Opinion

Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Ass'n v. Kealy

  • 125 Ohio St. 3d 238
  • 927 N.E.2d 591
  • 2010 Ohio 1554
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Apr 12, 2010
Status
Published
On the bench
Pfeifer, Stratton, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, Moyer, O'Connor, Cupp
Cited by
4 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.1%

finding that 25 years of involvement with the legal aid society, a “staggering amount” of pro bono work, and a long history of volunteerism qualify as a mitigating factor

How later courts described this case

  • finding that 25 years of involvement with the legal aid society, a “staggering amount” of pro bono work, and a long history of volunteerism qualify as a mitigating factor

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

[Cite as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Kealy, 125 Ohio St.3d 238, 2010-Ohio-1554.]

CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. KEALY.

[Cite as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Kealy,

125 Ohio St.3d 238, 2010-Ohio-1554.]

Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Multiple violations of the Disciplinary Rules —

Substantial mitigation — 18-month license suspension, partially stayed.

(No. 2009-1535 — Submitted December 1, 2009 — Decided April 12, 2010.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 08-075.

__________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, John C. Kealy of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney

Registration No. 0031331, has been admitted to the practice of law in Ohio since

1970. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends

that we suspend respondent’s license to practice law for 18 months, with six

months stayed, based on its findings that he failed to carry out a contract of

employment with Ben Davis and neglected several matters during the

representation. Further, respondent failed to cooperate in relator’s subsequent

investigation and, in doing so, knowingly misrepresented certain facts. In

addition, respondent improperly borrowed $20,000 from another client, John

Krawulski, from whom he had obtained a power of attorney, and after

Krawulski’s death, he failed to disclose the loan in the inventory prepared while

also serving as executor for Krawulski’s estate. We accept the board’s findings

regarding this professional misconduct, but due to mitigating factors, we modify

its recommended sanction to that recommended by the panel and impose an 18-

month suspension with 12 months stayed.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 2} Relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, charged

respondent with violations of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, the Rules of Professional Conduct,1 and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G)

(requiring a lawyer to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation). A panel of the

Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the case, found that

respondent had committed professional misconduct, and recommended an 18-

month suspension with 12 months stayed. The board adopted the panel’s findings

but recommended an 18-month suspension with six months stayed.

Misconduct

Count I: The Davis Matter

{¶ 3} On May 6, 2000, Ben Davis was cited for causing an automobile

accident involving another driver. On May 2, 2002, the United Services Auto

Association (“USAA”), the other driver’s insurance carrier, sued Davis on a

subrogation claim, seeking to recover approximately $13,000 as a result of that

accident. Respondent undertook Davis’s representation and filed an answer and

counterclaim. But the counterclaim alleged damages for injuries to Davis caused

by the other driver, and respondent never joined the other driver as a party to that

litigation. Additionally, he never responded to USAA’s requests for admissions

or to its motion to dismiss the counterclaim. And on January 16, 2003,

respondent failed to appear for the final pretrial hearing. Thereafter, neither

respondent nor Davis appeared for the scheduled trial on May 7, 2003, and as a

result, the trial court entered a default judgment against Davis in the amount of

$13,609.08.

1. Relator charged respondent with misconduct under applicable rules for acts occurring before

and after February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which

supersede the Code of Professional Responsibility. When both the former and current rules are

cited for the same act, the allegation constitutes a single ethical violation. Disciplinary Counsel v.

Freeman, 119 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio-3836, 894 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 1, fn. 1.

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January Term, 2010

{¶ 4} The board found by clear and convincing evidence that in failing to

properly represent his client, respondent had violated 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting an

entrusted legal matter), DR 7-101(A)(2) (intentionally failing to carry out a

contract of employment with a client), and 7-101(A)(3) (intentionally prejudicing

or damaging a client). We accept the board’s findings as to this representation.

Count II: Failure to Cooperate and Knowing Misrepresentation

{¶ 5} In October 2007, an investigator for the Cleveland Metropolitan

Bar Association interviewed respondent regarding the Davis matter. During that

meeting, respondent told the investigator that he had never received notices of the

pretrial or trial dates in the Davis case when, in fact, he had received written

notices from the court.

{¶ 6} As a result of respondent’s deception, the board found clear and

convincing evidence that he had violated Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) and Prof.Cond.R.

8.1(a) (knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection with a

disciplinary matter) and 8.4(h) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on the

lawyer’s fitness to practice law). We also accept these findings of the board.

Count III: The Krawulski Matter

{¶ 7} Respondent began representing John Krawulski in early 2002. In

November 2003, Krawulski developed serious medical problems and signed a

general power of attorney authorizing respondent to act for him. Krawulski also

executed a last will and testament naming respondent as executor of his estate.

