Harris v. United States

ORl$l'- L

lJn tbe @nfte! $.tutes [.ourt of JfeDers[ @lsfms

No. 14-229 C FILED

Filed: July 30,2014

* :t :i ** :i ** + ****** + * :l * * *,I,{. * *,} * * * * * * * * * * * * * * JUL 3 0 2014

U.S. COUBTOF

FEDEMLC|jIIff}

MICHAEL HARRIS, Jurisdiction;

Motion to Dismiss, RCFC l2(b)(l);

Plaintiff, pro se, Pro Sei

28 U.S.C. $ 2s01.

THE I.INITED STATES,

Defendant.

**** + * * :l {. :} :* ** :1. * :t * * :i l. {. * * * *'} * :i :lr ** {r * :i * :l' :} {. :i *

Michael Harris, Lake City, Florida, Plaintiff, pro se.

Anna Bondurant Eley, United States Department of Justice, Trial Attomey, Washington, D.C.,

Counsel for the Govemment.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND FINAL ORDER

BRADEN, Jzdge.

I. RELEVANTBACKGROUND.'

On December 1,2000, Michael Harris ("Plaintiff') filed a Complaint against Conections

Corporation of America C'CCA) and Prison Realty Trust C'PRT) in the United States District

Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division ("United States District Court"),

alleging that his employer, CCA, engaged in employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

rThe relevant facts

discussed herein were derived from: an April 8,2014 Amended

Complaint ("Am. Compl."), including appendices attached thereto ("Am. Compl. App. l-2"); an

April 8, 2014 Notice Of Directly Related Cases ("P1. Notice"); Plaintiff s December 1, 2001

Complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ("Dist.

Compl."); CCA's November 24,2003 Renewed Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law or,

in the altemative, a Motion For New Trial or a Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment

("11/2412003 CCA Dist. Mot."); and the United States District Court for the Middle District of

Florida's March 10, 2004 Order ("3/10/2004 Dist. Order").

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. $ 200e er seq. See Harris v. Corrections Corp of

lm., No. 3:00-cv-01297-UATC-MCR (M.D. Fla. 2004).

That Complaint alleged that Plaintiff was passed over for promotions and denied pay

raises on the basis of his race, he was treated unfairly in various situations on the basis of his

race, his grievances regaxding harassment and discrimination were ignored by CCA, he was

ultimately terminated by CCA in retaliation for both "filing a complaint with [Equal

Employment Opporhmity Commission] and receiving Worker[s'] Compensation benefits," and

as a result he suffered "ineparable damage [to his] career and . . . reputation." Dist. Compl. flll 1,

2,3,24;see generally Dist. Compl.; Dist. Compl. at4.

Prior to trial, the United States District Court required both parties to proffer stipulations,

in lieu of offering evidence at trial. Am. Compl. 2. CCA provided stipulations, to which

Plaintiff objected. Am. Compl. 2. The District Court convened a jury trial on November 3, 2003

through November 5, 2003. 3/1012004 Dist. Order 1. At trial, the District Court took care to

explain the proposed stipulations to Plaintiff, who thereafter initialed the document to "show

[his] approval." Am. Compl. 2. The Stipulated Agreement ("Agreement") contained

background factual information conceming Plaintiff s employment at CCA aad the chronology

of events leading up to his termination. See generally Am. Compl. App. 2. After both parties

had initialed the Agreement, the District Court read the stipulations to the jury. 3/10/2004 Dist.

Order 2. On November 5,2003, the jury retumed a verdict for Plaintiff, finding that CCA "had

retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964," 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-5. 3/1012004 Dist. Order 1. The jury awarded Plaintiff $600,000 in

back pay and $150,000 for "emotional pain and mental anguish." 3/10/2004 Dist. Order 1. The

jury also found that Plaintiff had not established that CCA "discriminated against him on the

basis of his race in the terms of his employment or that [CCA] had created a racially hostile

working environment." 3110/2004 Dist. Order l. On Novembet 6, 2003, the District Court

entered judgment on the jury verdict.

On November 24,2003, CCA filed a Renewed Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of

Law, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1), or, in the altemative, a Motion For New Trial or a

Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment ("11/24/2003 CCA Dist. Mot."). In its motion, CCA

argued that Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence at trial that "would support a finding of

unlawful retaliation against [CCA]" and also made improper closing arguments which confused

the jury. 1112412003 CCA Dist. Mot. tffl 6, 18. In addition, CCA contended that, even if

Plaintiff s unlawful retaliation claim was supported by credible evidence, the damage award was

clearly enoneous. 1l/2412003 CCA Dist. Mot. 6.

