Opinion

Disciplinary Counsel v. Blair

  • 128 Ohio St. 3d 384
  • 2011 Ohio 767
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Feb 24, 2011
Status
Published
On the bench
O'Connor, Pfeifer, Stratton, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, Cupp, Brown
Cited by
9 cases
Authority
More cited than 78.7%

The opinion

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Blair, 128 Ohio St.3d 384, 2011-Ohio-767.]

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BLAIR.

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Blair, 128 Ohio St.3d 384, 2011-Ohio-767.]

Attorneys — Misconduct — Multiple violations of the Disciplinary Rules and

Rules of Professional Conduct — Partially stayed suspension, with

probation and continued alcohol and mental-health treatment ordered.

(No. 2010-1862 — Submitted January 4, 2011 — Decided February 24, 2011.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-013.

__________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Rebecca Susan Blair, of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney

Registration No. 0037270, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1986. In

July 2010, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed an amended two-count complaint

charging respondent with multiple violations of the Code of Professional

Responsibility and the Rules of Professional Conduct1 arising from her

mishandling and misappropriation of funds belonging to an incompetent ward,

and her failure to properly supervise her employees, which resulted in the filing of

a false guardian account and a forged affidavit. The parties entered into agreed

stipulations of fact and misconduct and have agreed to a number of mitigating

factors. The panel and board have accepted the stipulated findings.

{¶ 2} The parties stipulated that the appropriate sanction for respondent’s

misconduct is a one-year suspension with six months stayed on conditions. The

1. Relator charged respondent with misconduct under applicable rules for acts occurring before

and after February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which

supersede the Code of Professional Responsibility. When both the former and current rules are

cited for the same act, the allegation constitutes a single ethical violation. Disciplinary Counsel v.

Freeman, 119 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio-3836, 894 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 1, fn. 1.

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panel, however, concluded, and the board agreed, that respondent’s

misappropriation of more than $16,000 belonging to her incompetent ward

warranted a greater period of suspension and probation. Accordingly, the panel

and board recommend that we suspend respondent from the practice of law for

two years with 18 months stayed on the conditions that respondent be placed on

monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(9), remain in compliance

with her Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) contract, continue to

receive alcohol and mental-health counseling, and complete a continuing legal

education (“CLE”) course in law-office management. Neither party has objected

to the board’s findings or recommendation.

{¶ 3} We agree that respondent has committed professional misconduct

as stipulated by the parties and found by the board and that a two-year suspension

with 18 months stayed is the appropriate sanction for that misconduct.

Misconduct

Count I

{¶ 4} The panel and board adopted the parties’ stipulation that in January

2005, the Cuyahoga County Probate Court appointed respondent to serve as the

successor guardian for an incompetent ward’s estate. After deducting her court-

approved fees, respondent held $16,972.83 of the ward’s remaining assets in her

client trust account. None of this money was placed in an interest-bearing

account on behalf of the ward. Within six months, respondent had withdrawn all

the ward’s assets from her client trust account but did not use any of those funds

for the ward’s benefit.

{¶ 5} The panel and board agree that these facts clearly and convincingly

demonstrate that respondent’s conduct violates DR 1-102(A)(4) and Prof.Cond.R.

8.4(c) (both prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty,

fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), DR 1-102(A)(6) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h)

(both prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the

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January Term, 2011

lawyer’s fitness to practice law), DR 9-102(B)(3) and Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2)

(both requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for each client on whose behalf

funds are held), as well as DR 9-102(E)(1) (requiring an attorney to maintain

client funds in an interest-bearing account) and Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring a

lawyer to hold property of clients separate from the lawyer’s own property). They

further recommend that we dismiss alleged violations of DR 1-102(A)(5) and

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (both prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial to the

administration of justice) in accordance with the parties’ stipulations.

{¶ 6} In addition to the factual findings of the panel and board, we note

that the parties have stipulated that between March 25, 2005, and September 9,

2005, respondent wrote 31 checks against her client trust account. Twenty-six of

those checks – totaling $33,150 – were payable to respondent. And by July 2006,

respondent’s client trust account had a negative balance.

{¶ 7} Although the probate court issued a notice to file account in

January 2007 and a citation to file account in March 2007, respondent failed to

file the guardianship account. Instead, she requested and obtained eight separate

30-day extensions for the filing of the account. When the court granted the final

extension in November 2007, it also issued a motion to remove respondent as the

fiduciary for failure to file the account.

{¶ 8} By December 2007, respondent had accumulated over $20,000 in

earned fees in her client trust account, and on December 10, 2007, she reimbursed

$16,972.83 to her ward from those funds. In June 2009, she paid the ward an

additional $2,000 to compensate the ward for the interest that would have been

earned if respondent had initially deposited the ward’s funds in a separate interest-

bearing account.

{¶ 9} Accepting the board’s factual findings and adopting these

additional stipulated facts, we conclude that respondent has violated DR 1-

102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(6), 9-102(B)(3), and 9-102(E)(1), as well as Prof.Cond.R.

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8.4(c), 8.4(h), 1.15(a)(2), and 1.15(a), as found by the panel and board. We also

dismiss the alleged violations of DR 1-102(A)(5) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) as

stipulated by the parties and recommended by the panel and board.

Count II

{¶ 10} Count II arises from respondent’s failure to adequately supervise

her staff while she served as the guardian for the incompetent ward discussed in

Count I. Specifically, respondent had authorized her staff to prepare and file

pleadings regarding the guardianship in the probate court with no oversight and

supervision.

