State Ex Rel. Coble v. Lucas County Board of Elections

[Cite as State ex rel. Coble v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 130 Ohio St.3d 132, 2011-Ohio-

4550.]

THE STATE EX REL. COBLE v. LUCAS COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL.

[Cite as State ex rel. Coble v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections,

130 Ohio St.3d 132, 2011-Ohio-4550.]

Mandamus—Elections—Withdrawal of candidacy and submission of second

nominating petition—R.C. 3513.261 and 3513.052.

(No. 2011-1371—Submitted September 6, 2011—Decided September 9, 2011.)

IN MANDAMUS.

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Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This is an expedited election case in which a prospective candidate

for municipal court judge seeks a writ of mandamus to compel a board of

elections to place his name on the November 8, 2011 election ballot. Because the

prospective candidate has established his entitlement to the requested

extraordinary relief, we grant the writ.

Facts

{¶ 2} Relator, John Coble, was admitted to practice law in Ohio in 1984, is

in good standing, and has been a resident of Ottawa Hills1 since 1999. According

to Coble, he is fully qualified by age, residence, education, standing, and

experience to be a candidate for judge of the Toledo Municipal Court.

{¶ 3} Coble filed a designation of treasurer with respondent, Lucas County

Board of Elections, and took out a nominating petition to run for Toledo

Municipal Court judge at the November 8, 2011 election for the term

commencing January 3, 2012. A board employee gave him Secretary of State Jon

Husted’s “2011 Ohio Candidate Requirement Guide.” The guide provided that “if

1. Ottawa Hills is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Toledo Municipal Court. R.C.

1901.02(B).

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a prospective candidate withdraws his or her candidacy prior to the relevant filing

deadline or before the county board of elections acts to disqualify the person’s

candidacy, the person may re-file as a candidate for the same office or any other

office.” The deadline to file a nominating petition for the office was July 15,

2011. Coble determined that based on his analysis of the law, the secretary of

state’s guide, and the election-board staff’s advice, he could timely withdraw a

defective nominating petition after it was filed but before the board acted upon it,

and then file a new petition.

{¶ 4} On May 23, 2011, Coble filed his nominating petition with the board

of elections and paid the filing fee. At that time, a board employee advised Coble

that he could call to check whether his petition was in order and included enough

valid signatures. A board employee later told him that his petition was three valid

signatures short of the required number for certification of his candidacy. On

June 1, 2011, Coble withdrew his candidacy.

{¶ 5} On June 13, 2011, Coble filed a new nominating petition for the

same office and the same election with the board of elections. The next day,

when Coble called, a board employee told him that the petition contained

sufficient valid signatures and was otherwise acceptable.

{¶ 6} At its July 12 and 21, 2011 meetings, the board of elections tabled

consideration of relator’s petition so that an opinion could be requested from the

secretary of state. On July 22, Secretary of State Husted issued Directive 2011-

24, in which he reconsidered the office’s previous position and determined that

“[a] person who withdraws his or her candidacy for office cannot subsequently

file a new declaration of candidacy and petition, or nominating petition, or

declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate for the same office at the same

election.” (Emphasis sic.)

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January Term, 2011

{¶ 7} On July 29, 2011, the board of elections rejected Coble’s nominating

petition and refused to certify him as a candidate for Toledo Municipal Court

judge at the November 8 election.

{¶ 8} On August 11, 2011, Coble filed this expedited election action for a

writ of mandamus to compel the board of elections to certify him as a candidate

for Toledo Municipal Court judge and to place his name on the November 8, 2011

election ballot. The board of elections filed an answer, the secretary of state

intervened and filed an answer, and the parties submitted briefs and evidence

pursuant to the accelerated schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.9.

{¶ 9} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the

merits.

Legal Analysis

Mandamus

{¶ 10} Coble requests a writ of mandamus to compel the board of

elections to place his name on the November 8 election ballot as a candidate for

Toledo Municipal Court judge for the term commencing January 3, 2012. To be

entitled to the writ, Coble has to establish a clear legal right to the requested

relief, a clear legal duty on the part of the board to provide it, and the lack of an

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Eshleman v.