On March 10,2004, the District Court granted CCA's November 24,2003 Renewed

Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law and found that Plaintiff failed to adduce admissible

evidence sufficient to establish the elements of an unlawfirl retaliation claim entitling to

damages, so the jury award was "based upon pure speculation ." 311012004 Dist. Order 6, 8, 12.

consequently, the District court vacated the November 6, 2006 Judgment for the plaintiff. The

District court also stated that it would grant ccA's Motion For A New Trial, if the judgment for

ccA was reversed on appeal, but denied ccA's Motion To Alter or Amend Judgment.

3110/2004 Dist. Order 12-13. On March 11,2004,the District Court entered Judgment in favor

ofCCA.

On April 9,2004, Mr. Harris filed a Notice Of Appeal in the District Court, regarding the

District Court's March 10, 2004 Order. On April 22,2004, the District Court granted Plaintiffs

April9,2004 Notice of Appeal. on August 4,2005, the united states court of Appeals for the

Eleventh circuit affirmed the District court's grant ofjudgment in favor of ccA, as a matter of

law. Harris v. Corrections Corp. of America, 139 Fed. App'x 156 (l lth Cir. 2005).

In the following seven to eight years, "plaintiff [] filed numerous post-trial motions

unsuccessfully seeking to reinstate the jury verdict." 7123/2013 Dist. order. on August 22,

2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion For Relief For Fraud ("sl2zl2o07 pl. Dist. Mot."), alleging thai

CCA and tlre District Court Clerk's Office conspired to back-date CCA's 11/2412003 post-trial

motion to ensure that it was timely. 8/2212007 pl. Dist. Mot. 2-3. on october 26, i007, the

District Court also denied Plaintiff s August 22, 2007 Motion For Relief For Frau d (10/2612007

Dist. Order"), because the "record clearly and unequivocally establishes that no fraud was

perpetrated on the lDistrict] Court and Plaintiff|.l" 10/26/2007 Dist. Order 2.

on June 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion To compel Enforcement of courr order.

Therein, Plaintiff specifically argued that, although the District Court's 3/10/2004 Order ruled

in

favor of CCA on the Title VII retaliation claim, it ruled in Plaintiff s favor with resDect to his

Workers' Compensation retaliation claim. Nevertheless, the United States Distiict Court

reversed the entire damages award, not simply the damages corresponding to Title VII retaliation

claim. Thus, Plaintiff argues, he is entitled to at least half the jury a*id.. 6/26/2013 pl. Dist.

Mot. see also Am. compl. 2 n. 2 ("There were two

[c]laimi oi retaliation that [b]oth parties

_1-2;

stated needed no further proof. Harris Title vII and state workers' compensation

1c1iaims.f .

On July 23, 2013, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

denied Plaintiffs June 26, 2013 Motion To compel Enforcement of court order for lack

jurisdiction. The District Court held that it "lost jurisdiction to consider matters

of

related to the

merits of Plaintiff s case when he filed his Notice of Appeal

[on April g,2004].. 7/23/2013 Dist.

Order.

on August 8,2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion For Reconsideration And Enforcement of

Stipulated Fact Agreement challenging the District court's July 23,2013 order and argued,

for

the first time, that CCA violated the 1l/312003 Pre-trial Statement when it filed the November

24,2003 post-trial Motion For Judgment As A Matter of Law. plaintiff also argued

that ccA

conceded each element necessary to prove plaintiff s Title vII and workers, -compensation

retaliation claims when it agreed to the stipulations and was judicially estopped from re-arguing

those issues in its post-trial motion. 8/g/2013 pl. Mot. zn-zs. on-eugusi zs, zotl, plaintiff

amended the August 8, 2013 Motion to add that the District court Jecision was

not final,

because the District court never calculated pre-judgment intere st. g/g/20l3pl.

Am.Mot.22_24.

on october 10,2013, the District court denied the plaintiffs amended August g, 2013 Motion

for lack ofjurisdiction, as the matter was on appeal.

II, PROCEDURALHISTORY.

