Ohio State Bar Association v. McCafferty

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

Ohio State Bar Assn. v. McCafferty, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3075.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio,

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be

made before the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-3075

OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. MCCAFFERTY.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,

it may be cited as Ohio State Bar Assn. v. McCafferty,

Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3075.]

Judges—Misconduct—Felony convictions—Lying to FBI agents—Conduct

prejudicial to administration of justice—Conduct adversely reflecting on

fitness to practice law—Violation of rules of Code of Judicial Conduct,

including those prohibiting noncompliance with law and abuse of prestige

of office—Indefinite suspension imposed, without credit for time served

under interim felony suspension, to begin when term of federal supervised

release is completed.

(No. 2013-0939—Submitted August 21, 2013—Decided July 17, 2014.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2012-056.

____________________

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

O’NEILL, J.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Bridget Marie McCafferty of Westlake, Ohio,

Attorney Registration No. 0055367, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in

1991. Prior to this, McCafferty had no disciplinary history.

{¶ 2} McCafferty served as a judge on the Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas from January 11, 1999, until September 15, 2010, when she was

arrested. In February 2011, McCafferty was indicted by a federal grand jury on

multiple counts of making false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation

in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. In August of that year, a jury found McCafferty

guilty on all counts.

{¶ 3} On September 14, 2011, we imposed an interim suspension on

McCafferty’s license to practice law based on her conviction. In re McCafferty,

129 Ohio St.3d 1467, 2011-Ohio-4605, 953 N.E.2d 334. On August 6, 2012, the

Ohio State Bar Association, relator, filed a complaint with the Board of

Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline against McCafferty, requesting that

McCafferty be disciplined.

{¶ 4} On January 23, 2013, a three-member panel of the board held a

hearing. The parties stipulated that McCafferty’s convictions constituted certain

rule violations. In accordance with this stipulation, the panel found that

McCafferty’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from

committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty or

trustworthiness), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from

engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(h)

(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the

lawyer's fitness to practice law). The panel further found that McCafferty

violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.1 (a judge shall comply with the law), 1.2 (a judge shall

act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity,

2

January Term, 2014

and impartiality of the judiciary), 1.3 (a judge shall not abuse the prestige of

judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or

others), and 2.4(B) (a judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or

other interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or

judgment). The panel recommended that McCafferty be indefinitely suspended

from the practice of law with no credit for time served under the 2011 interim

felony suspension.

{¶ 5} On June 6, 2013, the board adopted the findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and recommendation of the panel and recommended that

McCafferty be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law in Ohio with no

credit for time served, with costs taxed to McCafferty.

{¶ 6} We adopt the board’s findings of fact, misconduct, and

recommended sanction. We find that an indefinite suspension from the practice

of law with no credit for time served during the felony suspension is the

appropriate sanction in this case.

Misconduct

{¶ 7} In the summer of 2007, the FBI formally opened an investigation

based on allegations of widespread corruption among public officials and public

employees in and around Cuyahoga County. The primary focus of the

investigation was on Cuyahoga County Commissioner James Dimora and

Cuyahoga County Auditor Frank Russo. The FBI intercepted some 44,000

telephone conversations between various public officials and private citizens in

furtherance of the investigation. These calls included conversations between

McCafferty, Frank Russo, and others in which she revealed that she had used or

intended to use her influence in cases in her courtroom to advance the interests of

Russo and Dimora and to get more favorable settlement terms for local

businessman Steve Pumper. This misuse of her judicial position was not charged

in the criminal complaint and is not part of the instant case.

3

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 8} On September 23, 2008, FBI Agents Oliver and Curtis pulled into

McCafferty’s driveway unannounced as she was taking her garbage cans to her

garage. They asked if they could talk to her about the Cuyahoga County

corruption investigation. McCafferty agreed and invited them inside to sit at her

kitchen table.

{¶ 9} The agents asked McCafferty numerous questions about Dimora,

Russo, and Pumper. McCafferty denied that Dimora had ever attempted to

influence or intervene in any cases before her court. She also denied that Dimora

had any involvement in any cases before her court. When questioned about Russo,

McCafferty told the federal agents that she had never spoken to Russo about any

of her cases. And when asked about Steve Pumper, McCafferty denied ever

attempting to sway settlement negotiations for Pumper. And she denied ever

telling Pumper that she had tried to settle his case for less money.

{¶ 10} The agents stopped the interview and told McCafferty that they

knew she was being dishonest. They warned her that lying to federal agents was a

federal crime. They even told her about the wiretapped conversations and

offered, multiple times, to play the tapes for her. McCafferty repeatedly refused

to listen to the recordings.

