Lee v. Godinez

Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Lee v. Godinez, 2014 IL App (3d) 130677

Appellate Court LINCOLN A. LEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SALVADOR A.

Caption GODINEZ, Director of the Department of Corrections; TY BATES,

Deputy Director of the Department of Corrections; SANDRA FUNK;

MARC HODGES, Warden of the Department of Corrections;

RANDY STEVENSTON, Defendants-Appellees.

District & No. Third District

Docket Nos. 3-13-0677, 3-13-0889 cons.

Filed June 20, 2014

Held In an action arising from the denial of plaintiff’s writ of mandamus

(Note: This syllabus alleging that defendant officials of the Department of Corrections

constitutes no part of the abused their discretion when they denied plaintiff good-time credits,

opinion of the court but work release, and electronic home detention based on his prior

has been prepared by the domestic battery conviction and that a change to the Unified Code of

Reporter of Decisions Corrections allowing for the discretionary award of good-time credit

for the convenience of constituted a violation of the ex post facto clause, plaintiff’s appointed

the reader.) appellate counsel was properly allowed to withdraw from the appeal

pursuant to Anders and plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed, since the

“perks” plaintiff claimed he was denied were clearly matters left to the

discretion of the Director of the Department of Corrections, and in the

absence of any ex post facto violations or any other constitutional

abuses, no issues of merit were presented.

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, No.

Review 13-MR-381; the Hon. Michael F. Meersman, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Motion to withdraw allowed; appeal dismissed.

Counsel on Nate Nieman, of Moline, for appellant.

Appeal

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Terry A. Mertel, of

State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for

appellees.

Panel JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice McDade specially concurred, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 On May 1, 2013, plaintiff, Lincoln Lee, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Rock

Island County circuit court against defendants, Department of Corrections Director Salvador

Godinez, Deputy Director Ty Bates, transfer coordinator Sandra Funk, Warden Marc

Hodges, and head counselor Randy Stevenston (hereinafter, defendants). The petition,

brought pursuant to section 14-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS

5/14-101 (West 2012)), alleged that defendants abused their discretion in denying plaintiff

good-time credits, work release, and electronic home detention based upon his prior domestic

battery conviction, and that section 3-6-3(a)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified

Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (West 2012)) violated the ex post facto clause. U.S. Const.,

art. I, §§ 9, 10; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 16.

¶2 The trial court, sua sponte, denied the petition without hearing on August 12, 2013. The

court appointed counsel on October 22, 2013. Plaintiff’s appointed counsel filed a notice of

appeal on November 14, 2013.

¶3 Plaintiff’s counsel has now filed a motion indicating that the instant appeal presents no

issues of merit. This motion, filed in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), requests that counsel be permitted to withdraw. Plaintiff opposes the motion. For

reasons set forth below, we allow the motion and dismiss this appeal.

¶4 ANALYSIS

¶5 I. Supplemental Sentencing Credit

¶6 Plaintiff first argues that he was wrongfully denied a 180-day supplemental sentencing

credit (SSC) to which he was entitled. Plaintiff argues that defendants prevented him from

receiving said credits based on an unwritten policy denying SSC to inmates with previous

domestic violence convictions, which is arbitrary and constitutes an abuse of discretion.

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¶7 Rules and regulations for sentencing credit are governed by section 3-6-3 of the Unified

Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2012)). At issue here is section 3-6-3(a)(3), which provides in

pertinent part as follows:

“(3) The rules and regulations shall also provide that the Director may award up to

180 days additional sentence credit for good conduct in specific instances as the

Director deems proper. The good conduct may include, but is not limited to,

compliance with the rules and regulations of the Department, service to the

Department, service to a community, or service to the State.” (Emphasis added.) 730

ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (West 2012).

¶8 The section then goes on to enumerate those offenses for which the Director shall not

award more than 90 days of sentence credit for good conduct.

¶9 Finally, section 3-6-3(a)(3) provides:

“Eligible inmates for an award of sentence credit under this paragraph (3) may be

selected to receive the credit at the Director’s or his or her designee’s sole discretion.