On March 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the United States Court of Federal

claims, together with two Appendices: (1) thJ Agreement ("compl. App. B"); and (2)

verification that the Agreement was admitted by and part of the United States District Court,s

record.

The Agreement contained the following factual stipulations:

o Plaintiff is an African-American aad a member of a protected class under Title

VII. Compl. App. A fl B.

r Plaintiff was employed by ccA at its correctional fac ity in Lake city,

Florida and supervised by chief of Security Steve Lister from Janu ary 6, 1997

until his employment was terminated by warden David Eads on iprit 17,

2000. Compl. App. B fl B, C, E.

o Plaintiff was promoted to Shift supervisor in late J,i,y 1997 and remained in

that capacity until his termination. Compl. App. B']f I.

o From September g, 1999 to May g, 2000, plaintiff filed ,.at least

three,,

discrimination claims against ccA with the United States Equar

e-proy-lnt

Opportunity Commission C,EEOC). Compl. App. B D.

tf

o On September 16, 1999, plaintiff was injured during his employment,

after

which he was put on leave from September 19, 19991o Uarct

received ,,medial and wage loss benefits from CCA,s

tj, 2000, ;;

workers,

msurance carrier." Compl. App. B L, M.

f "";p;;;;ti;

o on December 27 1999; while on leave, praintiff ',went to work

'

Departrnent of Corrections" as a corrections ofncer,

for the Florida

one-year probationary period of employment with

lntenaing ;.,;;;il;;

the Floridi o"p".t

Corrections and to thereafter quit hii employmenr with

CCA." C;ili "rt "r

A;;

B fl N_P.

o On March 13, 2000, plaintiff retumed to work at

CCA. Compl. App. B fl R.

. Over the following month,. Warden Eads repeatedly attempted

Plaintiffs employment with the Florida Department of to discuss

iorrectio"r; ;;,

Plaintiff rebuffed his-inquiries, calling the .utt". u ,,workers,

Compl.

*,np irru":;

App. B tTR_U.

o on April 17 2000, warden Eads terminated plaintifps

' emproyment, because

of his unwillingness to provide the information requested.

Compl. App. B !f

The March 25' 2014 Complaint, filed in the

united states court of Federal claims,

alleges claims for: breach of conrracr; a violarion

and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

of the seventh a-*a-."t.igr,iiJJj*v t iur;

also alleges that ccA retaliated after he filed

rigrrt io due process. compl. r. The compraint

air.?-inuiion claims and engaged in ,.fraud on the

[c]ourt'" compl. 1.

plaintiff seeks a jury t.i"i i" ,a:"ai"ate a breach of the Agreement,

enforcement of the Agreement, and payment of damages for pain and suffering caused CCA's

and PRT's breach and for "misleading the [District Court] into [taking] actions against

[Plaintiffl." Compl.4.

The March 25,2014 Complaint alleges that CCA violated the Agreement by filing the

November 24, 2003 Renewed Motion For Judgment As A Matter of Law, or in the altemative, a

Motion For New Trial or a Motion To Alter or Amend Judgment. The District court also

breached the Agreement, to which it was also bound, by granting ccA's post-trial motion.

Compl. 3-4; see also 3/1012004 Dist. Order. The Complaint further alleges that the breach by

CCA and by the District Court violated Plaintiffs Seventh Amendment rights and his right to

due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In

addition, Plaintiff suffered considerable harm to his reputation for appearing in court, for which

he seeks damages. Compl. 3-4. Finally, the Complaint alleges that the statute of limitations

does not apply in this case, because the District court's judgment never became final and ccA is

still in violation of the Agreement. Compl. 4.

On April 8,2014, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (,.Am. Compl.',) in the United

states court of Federal claims to: (1) conect a citation to vanDesande v. (Jnited states, 673

F.3d 1342 (Fed. cir. 2012); (2) further clarify the breach of contract claim; and (3) request

appoinftnent of counsel. Attached thereto were Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. In addiiion,

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Directly Related cases, pursuant to RCFC 40.2, to inform the court of

the prior litigation in the united States District court for the Middle District of Florida.

on May 20,2014 the Govemment filed a Motion For Summary Dismissal, pursuant to

RCFC l2(bx1), arguing that the united states court of Federal claims doei not have

jurisdiction to adjudicate claims alleged in either the March 25,2014 complaint and April g.

2014 Amended Complaint (Gov't Mot.").

To date, Plaintiff has not filed a Response.

