Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Evans

[Cite as Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Evans, 137 Ohio St.3d 441, 2013-Ohio-4992.]

OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. EVANS.

[Cite as Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Evans, 137 Ohio St.3d 441, 2013-Ohio-4992.]

Judge misconduct—Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules for

the Government of the Bar—One-year suspension, all stayed.

(No. 2013-0231—Submitted March 13, 2013—Decided November 19, 2013.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 12-059.

____________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Judge David Dean Evans of Gallipolis, Ohio,

Attorney Registration No. 0002043, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in

1972. He currently serves as judge of the general and domestic-relations

divisions of the Court of Common Pleas of Gallia County. Relator, Ohio State

Bar Association, charged Judge Evans with professional misconduct for failing to

disqualify himself from a case in which the judge had an admitted conflict with

defense counsel.

{¶ 2} The parties submitted a consent-to-discipline agreement

recommending that Judge Evans be publicly reprimanded. The Board of

Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline rejected the agreement and

remanded the matter for further proceedings before a three-member panel of the

board. On remand, the parties waived a hearing, submitted stipulations of fact

and misconduct, and jointly recommended a stayed six-month suspension. The

panel, and later the board, adopted the parties’ stipulations and recommended

sanction. No objections have been filed.

{¶ 3} While “we ordinarily accept the panel’s and board’s conclusions as

to the propriety of an attorney’s conduct or the appropriate sanction, and to that

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extent, our decisions reflect deference to their expertise,” as the ultimate arbiter of

misconduct and sanctions in disciplinary cases, we remain free to exercise our

independent judgment. Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly, 121 Ohio St.3d 39, 2009-

Ohio-317, 901 N.E.2d 798, ¶ 11. Given the judge’s serious ethical violations and

the significant harm caused by his misconduct, we impose a fully stayed one-year

suspension.

Misconduct

{¶ 4} The Gallia County public-defender commission, through a separate

public-defender corporation, employed Robert W. Bright to represent indigent

criminal defendants in the Gallia County Common Pleas Court. As the only judge

of the general division of that court, Judge Evans presided over all felony cases in

which Bright was appointed counsel.

{¶ 5} In the matter that led to this disciplinary proceeding, Bright

represented a defendant who had initially agreed to enter into a plea agreement

but during the plea hearing had decided against it. Moments later, the defendant

changed his mind again, but at that point, Judge Evans refused to accept the plea.

Judge Evans again refused to accept the plea agreement three days later when

Bright and the county prosecutor jointly requested that the judge allow a plea

change.

{¶ 6} Bright thereafter filed an 18-page motion requesting that Judge

Evans accept the plea agreement and characterizing the judge’s refusal to do so as

“an abuse of discretion” and “unreasonable and/or arbitrary and/or

unconscionable.” Although irrelevant to the pending matter, Bright also

criticized, at length, some of Judge Evans’s other courtroom practices, such as the

judge’s alleged use of a “drop-dead date” for pleas. Judge Evans later described

Bright’s motion as “scathing” and showing Bright’s “bias toward and contempt

for the court,” and he sent a copy of the motion to disciplinary counsel.

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{¶ 7} Judge Evans also issued an entry overruling Bright’s motion and

sua sponte removing Bright as counsel in the matter. The entry stated:

The Court finds that while Defense Counsel’s attitude

toward the Court as expressed in the instant motion may not rise to

the level of Professional Misconduct or to the level of being

contemptuous, it certainly is not acceptable behavior. By such

conduct he has created conflict with the Court whereby in this case

or for that matter any other case in the future, when he does not

agree with a decision or ruling by the Court, instead of being

critical by accusation of being arbitrary, unreasonable,

unconscionable or of abusing discretion, he simply may accuse the

court of being bias [sic] or prejudice [sic] as it relates to him. The

Court must not only avoid any impropriety, bias or prejudice but

must avoid any appearance of such. The expressions and attitudes

of Defense Counsel as exhibited and announced in the instant

motion toward this Court compromises [sic] the Court’s ability to

avoid any appearance of bias [or] prejudice, or to be fair and

impartial as it relates to Defense Counsel regardless [of] how hard

it tries or what strides it makes toward guaranteeing that there

would be no bias, prejudice and that it would be fair and impartial.