{¶ 11} McCafferty was indicted, tried, and convicted on ten counts of

violating 18 U.S.C. 1001, making false statements to federal law enforcement. In

sentencing McCafferty, the trial court merged the counts, reducing the number to

four. The court applied an upward variance from a standard sentence due to the

fact that McCafferty was a sitting judge at the time she committed her crimes.

McCafferty received the maximum sentence of 14 months in prison, with three

years of supervised release. She was also ordered to serve 150 hours of

community service and pay a fine of $400.

{¶ 12} On September 13, 2011, McCafferty reported to Federal Prison

Camp Alderson in West Virginia. She completed her prison term with good-time

4

January Term, 2014

credit, and on September 17, 2012, she began serving three years of probation in

accordance with her sentence. She has completed her community-service

requirement and paid her fine and has no requirements left on her probation other

than filing a monthly report with her probation officer. Barring a parole violation,

McCafferty will complete her term of supervised release on September 17, 2015.

{¶ 13} The day after her incarceration, we imposed the interim felony

suspension, and 11 months later, the complaint now before us was filed. A panel

of the board held a hearing in January 2013. The parties stipulated to the

following: (1) Pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(B), McCafferty’s federal conviction

of four counts of providing false statements “constitute[s] conclusive evidence

that she engaged in the charged acts and conduct,” (2) McCafferty’s actions

constitute a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b), (c), (d), and (h), and (3)

McCafferty’s actions constitute a violation of Jud.Cond.R. 1.1 and 1.2.

{¶ 14} McCafferty disputed that her conduct violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 and

2.4. Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 provides, “A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial

office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or

allow others to do so.” Jud.Cond.R. 2.4(B) and (C) provide, “A judge shall not

permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to

influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment,” and a judge “shall not convey

or permit others to convey the impression that any person or organization is in a

position to influence the judge.” The board, however, found that McCafferty had

violated these rules. The board concluded that McCafferty’s false statements to

the FBI about Russo’s and Dimora’s attempts to influence her judicial conduct

were attempts to make herself appear less susceptible to such influence than she

actually was and that through those false statements, she abused the prestige of

her office to advance her personal interest and the interests of Russo and Dimora.

We agree. Thus, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law

regarding McCafferty’s misconduct.

5

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Sanction

{¶ 15} When determining the appropriate sanction to impose on

McCafferty for her violations of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct and the

Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, we consider the duties violated, respondent’s

mental state, the injury caused, the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors,

and applicable precedent. Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204,

2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 45; Disciplinary Counsel v. Kaup, 102 Ohio

St.3d 29, 2004-Ohio-1525, 806 N.E.2d 513, ¶ 11; Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans,

89 Ohio St.3d 497, 501, 733 N.E.2d 609 (2000). McCafferty has not offered

evidence of any medical disability or chemical dependency that contributed to her

ethical violations. Thus, we presume that she was healthy and unhindered at the

time. Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008-Ohio-3194, 891

N.E.2d 324, at ¶ 84, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Sargent, 118 Ohio St.3d 322,

2008-Ohio-2330, 889 N.E.2d 96, ¶ 31.

{¶ 16} This court has stated that judges are held to the highest possible

standard of ethical conduct. Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17,

23, 151 N.E.2d 17 (1958); Hoskins at ¶ 42. Canon 1 of the Ohio Code of Judicial

Conduct states that a judge “shall uphold and promote the independence,

integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the

appearance of impropriety.” As the board correctly observed, a judge’s violation

of these duties can undermine public confidence in the judiciary, particularly

when the violation constitutes a felony, Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher, 82

Ohio St.3d 51, 53, 693 N.E.2d 1078 (1998) (“When a judge’s felonious conduct

brings disrepute to the judicial system, the institution is irreparably harmed”). By

her own admission, McCafferty violated duties imposed upon her by the Code of

Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Professional Conduct. The most basic of those

duties is to adhere to the law at all times without fail. McCafferty thus had the

duty to be truthful with the FBI without regard to the outcome for herself, Russo,

6

January Term, 2014

Dimora, or others. Her failure to cooperate with the FBI resulted in prolonging a

federal investigation, and McCafferty’s conviction undermined public confidence

in the judiciary.

{¶ 17} In aggravation, the parties have stipulated and the board has found

that McCafferty’s conviction arose from conduct that involved dishonesty. BCGD

Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1). We agree. We further observe that McCafferty’s insistence

that she subjectively believed that she was telling the truth to the FBI agents,

despite the fact that there are recordings of telephone calls demonstrating that she

was not telling the truth, is an aggravating factor in this case. BCGD Proc.Reg.