III. DISCUSSION.

A. Jurisdiction.

The United states court of Federal claims has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 2g

u.s.c. $ 1491, "to render judgment upon any claim against the united States founded either

upon the constitution, or any Act of congress or any regulation of an executive department, or

upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated

lamages

in cases not sounding in tort." 28 u.s.c. $ 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act, however, is ,,a

jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the

United

States for money damages. . . . [T]he Act merely confers jurisdiction upon united states

lihe

court of Federal claims] whenever the substantive right exists.', unirca stutes v. Testan, 424

u.s. 392, 398 (1976).

Therefore, to pursue a substantive right under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identifu

and plead an independent contractual relationship, constitutional provision, federal statute,

and,/,or executive agency regulation that provides a substantive righi to money damages.

see

Todd v. united states, 386 F.3d 1091, 1093-94 (Fed, cir. zoo4;

1,,14urisaiction rinder the

Tucker Act requires the litigant to identifu a substantive right for money damages against the

united states separate from the Tucker Act . . . ."); see also Fisher v. united states,402 F.3d

1167' 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("The Tucker Act . . . does not create a substantive cause

of action; . . . a plaintiff must identifr a separate source of substantive law that creates the risht

to money damages. . . . [T]hat source must be 'money-mandating."'). Specifically, a plainiiff

must demonsuate that the source of substantive law upon which he ielies ,,can fairly be

interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Govemment." (Jnited States v.

Mitchell,

463 u.s. 206,217 (1983) (quoting Testan,424 u.s. at 400). And, the plaintiffbears

the burden

of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. see'Reynolds v. Army & Air

Force Exch. serv.,846F.2d,746,74g (Fed. cir. 19gg) (,,[o]nce the

jurisdiction [is] put in question . . . [trialicourt's subjecr matter

- [the plaintiff] bears'the 6urd"n oi"st blishing subject matter

jurisdiction by a preponderance ofthe evidence."j.

B. Standard Of Review For pro Se Litigants.

The pleadings of a pro se plaintiff are held to a less stringent

standard than those of

litigants represented by counsel. si.e Haines v. Kerner,404

pro se complaints' "however inartfully pleaded," are held to

u.s. sio, szo (leil ffiaing mat

"less stringent stanaarls than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers"). It has been the tradition

of this court to examine the record ,.to

see if fa pro sel plaintiff has a cause of action

somewhere displayed.,, Ruderer v. inilea States,

412 F.2d' 1285, 1292 (ct. cl. 1969). Nevertheress,

while the'court

plaintiff s complaint, the court "does not excuse -uy """u." a-Iiguiti"s in a

l:o ,t" united states,60

Henke v. [a compraint,s]-'failures.,,

F.3d 795, 7g9 (Fed. cir. 1995).

C. Standard Of Review For A Motion To Dismiss pursuant

To RCFC l2(bxl).

A challenge to the united states court ofFederal claims, ,.general

power to adiudicate in

specific areas of substantive law .

Patmerv. {Jnited states, 168 F.3d 1310,. l3i3

. i, prop"rry *ir"d by"; iRu1."j"iitiliil"."r,"n.,,

(allowing a party to assert, by motion, "lack ir"i. cr.. .,gr; ;ee

"i""-i6i6 l2(ox1)

or suu)"ci-mutter jurisdiction,,). wien insiaering

whether to dismiss an action for lack of subject

,iun., iuriroirtion, the court ir::outigut.a to

.ass11e 3ll-fagtual allegations [of the complaint] to u. t-e and to

draw all reasonable infbrences

in plaintiff s favor.', Henke,60F.3dat7g7.

D' The Government's May 20r20r4,Motion For

Summary Disrnissar

Complaint. of pro se

l. The Government,s Argument.

The Govemmenr argues that bgih the March

25,2014

Amended Complaint fail to allege a claim within .Complaint and the April B, 2014,

this court's jurisdiction. Gov,t Mot. L

cCA

and PRT cannot be sued in the united States

jurisdiction is limited to claims against

cou.t-oir"a"ral claims, because the court,s

the Utt"a Siat"s. Cov,t Mot. 2_3.

Further' even if the compraint and Amended

complaint were construed as alreging

claims against the Govemment,^th. .ou.t

r""n 1*iJi.tln to adjudicate the alleged claims.