The Court finds in this case due to the conflict Defense

Counsel has created with this Court and to protect the rights of

Defendant, that Defense Counsel, Robert W. Bright should be

relieved of further responsibility for representation of Defendant

and that substitute counsel should be appointed.

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{¶ 8} Judge Evans next filed entries removing Bright as appointed

counsel in 63 other criminal cases—even though none of the defendants in any

case had requested Bright’s removal as their counsel. The entry in each case

stated that “Attorney Robert W. Bright is relieved of further obligation due to the

conflict he has created with the Court” and “due to the Court’s inquiry to the

Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio regarding Mr. Bright’s

conduct.”

{¶ 9} Judge Evans’s actions removed Bright’s entire caseload, and

within a month of the judge’s entries, the Gallia County public defender

terminated Bright’s employment, reasoning that it had “no other options,” since

Bright could not practice in Judge Evans’s courtroom. Disciplinary counsel

ultimately decided against filing any charges against Bright based on Judge

Evans’s grievance.

{¶ 10} The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree, that Judge

Evans’s conduct violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 (requiring a judge to disqualify

himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might

reasonably be questioned, including circumstances in which a judge has a

personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s counsel) and Gov.Bar R.

V(11)(E) (requiring that all proceedings and documents relating to the review and

investigation of grievances be private). Relator did not pursue Count III of its

complaint, and the board recommends dismissal of that charge. Accordingly,

Count III is hereby dismissed.

Sanction

{¶ 11} In determining the appropriate sanction for judicial misconduct, we

consider the ethical duties violated, the injury caused, the existence of aggravating

and mitigating circumstances listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B), and our precedent.

Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 126 Ohio St.3d 150, 2010-Ohio-3265, 931

N.E.2d 558, ¶ 53, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Sargeant, 118 Ohio St.3d 322,

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2008-Ohio-2330, 889 N.E.2d 96, ¶ 28, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans, 89

Ohio St.3d 497, 501, 733 N.E.2d 609 (2000).

1. Duties violated and injuries caused

{¶ 12} “It is of utmost importance that the public have confidence in the

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Allen, 79

Ohio St.3d 494, 495, 684 N.E.2d 31 (1997). For this reason, Jud.Cond.R. 2.11

requires that a judge disqualify himself or herself from a case in which he or she

has a personal bias or prejudice “concerning a party or a party’s lawyer” and also

from “any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.”

{¶ 13} Here, in Judge Evans’s own words, Bright’s motion created a

“conflict” with the judge that “compromise[d] the Court’s ability to avoid any

appearance of bias [or] prejudice, or to be fair and impartial * * * regardless [of]

how hard it tries.” The judge’s language indicates an actual personal bias

concerning Bright—or at the very least, the existence of an appearance of bias or

partiality. See, e.g., Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 28-30, 630 S.E.2d 326

(2006) (judge exhibited personal bias against an attorney by attempting to remove

him as attorney for the defendant and peremptorily removing the attorney from

the court-appointed-attorney list). Even if we concede that Bright’s motion was

inappropriate or disrespectful to Judge Evans, there is no dispute that Judge

Evans—not Bright—unilaterally declared that a conflict existed. Contrary to the

plain language of Jud.Cond.R. 2.11, Judge Evans cured the conflict by removing

Bright as counsel in 64 cases, rather than by disqualifying himself. And in further

violation of his ethical duties, Judge Evans, in his entries removing Bright,

implied that Bright was the subject of a disciplinary investigation, even though

disciplinary matters must be kept private and confidential until there has been a

finding of probable cause or certification of a complaint. Gov.Bar R. V(11)(E).

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In sum, the judge violated a fundamental principle of our judicial system and

showed disrespect for our attorney-discipline process.

{¶ 14} Judge Evans’s actions erode the public confidence in the integrity

and impartiality of our judiciary. But his misconduct resulted in a more concrete

injury to Bright, who lost his job as a public defender and his privacy protections

under Gov.Bar R. V(11)(E). The judge’s misconduct also likely harmed Bright’s

clients, who did not request his removal as their counsel.