Fornshell, 125 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-1175, 925 N.E.2d 609, ¶ 20. Because of

the proximity of the November 8 election, Coble has established that he lacks an

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Owens v. Brunner,

125 Ohio St.3d 130, 2010-Ohio-1374, 926 N.E.2d 617, ¶ 25.

{¶ 11} For the remaining requirements, Coble claims that the board of

elections abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law by following

Secretary of State Directive 2011-24 and rejecting his candidacy for municipal

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court judge. See Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. Of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 216,

2002-Ohio-5923, 778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 11.2

R.C. 3513.261

{¶ 12} Under R.C. 1901.07(C)(2), judges in the Toledo Municipal Court

“shall be nominated only by petition.” R.C. 3513.261 prohibits a board of

elections from accepting a nominating petition of a person seeking to be a

candidate for a municipal office if that person has already filed a nominating

petition to be a candidate for the municipal office at the same election:

{¶ 13} “The secretary of state or a board of elections shall not accept for

filing a nominating petition of a person seeking to become a candidate if that

person, for the same election, has already filed a declaration of candidacy, a

declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate, or a nominating petition, or has

become a candidate through party nomination at a primary election or by the

filling of a vacancy under section 3513.30 or 3513.31 of the Revised Code for any

federal, state, or county office, if the nominating petition is for a state or county

office, or for any municipal or township office, for member of a city, local, or

exempted village board of education, or for member of a governing board of an

educational service center, if the nominating petition is for a municipal or

township office, or for member of a city, local, or exempted village board of

education, or for member of a governing board of an educational service center.”

(Emphasis added.)

2. Although the secretary of state correctly observes that boards of elections have a duty to

“[p]erform other duties as prescribed by law or the rules, directives, or advisories of the secretary

of state,” R.C. 3501.11(P), that provision does not insulate elections boards from actions

challenging their decisions based on rules, directives, or advisories issued by the secretary that are

ultimately determined to be erroneous or inapplicable. See In re Election of Member of Rock Hill

Bd. of Edn. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 601, 609-610, 669 N.E.2d 1116 (board of elections could not

rely on secretary of state advisory opinion that erroneously interpreted election statute); State ex

rel. Allen v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 186, 2007-Ohio-4752, 874 N.E.2d 507,

¶ 16-17 (board of elections erred in relying on an inapplicable secretary of state advisory opinion).

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January Term, 2011

{¶ 14} R.C. 3513.05 (concerning partisan candidates, who must file a

declaration of candidacy and petition) and 3513.041 (concerning write-in

candidates, who must file a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate)

contain comparable prohibitions.

{¶ 15} Over five years ago, we construed these provisions in State ex rel.

Canales-Flores v. Lucas Cty. Bd. Of Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-

5642, 841 N.E.2d 757. In that case, a prospective candidate for the Toledo City

Council filed a defective nominating petition, and after a hearing on a protest

against that petition, her candidacy was rejected. The person then filed a new

nominating petition to become a candidate for the same office at the same

election, and after the board refused to accept it, she filed an expedited election

action in which she sought a writ of mandamus to compel the board of elections

to place her name on the ballot. We denied the writ on the basis that the board of

elections had neither abused its discretion nor clearly disregarded applicable law

by ruling her first nominating petition to be invalid or by refusing to accept her

second nominating petition. Id. at ¶ 19, 42.

{¶ 16} In upholding the board’s refusal to accept her second nominating

petition, we held that the plain language of the applicable statutes, including R.C.

3513.261, justified the board’s decision:

{¶ 17} “The plain language of R.C. 3513.261 and 3513.05 prevented the

board of elections from accepting Canales-Flores’s second nominating petition for

filing because she had already filed a nominating petition for a municipal office—

Member of Toledo City Council, District Six—for the same election. The phrase

‘any municipal * * * office’ is worded broadly enough to encompass a previous

nominating petition for the same municipal office. (Emphasis added.)” Id. at

¶ 26.

