Opinion

Redilla v. Avon Lake

  • 2013 Ohio 849
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Mar 11, 2013
Status
Published
On the bench
Belfance
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 48.6%

The opinion

[Cite as Redilla v. Avon Lake, 2013-Ohio-849.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF LORAIN )

JACK REDILLA, et al. C.A. No. 12CA010204

Appellants

v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

CITY OF AVON LAKE, BOARD OF COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

ZONING APPEALS, et al. COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO

CASE No. 08CV158796

Appellees

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 11, 2013

BELFANCE, Judge.

{¶1} Appellants Jack Redilla, Donna Dolezal, and Green Sun Research, LLC appeal

the decision of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas which affirmed the decision of the

City of Avon Lake, Board of Zoning Appeals (“Board”). For the reasons set forth below, we

reverse and remand the matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

{¶2} The facts of this case have been previously recited in a prior appeal:

[Mr.] Redilla, [Ms.] Dolezal and Green Sun Research, LLC (collectively “Green

Sun”), are the owners of a parcel of lakefront property in Avon Lake, Ohio.

Redilla and Dolezal are the sole members of Green Sun. The parcel in question,

Parcel C, was recently owned by a developer, Neil Bower. Bower also owned

two neighboring parcels, Parcel B and Parcel A. Parcel A sits to the east of Parcel

B on Lake Road, while Parcel C sits to the west of Parcel B on Lake Road. The

Bongers purchased Parcel A and Parcel B from Bower and built a home on Parcel

A. Parcel B was undeveloped and the Bongers have retained it as an investment

property. Parcel B conforms to the Avon Lake zoning regulations and is

considered a buildable lot. The frontage requirement in an R-1 residential district,

in which the parcels are situated, is 60 feet. Parcel C, although approximately 1.26

2

acres in size, does not conform to the frontage requirements. It has only 32.28

feet of frontage on Lake Road. From Lake Road, Parcel C travels north in a thin

strip, widening into a flag or paddle shape at its northern end where it meets Lake

Erie.

Between 2006 and 2008, Bower experienced a financial reversal and the bank

foreclosed on Parcel C. Title to Parcel C eventually transferred to Sopramco CV

7, LLC. Green Sun entered into a contract with Sopramco to purchase Parcel C.

Prior to closing, Green Sun sought a variance from the frontage requirement in

order to allow construction of a large home.

On July 22, 2008, a hearing took place before a bare quorum of the Board.

Although two of the members present voted in favor of the variance, a unanimous

vote would have been necessary to approve the variance. As a result, the matter

was tabled until the Board’s next meeting. On August 26, 2008, the Board

reconvened and the matter was presented to four of the Board’s five members

because one was recused due to a conflict of interest. After presentations by

Redilla and the Bongers, along with their respective counsel, and after hearing

testimony from area residents, the Board unanimously voted against the variance.

According to Green Sun’s brief and the trial court’s order, Green Sun took title to

Parcel C shortly after denial of the variance at the August Board meeting.

Green Sun, Redilla and Dolezal appealed to the Lorain County Court of Common

Pleas. The Bongers filed an unopposed motion to intervene, which was granted.

The trial court reversed the Board’s decision, finding it unsupported by the weight

of the evidence.

Redilla v. Avon Lake, Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 9th Dist. Nos. 09CA009731, 09CA009735, 2010-

Ohio-4653, ¶ 2-5.

{¶3} The Bongers and the Board appealed. Id. at ¶ 6. In that appeal, we noted that

while “the Board[’s decision] considered all ten factors embodied in section 1217.07 of the Avon

Lake Ordinances[,] [t]he trial court’s decision * * * reviewed only the seven Duncan factors.”

Id. at ¶ 14. We concluded that:

the trial court erred in failing to fully review the whole record and all factors the

Board considered when determining whether the Board’s decision was

appropriately supported. Moreover, the trial court appears to have reviewed the

Duncan factors independently and substituted its judgment for that of the [Board];

instead, it should review the Board’s decision and determine whether it is

supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence[.]

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(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Id. Accordingly, we “reverse[d] the decision of the

trial court and remand[ed] the matter to the trial court so that it [could] review all the appropriate

factors in light of the whole record and the established legal standard.” Id.