2. Aggravating and mitigating factors

{¶ 15} The board found the existence of one aggravating factor: Judge

Evans engaged in multiple offenses by filing an entry in 63 pending cases

mentioning the possible disciplinary investigation into Bright’s conduct. See

BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d). As an additional aggravating factor, we find that

Judge Evans’s misconduct caused harm to Bright and his clients. See BCGD

Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(h) (vulnerability of and resulting harm to victims of

misconduct).

{¶ 16} In mitigation, the board found (1) an absence of a prior disciplinary

record, (2) an absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, (3) full and free disclosure

to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, and

(4) good character and reputation. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (b), (d), and

(e). As to the fourth factor, the parties stipulated that Judge Evans’s character and

reputation “demonstrate his commitment to the judicial system and the citizens he

serves,” but the record lacks any additional evidence supporting this stipulation.

While we have no reason to doubt Judge Evans’s excellent reputation in his

community, we give somewhat less weight to this factor without more evidence to

support it. Compare Disciplinary Counsel v. Elum, 133 Ohio St.3d 500, 2012-

Ohio-4700, 979 N.E.2d 289, ¶ 23 (the judge, in a fully stipulated case, submitted

many letters of reference attesting to his commitment to his community).

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3. Applicable precedent

{¶ 17} Neither the board nor the parties have cited any precedent

supporting their recommendation of a stayed six-month suspension. We find the

following judicial- and magistrate-discipline opinions instructive: Disciplinary

Counsel v. Gaul, 127 Ohio St.3d 16, 2010-Ohio-4831, 936 N.E.2d 28 (stayed six-

month suspension for a judge’s making highly prejudicial and unnecessary

remarks against a defendant and getting the media involved in a case by advising

the media that he was going to issue an Amber Alert to locate a witness even

though he knew he probably did not have the authority to issue such an alert);

Elum (stayed six-month suspension for the judge’s undignified and discourteous

manner toward litigants, unnecessary involvement in a police-department

administrative investigation, and failure to act impartially in and to disqualify

himself from a proceeding involving the police department with which the judge

had a history of conflict); Disciplinary Counsel v. McCormack, 133 Ohio St.3d

192, 2012-Ohio-4309, 977 N.E.2d 598 (stayed one-year suspension for a

magistrate’s pattern of misconduct in a single case, including acting in a

discourteous and undignified manner, treating litigants with disdain, terminating

hearings before the parties had presented all their evidence, and failing to timely

resolve the matter); and Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 126 Ohio St.3d 150,

2010-Ohio-3265, 931 N.E.2d 558, ¶ 53 (one-year suspension with six months

stayed for a judge’s multiple and repeated ethical violations in several matters,

including conducting an improper investigation of a defendant, using undignified

language toward counsel, failing to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant,

making improper remarks from the bench about county commissioners, using his

position as a judge to obtain access to a prosecutor’s file, and improperly placing

a defendant in a holding cell).

{¶ 18} Judge Evans’s misconduct is comparable to the judicial

misconduct in Gaul and Elum, in which both judges received stayed six-month

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suspensions. However, a significant aggravating factor is present here that was

absent in those cases: i.e., harm to the victims. Indeed, in Gaul, the board found

that the victim of the judge’s misconduct “suffered no actual prejudice.” Gaul,

¶ 75. See also Elum, ¶ 23 (harm to victim was not listed as an aggravating factor).

However, that aggravating factor was present and considered in McCormack, in

which an attorney received a stayed one-year suspension for his misconduct while

serving as a magistrate. McCormack, ¶ 19 (the magistrate’s misconduct “caused

harm to vulnerable litigants who bore the time commitment and expense of

multiple hearings for well over a year without movement toward the resolution of

their conflict”). On the other hand, Judge Evans’s misconduct does not rise to the

level of that of Judge Campbell—either in the number of rule violations or the

persistency of the misconduct—who received a one-year suspension with six

months stayed. Therefore, a lesser sanction than was imposed in Campbell is

justified here.