Firsr' with respecr [o the District cou.t'. gr*rin;.iicZ:e:,

post-trial motion, ailegedly in breach

of the Agreement, the court "does not hai j".ir[i.,i"r

t" *"iew the decisions of district courts.,,

Gov't Mot. 3 (quoting Vereda, Ltda. v. United States,2Tl F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)

(intemal quotation omitted)). Second, the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims

under the Seventh Amendment, Gov't Mot. 3 (citing webster v. united states,74 Fed,. cl. 439,

444 (2006)), or under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Gov't Mot. 3

(citing LeBlanc v. united states, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. cir. 1995)). Lastly, in response ro

Plaintiffs assertions that his reputation was damaged, he was subject to retaliation, or he was the

victim of a "fraud on the court," these are tort claims. Gov't Mot. 3 (quoting Am. compl. l);

see also id. (citing 28 U.S.C. $ 1a91(a)(1) ("The United States Court of Federal Claims shall

have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the united states . . . in cases not

sounding in tort.")).

2. The Plaintiff s Response.

Plaintiff did not respond to the Government's May 20, 2014 Motion For Summary

Dismissal Of Pro Se Complaint.

3. The Court's Resolution.

a. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have

Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Claims Against private Entities.

_ The only 28 U.S.C. g

Govemment. See

proper defendant in the United states court of Federal claims is the

la91(a)(l); see also Gump v. United States,482 Fed. App,x 5gg,

590 (Fed. cir. 2012) ("The United states is the only appropriate defendant in the bourt of

Federal claims."). Therefore, all claims against ccA and FR'l-must be dismissed,

because these

are private entities. Although Ptaintiff indicates tlere are other defendants

by injudint ,,er af ,,

in the case caption, neither the March 2s, 2014 complaint nor the April"g, ioi+ -i."ro"a

Complaint identiff those entities or individuals. To the ixtent "et al." indicates that

this case is

directed against the District Court Judge or an officer of the District Court for gr-ting

post-trial motion, such a claim must be dismissed. see Brown v. (Jnited

Cca'.

states, 105 F.3d 621,

624 (Fed'. Cir. 1997) ("The Tucker Act grants the Cout of Federal Claims jurisdiction

over suits

against the united states, not against individual federal officials:,); see

iso conre v. united

states, 42 Fed. cl. 144, l4g (199s) ("The court of Federal claims does not

have jurisdiction

over individuals; it only has jurisdiction over suits against the united states.,,).

ro trre

Plaintiff seeks review of the District Court's decision, Plaintiff s remedy fi." #tf, "*t"nt

t" tf,"

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. "pp"^f

b. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have

Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Plaintiffs Contract Breach Claim

Because The Stipulation Agreement Did Not Constitute A

Contract With The United States Government.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that ,,to

jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identifu invoke

a contractual relaiionstrip,

constitutional provision, statute, regulation that provides a substantive .rgt i io

damages." Khan v. united states,20r F.3d 1357 , 1377 (Fed. cir. 2000);

-o^r, -orr"y

see c so Fodd, 386 F .3d

at 1094 ("[Jlurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to ijentifl,

a,ul.iantiue .igt t

for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act itself."). our

appellate court, however, has discussed the difference between contract claims and claims based

on federal statutes, constitutional provisions, or regulations. See Holmes v. United States,657

F.3d 1303, 1313-14 (Fed. cir. 2011) ("In our view, when referencing the money-mandating

inquiry for Tucker Act jurisdiction, the cases logically put to one side contracfbased ctaims.";]

see also Tippet v. united states,l35 F.3d 1250, 1254-55 (Fed. cir. 1999) (,,when

a contract is

not involved, to invoke jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a

constitutional provision, a.sta:u1:, or a regulation that provides a substantive

right to money

damages."). This court's jurisdiction ovei claims in the latter category dependi,

in part, on

whether the source of the substantive right a plaintiff asserts

"cai fairty'be interpreted as

mandating. compensation by the . . . Govemment for the damages

sustained.i Hoh";,657 F.3d

at 1313 (citing Testan, 424 u.S. at 400 (quoting Eastport s.s. Corp.

v. unrted states, zll p.za

1002 1009 (Fed. cir. l 967))). In contraci claims, however, tt . .,-on"y---auting

for Tucker Act jurisdiction normally,is satisfied by the presumption

."quo.'n"nt

that money damages are

available for breach of contmct[.]" Hormes, 657 F.3d yet, this .oui rnuf properry

require a plaintiff to show that the contract ai issue

"could

l?*.

