The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4009
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RAYMOND FRANK BROWN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:13-cr-00154-RWT-1)
Submitted: June 27, 2014 Decided: July 8, 2014
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Paresh S. Patel, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland; Nishant Kumar,
PERKINS COIE LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Thomas P. Windom, Assistant
United States Attorney, Gerald A. A. Collins, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Raymond Frank Brown appeals from his conviction
following his conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm
and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012). Brown preserved the right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
seized pursuant to a patdown conducted by a police officer
during a lawful traffic stop of a vehicle in which Brown was a
passenger. On appeal, Brown argues that although the traffic
stop was legal, the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion
to perform the frisk of his person. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
We review the district court’s factual findings
regarding the motion to suppress for clear error, and the
court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. McGee, 736
F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1572
(2014). Where, as here, the motion to suppress has been denied,
we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government. United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir.
2013).
Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), an officer may
conduct a protective frisk of a car’s driver or passenger if he
“harbor[s] reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the
frisk is armed and dangerous.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S.
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323, 327 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Specifically, we have explained:
To conduct a lawful frisk of a passenger during a
traffic stop, “the police must harbor reasonable
suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is
armed and dangerous.” “The officer need not be
absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the
issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger.” The
reasonable suspicion standard is an objective one, and
the officer’s subjective state of mind is not
considered.
In determining whether such reasonable suspicion
exists, we examine the “totality of the circumstances”
to determine if the officer had a “particularized and
objective basis” for believing that the detained
suspect might be armed and dangerous.
A host of factors can contribute to a basis for
reasonable suspicion, including the context of the
stop, the crime rate in the area, and the nervous or
evasive behavior of the suspect. A suspect’s
suspicious movements can also be taken to suggest that
the suspect may have a weapon. And multiple factors
may be taken together to create a reasonable suspicion
even where each factor, taken alone, would be
insufficient.
United States v. George, 732 F.3d 296, 299-300 (4th Cir. 2013)
(citations omitted).
Here, under the above standards, Officer Watson, the
officer who decided that both the vehicle’s driver (Ferguson)
and his passenger (Brown) should be frisked, had reasonable
suspicion to believe the occupants of the vehicle were armed.
Minutes before the traffic stop, at a nearby 7-11 convenience
store, Officer Watson had observed Brown acting in what Officer
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Watson, based on his training and experience, considered to be a
suspicious manner. It was after midnight in a high crime area,
and according to Officer Watson, Brown and Ferguson appeared to
be loitering in the store, examining their surroundings, as if
they were about to effect a robbery. When, after Officer Watson
moved his patrol car into a position on the parking lot so that
it could be seen from inside the store, Ferguson and Brown
immediately left the store and drove away.
Moreover, once the vehicle was stopped based on an
expired license tag, Officer Watson observed both occupants
making furtive movements. As he approached the vehicle, Officer
Watson observed that Ferguson, the driver, appeared nervous.
Furthermore, as Ferguson handed over his license and
registration documents, Ferguson attempted to block Officer
Watson’s view of the interior of the vehicle by “squaring up.”
Thereafter, after having been ordered to make their hands
visible, both Ferguson and Brown made additional furtive
movements in the vehicle, including one of them reaching for the
glove box. Finally, one of Officer Watson’s responding back-up
officers testified that he smelled what he described as the
“[v]ery distinct” and unforgettable odor of PCP emanating from
the partially open window on the side of the truck where Brown
was a passenger, a smell with which he was familiar both from
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his recent police training and his involvement with at least one
traffic stop involving PCP.
Based upon the totality of the circumstances presented
on this record, we hold that the frisk of Brown after he exited
the vehicle was on a “particularized and objective basis” that
he might be armed and therefore constitutionally sound. See
George, 732 F.3d at 301.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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