Doe v. Marlington Local School District Board of Education

[Cite as Doe v. Marlington Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 12, 2009-Ohio-

1360.]

DOE ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. MARLINGTON LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT

BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE, ET AL.

[Cite as Doe v. Marlington Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,

122 Ohio St.3d 12, 2009-Ohio-1360.]

Political subdivision immunity — R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) — The exception to political

subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) for “negligent operation of

any motor vehicle” does not encompass supervision of the conduct of the

passengers of the vehicle.

(No. 2007-1304 — Submitted September 17, 2008 — Decided March 31, 2009.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County,

No. 2006CA00102, 2007-Ohio-2815.

__________________

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

The exception to political subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) for

“negligent operation of any motor vehicle” does not encompass

supervision of the conduct of the passengers of the vehicle.

__________________

CUPP, J.

{¶ 1} The facts alleged in this case are disturbing. However, this case

presents a purely legal issue: whether the immunity granted by R.C. Chapter 2744

applies to bar liability of a school district for negligent supervision of the conduct

of children on a school bus. Jane and John Doe, the court-appointed custodians of

Holly Roe,1 a minor, sued the Marlington Local School District Board of

1. The names of the individual plaintiffs, as well as that of “Bob Boe,” the boy who was the

perpetrator of the actions out of which the case arose, are identified by fictitious names to protect

their privacy.

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Education and several employees of the school district seeking damages after

their daughter was sexually molested by another child on a school bus. The board

moved for summary judgment and raised the defense of political subdivision

immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744. The trial court denied the board’s motion for

summary judgment, and the board appealed. The court of appeals reversed,

holding that the alleged negligent supervision of the children on the bus did not

constitute negligent operation of a motor vehicle within the meaning of R.C.

2744.02(B)(1). We accepted the Does’ appeal of that judgment to this court.

{¶ 2} We conclude that the appellate court correctly determined that the

R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) exception to political subdivision immunity for injuries

sustained as a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle does not apply

to this claim for negligent supervision of the conduct of the children on a school

bus. We therefore affirm the court of appeals’ judgment.

I

A

{¶ 3} Holly Roe lived within the Marlington Local School District, but

she was enrolled as a fourth-grade student at Fairhope Elementary School in the

Louisville City School District, where she received special-education services

during the 2004-2005 school year. Marlington’s school buses for transportation of

special-needs students took Roe to and from her school. In the afternoons, Roe

rode home on a Marlington bus with three other special-needs students, who were

boys enrolled at the Louisville Middle School. Those four students were the only

passengers on the bus. Sabrina Wright was the regular bus driver for that route

during the afternoons from the third week of September 2004 through mid-

November 2004. No bus aide was assigned to that route because, in part, the

individualized education programs for the four special-needs students who rode

that bus did not require that a bus aide be present. The plaintiffs alleged that Bob

Boe, one of the boys on that bus, had exhibited serious behavior problems,

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including physical and verbal aggression. Marlington asserted that Boe had no

history of sexual misconduct that was known to defendants.

{¶ 4} On the March 16, 2005, morning ride, a bus aide saw Bob Boe

slumped in his seat next to Roe and discovered that Boe had his hand up Roe’s

dress. The aide immediately separated the two students. Upon questioning Holly

Roe, the bus aide learned that Boe had sexually molested her on the bus that

morning. Roe also told the aide that Boe had done similar things “every day on

Sabrina Wright’s” afternoon school bus. Wright, the driver of the afternoon bus

from mid-September 2004 to mid-November 2004, had never witnessed this

conduct, and Roe had told no one about it until questioned by the bus aide on

March 16, 2005. The afternoon of March 16, 2005, employees of the district

notified Jane Doe, Roe’s guardian, of what had occurred that day.

{¶ 5} The Does and the school district later learned that on Wright’s bus,

Roe was sometimes seen on the floor of the bus; Wright thought the students were

“playing tag.” Wright testified at her deposition that anytime she saw the students

“playing tag,” Wright told the students to separate and move to another seat on

the bus. Boe later pleaded “true” to a delinquency charge of gross sexual

imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05 based on his sexual assault of Roe.

B

{¶ 6} The Does, in their own right and on behalf of Roe, sued

Marlington Local School District Board of Education, Wright, and Patricia

Middleton, the director of transportation for the district, alleging “negligent[],

reckless[], and/or wanton[] operat[ion of] a motor vehicle” and that defendants

failed to safely transport and supervise Roe and the students on the bus. The board

moved for summary judgment, in part claiming that it was entitled to immunity

under R.C. 2744.02. The Does opposed the motion for summary judgment.