^: fairly be

int.rp."t"a u.

money damages" for breach, where the contract,,could

"expressly disavow[s] mon11j.1ma,Bes. )'. Id. at 1314-15;

involve p*"lt;;;;iJy* "onlmplating

refief, or

see alsi Saniers v. Uni:ted'States,252

F.3d, 1329, 1334 (Fed. cir. 2001). In this case, plaintitr

claim must be

failed to show, among ottrer.-thjr-rs.s, thar the ag.."-"rt ..courd dismissed because he has

contemplating money damages.,' Holmes, 657 F

fairly be interpreted as

3d,;t :.315.

with this background in mind, the court must determine

whether plaintiff, in fact, had a

Formation of an express contract with the coue--eni requires

|nJffii:#i* $;,":ilr",-'"*t'

(1) mutuality of intent to. contract; (2) lack

of ambiguity in offer and acceptance;

(3) considerationt

-1 I got:--"nt

bind the United States lolcontract.

m

r"pr"r"niuti-* il;t;;;ffi ;ilJ#;

Anderson v. (Jnited states,344 F.3d 1343,

1353 (Fed. cir. 2003);

states' 166 F.3d 1r84, l188 (Fed. cir. r e6r1-( 'tainy 'ug;.n'"n, see arso Mqssie v. Ilnited

meaning of the Tucker Act, provided trrut can be a contract within the

ii ...ir

irrJo."quirem"nt. for a contract with the

(quoting rrqima serv. crp. ,. uniri'stotis,

104 F.3d t3ii, i;;;1r.a. cr.

fiil"rff*,,,"

To contractually bind.:le-,9ove:r,rTenj,lrs

reprg:enlarive .,must have actual aurhority

enter into .oe contract.,' Jy.nalt v. to

Fed. CL ;03;-;;-A;;;. Such a

representative has actual authority to'nited'Statei,90

bind the cou.-.*, ,,only when the constitutron,

statute, or a regulation grants it to that a

agent in *uri-iguou. terms.,, /d (intemal quotation

omitted;; see citv of Et cenrro v..un*ed Sia*t,nieii'ito,r20

(Fed. cir. iirin-ii:ir'j;,.;**

rs not whether some authoriry.exis*

contract; rather, the issue is v

p.o*ffii;il,J

tttut rrom obligating rhe Govemmenr m

ouLgate'th; Gov;;j,;. 'vnetner lthe agent] had been granted the authority to affirmatively

The Agreement in this case, however,

is between private parties: plaintiff and plaintiffs

former emplover, ccA. see genrittv t^.'ci^pL;;;.;. But, the Districr courr did not have

actual authority to bind the Government, who was not a party to the litigation. see Jumqh, 90

Fed. Cl. at 612.

Instead, the District court approved the Agreement for purposes of trial and is

responsible for overseeing and enforcing the stipulations. see Ring & pinion serv. Inc. v. ARB

Corp.,743 F.3d 831, 836 (Fed. cir. 2014) ("A stipulation of fact that is fairly entered into is

controlling on the parties and the court is generally bound to enforce it.,'). As such, to the extent

ccA's post-trial motion violated the Agreement, the proper remedy was to object to that filing

with the District Court and if that effort was not successful, to file an app"ul to the Eleventh

circuit, which Plaintiff did and the District court's ruling was affirmed. see Harris v.

Corrections corp. of America, 139 Fed. App'x 156 (l1th cir. 2005). The United States court of

Federal Claims, by contrast, "does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of the district

colrts." vereda,271 F.3d at 1375 (quoting Joshua v. united states,lT F.3d 378, 3g0 (Fed. cir.

1ee4)).

Even assuming, arguendo, that the Agreement is a contract between the District Court

and Plaintiff, and the District Court had actual authority to contractually bind the Govemment

and purported to do so, Plaintiffs breach claim must still be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction

because the Agreement cannot "fairly be interpreted as contemplating money damages

-

for

breach." Holmes,657 F.3d at 1315. As mentioned, the court may properly require plaintiff

to

show that the contract at issue "can fairly be interpreted as contemplaiing'rnon"y damages

for

breach," where the contract "could involve purely nonmonetary relieil.]"

issue contains factual background information conceming ptaintiifs employm"ent

id

rh" Agr""."nt ut

and a

of events leading up to his termination. see geneialy Arn. compl.ipp. 2.