10(B)(1)(g).

{¶ 18} In mitigation, the board found the following factors: McCafferty

had no prior disciplinary record, she displayed a cooperative attitude during the

disciplinary proceedings, she submitted many letters attesting to her good

character and reputation, she had a record of extensive community service, and

she had suffered prior penalties for this misconduct, such as the loss of her

judgeship, incarceration, a fine, court-ordered community service, and supervised

release. BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (d), (e), and (f). We agree. We further

observe that McCafferty has made a timely good-faith effort to rectify the

consequences of her misconduct. Examples of this include McCafferty’s prompt

completion of the 150 hours of community service imposed as a result of her

conviction, prompt payment of her monetary penalty, and her efforts in tutoring

women in prison to help them to obtain a GED. BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c).

Applicable precedent

{¶ 19} The relator has maintained that permanent disbarment is the

appropriate sanction, and the case law supporting disbarment is clear. McCafferty

has requested a fixed suspension of 24 months. The board has recommended an

indefinite suspension with no credit for the time served under the interim felony

suspension imposed in September 2011.

7

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 20} This court affirms its position that “ ‘judges are held to higher

standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not

invested with the public trust.’ ” O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704,

814 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 57, quoting Shaman, Lubet & Alfini, Judicial Conduct and

Ethics 2 (3d Ed.2000). The primary purposes of judicial discipline are to protect

the public, guarantee the evenhanded administration of justice, and to bolster

public confidence in the institution. Id. at ¶ 33, citing Kloepfer v. Comm. on

Judicial Performance, 49 Cal.3d 826, 864-865, 264 Cal.Rptr. 100, 782 P.2d 239

(1989).

{¶ 21} We recognize the board’s observation, at relator’s urging, that this

court has found disbarment to be an appropriate sanction for a judge who has been

convicted of a felony. Gallagher, 82 Ohio St.3d 51, 693 N.E.2d 1078 (judge

disbarred after federal conviction for distributing cocaine); Disciplinary Counsel

v. McAuliffe, 121 Ohio St.3d 315, 2009-Ohio-1151, 903 N.E.2d 1209 (judge

disbarred after being convicted of multiple federal offenses for burning down his

house to defraud an insurance company). And this court has disbarred judges for

dishonest conduct that has not resulted in a felony conviction. Hoskins, 119 Ohio

St.3d 17, 2008-Ohio-3194, 891 N.E.2d 324 (judge disbarred for multiple

violations involving serious deceit and misrepresentation).

{¶ 22} We also recognize that this court has not always permanently

disbarred a judge for dishonest conduct. Evans, 89 Ohio St.3d 497, 733 N.E.2d

609 (six-month stayed suspension for judge who, as judicial candidate, used

township property and the labor of inmates and welfare recipients that he did not

pay for or disclose). Even when the misconduct results in a felony conviction,

disbarment is not inevitable. Disciplinary Counsel v. Crane, 56 Ohio St.3d 38,

564 N.E.2d 96 (1990) (indefinite suspension with no credit for time served for

judge convicted of federal tax evasion and filing a false return). And this court

has said, “ ‘[P]roof of a criminal conviction is generally not conclusive of the

8

January Term, 2014

issue of moral turpitude, which required consideration of all the circumstances

surrounding the illegal conduct.’ ” McAuliffe at ¶ 24, quoting Disciplinary

Counsel v. Burkhart, 75 Ohio St.3d 188, 191, 661 N.E.2d 1062 (1996).

{¶ 23} We agree with the board that the circumstances in this case can be

distinguished from Gallagher, McAuliffe, and Hoskins, in which judges were

permanently disbarred. In those cases, the judges had engaged in criminal

conduct over a period of time, from a few days to months, and the misconduct

was preplanned.

{¶ 24} Certainly McCafferty’s conduct warrants a severe sanction. She

was convicted on multiple counts of lying to FBI agents about conversations with

people who were the subject of a county-wide corruption investigation. In

addition, McCafferty was deceptive about the nature of those conversations, most

particularly that those conversations included matters that had been before her in

court. Notwithstanding, the conduct that led to the criminal convictions and rule

violations occurred during a single impromptu conversation with FBI agents,

rather than as a pattern of premeditated criminal conduct. Thus, we agree with the

board that imposition of the system’s most severe sanction is not warranted in this

case.

{¶ 25} But we also do not believe that the appropriate sanction is a fixed-

term suspension. Despite McCafferty’s cooperative attitude during the

disciplinary proceedings, we are troubled by the contradiction between

McCafferty’s assertion that she accepts full responsibility for her actions and her

statement that she believed that she had answered the agents’ questions as

truthfully as she could. She clings to this claim, despite its utter implausibility in

the face of the recorded conversations. Thus, we determine that an indefinite

suspension without credit for time served is the appropriate sanction for her

misconduct.