{¶ 19} Accordingly, we find that the midrange sanction is proper. We

have previously imposed sanctions harsher than that recommended by the board

because of the harm caused by a judge’s misconduct. See, e.g., Disciplinary

Counsel v. Russo, 124 Ohio St.3d 437, 2010-Ohio-605, 923 N.E.2d 144, ¶ 31

(rejecting the recommended sanction of a stayed six-month suspension and

imposing a stayed one-year suspension because “a sanction more rigorous than

the board’s recommendation is required for the harm caused by respondent’s

improprieties”).

Conclusion

{¶ 20} Judges are subject to the highest standards of ethical conduct.

Russo, ¶ 13, citing Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 23, 151

N.E.2d 17 (1958). Given Judge Evans’s serious ethical violations and the

significant harm caused by his misconduct, and having considered the aggravating

and mitigating factors and sanctions imposed for comparable conduct, we

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conclude that a stayed six-month suspension, as recommended by the board, is too

lenient and that a stayed one-year suspension is more appropriate. Accordingly,

Judge David Dean Evans is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for

one year, with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he commit no

misconduct during the suspension. If Judge Evans fails to meet this condition, the

stay will be lifted and Judge Evans will serve the entire one-year suspension.

Costs are taxed to Judge Evans.

Judgment accordingly.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ.,

concur.

PFEIFER, J., dissents with opinion.

O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would impose a six-month suspension,

stayed, as recommended by the board.

____________________

PFEIFER, J., dissenting.

{¶ 21} Judges in smaller counties encounter problems that those in larger

counties are able to address rather easily. When a judge in a large county has an

irreconcilable conflict with an attorney, that attorney’s cases can be assigned to

another judge. In smaller counties, especially those like Gallia County that have

only one judge in the general division of the court, that simple resolution is not

possible.

{¶ 22} Judge David Evans, upon concluding that he and attorney Robert

Bright had an untenable working relationship, filed entries removing Bright from

all cases in which Bright had been appointed as counsel. In my opinion, that was

a reasonable reaction to the problem that he confronted. It was better than having

visiting judges assigned to a host of routine cases, better than having an

antagonistic relationship between a judge and a public defender. Better still

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would have been an amicable reconciliation; but the record suggests that that was

not possible.

{¶ 23} In the circumstances before us, it is more sensible for the attorney

to give way than the judge. Judge Evans was elected by the people of Gallia

County to serve as their sole judge; however highly skilled, attorney Bright is an

at-will employee. Surely, when an irreconcilable conflict prevents them from

working on cases, the elected judge should supersede the at-will employee.

{¶ 24} This case is not like the cases to which this court compares it. In

Disciplinary Counsel v. Gaul, 127 Ohio St.3d 16, 2010-Ohio-4831, 936 N.E.2d

28, the judge made prejudicial and unnecessary comments against a defendant and

informed the media that he was going to issue an Amber Alert for a missing

witness when he knew that he probably did not have the authority to issue that

alert. In Disciplinary Counsel v. Elum, 133 Ohio St.3d 500, 2012-Ohio-4700, 979

N.E.2d 289, the judge treated litigants discourteously and unnecessarily involved

himself in an administrative investigation into a police officer’s conduct. In

Disciplinary Counsel v. McCormack, 133 Ohio St.3d 192, 2012-Ohio-4309, 977

N.E.2d 598, the magistrate terminated hearings before all the evidence was

presented and failed to timely resolve the matter before him. In Disciplinary

Counsel v. Campbell, 126 Ohio St.3d 150, 2010-Ohio-3265, 931 N.E.2d 558, the

judge failed to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant, used his position as a

judge to obtain access to a prosecutor’s file, and improperly placed a defendant in

a holding cell. Judge Evans did none of these things. He merely concluded that

he and attorney Bright could not work together and then took steps to ensure that

that fact didn’t result in his appearing to handle cases with prejudice.

{¶ 25} The parties submitted a consent-to-discipline agreement that

recommended that Judge Evans be publicly reprimanded. That is an appropriate

sanction. Because this court issues a suspension, I dissent.

____________________

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Eugene P. Whetzel; Nolan, Sprowl & Smith and Edward M. Smith; and

Jason M. Dolin, for relator.

Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, George D. Jonson, and Lisa M. Zaring,

for respondent.

________________________

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