Opinion

Disciplinary Counsel v. Detweiler

  • 127 Ohio St. 3d 73
  • 2010 Ohio 5033
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Oct 21, 2010
Status
Published
On the bench
Brown, Pfeifer, Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, Cupp
Cited by
4 cases
Authority
More cited than 71.3%

The opinion

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Detweiler, 127 Ohio St.3d 73, 2010-Ohio-5033.]

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. DETWEILER.

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Detweiler,

127 Ohio St.3d 73, 2010-Ohio-5033.]

Attorney misconduct, including representing a client when there was a substantial

risk that the attorney’s ability to represent the client was materially

limited by his own personal interests — Public reprimand.

(No. 2010-1104 — Submitted August 10, 2010 — Decided October 21, 2010.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-014.

__________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, William Jeffrey Detweiler of Akron, Ohio, Attorney

Registration No. 0039269, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1987.

On February 8, 2010, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent with

violating the Rules of Professional Conduct by engaging in a sexual relationship

with a client. A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline considered the cause on the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement,

filed pursuant to Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on

Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline of the Supreme Court (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). The panel accepted the

agreement, concurred in the agreed sanction, and recommended that the board

accept the agreement, which the board did. We, too, accept the agreement, and

we publicly reprimand respondent for his misconduct.

Misconduct

{¶ 2} The stipulated facts of this case show that in April 2008, a female

client retained respondent to represent her in her divorce. In May 2008, while the

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

divorce was pending, respondent and his client began expressing romantic and

sexual feelings toward one another in person and by telephone and e-mail. The

following month, they had a sexual encounter in the client’s car. They continued

to exchange sexual e-mails in July and August, and the sexual relationship ended

in September 2008. Respondent, however, continued to represent the client in her

divorce case until she terminated his services in July 2009.

{¶ 3} The parties have stipulated that respondent’s improper sexual

relationship with his client violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) (prohibiting a lawyer from

soliciting or engaging in sexual activity with a client unless a consensual sexual

relationship existed prior to the client-lawyer relationship), 1.7(a)(2) (providing

that a lawyer’s continued representation of a client creates a conflict of interest if

there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s ability to represent the client will be

materially limited by the lawyer's own personal interests), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting

a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness

to practice law).

Sanction

{¶ 4} In recommending that we accept the agreed sanction for

respondent’s misconduct, the board considered the aggravating and mitigating

factors listed in BCDG Proc.Reg. 10. In mitigation, the parties have stipulated

that respondent does not have a prior disciplinary record and that he has displayed

a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings. BCGD Proc.Reg.

10(B)(2)(a) and (d). There is no evidence of any aggravating factors. See BCGD

Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1).

{¶ 5} We have publicly reprimanded attorneys for having sexual

relationships with clients when the relationships are legal and consensual and

have not compromised the clients’ interests. See, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Assn. v.

Schmalz, 123 Ohio St.3d 130, 2009-Ohio-4159, 914 N.E.2d 1024, ¶ 9;

Disciplinary Counsel v. Engler, 110 Ohio St.3d 138, 2006-Ohio-3824, 851

2

January Term, 2010

N.E.2d 502 ¶ 12-13. Therefore, we conclude that the recommended sanction is

appropriate.

{¶ 6} Accordingly, respondent is publicly reprimanded for his violations

of Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(2), 1.8(j), and 8.4(h). Costs are taxed to respondent.

Judgment accordingly.

BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR,

O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur.

__________________

Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Philip A. King, Assistant

Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.

Charles E. Grisi, for respondent.

______________________

3

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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