Opinion

Trumbull County Bar Ass'n v. Rucker

  • 134 Ohio St. 3d 282
  • 981 N.E.2d 866
  • 2012 Ohio 5642
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Dec 5, 2012
Status
Published
On the bench
O'Connor, Pfeifer, Stratton, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, Cupp, Brown
Cited by
9 cases
Authority
More cited than 85.9%

The opinion

[Cite as Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Rucker, 134 Ohio St.3d 282, 2012-Ohio-5642.]

TRUMBULL COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. RUCKER.

[Cite as Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Rucker,

134 Ohio St.3d 282, 2012-Ohio-5642.]

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct,

including failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client

and failing to maintain client funds in a separate account and to render a

full accounting of a client’s funds—Public reprimand.

(No. 2012-1341—Submitted August 22, 2012—Decided December 5, 2012.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 12-028.

_______________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Gilbert Robert Rucker III of Warren, Ohio, Attorney

Registration No. 0034535, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1986.

On April 16, 2012, relator, Trumbull County Bar Association, charged Rucker

with professional misconduct in one client matter. Relator alleged that Rucker

had neglected the client matter, failed to reasonably communicate with the client,

failed to deposit the client’s funds in an interest-bearing client trust account, and

charged the client a fee denominated as “nonrefundable” without also advising the

client in writing that the client may be entitled to a refund of the fee.

{¶ 2} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline considered the cause on the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement.

See BCGD Proc.Reg. 11.

{¶ 3} In the consent-to-discipline agreement, Rucker stipulates to the

facts as alleged in relator’s complaint and agrees that his conduct violated

Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

representing a client), 1.4 (requiring a lawyer to reasonably communicate with a

client), 1.5(d)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from charging a fee denominated as

“nonrefundable” without simultaneously advising the client in writing that the

client may be entitled to a refund of all or part of the fee if the lawyer does not

complete the representation), 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold property of

clients in an interest-bearing client trust account, separate from the lawyer’s own

property), 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit legal fees and expenses that are

paid in advance into a client trust account, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as

fees are earned or expenses incurred), 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to promptly

deliver to a client any funds or property that the client is entitled to receive, and

upon the client’s request, to promptly render a full accounting of such funds or

property), and 8.4(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from violating or attempting to violate

the Rules of Professional Conduct).

{¶ 4} The parties stipulate that mitigating factors include the absence of

a prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, a timely

good-faith effort to make restitution, full and free disclosure and a cooperative

attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and reputation of good character in

the community. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e). The

parties also stipulate that there are no aggravating factors. See BCGD Proc.Reg.

10(B)(1). Based upon the facts of Rucker’s misconduct and the substantial

mitigating factors, the parties stipulate that a public reprimand is the appropriate

sanction for Rucker’s misconduct.

{¶ 5} The panel and board found that the consent-to-discipline

agreement conforms to BCGD Proc.Reg. 11 and recommend that we adopt the

agreement in its entirety. We agree that Rucker violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4,

1.5(d)(3), 1.15(a), (c), and (d), and 8.4(a) and that this conduct warrants a public

reprimand. Therefore, we adopt the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement.

2

January Term, 2012

{¶ 6} Accordingly, Rucker is hereby publicly reprimanded for his

violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(d)(3), 1.15(a), (c), and (d), and 8.4(a).

Costs are taxed to Rucker.

Judgment accordingly.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL,

LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur.

_________________

Edward L. Lavelle and Randil Rudloff, for relator.

Gilbert Robert Rucker III, pro se.

________________________

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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