{¶ 18} Likewise, Coble had previously filed a nominating petition for the

same municipal office—Toledo Municipal Court judge for the term beginning

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January 3, 2012—for the same election—November 8, 2011. Therefore, absent

an applicable exception, R.C. 3513.261 barred him from filing his second

nominating petition.

R.C. 3513.052(G)

{¶ 19} Nevertheless, for the following reasons, R.C. 3513.261 did not bar

Coble’s candidacy for municipal court judge based on his second nominating

petition.

{¶ 20} Initially, although the plain language of R.C. 3513.261 standing

alone would prevent Coble’s second nominating petition, the equally

unambiguous language of R.C. 3513.052(G) permitted Coble to timely withdraw

his first petition and to file his second petition notwithstanding R.C. 3513.261:

{¶ 21} “Nothing in this section or section 3513.04, 3513.041, 3513.05,

3513.251, 3513.253, 3513.254, 3513.255, 3513.257, 3513.259, or 3513.261 of the

Revised Code prohibits, and the secretary of state or a board of elections shall

not disqualify, a person from being a candidate for an office, if that person timely

withdraws as a candidate for any offices specified in division (A) of this section

for which that person first sought to become a candidate by filing a declaration of

candidacy and petition, a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate, or a

nominating petition, by party nomination in a primary election, or by the filling of

a vacancy under section 3513.30 or 3513.31 of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis

added.)

{¶ 22} R.C. 3513.052(H) provides:

{¶ 23} “As used in this section:

{¶ 24} “* * *

{¶ 25} “(2) ‘Timely withdraws’ means either of the following:

{¶ 26} “(a) Withdrawing as a candidate before the applicable deadline for

filing a declaration of candidacy, declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate,

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January Term, 2011

or nominating petition for the subsequent office for which the person is seeking to

become a candidate at the same election.”

{¶ 27} Coble timely withdrew as a candidate for municipal court judge

before the applicable filing deadline of July 15, 2011, and timely submitted his

subsequent nominating petition for the same office before that deadline. See R.C.

3513.052(H)(2). The office for which he withdrew his candidacy—municipal

court judge—is one of the offices specified in R.C. 3513.052(A), i.e., a municipal

office. See R.C. 3513.052(A)(5). Therefore, under the manifest language of the

pertinent statutes, Coble timely withdrew his candidacy for municipal court judge

based on his first petition, and nothing in R.C. 3513.261 prevented him from

becoming a candidate for the same office at the same election based on his second

petition. Because the language of R.C. 3513.052(G) is unambiguous, we cannot

add language to it or delete language from it. State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd.

Of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, 881 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 39.

{¶ 28} Moreover, the mere fact that the General Assembly placed R.C.

3513.052(G) and (H) within that statute and did not include them either within

R.C. 3513.261, 3513.05, or 3513.041 or in a separate statute does not mean that

the exceptions do not apply to these latter statutes when the second nominating

petition, declaration of candidacy, or declaration of intent to be a write-in

candidate is for the same office at the same election.

{¶ 29} It is certainly true that “[i]n reviewing a statute, a court cannot pick

out one sentence and disassociate it from the context, but must look to the four

corners of the enactment to determine the intent of the enacting body.” State v.

Wilson (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 334, 336, 673 N.E.2d 1347; see also State v.

Jackson, 102 Ohio St.3d 380, 2004-Ohio-3206, 811 N.E.2d 68, ¶ 34 (applying the

foregoing rule of construction to an election statute).

{¶ 30} But the “enactment” here is not simply the Revised Code section–

R.C. 3513.052—but the entire act itself, H.B. 445. H.B. 445 enacted R.C.

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3513.052, but at the same time, it also enacted those provisions in R.C. 3513.261,

3513.05, and 3513.041 generally precluding a second nominating petition or

declaration for the specified offices for the same election. Therefore, the

legislative history of H.B. 445 supports what the plain language of R.C.