{¶ 11} On December 4, 2007, respondent’s staff prepared and filed a

motion to correct an inventory previously filed in the guardianship proceeding to

reflect that the true value of the ward’s assets was $25,656 instead of the $30,000

previously reported. In support of that motion, respondent’s staff prepared an

affidavit falsely stating, “Affiant further states that this entire amount was

deposited into her [client trust] account to hold on behalf of [the ward], and the

only disbursements from said funds have been $8,683.17 for attorney’s fees

approved by this Court.” A member of the staff signed respondent’s name to the

affidavit and notarized the forged signature before filing it with the court. In fact,

the ward’s account was bankrupt.

{¶ 12} Based upon the misrepresentations in the affidavit, the probate

court “corrected” the inventory and dismissed its motion to remove respondent as

fiduciary. The parties stipulated that respondent’s staff later prepared a

guardian’s account that falsely represented the disbursements and remainder of

the ward’s assets, signed the respondent’s name to the document, and filed it in

the probate court.

{¶ 13} The panel and board conclude that these findings clearly and

convincingly demonstrate that respondent’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d),

8.4(h), and 5.3(a) (requiring a lawyer possessing managerial authority in a law

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January Term, 2011

firm to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the conduct of nonlawyers working

for the firm is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer). We

accept these findings of fact and misconduct.

Sanction

{¶ 14} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider

relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the

sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio

St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final

determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors

listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on

Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio

St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.

{¶ 15} In mitigation of punishment, the panel and board accepted the

parties’ stipulations that respondent has no prior disciplinary record, has made a

timely and good-faith effort to make restitution, has made full and free disclosure

to the board and demonstrated a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary

proceedings, and has a positive reputation in the legal community. See BCGD

10(B)(2)(a), (c), (d), and (e). Additionally, the panel and board observed that Dr.

David Feldman, a board-certified psychiatrist, has diagnosed respondent with

alcohol dependence and recurrent major depressive disorder and determined that

these conditions contributed to the conduct alleged in Count II of the amended

complaint. Further, they found that respondent has been sober since January 2,

2008, continues to actively participate in Alcoholics Anonymous and the Ohio

Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), has sustained treatment for her

depression, and remains under the care of her treating psychiatrist and a licensed

social worker. The panel and board concluded that these factors constitute “other

interim rehabilitation” pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(h). Moreover,

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respondent’s treating psychiatrist and her OLAP counselor report that she will be

able to return to the competent, ethical practice of law. See BCGD 10(B)(2)(g).

{¶ 16} Although the parties stipulated that no aggravating factors were

present, the panel and board found that respondent had acted with a dishonest or

selfish motive when she misappropriated the guardianship funds in Count I.

BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b).

{¶ 17} Citing the lack of criminal consequences for respondent’s

misappropriation of guardianship assets and the lack of an expert opinion causally

linking that conduct to her chemical dependency or her depression, the panel and

board rejected the parties’ recommended sanction of a 12-month suspension with

six months conditionally stayed. Citing Columbus Bar Assn. v. Kostelac (1997),

80 Ohio St.3d 432, 687 N.E.2d 408, and Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Diehl, 105 Ohio

St.3d 469, 2005-Ohio-2817, 828 N.E.2d 1004, they recommend that we impose a

two-year suspension with 18 months stayed on the conditions that respondent

serve 18 months of monitored probation, continue to comply with her OLAP

contract, continue to receive alcohol and mental-health counseling, and in

addition to the CLE requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, complete a CLE course in

law-office management.

{¶ 18} In Kostelac, the attorney used his client trust account as an

operating account, failed to keep accurate records of deposits and disbursements,

issued a check to a client that was dishonored for insufficient funds, and used

client funds for his own purposes. Kostelac, 80 Ohio St.3d at 433, 687 N.E.2d

408. Although he paid restitution to the affected clients, we observed that “even

where the client suffers no harm, an attorney’s commingling of his own funds

with client funds or the attorney’s use of client funds for operating expenses is

subject to sanction.” Id. at 434. Therefore, we adopted the board

recommendation and suspended Kostelac’s license to practice law for two years

with 18 months stayed on conditions. Id. at 435.

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January Term, 2011

{¶ 19} Likewise, in Diehl we suspended an attorney’s license to practice

law for two years with 18 months conditionally stayed for misappropriating client

funds to cover his business expenses, failing to maintain professional-liability

insurance, and failing to notify his client of this fact. Diehl, 105 Ohio St.3d 469,

2005-Ohio-2817, 828 N.E.2d 1004, at ¶ 4, 6, 11.

{¶ 20} In this case, respondent not only misappropriated $16,972.83

belonging to an incompetent ward, but respondent’s depression and alcohol abuse

prevented her from adequately supervising her staff. Due to her lax supervision,

her staff was able to file a false account and a forged affidavit in the guardianship

proceeding.

{¶ 21} We have recognized that “[t]he mishandling of clients’ funds either

by way of conversion, commingling, or just poor management, encompasses an

area of the gravest concern of this court in reviewing claimed attorney

misconduct.” Columbus Bar Assn. v. Thompson (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 667, 669,

23 O.O.3d 541, 433 N.E.2d 602. Therefore we agree with the board’s conclusion

that respondent’s conduct warrants a greater sanction than the parties have jointly

recommend. Accordingly, we adopt the board’s recommended sanction and

suspend Rebecca S. Blair from the practice of law in Ohio for two years, with 18

months stayed on the conditions that she serve 18 months of probation supervised

by a monitor appointed by relator in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(9), remain in

compliance with her OLAP contract and continue to receive both alcohol and

mental-health counseling, complete 12 hours of CLE in law-office management in

addition to the CLE requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, and commit no further

misconduct. If respondent fails to comply with these conditions, the stay will be

lifted, and respondent will serve the entire two-year suspension. Costs are taxed

to respondent.

Judgment accordingly.

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O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL,

LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur.

__________________

Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph M. Caligiuri,

Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.

Michele M. Lazzaro, for respondent.

______________________

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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