{¶ 7} The trial court denied the board’s motion for summary judgment

without opinion. The board appealed that order pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C),

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which provides that “[a]n order that denies a political subdivision or an employee

of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as

provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final order.”

C

{¶ 8} The court of appeals reversed. The appellate court determined that

Sabrina Wright’s alleged inadequate supervision of the students on her school bus

did not amount to the negligent operation of a motor vehicle within the meaning

of R.C. 2744.02(B)(1), so as to avoid the board’s immunity from liability under

R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). Doe v. Marlington School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 5th Dist. No.

2006CA00102, 2007-Ohio-2815, ¶ 24. The Does sought review in this court, and

review was granted on December 26, 2007. 116 Ohio St.3d 1460, 2007-Ohio-

6803, 878 N.E.2d 36. On September 15, 2008, this court ordered that argument in

the case be limited to the Does’ first proposition of law. 119 Ohio St.3d 1456,

2008-Ohio-4656, 893 N.E.2d 847. This court dismisses the appeal as to the Does’

second and third propositions of law as having been improvidently accepted. The

Does’ first proposition of law asserts that a school bus driver’s negligent failure to

supervise and control obvious misbehavior by students on the school bus

constitutes “negligent operation” of the school bus for purposes of R.C.

2744.02(B)(1).

II

{¶ 9} The issue in this case is whether a school bus driver’s supervision

of the conduct of children passengers on a school bus amounts to operation of a

motor vehicle within the statutory exception to political subdivision immunity

under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1). The Does argue that in the context of a school bus,

“operation of any motor vehicle” means all of the essential functions that the bus

driver is trained or required to do by law. The board, by contrast, argues that even

if operating a motor vehicle entails more than just driving the bus, it is still tied to

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the movement of the vehicle or the equipment on the bus, and thus operation of

the bus does not include the supervision of the conduct of students on board.

A

{¶ 10} The recognized purpose of R.C. Chapter 2744, the political

subdivision immunity law, is the “preservation of the fiscal integrity of political

subdivisions.” Wilson v. Stark Cty. Dept. of Human Servs. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d

450, 453, 639 N.E.2d 105. R.C. Chapter 2744 was the General Assembly’s

response to this court’s abrogation of governmental immunity for political

subdivisions. Id. We bear this legislative purpose in mind as we consider and

apply the provisions of R.C. Chapter 2744.

{¶ 11} The analysis of the defense of immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744

is a familiar one. First, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) provides that a political subdivision,

like the school district here, is generally immune from liability for damages “for

injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or

omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in

connection with a governmental or proprietary function.” Governmental functions

include “[t]he provision of a system of public education.” See R.C.

2744.01(C)(2)(c). The parties in this court do not contest that transportation of

students to and from school on school buses is a governmental function.2

{¶ 12} Second, a political subdivision has immunity unless one of five

statutory exceptions creating liability applies. See R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) through (5).

2. See Doe v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1999), 137 Ohio App.3d 166, 170, 738

N.E.2d 390 (“Because the board was required by law to provide transportation for Doe, the

function of providing it was governmental, not proprietary, per R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)”); R.C.

3314.09 (“the board of education of each city, local, and exempted village school district shall

provide transportation to and from school for its district’s native students”); and R.C. 3327.01(“In

all city, local, and exempted village school districts where resident school pupils in grades

kindergarten through eight live more than two miles from the school for which the state board of

education prescribes minimum standards * * * and to which they are assigned by the board of

education of the district of residence or to and from the nonpublic or community school which

they attend the board of education shall provide transportation for such pupils to and from such

school * * *”).

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Finally, even if a court finds that an exception to immunity applies, the political

subdivision’s immunity may be reinstated pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A) if one of

the defenses in that section applies. See Cater v. Cleveland (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d

24, 28, 697 N.E.2d 610.

{¶ 13} The Does contend that the board of education does not have

immunity because of the first exception in R.C. 2744.02(B). The statute provides:

{¶ 14} “Subject to sections 2744.03 and 2744.05 of the Revised Code, a

political subdivision is liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss

to person or property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the political

subdivision or of any of its employees in connection with a governmental or

proprietary function, as follows:

{¶ 15} “(1) Except as otherwise provided in this division, political

subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by

the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their employees when the

employees are engaged within the scope of their employment and authority.”

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 16} The parties do not dispute that Sabrina Wright, the bus driver in

question, was acting within the scope of her employment and authority when she

drove the school bus on which Boe committed sexual misconduct against Roe.

Neither do the parties dispute that a school bus is a “motor vehicle.”3

B

{¶ 17} The resolution of the issue in this case depends on what “operation

of” a motor vehicle means in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1). The term “operation” is not

defined by R.C. 2744.02.