9hr9no_logy Nothing

in the language contained therein indicates money damales were contemplated

as a remedy fbr

breach. See id.

The Agreement at issue here serves as a trial management toor and is readily

distinguishable ftom vanDesande, the case Plaintiff cites to buttress his contention

that this court

has jurisdiction to adjudicate his claims. This case is also distinguishable

fuom Holmes.

The stipulation agreement in vanDesande v. united states, 6"13 F.3d 1342,

Ct' 2012), "result[ed] from a settlement of an earlier personnel case" between the plaintiff(Fed.

_ - 1343

and

the united States Postal Service. 1d It included ,,compensation for

back puy

-Joi"rti-"; rort

sick and annual leave; interest payments; tax consequence payments; payments

for pain and

suffering; medical and other expenses; and . . . a rump sum payment

in exchange for Ms.

VanDesande's resignation." Id. at 1351 n.4. Such an agreement,

by its terms, clearly

contemplated monetary damages in the event of breach by Ms. vanDes-a"',

,.".

",ofioy".,

ISiling t9 make the payments agreed upon. Moreover, the issue in vanDesande was whether the

United States Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction to adjudicate a contract

claim alleging

breach of a settlement agreement, which was incorporated ln

a consent decree, or if the forum

that issued the decree retains exclusive jurisdiction. See id. at

134H7. The Federal Circuit

not explicitly address the question of whether the settlement agreement ;,.ouia-ai.ry did

r:t:pt*a u"

as contemplating money damages for breach." Hormes,Esz p.za"

1351 (footnote omitted) (intemar quotation marks omitted) (,.Furthermore,

i:ii, see id. at

the circ'trmstances

under which the Agreement yas. entgreg into by the parties to it,

and its extensiverf detailed

terms, leave little doubt about its legal character. Thus, we agree

with the opinion of Lother of

our sister circuits that a settlement agreement, even one embodied in a decree, is a conrracr

within the meaning of the Tucker Act.").

Likewise, in Holmes, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that

the united states court of Federal claims had jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 2g

u.s.c. $ 1491, over a suit alleging breach of two Title vII settlement agreements, m part,

because each could "fairly be interpreted as mandating the payment of money damages for

breach by the govemment ;' Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1306, 13 12. under the irst settlement

agreement-the 1996 Agreement-the Navy "agreed to document Mr. Holmes's

[office

Personnel Folder] to show that he had resigned on luly 22, 1994 for personal reasons.', .Id. at

1315 (citations omitted). Under the second settlement agreement-the 2001 Agreement-the

Navy agreed to "take the necessary steps, within a reasonable time, to from [Mr.

Holmes'sl Official Personnel File, the fourteen-day suspension and to provide ihe -Marine Index

"*pung.

Bureau . . . with a neutral reference for [Mr. Holmes].- Id at 13 15-16. The Federal Circuit

held

that because both agreements "inherently relate to monetary compensation through relationship

to^ Mr. Holmes's future employment" each could "fairly be interprited

as mandatirig the payment

of money damages for breach by the government." Id. at1306,1316.

The Agreement in this case, however, is simply a list of stipulated facts. ,See generalry

Am. compl. App. 2. It is not a settlement agreement providing ior various paymelnts as in

vanDesande and it does not "relate to monetary compinsation through

[its] reiationship to

[PlaintifPs] future employment." vanDesande, ais p.za- at 1351 n.4; Holmes,657 F.3d at 1316;

Am. compl. App. 2. Nor is it even an agreement between plaintiff and the

Govemment. C/.

Vandesande,6T3 F.3d at 1343. Thus, for the aforementioned reasons, plaintiffs

contract breach

claims must be dismissed for lack of iurisdiction.

c. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have

Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Tort Claims.

The April 8,2014 Amended

- terminating his employment, Complaint also alleges that CCA retaliated against plaintiff,

by for bringing Title VI-I discrimination claims jn th" lirt i"t

gortr and that his reputation has suffered considerabre damage ,,by the actions o, in[*too, or

the [District court], for which he seeks damages. Am. compl. i, 4-5; ,r, c/so Am. compl.

