Opinion

Samuel Bridgefourth, Jr. v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc.

Court
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Jul 21, 2014
Status
Published
On the bench
Judge Andy D. Bennett
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.9%

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

June 18, 2014 Session

SAMUEL BRIDGEFOURTH, JR. v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County

No. CT00555611 Robert Samual Weiss, Judge

No. W2013-02468-COA-R3-CV - Filed July 21, 2014

Plaintiff’s car was repossessed. Plaintiff paid the amount owed, but never received the car.

Plaintiff sued and won a judgment for conversion. He was also awarded attorney’s fees, first

as special damages and then, in an amended order, as punitive damages. Defendant appeals.

We reverse because attorney’s fees cannot be awarded as punitive damages and no statute

or contract involved in this case provides for attorney’s fees.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed

A NDY D. B ENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D AVID R. F ARMER, J., and

J. S TEVEN S TAFFORD, J., joined.

Kannon C. Conway, Memphis, Tennessee, and Dustin N. Pickens, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,

for the appellant, Santander Consumer USA, Inc.

Kevin A. Snider, Germantown, Tennessee, for the appellee, Samuel Bridgefourth, Jr.

OPINION

This case began with the repossession of Mr. Bridgefourth’s car by Santander

Consumer USA, Inc. (“Santander”) on October 6, 2010. Mr. Bridgefourth was 85 days past

due on the balance of the loan. On October 18, 2010, he paid the arrearage. Three days later,

he received the title in the mail. Mr. Bridgefourth was also advised that he must pay a

repossession fee. Santander eventually waived the repossession fee, but never provided the

vehicle to Mr. Bridgefourth.

Mr. Bridgefourth filed a civil warrant against Santander in Shelby County General

Sessions Court in March 2011 alleging breach of contract, conversion, trespass to chattels,

fraud, misrepresentations, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and a

number of reckless or negligent actions and omissions. The general sessions court ruled in

Mr. Bridgefourth’s favor, and Santander appealed to the circuit court. Mr. Bridgefourth filed

an amended complaint. The case was tried September 11, 2011. Mr. Bridgefourth presented

evidence about the car and also testified that he had incurred $13,386.00 in attorney’s fees.

The trial court awarded Mr. Bridgefourth $6,000.00 in compensatory damages for conversion

of the car and “special damages in the amount of $13,348.00 for attorney fees necessary to

compensate Plaintiff for his losses as a result of Defendant’s actions.” Mr. Bridgefourth

asked for clarification and the court, on November 25, 2013, entered an amended order of

judgment which replaced the $13,348.00 special damages award for attorney’s fees with an

award of $13,348.00 in punitive damages. Santander appealed.

S TANDARD OF R EVIEW

In a civil case tried without a jury, we review the trial court’s findings of fact de novo

with a presumption of correctness unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). We review questions of law de novo with no presumption of

correctness. Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999).

A NALYSIS

Santander questions whether the trial court had jurisdiction to amend its previous

decision to grant Mr. Bridgefourth punitive damages and whether any basis exists for

awarding Mr. Bridgefourth his attorney’s fees. We will address the second issue first.

“The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff but to punish the

wrongdoer and to deter others from committing similar wrongs in the future.” Concrete

Spaces, Inc. v. Sender, 2 S.W.3d 901, 906-07 (Tenn. 1999). “[A]ttorney’s fees are not

punitive in nature.” Miller v. United Automax, 166 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tenn. 2005).

Attorney’s fees “are meant to be compensatory, and it is therefore inappropriate to award

attorneys’ fees as punitive damages.” Buttrey v. Holloway’s Inc., No. M2011-01335-COA-

R3-CV, 2012 WL 6451802, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2012).

In Tennessee, courts follow the American Rule, which provides that litigants must pay

their own attorney’s fees unless there is a statute or contractual provision providing

otherwise. State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18 S.W.3d 186, 194 (Tenn. 2000).

At oral argument, Mr. Bridgefourth’s counsel conceded that the American Rule applies and

there is no authority to award attorney’s fees in this conversion case.

Because Mr. Bridgefourth cannot be awarded attorney’s fees as either punitive or

special damages,1 we need not address the trial court’s jurisdiction to award the attorney’s

fees as punitive damages.

We reverse the decision of the trial court. Costs of appeal are assessed against the

appellee, Mr. Bridgefourth, for which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________

ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

1

Counsel for Santander commented on opposing counsel’s argument thusly: “You can put

lipstick on a pig, but it’s still a pig. And you can call attorney’s fees punitive damages, but they are

still attorney’s fees.” The phrase regarding pigs seems to be a modern update of much older sayings,

such as, “A hog in armour is still but a hog,” and “A hog in a silk waistcoat is still a hog.” Ben

Zimmer, Who First Put Lipstick on a Pig?, SLATE MAGAZINE , (Sept. 10, 2008)

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/09/who_first_put_lipstick_on_a

_pig.html. The lipstick variation is obviously of more recent origin. The word “lipstick” dates to

1880. Id.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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