On or about August 23, 2004, respondent and his wife borrowed $20,000 from

Krawulski, evidenced by a promissory note agreeing to repay the loan.

Respondent signed the check from Krawulski’s account to himself and his wife

under the durable power of attorney. Krawulski died on January 10, 2005, and on

February 4, 2005, respondent filed an application in the Cuyahoga County

Probate Court to administer Krawulski’s estate. In the application, however,

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respondent failed to disclose the $20,000 promissory note. On July 26, 2005,

Krawulski’s heirs filed a motion to remove respondent as the estate’s executor.

The next day, respondent filed an inventory and appraisal in connection with the

estate and again failed to disclose the existence of the promissory note.

Krawulski’s heirs filed exceptions to the inventory and appraisal, and on

September 1, 2005, respondent resigned as executor of the estate. The

administrator of the Krawulski estate subsequently filed a complaint in probate

court against respondent alleging breach of fiduciary duty and seeking an

accounting. The new executor filed suit against respondent in the Cuyahoga

County Court of Common Pleas, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and

negligence. Respondent and the estate ultimately settled both complaints for

$45,000.

{¶ 8} As a consequence of violating his fiduciary duties as attorney and

executor of Krawulski’s estate, the board found clear and convincing evidence

that respondent had violated DR 1-102)(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5), and 5-104(A)

(entering into a business transaction with a client when the lawyer and client have

differing interests). We accept these findings.

Sanction

{¶ 9} Respondent does not object to the board’s findings, but seeks a

lesser sanction. Relator had initially recommended an 18-month suspension with

12 months stayed, but now seeks an 18-month suspension with six months stayed,

in accord with the board’s recommendation.

{¶ 10} Respondent has breached duties to his clients and to the public. In

determining the appropriate sanction for attorney misconduct, “we consider the

duties violated, the actual or potential injury caused, the attorney’s mental state,

the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and sanctions imposed

in similar cases.” Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Ake, 111 Ohio St.3d 266, 2006-Ohio-

4

January Term, 2010

5704, 855 N.E.2d 1206, ¶ 44. We weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors to

decide whether circumstances warrant a more lenient or exacting disposition. See

Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints

and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline

(“BCGD Proc.Reg”). Because each disciplinary case involves unique facts and

circumstances, we are not limited to the factors specified in the rule and may take

into account “all relevant factors” in determining which sanction to impose. Id.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

{¶ 11} In recommending a sanction for respondent’s misconduct, the

board weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg.

10(B).

{¶ 12} Regarding aggravating factors, the board determined that

respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct and that he refused to completely

acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct (although he admitted to engaging

in the actions that form the basis of the misconduct). BCGD Proc.Reg.

10(B)(1)(c) and (g). The board also found troubling the fact that he was not

initially forthcoming in the investigation of his ethical infractions and that he

caused actual harm to his clients. BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(e) and (h).

{¶ 13} Regarding mitigating factors, the board noted that respondent was

64 years old at the time of the hearing, had been admitted to the practice of law in

1970, and has not been subject to any prior discipline. BCGD Proc.Reg.

10(B)(2)(a). Additionally, the board noted that respondent has been active with

the local legal aid society for 25 years and does a “staggering amount” of pro

bono work. BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e). It noted that respondent is also active

in his community, with a long history of volunteer work for his church, local

charities, and other organizations. Id.

{¶ 14} We accept the board’s findings as to the aggravating and

mitigating factors.

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Sanctions Imposed in Similar Cases

{¶ 15} We have considered sanctions in cases similar to that of the

respondent. In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Larson, 124 Ohio St.3d 249, 2009-Ohio-

6766, 921 N.E.2d 618, we imposed a two-year suspension with the last year

stayed on conditions, where an attorney had engaged in misleading one client

about the status of her driver’s license suspension and other traffic citations, failed

to perform his duties as counsel for that client and two others, failed to return

unearned fees to all three of these clients, and failed to cooperate in two of the

ensuing disciplinary investigations. Id. at ¶ 2. As aggravating factors, we

accepted the board’s findings that the attorney had engaged in a pattern of

misconduct and had caused all three clients harm, had failed to respond during

relator’s investigations until compelled by subpoena, and did not fully accept

responsibility for his misconduct. Id. at ¶ 41. As mitigating factors, we accepted

the board’s findings that the attorney had no prior disciplinary record, that he had

a debilitating sleep disorder, and that he had received favorable character and

competence assessments by three judges. Id. at ¶ 20.