3. For the purpose of R.C. Chapter 2744, a “motor vehicle” has the same meaning as in R.C.

4511.01. R.C. 2744.01(E). R.C. 4511.01(B) defines “motor vehicle” as “every vehicle propelled or

drawn by power” with certain exceptions not relevant here.

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{¶ 18} The parties agree generally that the term “operation” in R.C.

2744.02(B)(1) should be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning. “The rule is that

when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and

definite meaning, there is no need to apply the rules of statutory interpretation.”

State ex rel. Jones v. Conrad (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 389, 392, 750 N.E.2d 583.

However, the parties have a different view of the plain and ordinary meaning of

“operation.”

{¶ 19} The Does argue that “operation” must be understood in terms of its

context and that driving a school bus involves not only driving the vehicle but

also supervising the student passengers. The Does rely upon Ohio regulations that

require bus drivers to be trained in pupil management, as well as case law from

other states, to support their argument that operation of a school bus includes

supervision of the students. By contrast, the board contends that the plain meaning

of “operation” of a motor vehicle in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) refers to injuries that

occur as a direct result of driving or moving the vehicle and that Ohio appellate

courts generally have construed R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)’s immunity exception in that

manner.

{¶ 20} One dictionary definition of “operate” is “[t]o control or direct the

functioning of.” Webster’s II New College Dictionary (3d Ed.2005) 786. That

definition suggests that “operation,” when used in reference to a motor vehicle,

pertains to controlling or directing the functioning of the motor vehicle itself as

opposed to directing the occupants within the car.

{¶ 21} The Does also point to our decision in State v. Cleary (1986), 22

Ohio St.3d 198, 22 OBR 351, 490 N.E.2d 574, to support their interpretation of

“operation” of a motor vehicle under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1). Cleary addressed the

meaning of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1), which prohibits operating a motor vehicle while

under the influence of alcohol or a drug of abuse. In Cleary, this court held that

“operation of a motor vehicle” for the purpose of former R.C. 4511.19 included

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sitting in the car with the key in the ignition and the engine running, even though

the car was not moving.4 See id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. The court

reasoned that operating a motor vehicle meant more than just driving the car. “A

person under the influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse behind the wheel of a

motor vehicle is the obvious hazard at which the statute is directed whether the

vehicle is stationary or in motion.” Id. at 201.

{¶ 22} The Does’ reliance on Cleary is misplaced. Cleary’s reading of

former R.C. 4511.19, a statute intended to combat the dangers of driving while

under the influence of drugs or alcohol, cannot be taken as a license for expanding

the meaning of operation of a motor vehicle under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) to include

anything a driver may do while driving, however unrelated the activity is to

moving the car. Even in Cleary, the acts of putting the key in the ignition and

racing the engine were directly related to the physical functioning, or operation of

the car and had the potential for causing it to move. The same close relationship

does not exist between driving a motor vehicle and supervising the conduct of the

passengers in the motor vehicle.

{¶ 23} Since Cleary, the General Assembly has amended R.C. 4511.01 to

add a definition of “operate.” Am.Sub.S.B. No. 123, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II,

2467, 2951. R.C. 4511.01(HHH) provides that “operate” means “to cause or have

caused movement of a vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley.” That statute was in

effect at the time of the events that precipitated this case. Id. at 3216.

{¶ 24} Although the R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) exception to immunity for the

negligent operation of a motor vehicle predates the General Assembly’s addition

4. R.C. 4511.19 has been amended several times since Cleary was decided. For example,

Am.Sub.S.B. No. 123, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2467, 2958, rewrote R.C. 4511.19(A) to read: “No

person shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state, if, at the time of

the operation, any of the following apply: (1) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug

of abuse, or a combination of them.” The act also added R.C. 4511.194, which prohibits a person

from being in physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse,

or a combination of them. Id. at 3001.

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of R.C. 4511.01(HHH)’s definition of “operate,” that definition nevertheless

sheds light on the meaning of “operation” in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1). R.C. 2744.01(E)

expressly points to R.C. 4511.01 for the definition of “motor vehicle” in R.C.

Chapter 2744. The definition of “operate” in R.C. 4511.01 is also useful in

gleaning the meaning of “operation” in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1). See, e.g., Meeks v.

Papadopulos (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 187, 191-92, 16 O.O.3d 212, 404 N.E.2d 159

(“the General Assembly, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have been aware of

other statutory provisions concerning the subject matter of the enactment even if

they are found in separate sections of the Code”).