Consideration may be based on, but not limited to, any available risk assessment

analysis on the inmate, any history of conviction for violent crimes as defined by the

Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act, facts and circumstances of the inmates’s

holding offense or offenses, and the potential for rehabilitation.” (Emphases added.)

730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (West 2012).

The Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act defines “any offense involving ***

domestic battery” as a violent crime. 725 ILCS 120/3(c) (West 2012). A reading of section

3-6-3(a)(3) makes it clear that good behavior in prison renders an inmate eligible for

good-time credit at the Director’s sole discretion.

¶ 10 The trial court relied solely on section 3-6-3(a)(3) in denying the petition, noting that

because the award of good-time credit is at the Director’s sole discretion, there is no statutory

right to good-time credit, nor is the Director required to have a written policy. The court

found that the fact plaintiff did not receive such a credit did not entitle him to a writ of

mandamus.

¶ 11 Plaintiff’s counsel relies on the same language in his motion to withdraw, contending that

plaintiff’s argument for SSC does not state a claim for mandamus relief because the award of

meritorious good-time credit is discretionary.

“ ‘Mandamus is an extraordinary civil remedy that will be granted to enforce, as a

matter of right, the performance of official nondiscretionary duties by a public officer.

[Citation.] *** Mandamus will issue only where the plaintiff has fulfilled his burden

[citation] to set forth every material fact needed to demonstrate that (1) he has a clear

right to the relief requested, (2) there is a clear duty on the part of the defendant to

act, and (3) clear authority exists in the defendant to comply with an order granting

mandamus relief. [Citation.]’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Dupree v. Hardy, 2011 IL App

(4th) 100351, ¶ 22 (quoting Rodriguez v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 376 Ill. App.

3d 429, 433-34 (2007)).

¶ 12 We find Helm v. Washington, 308 Ill. App. 3d 255 (1999), instructive. Donald Helm

brought a mandamus action against the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections.

Helm claimed he was entitled to 180 days of meritorious good-time credit, which the

Director arbitrarily denied. Id. at 256. He alleged that he was serving an eight-year sentence

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for burglary and had subsequently completed educational programs and work assignments,

qualifying him for 180 days of meritorious good-time credit, pursuant to section 3-6-3(a)(3)

of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (West 1998)). According to Helm, the Director

denied his request for good-time credit on the grounds that he had a prior order of protection

filed against him.

¶ 13 The Director moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the award of meritorious

good-time credit is discretionary. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the cause.

In affirming the dismissal, this court found that Helm did not adequately state a claim for

mandamus relief. Specifically, the petition alleged only that he qualified for consideration of

good-time credit against his sentence, which could be granted or denied at the Director’s

discretion. Helm, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 257. As such, Helm failed to allege a clear duty to act on

the part of the Director, and the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition. Id. at 258.

The court emphasized that the decision to award good-time credit is discretionary under

section 3-6-3(a)(3), and that “[d]efendant is not required to grant the credit or even consider

it.” Id. at 257 (citing Brewer v. Peters, 262 Ill. App. 3d 610 (1994)).

¶ 14 Similarly, the plaintiff here has failed to allege either a clear right to relief or a clear duty

to act by defendants. The plain language of section 3-6-3(a)(3) vests the Director with full

discretion to award or deny good-time credit as he deems proper. Plaintiff has no right to

good-time credit and, thus, has no clear right to the relief requested. The fact that the denial

of good-time credit might be based on a past conviction for domestic battery is rendered

inconsequential. Nonetheless, the 2012 amendments to section 3-6-3(a)(3) make it clear that

the Director may consider such a conviction in determining whether to grant early release to

an otherwise eligible inmate. Therefore, plaintiff’s basic premise that the Director relied upon

an unwritten rule is a false premise. The “unwritten rule” upon which plaintiff alleges

defendants relied is written within the statute.

¶ 15 In reaching this conclusion, we would be remiss not to mention Guzzo v. Snyder, 326 Ill.