App. 2 fltf A, D. It arso aileges that "these acts" committed by cca, pRT,

and the Districr court,

constitute "a fraud on the Court." Am. Compl. l

Plaintiffs first craim-that the District court's actions and inactions caused

him

reputational damage, or constituted defamation- must be dismissed,

as the court aoes not t aue

jurisdiction to adjudicate tort claims. ,See 28

U.S.C. g l49l (,,The united States Court of Federal

claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim

unliquidated damages . . . in cases.not- tounding in tort."); Frawley

. ror tiqurdated or

v. united statiiJ+'cr. ct.

766' 767-68 (1988) (dismissing plaintiffls claim-for damale to

reputation as a tort claim beyond

the jurisdiction of the united states court of Federal c"laims);

see arso Matthews v. united

states, 72 Fed.. cl. 274,279 (2006) (dismissing plaintif|s

claims for libel and defamation as tort

claims beyond the jurisdiction of the united stites court of

Federal claims).

10

Plaintiffs fraud claim appears to arise from Plaintiffs perception that CCA and the

District Court Clerk's Office conspired to back-date CCA's post-trial motion to ensure that it

was timely. 8/22/2007 Pl. Dist. Mot. 2-3; see also 10/2612007 Dist. order l-2. Fraud is a tort

and, as such, that claim also must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The United States

District Court is the proper forum to bring tort claims. See 28 U.S.C, g 13a6@)(1) (,.tTlhe

district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United

States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused

by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govemment while acting

within the scope of his office or employment[.]"); see also 2g u.s.c. g 1491 (,,The united states

court of Federal claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim . . . for

liquidated damages . . . in cases not sounding in tort.',).

d. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have

Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Claims Arising From Violations Of

The Seventh Amendment Or Violations Of The Due process

Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment

The April 8, 2014 Amended complaint also alleges that ccA and the Dishict court

violated Plaintiff s Seventh Amendment rights when the District Court allowed CCA

to argue, in

its post-trial motion, matters in the Agreement. Am. compl. 3. Again, this court,s

_stipulated

jurisdiction is limited to claims based on a substantive right to

money aurn'ug., against the

Federal Govemment' See Todd,386 F.3d at 1094. The sourie of the substantive"right:heed

not

explicitly govide that the right or duty it creates is enforceable through a suit for

dfrages, but it

triggers liability only if it 'cqyfairly be interpreted as mandating co'mpensation

uy it"e rea"rat

Govemrnent."' Holmes, 6s7 F,3d at 1309 (quoring lJnited stais v. 'N*rii i.iLr,lso u.s.

287,290 (2009).

A violation of the Seventh Amendment does not, however, ,,explicitly or impricitry

9!lig"f !] the {Flederal *2

1995. wL 592017, at

[G]ovemment to pay damages[ .]- Jaffer v. inited' statei, No. ss-s r zz,

(Fed. cir. oct. 6, r9g5).- accoiaingly, the court does not

have

jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising from a violation

or due irocess. rrrer"tii", piuintirr.

Seventh Amendment claim must be dismissed.

^ Plaintiffs April 8,2014 Amended complaint also alleges that ccA and

court violated PlaintifPs due. process rights under the Fourte-enth emendment, the District

when cca

breached the Agreement by filing its post-trial motion. Am.

Compl. 3. as an initial matte., ttre

Fourteenth Amendment is only applicable against the states, not

the Federal Govemment. More

significantly, a violation of the Due process clause of the Fifth

or Fourteenth em"nJ-ent ooe,

not "mandate paymenr of money by the

[G]ovemment.', LeBranc v. united statis,ii nsi rozs,

102.8_ (Fed. cir' 1995); see arso cottins i united states, 67 F.3d,2g4,2gg ri"a. bir. rcssr

(holding the same with respect to violations of the Fifth

Amendment), a""o.jngiy, ih.

does not have jurisdiction to adjudicale.craims arising from "oun

a violaiion

Colliw'67 F'3d at 288. Therefore, plaintifps d,re p.oce"r, claim must be or au" irl""rr. s*

dismissed.'

u

w. coNcLUsIoN.

For these rcasons, the United States Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to

adjudicate the causes of action alleged in Plaintiffs complaint and Amended complaint.

Therefore, the Government's May 20, 2014 Motion For Summary Dismissal of pro se

complaint is granted. see RCFC l2OXl). Accordingly, the clerk is directed to dismiss the

April 8,2014 Amended Complaint.

ITISSOORDERED.

G.BRADEN

Judge

12