{¶ 25} In any event, the definition of “operate” in R.C. 4511.01(HHH) is

generally consistent with the interpretation courts have given to “operation” under

R.C. 2744.02(B)(1). For example, in Doe v. Jackson Local School Dist., 5th Dist.

No. 2006CA00212, 2007-Ohio-3258, 2007 WL 1840864, ¶ 23, the court rejected

a claim that the immunity exception for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle

included the supervision of students who were passengers in a school minivan.

The court noted that while pupil management may well be part of the driver’s

responsibility, it is a responsibility that is separate and distinct from that of the

operation of the motor vehicle. Id. And in Doe v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of

Edn. (1999), 137 Ohio App.3d 166, 738 N.E.2d 390, the court rejected an

argument that the alleged negligent supervision of students on a school bus, which

failed to prevent a sexual assault of a minor student, amounted to negligent

operation of a motor vehicle. Id. at 172. The court reasoned that the student

suffered harm as a result of an external factor, the conduct of another student, and

that the harm was not directly traceable to the driver’s operation of the bus, as

required by R.C. 2744.02(B)(1). Id.

{¶ 26} We conclude that the exception to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)

for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle pertains only to negligence in

driving or otherwise causing the vehicle to be moved. The language of R.C.

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2744.02(B)(1) is not so expansive that it includes supervising the conduct of

student passengers, as alleged in this case.

{¶ 27} This is not to say that supervision of students may not be a part of

a school bus driver’s duties. As the Does point out, the Ohio school-bus-driver

training requirements include instruction in pupil management. See Ohio

Adm.Code 3301-83-10(A)(2)(f) (minimum school-bus-driver training

requirements include pupil management) and 3301-83-10(B)(7) (annual inservice

training for school bus drivers includes pupil management). However, it does not

follow that every duty required of a school bus driver, or for which the driver is

trained, constitutes operation of the school bus within the meaning of R.C.

2744.02(B)(1). The Ohio regulations also require school bus drivers to be trained

in public relations, Ohio Adm.Code 3301-83-10(A)(2)(b), and the “[u]se of first

aid and blood borne pathogens equipment,” Ohio Adm.Code 3301-83-

10(A)(2)(h). No one has yet seriously contended that “public relations” is part of

operating a school bus.

{¶ 28} Because the Ohio statute forecloses the Does’ contention that the

immunity exception in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) applies, we do not find the Does’

citations of cases from other states interpreting the meaning of operation of a

motor vehicle in those states’ immunity statutes persuasive. The Does have not

cited any cases that held that operation of a motor vehicle, as the phrase is used in

governmental-immunity statutes, includes negligent supervision of students on a

school bus that fails to prevent the assault of one student by another. Cf. Stockwell

v. Regional Transp. Dist. of Denver (Colo.App.1997), 946 P.2d 542, 544

(rejecting claim that injuries suffered by a bus passenger who was beaten by other

passengers on public transportation resulted from operation of a motor vehicle

within the meaning of Colorado’s governmental-immunity statute); Chandler v.

Muskegon (2002), 467 Mich. 315, 321, 652 N.W.2d 224 (the operation of a motor

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vehicle under Michigan governmental-immunity statute “encompasses activities

that are directly associated with the driving of a motor vehicle”).

{¶ 29} While the facts alleged in this case are distressing, the plain

language of R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)’s exception to political subdivision immunity for

the negligent operation of a motor vehicle does not include within its scope the

negligent supervision of the conduct of students on a school bus as alleged here. It

is our duty to apply the statute as the General Assembly has drafted it; it is not our

duty to rewrite it. See, e.g., Bd. of Edn. of Pike-Delta-York Local School Dist. v.

Fulton Cty. Budget Comm. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 147, 156, 70 O.O.2d 300, 324

N.E.2d 566 (“Courts do not have the authority to ignore, in the guise of statutory

interpretation, the plain and unambiguous language in a statute. * * * The remedy

desired by appellants from this court must be obtained from * * * the General

Assembly”).

III

{¶ 30} Accordingly, we hold that the exception to political subdivision

immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) for the “negligent operation of a motor vehicle”

does not encompass supervision of the conduct of the passengers in the vehicle.

{¶ 31} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER,

JJ., concur.

PFEIFER, J., dissents.

O’CONNOR, J., dissents without opinion.

__________________

PFEIFER, J., dissenting.

I

{¶ 32} Ohio parents will be startled to learn that school bus drivers in this

state have but one responsibility: don’t crash the bus. A school bus can become

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“Lord of the Flies” on wheels, but apparently as long as the driver maintains an

assured clear distance from other drivers, a school board faces no liability for

what happens inside. It turns out that the school bus driver’s cargo is no more

precious than that of the garbage truck driver. Just don’t crash the bus!