App. 3d 1058 (2001). In Guzzo, this court affirmed the trial court’s immediate release of

plaintiff pursuant to a writ of mandamus, where it found that the Director’s refusal of

Guzzo’s good-time credit, pursuant to section 3-6-3(a)(3) of the Unified Code, was based on

an unwritten policy that excluded inmates with domestic battery arrests from eligibility. Id. at

1063. In making its determination, the Guzzo court noted that the formulation of a good-time

policy was within the Director’s discretion, but that the discretion was “restricted” by both

the enabling statute and the related parts of the Illinois Administrative Code. Id. at 1062; 5

ILCS 100/5-20 (West 2000). It, therefore, found that the Director’s policy of denying

good-time credit based solely on an inmate’s domestic battery arrest was both unwritten and

unrelated to prison discipline; thus, the use of the policy was an abuse of discretion, which

implicated the mandamus exception. Guzzo, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1064.

¶ 16 The Guzzo court declined to follow the rationale of Helm v. Washington, or rather,

attempted to distinguish it. It observed that Helm affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the

plaintiff’s request for mandamus relief, and held that because the award of meritorious

good-time credit was discretionary, mandamus was inappropriate. The court explained,

however, that the plaintiff in Helm did not allege an abuse of discretion by the Director

implicating the mandamus exception, nor did he assert that he had a clear right to relief or

that the Director had a clear duty to act. Id.

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¶ 17 Having examined both cases, we cannot see how this distinction would allow the Guzzo

court to reach such a conclusion. Because the Director has the discretion to award

meritorious good-time credit, Helm’s argument could not have been construed as anything

other than an argument that the Director abused his discretion in arbitrarily denying that

credit. Finally, the Guzzo court paid little attention to the requirements necessary for a

mandamus action to lie. Guzzo, like Helm and the plaintiff in this case, alleged that the

warden failed to award him good-time credit to which he had absolutely no right.

¶ 18 As the Guzzo court declined to follow the rationale in Helm, we similarly decline to

follow the rationale of Guzzo. To the extent Guzzo was ever good law, the 2012 amendments

to section 3-6-3(a)(3) make it clear that the Director may consider an eligible inmate’s

history of domestic battery convictions. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (West 2012). Allowing such

matters to proceed on a mandamus petition effectively strips the Director of that statutorily

vested discretion. The General Assembly vested the Director, not the courts, with the

discretion to award SSC. Mandamus relief is therefore inappropriate. The Guzzo court failed

to recognize that the Director might reasonably conclude that an inmate with a history of

violent crimes against women or children might very well be a model prisoner due to the

absence of women or children in the penitentiary. It simply is not an abuse of discretion to

deny that inmate discretionary early release. Regardless, the Director’s discretion in the

matter of awarding meritorious good-time credit negates the notion that any inmate has a

clear right to the credit.

¶ 19 II. SSC and the Ex Post Facto Clause

¶ 20 Plaintiff also argues that prior to the 2010 suspension of the 180-day meritorious good

time and supplemental meritorious good time, the award of good-time credit was not

discretionary and the revised statute violates the ex post facto clause. A review of the text

amendments to section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code reveals that the statute has always stated

that the “rules and regulations shall also provide that the Director may award up to 180 days

additional good conduct credit for meritorious service in specific instances as the Director

deems proper.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (West 2008). We acknowledge

that it was not until Public Act 97-697 (eff. June 22, 2012) that the legislature added the

language to section 3-6-3(a)(3) that provided inmates eligible for an award of sentence credit

may be selected to receive the credit at the Director’s or his or her designee’s sole discretion.

Even so, we observe that when the legislature uses the word “may,” it is generally considered

as expressing a permissive or directory reading. People v. Graham, 406 Ill. App. 3d 1183,

1194 (2011).

¶ 21 Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to establish that revised section 3-6-3(a)(3) presents this

court with an ex post facto violation.