9

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Conclusion

{¶ 26} Accordingly, Bridget Marie McCafferty is indefinitely suspended

from the practice of law in Ohio with no credit for any period of earlier

suspension. Her interim felony suspension continues until she completes all terms

of her federal supervised release and has been discharged by the federal district

court, and this indefinite suspension will begin at that time. Costs are taxed to

McCafferty.

Judgment accordingly.

PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and FRENCH, JJ., dissent.

____________________

LANZINGER, J., dissenting.

{¶ 27} I do not see how the majority can square a sanction of a mere

indefinite suspension with its statements that “[t]his court has stated that judges

are held to the highest possible standard of ethical conduct,” majority opinion at

¶ 16, citing Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 23, 151 N.E.2d

17 (1958), and Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008-Ohio-

3194, 891 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 42, and that “ ‘ “judges are held to higher standards of

integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not invested with the

public trust,” ’ ” majority opinion at ¶ 20, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v.

O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 814 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 57, quoting

Shaman, Lubet & Alfini, Judicial Conduct and Ethics 2 (3d Ed.2000).

{¶ 28} I disagree that Bridget McCafferty’s case should be distinguished

from other cases in which a judge has been disbarred. She has been convicted of

a felony, as were the judges in Disciplinary Counsel v. Mosely, 69 Ohio St.3d

401, 632 N.E.2d 1287 (1994); Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher, 82 Ohio St.3d

51, 693 N.E.2d 1078 (1998); Disciplinary Counsel v. McAuliffe, 121 Ohio St.3d

315, 2009-Ohio-1151, 903 N.E.2d 1209.

10

January Term, 2014

{¶ 29} We are to consider all the circumstances surrounding her conduct

in determining what sanction should be imposed for these disciplinary violations.

See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B); Hoskins at ¶ 79. McCafferty was convicted on

multiple counts of lying to FBI agents about conversations with people who were

the subject of a county-wide corruption investigation. Those conversations,

which the FBI intercepted, revealed that she had used or intended to use her

influence in cases in her courtroom to advance the interests of Frank Russo,

Jimmy Dimora, and a local businessman. This misconduct strikes at the very

heart of the judiciary.

{¶ 30} And it is not conduct that we can ignore, as the majority opinion

attempts to do. The majority focuses solely on McCafferty’s conversation with

FBI agents and paints her conduct as a one-time, brief lapse in judgment. This

narrow characterization is simply untrue; McCafferty’s misconduct was more

prolonged and more egregious than the majority admits. Months before she ever

spoke to the FBI, McCafferty was swaying judicial outcomes for political

associates and giving special consideration to high-ranking politicians. There can

be no dispute that this conduct occurred. McCafferty’s criminal indictment

outlined her involvement with Dimora and Russo, and she stipulated, at her

disciplinary hearing, to engaging in the conduct described in the indictment. Even

without this clear stipulation, her convictions alone would still establish an

irrebuttable presumption that this particular misconduct occurred. See Gov.Bar R.

V(5)(B). We must therefore presume that she grossly abused her judicial position

for political favor.

{¶ 31} There can also be no dispute that this misconduct is part of the case

before us. The disciplinary complaint specifically charged McCafferty with

violations of Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 (“A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial

office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or

allow others to do so”) and Jud.Cond.R. 2.4 (“A judge shall not permit family,

11

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to influence the

judge’s judicial conduct or judgment”). Both of these rule violations relate to her

abuse of office and her involvement with Russo and Dimora. It therefore makes

no sense for the majority to claim that McCafferty’s misuse of her position is “not

a part of the instant case.” Majority opinion at ¶ 7. If it formed the basis for her

rule violations—violations which the majority upholds—then it is clearly part of

this case and we must consider it in imposing our sanction.

{¶ 32} We have stated that “[w]hen a judge’s felonious conduct brings

disrepute to the judicial system, the institution is irreparably harmed,” and the

judge deserves “the full measure of our disciplinary authority.” Gallagher, 82

Ohio St.3d at 53, 693 N.E.2d 1078. If the primary purposes of judicial discipline

are to protect the public, guarantee the evenhanded administration of justice, and

to bolster public confidence in the institution, then nothing short of disbarment

should be imposed in this case.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, J., concur in the foregoing opinion.

____________________

Douglas N. Godshall, Eugene P. Whetzel, and Joseph S. Kodish, for

relator.

Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, George D. Jonson, and Kimberly

Vanover Riley, for respondent.

_________________________

12