{¶ 33} I would hold that “operation” of a school bus pursuant to R.C.

2744.02(B)(1) includes attention to student safety. The majority writes that “the

exception to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) for the negligent operation of a

motor vehicle pertains only to negligence in driving or otherwise causing the

vehicle to be moved.” However, R.C. 2744.01(B)(1) does not refer to “driving” –

it refers to “operation.” I would hold that “operation” of a motor vehicle includes

“driving” but also includes other activities relevant to the general purpose of the

vehicle.

{¶ 34} The Ohio Administrative Code distinguishes between “driving” a

school bus and “operating” a school bus; in the code, “driving” a bus is only one

aspect of “operating” a bus. Before a bus driver may “operat[e] a school bus with

pupils on board,” he or she must complete training that includes “[d]riving the

bus” but also includes “[p]upil management.” (Emphasis added.) Ohio Adm.Code

3301-83-10(A)(2)(d) and (f). Before “operating a bus with pre-school and special

needs children on board,” the driver must receive training in “[a]ppropriate

behavior management.” (Emphasis added.) Ohio Adm.Code 3301-83-10(A)(3)(a).

Throughout Ohio Adm.Code 3301-83-10, in regard to driver-training

requirements, annual inservice training, and certification renewal, driving is

treated as only one part of operating a school bus.

{¶ 35} The court in Groves v. Dayton Pub. Schools (1999), 132 Ohio

App.3d 566, 725 N.E.2d 734, recognized that there is more to the operation of a

school bus than driving. In Groves, a disabled student alleged that she had

suffered injuries as a result of a district bus driver’s negligence in failing to secure

her in her wheelchair when helping her off the bus. The court held that assisting a

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handicapped student off the bus was part of a bus driver’s duties and could be

found by a jury to be part of “operating” the school bus for purposes of R.C.

2744.02(B)(1). Id. at 570, 725 N.E.2d 734.

{¶ 36} Every child, parent, and school administrator knows that there is

much more to a bus driver’s operation of a school bus than driving. Whether the

driver in this case was negligent should be an issue for the trier of fact. This case

is about more than whether the Marlington school board is liable; it is about

whether a school board can ever be liable for anything that happens on a school

bus. The injurious activities in this case were apparently surreptitious. But the

holding today would apply to cases where the abuse was visible. It would apply

to cases where a child was screaming for help. It would apply to cases where a

bus driver allowed strange adults onto the bus. As long as the driver drove safely,

the school district would be immune.

{¶ 37} To be sure, operating a school bus is complex. But R.C.

2744.02(B)(1) refers to the operation of any motorized vehicle, without regard to

the inherent complexities of operating any particular type of vehicle. The

exception from immunity contained in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) should apply to all

aspects of operating a school bus.

II

{¶ 38} As I wrote in Garrett v. Sandusky (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 139, 144,

624 N.E.2d 704 (Pfeifer, J., concurring), “Governmental immunity, including

municipal immunity, is contrary to the clear meaning and mandate of the Ohio

Constitution.” Sovereign immunity is not rooted in the Ohio Constitution; it was

originally a creation of the common law. In Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc.

(1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 26, 2 OBR 572, 442 N.E.2d 749, this court abrogated the

common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity for political subdivisions, so the

General Assembly responded by imposing sovereign immunity by statute. R.C.

2744.01 et seq. But any statute purporting to grant immunity to political

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subdivisions violates Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and its grant

of a right to a remedy to any injured citizen:

{¶ 39} “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him

in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,

and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.”

{¶ 40} As it stands, the General Assembly’s virtual proclamation in R.C.

2744.01 et seq. that “the King can do no wrong” leaves certain profoundly injured

Ohioans with no remedy in court, in direct defiance of Section 16, Article I of the

Ohio Constitution. As George Bernard Shaw once said, “Kings are not born: they

are made by artificial hallucination.” Or in this case, by statute.

__________________

Hill Hardman Oldfield, L.L.C., John F. Hill, and Joy Malek Oldfield, for

appellants.

Britton, Smith, Peters & Kalail Co., L.P.A., David Kane Smith, Krista K.

Keim, and Sherrie C. Massey; and Mary Jo Shannon Slick, for appellees.

Harry B. Keith, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Legal Rights

Service.

Tzangas, Plakas, Mannos & Raies, Ltd., Denise K. Houston, and Edmond

J. Mack, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Coalition for the Education of

Children with Disabilities, Children’s Defense Fund, Equal Justice Foundation,

and Ohio Association for Justice.

Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker Co., L.P.A., Nicole M. Donovsky,

and Richard W. Ross, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio School Boards

Association.

______________________

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