¶ 22 The Illinois Constitution, like the United States Constitution, forbids the enactment of

ex post facto laws. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 16. “Our supreme court has interpreted the

ex post facto clause of the Illinois Constitution in accord with the pronouncements of the

United States Supreme Court.” Hadley v. Montes, 379 Ill. App. 3d 405, 409 (2008) (citing

People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 207 (2004)). “[T]he focus of the ex post facto inquiry is

not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ *** but

on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty

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by which a crime is punishable.” California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S.

499, 506 n.3 (1995). To establish an ex post facto violation, a “ ‘plaintiff must show the

following: (1) a legislative change; (2) the change imposed a punishment; and (3) the

punishment is greater than the punishment that existed at the time the crime was

committed.’ ” Hadley, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 409 (quoting Neville v. Walker, 376 Ill. App. 3d

1115, 1118-19 (2007)).

¶ 23 Plaintiff relies on Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), for the proposition that

“reducing or eliminating early-release credits for good behavior is an ex post facto law that

increases punishment.” This reliance is misplaced. The plaintiff in Weaver sought relief via a

habeas corpus petition, not a writ of mandamus, and was challenging the validity of a Florida

statute that modified the amount of “gain time” he was able to receive. In finding that the

change in the law governing the amount of “gain time” that a prisoner automatically earned

by operation of law amounted to an ex post facto law, the Supreme Court explicitly

recognized the difference between “gain time” that a prisoner automatically earned by

operation of law and “gain time” that was discretionary and awarded based on special

behavior.

¶ 24 Weaver is thus inapplicable to this case, where the sentence credit plaintiff is seeking

here is not awarded based on the operation of law. The award of SSC is, and always has

been, discretionary. Whether or not the plaintiff actually received it has no effect whatsoever

on his actual sentence. The changes to section 3-6-3(a)(3) did not impose a punishment;

failure to award discretionary SSC credits does not increase plaintiff’s punishment. There is

no ex post facto violation.

¶ 25 III. Work Release and Electronic Home Detention

¶ 26 Plaintiff also contends that he was wrongfully denied both work release and electronic

home detention to which he is entitled, again, arguing that defendants abused their discretion

and he is, therefore, entitled to mandamus relief. However, plaintiff does not cite to the

applicable law regarding work release or electronic home detention, and he relies solely on

those arguments made in regard to the denial of his SSCs.

¶ 27 As with SSC, work-release programs and electronic home detention are also a matter of

discretion for the Department of Corrections. “A prisoner had no constitutional right, no

liberty or property interest entitled to due-process protection, to participate in a work-release

program.” Briggs v. Walker, 375 Ill. App. 3d 849, 850 (2007). “[N]either the provisions in

the Unified Code *** nor the Illinois Constitution, each of which propounds general policies

of rehabilitation and restoration to useful citizenship, creates an entitlement to participate in

the work-release program.” Id. at 851 (citing Williams v. Thompson, 111 Ill. App. 3d 145,

149-51 (1982)). “[W]hether a prisoner may participate in a work-release program is a matter

of discretion solely for the IDOC.” Id. Moreover, it has been held that consideration of an

inmate’s criminal history, which plaintiff claims happened here, is permissible in

determining whether the inmate poses a risk to society and is thus not a suitable candidate for

a prerelease program. See Fuller v. Lane, 686 F. Supp. 686 (C.D. Ill. 1988). Likewise, as

pointed out above, consideration of plaintiff’s prior domestic battery conviction does not, as

a matter of law, constitute an abuse of discretion. Given the discretionary nature of

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work-release programs, plaintiff has failed to show that he has a clear right to the relief

requested or that defendants have a clear duty to act.

¶ 28 Electronic home detention is governed by section 5-8A-3 of the Electronic Home

Detention Law (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3 (West 2008)). It allows for certain individuals serving

terms of imprisonment to be released from a correctional institution and placed in an

electronic home detention program. “A person serving a sentence for a conviction of a Class

X felony [as the plaintiff here], other than an excluded offense, may be placed in an

electronic home detention program for a period not to exceed the last 90 days of

incarceration, provided that the person was sentenced on or after the effective date of this

amendatory Act of 1993 and provided that the court has not prohibited the program for the

person in the sentencing order.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3(c) (West 2008).