{¶ 16} In Toledo Bar Assn. v. Peters (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 348, 349, 721

N.E.2d 26, we suspended an attorney for 18 months with the final 12 months

stayed on the condition that he submit to a monitoring program, based on neglect

of an entrusted legal matter and commingling his client funds with his own. As

mitigating factors, we accepted the board’s findings that the attorney had not been

previously disciplined by the court, had freely admitted his wrongdoing, and

showed remorse for his misconduct. Id.

{¶ 17} In Akron Bar Assn. v. Holder, 102 Ohio St.3d 307, 2004-Ohio-

2835, 810 N.E.2d 426, we suspended an attorney for two years, with 18 months

stayed on the condition that the attorney engage in no further misconduct, based

on the attorney’s violations of 12 Disciplinary Rules, including DR 1-102(A)(4),

and Gov.Bar R. V(4). As aggravating factors in the case, the board found that the

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January Term, 2010

attorney’s client had been harmed by his misconduct and that he had acted

entirely from selfish motives. Id. at ¶ 33. As mitigating factors, the board found

that the attorney had practiced law for 37 years and had never before been

disciplined for professional misconduct, that his misconduct was directed against

only one client, and that he cooperated appropriately with the disciplinary

investigation. Id. at ¶ 32. Although the Akron Bar Association sought the

attorney’s disbarment, we accepted the board’s recommendation of a more lenient

sanction, stating that the attorney’s 37 discipline-free years of practice, in

combination with the depth of remorse he expressed in the proceedings before the

court, convinced us that he would not repeat his transgressions. (Holder did not

live up to our expectations and was disbarred on December 27, 2006.)

{¶ 18} In Akron Bar Assn. v. Markovich, 117 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008-Ohio-

862, 883 N.E.2d 1046, we suspended an attorney for one year with six months

stayed, on conditions, for committing professional misconduct by, among other

things, neglecting two clients’ cases, helping a client violate a civil protection

order, filing an unapproved dismissal entry, borrowing money from a client, and

misusing his client trust account. Id. at ¶ 2. The board found one aggravating

factor in the case – that the attorney had committed multiple offenses. As

mitigating factors, the board found that the attorney had no previous disciplinary

record, had made restitution, and had submitted recommendations as to his good

character and reputation apart from the underlying conduct. Id. In accepting the

board’s findings, which we stated weighed in favor of leniency, we also noted that

the attorney had acknowledged the wrongfulness of his conduct and had

expressed genuine remorse.

Disposition

{¶ 19} Based on a review of the aggravating and mitigating factors in this

case, we conclude that respondent’s misconduct warrants a sanction more severe

than that imposed in Markovich but less exacting than that imposed in Larson.

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While we recognize respondent’s grievous misconduct, we note that he has

worked in private practice for 39 years with no prior disciplinary record, has

settled and paid all claims owed to his clients, thereby alleviating their loss, has

provided extensive pro bono work with the Legal Aid Society for 25 years, and

has volunteered for his church, charities, and other community organizations.

This long history and other mitigating circumstances provide a basis to modify the

board’s recommended sanction to conform with what relator originally sought and

what the panel recommended. Accordingly, respondent is suspended from the

practice of law in the state of Ohio for 18 months, with 12 months stayed, on the

condition that he commit no further misconduct. If respondent fails to comply

with the terms of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and respondent will serve the full

18-month suspension.

{¶ 20} Costs are taxed to respondent.

Judgment accordingly.

PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur.

MOYER, C.J.,2 and O’CONNOR and CUPP, JJ., dissent.

__________________

MOYER, C.J., dissenting.

{¶ 21} I respectfully dissent from the majority decision in regard to the

sanction imposed on respondent. Respondent neglected a client matter, resulting

in a default judgment being entered against the client. He improperly obtained a

loan from another client who had hired respondent to execute a last will and

testament, a will that named respondent as executor of the estate. Both of these

charges are serious in their own right, but respondent’s misconduct is

compounded by the pattern of dishonesty and deceit he exhibited. Respondent

attempted to deceive the investigator from the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar

2. The late Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer participated in the deliberations in, and the final

resolution of, this case prior to his death.

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January Term, 2010

Association who interviewed respondent about the client matter he neglected. In

the other matter, respondent did not disclose the loan he received from the client

when he applied for authority to administer the client’s estate and again failed to

disclose the client’s loan to him in the inventory and appraisal of the estate.

{¶ 22} I conclude that due to the dishonesty displayed by the respondent,

he should serve a more severe suspension than that imposed by the majority. The

mitigating factors in this case do not warrant modifying the board’s recommended

sanction. I would therefore adopt the recommendation of the board and impose

an 18-month suspension with six months stayed.

O’CONNOR and CUPP, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.

__________________

R. Jeffrey Pollock and Erin K. Walsh, for relator.

Leonard A. Spremulli, for respondent.

______________________

9

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