{¶4} Upon remand, the trial court took additional briefing on the issue and issued a

decision affirming the decision of the Board. Mr. Redilla, Ms. Dolezal, and Green Sun

Research, LLC have appealed, raising three assignments of error for our review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO FOLLOW AND IMPLEMENT

THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A BZA DECISION.

{¶5} Mr. Redilla, Ms. Dolezal, and Green Sun Research, LLC essentially assert in their

first assignment of error that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to comply with

this Court’s prior decision and in creating a judgment entry insufficient to permit appellate

review. We agree.

{¶6} As noted above, in the prior appeal, we concluded that “the trial court erred in

failing to fully review the whole record and all factors the Board considered when determining

whether the Board’s decision was appropriately supported.” Redilla, 2010-Ohio-4653, at ¶ 14.

We also stated that, although unclear, it appeared that, in reviewing the Duncan factors, the

lower court did so independently and substituted its judgment for that of the Board. Id. Thus,

we remanded the matter for the trial court to review the Board’s decision and all of the

appropriate factors in light of the entire record and legal standard and then determine if the

Board’s decision was supported by the preponderance of the reliable, probative, and substantial

evidence. Id.

4

{¶7} Upon remand, the trial court took additional briefing on the issue and issued a

brief entry that set forth no analysis, yet came to the opposite conclusion it did the first time.

The entirety of the trial court’s decision states:

This matter is on remand from the Court of Appeals, Case No. 09CA009731 and

09CA009735. Based upon a review of the decision entered therein, the applicable

standard of review, the supplemental briefs of the parties, and Avon Lake Zoning

Ordinance Section 1217.01, the Court finds that the decision of the Avon Lake

Board of Zoning Appeals is supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative

and substantial evidence. The decision of the Avon Lake Zoning Board of

Appeals is affirmed and Appellant[s’] request for a variance is denied. Costs

taxed to Appellant.

{¶8} We are mindful that this Court is only granted a limited review of the matter:

[R.C. 2506.04] grants a more limited power to the court of appeals to review the

judgment of the common pleas court only on questions of law, which does not

include the same extensive power to weigh the preponderance of substantial,

reliable and probative evidence, as is granted to the common pleas court. It is

incumbent on the trial court to examine the evidence.

(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Redilla at ¶ 10. Thus, in cases such as these, it is

particularly important that the lower court’s entry is detailed enough to allow this Court to

conduct the review it is required to do pursuant to statute. The trial court’s entry in this case

does not demonstrate that it complied with our remand instructions. See Budd v. Budd, 9th Dist.

No. 24899, 2010-Ohio-55, ¶ 5, 7. Nor does it offer an explanation for why the lower court

reached the opposite result. Absent any explanation or analysis, such a change of course

inherently seems arbitrary and unreasonable. Because of the lack detail and analysis in the entry

before us, we cannot tell whether the trial court fulfilled its obligation under the statute, thereby

preventing us from performing our more limited appellate review. See MSRK, L.L.C. v.

Twinsburg, 9th Dist. No. 24949, 2012-Ohio-2608, ¶ 10. Accordingly, we sustain Mr. Redilla’s,

Ms. Dolezal’s, and Green Sun Research, LLC’s first assignment of error. We remand the matter

5

so that an appropriate review of the Board’s decision can be conducted and an entry containing

the trial court’s full analysis can be generated so as to be capable of review by this Court.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THE BZA’S

DECISION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR UNREASONABLE

BECAUSE IT WAS CONFISCATORY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY

BURDENSOME.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE BZA’S

DECISION WAS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.

{¶9} Mr. Redilla’s, Ms. Dolezal’s, and Green Sun Research, LLC’s remaining

assignments of error assert that the trial court erred in affirming the Board’s decision. Because

our resolution of their first assignment of error has rendered their remaining assignments of error

moot, we decline to address them. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

III.

{¶10} In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common

Pleas is reversed, and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Judgment reversed,

and cause remanded.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

6

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellees.

EVE V. BELFANCE

FOR THE COURT

MOORE, P. J.

HENSAL, J.

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

JOHN P. SLAGTER and ANTHONY R. VACANTI, Attorneys at Law, for Appellants.

SHAWN W. MAESTEL and PATRICK J. MCINTYRE, Attorneys at Law, for Appellees.

DAVID M. GRAVES, Assistant Law Director, for Appellee.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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