¶ 29 Hadley v. Montes, 379 Ill. App. 3d 405 (2008), while not directly on point, is instructive

as to the discretionary nature of the electronic home detention program. Plaintiff filed a

complaint for injuctive, declaratory, and mandamus relief based on the requirement that he

submit to electronic monitoring while on parole. The Fourth District found that “the

electronic monitoring condition was another tool the [parole] Board could utilize in its

discretion to assist the plaintiff in leading a law-abiding life as he stepped outside the

confines of the penitentiary and ventured back into a free society.” Id. at 414. As it was a

discretionary function, the courts found that plaintiff’s claim for mandamus was without

merit.

¶ 30 Granted, the defendant in Hadley was subject to electronic monitoring on parole, and not

looking to shorten any potential time in prison via home detention, but the discretionary

nature of the electronic home detention law is the same. We, therefore, find that mandamus

relief in regard to electronic home detention is also inappropriate.

¶ 31 It seems clear that the General Assembly intends that the Director, and not the courts, run

the day-to-day operations of the Department of Corrections. This includes deciding whether

any particular inmate receives the discretionary “perks” sought by the plaintiff here. Absent

constitutional violations, it is not the court’s job to run the penitentiary. Plaintiff does not

allege he was denied good-time credit because he is a member of a protected class. We have

found no ex post facto violations, and plaintiff alleges no other constitutional violation.

¶ 32 Because we agree that this appeal presents no issues of merit, we allow counsel’s motion

to withdraw. For the same reason, we also dismiss this appeal.

¶ 33 CONCLUSION

¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, the motion to withdraw is allowed. Appeal dismissed.

¶ 35 Motion to withdraw allowed; appeal dismissed.

¶ 36 JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring.

¶ 37 The majority has found that the trial court correctly denied the plaintiff’s petition for a

writ of mandamus to require the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections to reverse

his denial of good-time credit, work release and electronic home detention because of his

prior domestic violence conviction. In the decision, the plaintiff’s ex post facto issue is also

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rejected. As a result, the motion of plaintiff’s counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), to be allowed to withdraw because there are no meritorious issues for

appeal is granted and the Director’s denial of sentencing relief stands affirmed. I concur with

that decision.

¶ 38 I write separately because I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusions about this

court’s earlier decision in Guzzo v. Snyder, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1058 (2001).

¶ 39 It should first be noted that the version of the applicable statute in effect when Guzzo was

decided differed in significant and relevant respects from the current version of that law.

Although Guzzo has been rendered largely irrelevant by the legislative changes, the majority

still attempts to discredit its conclusion that mandamus can apply when a public official

exercises his discretion in violation of the controlling act and its administrative rules and

regulations.

¶ 40 The statute and regulations at issue in Guzzo and in the instant case relate to the award of

certain forms of sentencing relief that can be awarded by the Director of the Illinois

Department of Corrections under the Corrections Code.

¶ 41 In their 2000 versions, section 3-6-3(a)(3) (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (West 2000)) and

section 107.210 of Title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code 107.210,

adopted at 20 Ill. Reg. 6745 (eff. May 5, 1996)) put limits on the good-time credit available

for inmates convicted of specific enumerated felonies, not including domestic violence, or

who ran afoul of articulated behavioral standards. Nothing in either the statutes or

administrative regulations authorized the Director to create and implement a policy of

arbitrarily withholding sentencing relief for persons arrested for or convicted of domestic

violence offenses.

¶ 42 The legal holding in Guzzo, as I read it, is that mandamus is available to compel the

Director to exercise his discretion in conformity with the statutes and regulations rather than

contrary to them. In the context of the contemporaneous versions of the law, that decision

appears to have been correct.

¶ 43 One could quite reasonably argue that, having reached that conclusion, the court went a

step too far in determining that the record was devoid of any indication that the Director had

considered any other factors or misconduct or misbehavior in denying sentencing relief and

awarding that relief on its own. That action, however, does not negate the court’s finding that

mandamus was available on the facts of that case.

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