn, 73 F.3d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1996) (“In their petition

for rehearing, appellees have raised a number of arguments that they did

not  make  to  this  court  in  their  original  appellate  briefs … .  These  argu‐

ments  have  been  raised  too  late  in  the  appellate  process  to  be  useful  to

this court, and they are deemed waived and have played no role in our

decision.”);  Costo  v.  United  States,  922  F.2d  302,  302–03  (6th  Cir.  1990)

(“Generally,  an  argument  not  raised  in  an  appellate  brief  or  at  oral  ar‐

gument may not be raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing.”);

Johnson  v.  Woodcock,  444  F.3d  953,  954  n.2  (8th  Cir.  2006)  (an  issue  that

was not raised “in the district court or in the briefs or during oral argu‐

ment  before  this  court”  but  raised  “belatedly  by  way  of  a  petition  for

rehearing” was waived); Picazo v. Alameida, 366 F.3d 971, 971–72 (9th Cir.

36  Nos. 12‐2746 and 13‐1143

forfeiture rather than waiver.3 At least two circuits opt for a

flexible  waiver  principle,  where  the  court  occasionally

chooses  to  consider  arguments  raised  for  the  first  time  in  a

petition for rehearing, in extraordinary cases.4 But no case—

in our circuit or elsewhere—allows for a party to freely raise

a new theory of its case in a petition for rehearing, one that it

has repeatedly declined to raise in the district court or in its

briefs before us.

I agree that the matter of whether private corporate liabil‐

ity under § 1983 should be evaluated in the same manner as

municipal liability is an important question. And the majori‐

ty opinion certainly also issues an invitation to resurrect that

question  in  subsequent  cases.  The  district  courts  of  this  cir‐

2004) (“[A]t no point in this litigation until the petition for rehearing did

the state argue that we should apply Esparza, or even consider it … . Un‐

der  the  law  of  this  circuit,  we  deem  the  state’s  most  recent  argument

waived.”); United States v. Martinez, 96 F.3d 473, 475 (11th Cir. 1996) (“We

do not consider issues or arguments raised for the first time on petition

for  rehearing.”);  Haas  v.  Peake,  544  F.3d  1306,  1308  (Fed.  Cir.  2008)  (an

argument that was not argued in a brief on appeal, but raised for the first

time in the petition for rehearing, was waived).

3  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Andrus,  499  F.3d  1162,  1163  (10th  Cir.  2007)

(appellant’s argument, “made for the first time in his petition for rehear‐

ing and … not initially presented to the panel,” was forfeited).

4  See  Fox  Television  Stations,  Inc.  v.  F.C.C.,  293  F.3d  537,  540  (D.C.  Cir.

2002) (court “ordinarily deems an argument raised for the first time in a

petition  for  rehearing  to  have  been  waived”  but  the  practice  is  “more

practical than rigid”); Anderson v. Branen, 27 F.3d 29, 30 (2d Cir. 1994) (a

party’s  failure  to  raise  an  argument  before  the  circuit  court  or  district

court “obviates any need on our part to address the merits of his petition

[for  rehearing]”  unless  “manifest  injustice  otherwise  would  result.”)

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

Nos. 12‐2746 and 13‐1143  37

cuit  will  likely  soon  be  faced  with  it,  and  our  court  will  no

doubt have it shortly thereafter.

I should point out one final reason why I think this case

in  particular  is  poorly  suited  for  rehearing  on  a  new  ques‐

tion.  Shields  is  currently  no  longer  represented  by  counsel.

He was represented in the district court and on the brief he

filed  in  this  court,  and  I  believe  that  he  waived  (or  at  least

forfeited)  any  contention  that  respondeat  superior  ought  to

apply  to  Wexford  through  his  counsel’s  argument  in  those

proceedings. His counsel was permitted to withdraw shortly

before this appeal was submitted to us on the briefs in lieu of

holding  oral  argument.  Even  if  Shields  obtains  counsel  to

pursue  a  petition  for  rehearing  in  a  fairly  short  period  of

time,  the  litigation  choices  made  by  Shields’  prior  counsel

will pose difficult hurdles to overcome in a rehearing effort.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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