3513.052(G) provides—that the prohibition listed in R.C. 3513.261 and the other

specified statutes does not bar a candidate from timely withdrawing a prior

candidacy and resubmitting a timely candidacy for the same office or another

office at the same election. That is, R.C. 3513.052(G) is not merely an exception

to the multiple-offices-candidacies provision of R.C. 3513.052(A); it is also an

exception to the other specified provisions, including R.C. 3513.261.

{¶ 31} Furthermore, Canales-Flores does not require a different result.

The board of elections and secretary of state rely on ¶ 34 of that opinion.3 In that

case, however, our holding was limited to the following principle: “R.C.

3513.052 does not prevent the application of R.C. 3513.261 and 3513.05 to bar a

second nominating petition for the same office at the same election after the first

nominating petition has been ruled invalid.” Id. at ¶ 36. Unlike Coble’s first

petition, Canales-Flores’s first petition was ruled invalid following a protest

hearing. Id. at ¶ 6, 19. And Canales-Flores never timely withdrew her candidacy

based on the first petition. Id. at ¶ 35. Thus, the paragraph that both the board of

elections and the secretary of state relied on from that case was not—as the

secretary of state claims—“essential” to our “ultimate holding”; instead, the

paragraph was unnecessary to the court’s holding and was thus dicta. Id. at ¶ 34.

3. That paragraph provided: “R.C. 3513.052, however, does not support Canales-Flores's claim.

The statute is expressly directed to forbidding persons to seek multiple offices at the same election.

See R.C. 3513.052(A). R.C. 3513.052(G) provides a method for a person to avoid violating the

multiple-office-candidacies prohibition of R.C. 3513.052(A) through the mechanism of a timely

withdrawal of an initial candidacy for an office at the same election.” (Emphasis sic.) 108 Ohio

St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-5642, 841 N.E.2d 757, ¶ 34.

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{¶ 32} Finally, this result “is also consistent with our duty to liberally

construe words limiting the right of a person to hold office in favor of those

seeking to hold office so that the public may have the benefit of choice from all

qualified persons.” State ex rel. Reese v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. Of Elections, 115

Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-Ohio-4588, 873 N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 34.

{¶ 33} Therefore, the board of elections abused its discretion and clearly

disregarded applicable law—R.C. 3513.052(G)—by rejecting Coble’s candidacy

for Toledo Municipal Court judge for the term commencing January 3, 2012, at

the November 8, 2011 election.

Conclusion

{¶ 34} Based on the foregoing, Coble has established his entitlement to the

requested extraordinary relief in mandamus. Consequently, we grant a writ of

mandamus to compel the board of elections to place Coble’s name on the

November 8 election ballot.

Writ granted.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur.

PFEIFER AND LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in judgment.

LANZINGER, J., dissents.

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PFEIFER, J., concurring.

{¶ 35} I concur in judgment. However, I believe this court should simply

overrule State ex rel. Canales-Flores v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio

St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-5642, 841 N.E.2d 757. Its holding was as wrong as its

dicta.

LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

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LANZINGER, J., dissenting.

{¶ 36} The secretary of state based Directive 2011-24 on our explanation

of R.C. 3513.052(G) and (H) in State ex rel. Canales-Flores v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of

Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-5642, 841 N.E.2d 757, ¶ 34-36. At that

time, the secretary’s interpretation was reasonable on the basis of that case.

However, we are now disavowing our reading of the pertinent statutes to allow

any candidate to withdraw a petition and file a second petition for the same office

before the filing deadline. The secretary and the Lucas County Board of Elections

could not have anticipated this retreat.

{¶ 37} Reliance on this court’s pronouncements cannot be considered an

abuse of discretion or a clear disregard of applicable law. I would therefore defer

to the reasonable interpretation of the secretary of state, see State ex rel. Lucas

Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt. v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 427, 2010-

Ohio-1873, 928 N.E.2d 1072, ¶ 23. I respectfully dissent.

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Kerger & Hartman, L.L.C., and Stephen D. Hartman, for relator.

Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew K.

Ranazzi, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.

Mike DeWine, Attorney General, and Richard N. Coglianese and Erick D.

Gale, Assistant Attorneys General, for intervening respondent.

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